677 thoughts on “Consciousness Cannot Have Evolved

  1. BruceS: I find myself in and i’m going to try to explain to you that briefly therefore the three reasons
    – one reason is biological
    – the second reason is a metaphysical
    – a third reason is it’s a computational”

    For a second I thought that was you commenting on the first paragraph quoted. Thanks for the info. Still intend to put up an OP but it will be a while. (I guess there’s no rush if folks are still arguing over something Plato came up with.)

  2. Corneel:

    CharlieM: How do you know that the physical world is real? By what process did you acquire that knowledge?

    By choice. I don’t see any reason to reject everything my senses tell me.

    But you didn’t just blindly make that choice. You had to choose by way of thinking. Only thinking can give the senses meaning.

    It may be that we have come to different conclusions about some of the relationships between brain activity and thinking, but we both start by thinking about the problem.

    Are you a solipsist?

    No.

  3. Alan Fox: For a second I thought that was you commenting on the first paragraph quoted. Thanks for the info. Still intend to put up an OP but it will be a while. (I guess there’s no rush if folks are still arguing over something Plato came up with.)

    We’re still wrestling with the problems that Plato invented. Hardly anyone accepts his own solutions to those problems, since he himself admits that they don’t work.

  4. CharlieM: Only thinking can give the senses meaning.

    I think that’s backwards. Only having something to think about gives sense to thinking.

  5. CharlieM: Only thinking can give the senses meaning.

    And therein lies the whole problem with your view: it allows no room for the idea that the senses have meaning of their own, independent of whatever the intellect contributes.

  6. CharlieM:
    Me: Are you a solipsist?

    Charlie: No.

    Then I don’t understand. If you accept the fact that we can gain knowledge about the external world, then why do you refuse to take it into consideration? You keep dismissing it on the grounds that you acquired it by “thinking”. So what if you did?

  7. Corneel: Then I don’t understand. If you accept the fact that we can gain knowledge about the external world, then why do you refuse to take it into consideration? You keep dismissing it on the grounds that you acquired it by “thinking”. So what?

    CharlieM thinks that thinking itself is the necessary starting-point for epistemology. The difficulty that some of us are having with him is that he doesn’t seem to appreciate that naturalism is not an unjustified assumption (as he regards it) but a warranted conclusion.

  8. Kantian Naturalist: CharlieM thinks that thinking itself is the necessary starting-point for epistemology.

    I admire that you seemed to have gained an understanding of Charlie’s line of reasoning. Even granting him his premise that “thinking” is the basis for epistemology, I fail to see how any of his conclusions follow.

  9. “naturalism is not an unjustified assumption but a warranted conclusion.”

    Please don’t trust a USAmerican philosophist to “straighten things out” for you on the topic of “naturalism”! This is the same curiosity that distorts Swamidass’ message also.

    Naturalism is an ideology. Full stop. KN in his philosophistry attempts to make naturalism sound good to fresh curious ears. To call ideological naturalism a “conclusion”, whether “warranted” or “unwarranted”, reveals a misunderstanding in communication. Arguing that it is one’s conclusion, does not require taking for granted that people will accept that conclusion, in short, that “there is nothing beyond nature”. In the human-social sciences, one surely need not commit to such naturalistic bias, even though many hands-off, highly abstract, impersonal “philosophers” do these days, and though a philosophist like KN might not realize is possible, there are indeed available alternatives.

    An unjustified assumption, or a hidden presupposition that biases the entire discussion field. Either one won’t help move the conversation forward constructively.

    Which naturalism? Whose naturalism? KN’s a self-declared Marxist, plus a whole bunch of other self-accepted -ists. Not really my go-to definition-setting re: “naturalism.” Disguised anti-theism as naturalism still carries little appeal for non-skeptic humanists. Let’s see what gross inflation of “naturalism” he has to offer this time, in the tradition of buyers of superficial, dehumanising knowledge through Sellars.

  10. Kantian Naturalist:

    In order to set up your proposed experiment you will require qualia to exist.

    My thought-experiment was based on how David Chalmers sets up the logical possibility of zombies in The Conscious Mind. He is quite clear that zombies are behaviorally indistinguishable from beings with qualia. As a result everything that a person with qualia would do and say, so would a zombie — including everything that a being with qualia would assert, infer, affirm, negate, etc. There would not be any way to determine if the person you are arguing with is a zombie or not.

    Yes, I wasn’t asking these questions to criticise you, I was just sort of thinking aloud.

    So do you agree that in order to know anything in the beginning the only thing I can be sure of is my thinking? It may be wrong but it is my activity.

    But it would be a mistake to begin a theory of knowledge by thinking about the phenomenal world without first thinking about the activity of cognition itself.

    As Steiner put it:

    Whatever the epistemologist proposes in order to establish his starting point raises, to begin with, no question of truth or error, but only of its suitability for this task. From the starting point, too, all error is excluded, for error can only begin with cognition, and therefore cannot arise before cognition sets in.

    Only a theory of knowledge that starts from considerations of this kind can claim to observe this last principle. For if the starting point is some object (or subject) to which is attached any conceptual definition, then the possibility of error is already present in the starting point, namely in the definition itself. Justification of the definition will then depend upon the laws inherent in the act of cognition. But these laws can be discovered only in the course of the epistemological investigation itself. Error is wholly excluded only by saying: I eliminate from my world-picture all conceptual definitions arrived at through cognition and retain only what enters my field of observation without any activity on my part. When on principle I refrain from making any statement, I cannot make a mistake.

    Error, in relation to knowledge, i.e. epistemologically, can occur only within the act of cognition. Sense deceptions are not errors. That the moon upon rising appears larger than it does at its zenith is not an error but a fact governed by the laws of nature. A mistake in knowledge would occur only if, in using thinking to combine the given perceptions, we misinterpreted “larger” and “smaller.” But this interpretation is part of the act of cognition.

    To understand cognition exactly in all its details, its origin and starting point must first be grasped. It is clear, furthermore, that what precedes this primary starting point must not be included in an explanation of cognition, but must be presupposed. Investigation of the essence of what is here presupposed, is the task of the various branches of scientific knowledge. The present aim, however, is not to acquire specific knowledge of this or that element, but to investigate cognition itself. Until we have understood the act of knowledge, we cannot judge the significance of statements about the content of the world arrived at through the act of cognition.

    “Cognition is not to be defined in terms of consciousness, but vice versa: both consciousness and the relation between subject and object in terms of cognition.”

  11. Gregory, calling someone a sophist is calling them a liar in my opinion. Please stop doing it. TIA.

  12. Alan Fox:

    CharlieM: Only thinking can give the senses meaning.

    I think that’s backwards. Only having something to think about gives sense to thinking

    But the “something to think about” does not depend on us in the way thinking does. Yes, we require both, but we need to acquire concepts to give meaning to that which we perceive. And it is only through thinking that we acquire concepts.

  13. CharlieM: So do you agree that in order to know anything in the beginning the only thing I can be sure of is my thinking? It may be wrong but it is my activity.

    You seem sure about your existence already if you are sure you are thinking.

  14. Kantian Naturalist:

    CharlieM: Only thinking can give the senses meaning.

    And therein lies the whole problem with your view: it allows no room for the idea that the senses have meaning of their own, independent of whatever the intellect contributes.

    Their meaning lies in the fact that they are never consciously experienced without some form of thinking on the part of the one perceiving.

    Steiner again:

    If a being with a fully developed human intelligence were suddenly created out of nothing and then confronted the world, the first impression made on his senses and his thinking would be something like what I have just characterized as the directly given world-picture. In practice, man never encounters this world-picture in this form at any time in his life; he never experiences a division between a purely passive awareness of the “directly-given” and a thinking recognition of it. This fact could lead to doubt about my description of the starting point for a theory of knowledge.

  15. Alan Fox:
    Gregory,calling someone a sophist is calling them a liar in my opinion. Please stop doing it. TIA.

    Are you making up your own definitions now Alan? You cloud this site with an unsightly grey ash with your opinions Alan.

    I think you should stop it. I bet I am not alone in thinking that.

  16. keiths:

    …their physical identity automatically guarantees that their behavior will match, given that the two universes are identical.

    phoodoo:

    Don’t you see the problem? The physical identity of lying must be different than the physical identity of telling the truth.

    Zombie Keith isn’t actually lying, though his statement is untrue. He doesn’t intend to deceive. He thinks he’s telling the truth, and so does Qualia Keith. There’s no difference.

  17. Alan Fox,

    Sorry, but your butting in again opinion, is worth little here, since you’re twisting a definition simply because you don’t like something. That doesn’t make “calling it like I see it” wrong in this case.

    What seems obvious is that Alan likely wouldn’t recognise philosophistry if he saw it staring right at him in the mirror, lead Admin (not Moderator), at TAMSZ.

    KN has demonstrated philosophistry throughout the history of this site. His recent pretend understanding of the term “irreducible” is a case in point. Notice he still hasn’t either retracted what he wrote, or admitted his own confusion?

    Such is the most ideologically tangled “position” being put forth at TSZ. To require censorship from calling “philosophistry” for what it is, does not seem consistent with Lizzie’s rules. Do you really wish to censor that term, Alan?

    Are you at all familiar with what sophistry is, Alan? That would be a good start.

  18. Gregory,

    I looked it up. Meaning “the use of clever but false arguments, especially with the intention of deceiving.” Rule is we don’t accuse fellow members of lying. The whole tone of your comment was a personal attack. You can make your points perfectly well without it.

  19. Alan:

    Perhaps Keiths will correct any misunderstanding. What I see as his position is qK is identical to zK.

    Physically identical. In one universe the physics leads to qualia, and in the other it doesn’t.

    a) qK = zK + Q

    b) qK > zK + Q

    So if a) is correct then Q (the total of qualia possessed by qK) is zero…

    Qualia aren’t “possessed” by people. They’re experienced, and then in most cases they go away.

    …or b) is correct and there is a discernable difference between qK and zK.

    The difference isn’t discernible. Remember, the two Keiths behave identically. How could you determine which one experienced qualia?

  20. Corneel: Then I don’t understand. If you accept the fact that we can gain knowledge about the external world, then why do you refuse to take it into consideration? You keep dismissing it on the grounds that you acquired it by “thinking”. So what if you did?

    I’m not dismissing it. I’m looking for the point where we can begin to acquire knowledge without making any prior assumptions. To posit an “external word” is a conclusion we make after thinking about what comes to us through our senses. The concepts I and the world are concepts gained by thinking about what I perceive.

  21. Kantian Naturalist:

    Corneel: Then I don’t understand. If you accept the fact that we can gain knowledge about the external world, then why do you refuse to take it into consideration? You keep dismissing it on the grounds that you acquired it by “thinking”. So what?

    CharlieM thinks that thinking itself is the necessary starting-point for epistemology. The difficulty that some of us are having with him is that he doesn’t seem to appreciate that naturalism is not an unjustified assumption (as he regards it) but a warranted conclusion.

    The justification for naturalism could be debated, but that is not the point. It seems to me that many philosophers take as their starting point the position that naturalism is an undisputed fact.

  22. CharlieM:… many philosophers take as their starting point the position that naturalism is an undisputed fact.

    You can of course dispute it. But it is impossible to conclude anything about a concept that doesn’t manifest itself physically in any way whatsoever, however indirectly.

  23. newton:

    CharlieM: So do you agree that in order to know anything in the beginning the only thing I can be sure of is my thinking? It may be wrong but it is my activity.

    You seem sure about your existence already if you are sure you are thinking.

    In considering the phrase “I think”, I am sure of the thinking part. The “I” part (the existence of my ego) is a conclusion I have arrived at through thinking. I don’t know it as directly as the thinking part.

  24. keiths: Zombie Keith isn’t actually lying, though his statement is untrue. He doesn’t intend to deceive. He thinks he’s telling the truth, and so does Qualia Keith. There’s no difference.

    He says it is true he has qualia but is unaware if he does or if he doesn’t. At best he is maybe ,not a yes.

  25. Alan Fox:

    CharlieM:… many philosophers take as their starting point the position that naturalism is an undisputed fact.

    You can of course dispute it. But it is impossible to conclude anything about a concept that doesn’t manifest itself physically in any way whatsoever, however indirectly.

    Well there have been many disputes over what is meant by the concept “physical”, but would anyone from any standpoint dispute that thinking was involved in arriving at this concept?

  26. newton,

    He says it is true he has qualia but is unaware if he does or if he doesn’t. At best he is maybe ,not a yes.

    The information processing he’s doing is identical to Qualia Keith’s, and so he reaches the same conclusion as QK: that he experiences qualia. Turns out his answer is incorrect, though he isn’t trying to lie.

  27. keiths:
    newton,

    The information processing he’s doing is identical to Qualia Keith’s, and so he reaches the same conclusion as QK:that he experiences qualia.Turns out his answer is incorrect, though he isn’t trying to lie.

    Then ask him if he prefers oranges or broccoli. If he has no experience, then he has no preferences.

  28. phoodoo,

    He’ll state the same preference as Qualia Keith. His access consciousness functions the same, after all. It’s just that he won’t experience the qualia associated with oranges and broccoli.

  29. Alan:

    How is this anything more than idle speculation?

    It’s a thought experiment, and it has the same function as other thought experiments.

  30. Alan Fox,
    Ah, yes, the “One definition I found says…” defense! = P

    Well, then I’ll just stick with the “fallacious” part of such definition, and have not ever accused KN of lying or deceit. He seems to really believe these ideologies he holds, that they are worth holding, and that there is no other “reasonable” choice, which is why he speaks using the verb “to be -> is” the way he does.

    When making truth claims, does one not often run the risk of self-deceit?

    “naturalism is not an unjustified assumption but a warranted conclusion.”

    Nonsense in words, just as KN’s misunderstanding of “irreducible” above in this thread. Naturalism is an ideology, one a person can choose to hold or instead discard as they mature, and eventually put aside such stultifying “naturalistic” thinking.

    I prefer the following definition of sophistry: “reasoning that seems plausible on a superficial level but is actually unsound”. Definitely not going to stop challenging that at this zone for skeptics. = )

  31. newton: That would be better, if the Egyptians had a record that could support the Biblical narrative, that is the point.

    All defeated nations, but especially proud world superpowers, like Egypt in those days, love to commemorate their military failures, put it in history books, and make sure it’s taught in schools…

    newton: You surprise me, you relish questioning Einstein’s narrative , why not the Bible’s?

    I relish both but tend to get defeated with the latter…

    newton: Why was the Parting of the Sea necessary anyway?

    Who am I to judge why?

    But it must have been an amazing experience and now science has proven you can do it on the smaller scale at home using strong magnetic fields…

    newton: If you can control nature to flood the Earth, bunch of guys with swords should be no issue. No army, no rush. Sorry.

    Have you actually read the account??? Ask Harshman, if you need help…

    newton: That is exactly the dishonesty of ID( tmiism) claiming the designer is not divine.

    I don’t think it’s necessary to infer ID.
    DI seems to be moving forward with the Return of the God Hypothesis..

    newton: I agree the infinite regress is a good argument for something existing outside our logic. It just does not help which the particular.

    It’s your argument that is leading to infinite regress, not mine…

    newton: Not mine, the witnesses to the alleged Act Of God, familiar with the Miracle of the Sun?

    Why would you move the goal posts?
    I have already explained it to you the practicality of a visual effect rather than the actual intervention in the laws of physics…

  32. Alan Fox,
    When KN writes nonsense, it will be called nonsense.

    “naturalism is not an unjustified assumption but a warranted conclusion.”

    Nonsense. Any sense in further badgering me about it?

  33. Up thread, KN wrote this dinger:

    “irreducibly complex systems are systems that were not designed, because we don’t design systems that are irreducibly complex. Irreducible complexity is diagnostic of self-organizing systems.”

    Nonsense. Not according to Behe’s mousetrap or mt. rushmore & many other IDist analogies.

    KN was met by at least 3 persons in opposition to his claim above. When challenged, where did he go avoiding an answer? Will he not answer now?

    Throwing up one’s hands, shouting “consciousness is evolvable” is one thing. Sitting on one’s hands suggesting “design” is just an abstract notion in one’s mind that cannot in principle make/create/build/manufacture “irreducible systems”, is a rather different approach to interpersonal communication. The suggestion that human beings cannot and do not design “irreducible systems” is not sustainable.

  34. keiths: The information processing he’s doing is identical to Qualia Keith’s, and so he reaches the same conclusion as QK: that he experiences qualia. Turns out his answer is incorrect, though he isn’t trying to lie.

    The information Qk is processing is informed by the awareness of the experience of qualia, the information zk is processing cannot be informed that awareness by definition. If we accept this, we can conclude the actual experience of qualia is not a necessary basis for the belief that one experiences qualia .

    Perhaps our experience of qualia is just as much an illusion as zk’s experience of qualia.

    Then again zombies themselves may be the only illusion.

  35. newton: Perhaps our experience of qualia is just as much an illusion as zk’s experience of qualia.

    It’s undecidable by introspection (or any other method).

  36. keiths:
    J-Mac,

    Then provide a link to the 90% surgical removal story.Don’t expect us to take your word for it.

    You have been able to dig out OMagain’s comment from ions ago, I you haven’t seen mine…
    Amazing!!!

  37. J-Mac,

    You have been able to dig out OMagain’s comment from ions [sic] ago…

    Where “ions ago” means “three days ago”.

    I repeat:

    Then provide a link to the 90% surgical removal story. Don’t expect us to take your word for it.

  38. CharlieM: The justification for naturalism could be debated, but that is not the point. It seems to me that many philosophers take as their starting point the position that naturalism is an undisputed fact.

    Maybe, but not the philosophers I read and find interesting — for them the entire question is, “on what basis would naturalism be justified?”

    CharlieM: So do you agree that in order to know anything in the beginning the only thing I can be sure of is my thinking? It may be wrong but it is my activity.

    I don’t think it is helpful to do epistemology in terms of tracing knowledge to its unquestionable first principles. I think that this language like “in the beginning” and “the only thing I can be sure of” amounts to framing the entire problem of epistemology along Cartesian terms, and I think that once you’ve done that, there’s no Middle Way between dogmatism and skepticism.

  39. keiths:
    J-Mac,

    Where “ions ago” means “three days ago”.

    I repeat:

    I thought you were referring to my OP on consciousness from 2017
    Sorry.
    http://theskepticalzone.com/wp/what-is-consciousness-the-soul-vs-the-quantum-state-of-particles-in-human-brain/

    https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20141216-can-you-live-with-half-a-brain

    https://www.plough.com/en/topics/justice/reconciliation/science-and-the-soul

    The idea is not how much brain mass is missing or is disfuntional , but which part of it I damaged. Even 1% damage can leave you with consciousness and 90% dysfunction or missing may leave you conscious…

  40. newton:

    If we accept this, we can conclude the actual experience of qualia is not a necessary basis for the belief that one experiences qualia .

    Yes. That’s what I was getting at here:

    Yes, very odd [result]. It means that when Qualia Keith says “I have qualia”, his statement is not caused by the fact that he has qualia. And when Zombie Keith says “I have qualia”, his statement occurs despite the fact that he doesn’t have qualia.

    In other words, both statements are functions of access consciousness only, despite being about phenomenal consciousness.

  41. Alan,

    But what is it [the p-zombie thought experiment] meant to show? That qualia are ineffable?

    Chalmers used it to argue for property dualism, but it also provides a tool set for discussions about consciousness generally.

    It’s useful even to skeptics like Dennett, who mentions ‘zombie’ 50 times and ‘qualia’ 85 times in his book Intuition Pumps.

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