Christian List on free will

For many people, the idea of free will is bound up with the notion of “could have done otherwise”. By their lights, if only one future is possible for a person — that is, if the person cannot do otherwise — then free will is an illusion.

Philosopher Christian List — author of the recent book Why Free Will is Real — proposes an interesting species of free will based on the claim that while physics may be deterministic, behaviors at the agent level are not. Agents can do otherwise, according to List, and this is enough to ground free will even if physics is deterministic.

I think List is mistaken, but I’ll save my criticisms for the comment thread.

Readers can find List’s argument in this paper:

Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise

See you in the comment thread.

756 thoughts on “Christian List on free will

  1. newton,

    Maybe the same people who decide what “ our standards “ are.

    That would be us. I’m willing to bet that our standards do overlap significantly. To roll out the hoary old example, I’ll bet we agree that it’s immoral to torture children for the fun of it, and that a God who commanded us to do so would be an evil God.

    Based on your reasoning do you feel your particular set of codes trumps other people codes?

    Depends on what you mean by ‘trumps’. My code doesn’t always prevail in practice, but I certainly think mine is better, because again, that’s why I chose it over the other options on offer.

    keiths:

    The same goes for everyone else.

    newton:

    Just like one’s favorite snowball flavor.

    No, because snowball flavors aren’t a moral issue (for most people, at least).

  2. walto,

    I don’t think they’re perfectly good distinctions. I think they’re opportunistic.

    When I make such distinctions, they’re “opportunistic”. When you make them, they’re fine. It’s a blatant double standard.

    We know or we don’t know. We can or we can’t.

    We’re free or we’re not.

    See? It backfires on you.

    Re my own compatibalism, i only say we’re free when we’re, you know, actually free.

    I only say we’re morally responsible when we’re, you know, actually morally responsible.

    My position is consistent, as you acknowledge. So why complain about the distinctions I draw, when you yourself also draw such distinctions?

    Compatibilistic free will is different from libertarian free will, and the former is the kind we actually have. Proximate moral responsibility is different from ultimate moral responsibility, and the former is the kind we actually have.

  3. keiths: Proximate moral responsibility is different from ultimate moral responsibility, and the former is the kind we actually have.

    Really?

  4. keiths: . The guy who carries out the murder is proximately responsible for it.

    That’s too much chopping for me. I’m content to say he’s morally responsible if he pulled the trigger because he wanted to, and that he’s not morally responsible otherwise. If he’s morally responsible, he’s ultimately responsible and if he’s not ultimately responsible, he’s not morally responsible. That is, I don’t think the big bang is responsible for any (i.e. all) murders in any interesting sense. That’s not what I mean by morally “responsible”–you’ve got it just a washed out term that doesn’t mean anything except maybe ka-powie and maybe bullet (not even guns kill people!)

  5. How quantum brain biology can rescue conscious free will
    “Stuart Hameroff1,2*
    1Department of Anesthesiology, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
    2Department of Psychology, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

    Conscious “free will” is problematic because (1) brain mechanisms causing consciousness are unknown, (2) measurable brain activity correlating with conscious perception apparently occurs too late for real-time conscious response, consciousness thus being considered “epiphenomenal illusion,” and (3) determinism, i.e., our actions and the world around us seem algorithmic and inevitable. The Penrose–Hameroff theory of “orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR)” identifies discrete conscious moments with quantum computations in microtubules inside brain neurons, e.g., 40/s in concert with gamma synchrony EEG. Microtubules organize neuronal interiors and regulate synapses. In Orch OR, microtubule quantum computations occur in integration phases in dendrites and cell bodies of integrate-and-fire brain neurons connected and synchronized by gap junctions, allowing entanglement of microtubules among many neurons. Quantum computations in entangled microtubules terminate by Penrose “objective reduction (OR),” a proposal for quantum state reduction and conscious moments linked to fundamental spacetime geometry. Each OR reduction selects microtubule states which can trigger axonal firings, and control behavior. The quantum computations are “orchestrated” by synaptic inputs and memory (thus “Orch OR”). If correct, Orch OR can account for conscious causal agency, resolving problem 1. Regarding problem 2, Orch OR can cause temporal non-locality, sending quantum information backward in classical time, enabling conscious control of behavior. Three lines of evidence for brain backward time effects are presented. Regarding problem 3, Penrose OR (and Orch OR) invokes non-computable influences from information embedded in spacetime geometry, potentially avoiding algorithmic determinism. In summary, Orch OR can account for real-time conscious causal agency, avoiding the need for consciousness to be seen as epiphenomenal illusion. Orch OR can rescue conscious free will.”

    ID doesn’t need an immaterial soul to defeat materialism…
    Quantum consciousness sending quantum information back in time will do…

  6. keiths: As Rumraket says, there is no problem.Physical phenomena routinely control other physical phenomena.

    Your computer schedules a virus scan for 3 AM.At 3 AM, the virus scan happens.It’s all physical.

  7. phoodoo:

    Walto,

    Now You See what you have done? Surely at least you see why physical properties can not make decisions about physical properties if they are only physical properties that follow physics, right?

    OK, fine, fine, it’s lost on Keith’s and of course rummy , but are you too going to deny the obvious?

    Physical states just do what physical states do based on their physical state. Keiths can always just say, yea but they can still decide, I mean what if they want a pizza, they can decide if they eat it or not….

    That’s pure silliness, come on you know it is. The chemical state says I want pizza. The chemical state says chose to eat or not eat a pizza, the chemical state says I have chosen to eat a pizza. So who gets to choose if they act on the chemical state? The chemical state does. There isn’t another entity.

    Oh,, for crying out loud, I don’t even have to try to explain the problem. It’s been known for ages. With out a soul, or emergence, or whatever magic you want to call it, no one decides anything. Chemicals just do physics.

    How can you let Keith get away with completely obfuscating the most obvious point.

  8. phoodoo: How can you let Keith get away with completely obfuscating the most obvious point.

    I don’t have much more control over keiths than i do over the pizza chemicals.

  9. phoodoo,

    I don’t know why this is so hard for you to grasp. I already gave you an example of a physical system controlling itself:

    Your computer schedules a virus scan for 3 AM. At 3 AM, the virus scan happens. It’s all physical.

    Self-driving cars are another example. The navigation computer — a physical system — controls the chassis — another physical system.

    Same with decisions. A self-driving car — a physical system — decides how to get from Muncie to Modoc based on distance, traffic conditions, road closures, etc.

    The systems are complicated, but there’s nothing magic about them, and they don’t require immaterial souls.

  10. phoodoo,

    The chemical state says I want pizza. The chemical state says chose to eat or not eat a pizza, the chemical state says I have chosen to eat a pizza. So who gets to choose if they act on the chemical state? The chemical state does. There isn’t another entity.

    You mean “system”, not “state”. But yes, a person is a chemical system that makes decisions and acts on itself, by feeding itself pizza, for instance. No soul needed.

    If your computer can act on itself and initiate a virus scan, why shouldn’t a person — a much more complicated physical system — be able to act on itself?

  11. walto,

    You’re contradicting yourself.

    Earlier you wrote:

    That’s just the common complaint about determinism: if it’s true there’s no moral responsibility. Every determinist has to deal with it–compatibalist or no. I accept that only those citizens who can should be expected to refrain from murdering each other.

    Now you say:

    I’m content to say he’s morally responsible if he pulled the trigger because he wanted to, and that he’s not morally responsible otherwise.

  12. keiths:
    phoodoo,

    I don’t know why this is so hard for you to grasp.I already gave you an example of a physical system controlling itself:

    Self-driving cars are another example.The navigation computer — a physical system — controls the chassis — another physical system.

    Same with decisions.A self-driving car — a physical system — decides how to get from Muncie to Modoc based on distance, traffic conditions, road closures, etc.

    The systems are complicated, but there’s nothing magic about them, and they don’t require immaterial souls.

    Do you see what you have done Walto, do you see what you have done?

    Now we are going to have to talk about putting computers in prison and charging them fines if they make a poor moral decision.

  13. Now we are going to have to talk about putting computers in prison and charging them fines if they make a poor moral decision.

    Why? To rehabilitate them? To deter other computers from following their lead?

  14. phoodoo,

    Have you finally grasped that physical systems can control physical systems?

  15. phoodoo: With out a soul, or emergence, or whatever magic you want to call it, no one decides anything.

    Remind me how decisions are made in phoodoo decision world?

    Oh, wait, you are just another “gut feeler” so don’t actually do explanations. We found that out over 2000+ comments in the thread dedicated to this very subject.

    You don’t know how or why, you just know that you are special.

  16. walto:

    Btw, i don’t like the comments according to which animals don’t have free will. I’m guessing they were made by people (like Descartes) who never had pets. Completely absurd.

    keiths replied:

    Not for the issue of free will. Remember, you believe that animals have free will (and I agree), but I see no evidence that animals try to control what they want.
    They are free, nevertheless.

    In what way can animals be said to have free will?

    IMO to act in freedom beings needs to have knowledge of the motives for their actions. Acting solely in order to satisfy an urge does not constitute acting in freedom even if it may involve choosing between conflicting desires. To act in freedom one needs to have self-knowledge. ‘Know thyself’.

  17. keiths: to phoodoo,

    I don’t know why this is so hard for you to grasp. I already gave you an example of a physical system controlling itself:

    Your computer schedules a virus scan for 3 AM. At 3 AM, the virus scan happens. It’s all physical.

    Self-driving cars are another example. The navigation computer — a physical system — controls the chassis — another physical system.

    Same with decisions. A self-driving car — a physical system — decides how to get from Muncie to Modoc based on distance, traffic conditions, road closures, etc.

    The systems are complicated, but there’s nothing magic about them, and they don’t require immaterial souls.

    What they do require is intelligent, creative minds. These systems all have thinking minds within their construction. An expert in the construction of these systems could analyse any one of them and say, “I can understand the thought process of the inventor/designer when he or she designed this or that part.

    Who or what is being held responsible for the ‘decisions’ made by the computer in the recent 737 Max tragedies?

    The fact that machines can be deigned with logic gates to ‘choose’ a certain path highlights the point that free will consists of more than just choosing between options.

  18. CharlieM: An expert in the construction of these systems could analyse any one of them and say, “I can understand the thought process of the inventor/designer when he or she designed this or that part.

    Does that imply that the designed object doesn’t have free will? If yes, don’t forget to remind those supporters of intelligent design that they have no free will, since they claim they can totally see at a glance how they’re designed

  19. dazz:

    CharlieM: An expert in the construction of these systems could analyse any one of them and say, “I can understand the thought process of the inventor/designer when he or she designed this or that part.

    Does that imply that the designed object doesn’t have free will? If yes, don’t forget to remind those supporters of intelligent design that they have no free will, since they claim they can totally see at a glance how they’re designed

    Yes it does imply that. And yes, any supporter of intelligent design who sees themselves as designed objects would have a hard job claiming that basically they are machines and also have free will.

  20. keiths:
    phoodoo,

    Have you finally grasped that physical systems can control physical systems?

    No, I wholly disagree with your use of the word control. They don’t control what they do, anymore then a wind vane controls what it does.

  21. CharlieM:
    Yes it does imply that. And yes, any supporter of intelligent design who sees themselves as designed objects would have a hard job claiming that basically they are machines and also have free will.

    OK, and how do you determine a machine doesn’t have free will if you don’t understand how it works at all?

  22. CharlieM: In what way can animals be said to have free will?

    Like us, they act freely when they do what they want. If we constrain them, say with a leash, they are not free.

  23. CharlieM: IMO to act in freedom beings needs to have knowledge of the motives for their actions.

    That does nothing whatever, so far as I can see. The knowledge is (similarly) freely gained if and and only if one wanted to gain it.

  24. CharlieM: What they do require is intelligent, creative minds

    Ah, if only wishing–or parroting Steiner–would make things true!!

  25. phoodoo: No, I wholly disagree with your use of the word control. They don’t control what they do, anymore then a wind vane controls what it does.

    So, given you were created by a designer….

  26. keiths: That would be us. I’m willing to bet that our standards do overlap significantly.

    I agree, it is like there is some common basis for the standards of behavior.

    To roll out the hoary old example, I’ll bet we agree that it’s immoral to torture children for the fun of it,

    Not in favor of torturing anyone, no matter how fun it might be. Without an objective moral code , labeling things as immoral doesn’t really add much to it. It still boils down to a preference of a certain way of behaving.

    What is the interesting to me about that example is the qualifications , not that torture is self evidently immoral but the appeal to emotion, little babies. And then the addition of pleasure as a justification implies that there are moral justifications for torturing babies.

    and that a God who commanded us to do so would be an evil God.

    In my experience Gods never command humans to do things for fun, just the opposite. So if a God commanded the torture of a infant , could we conclude It is evil? It does not need to be hypothetical.

    Babies are abused everyday , an Omnipotent God could prevent that abuse, babies continue to be abused.

    God is not universally condemned as evil. So many conclude He is justified in His lack of action.

    Based on your reasoning do you feel your particular set of codes trumps other people codes?

    Depends on what you mean by ‘trumps’.

    Your usage previously in reference to God .

    My code doesn’t always prevail in practice, but I certainly think mine is better, because again, that’s why I chose it over the other options on offer.

    Your moral code allows others to act in what you consider as immoral ways?

    newton:

    Just like one’s favorite snowball flavor.

    No, because snowball flavors aren’t a moral issue (for most people, at least

    I agree. My question is the how one arrives at the preference , whether it is morals or flavor of snowballs.

  27. phoodoo: No, I wholly disagree with your use of the word control. They don’t control what they do, anymore then a wind vane controls what it does.

    The capability of the wind vane to rotate controls what it does, that is what it means to be a wind vane.

  28. dazz: OK, and how do you determine a machine doesn’t have free will if you don’t understand how it works at all?

    Which machines aren’t understood?

  29. walto:

    CharlieM: In what way can animals be said to have free will?

    Like us, they act freely when they do what they want. If we constrain them, say with a leash, they are not free.

    So if we let a dog of the leash does that make it free to act other than its nature dictates? Did Nelson Mandela lose his free will by being locked in prison for all those years.

  30. walto:

    CharlieM: IMO to act in freedom beings needs to have knowledge of the motives for their actions.

    That does nothing whatever, so far as I can see. The knowledge is (similarly) freely gained if and and only if one wanted to gain it.

    So would you say that a junky who is stoned and doesn’t know what he or she is doing is acting in freedom in the same way as a person who decides to run a marathon to raise money for those in need?

  31. walto: Ah, if only wishing–or parroting Steiner–would make things true!!

    And you sound like you’re parroting keiths 🙂

  32. CharlieM: So if we let a dog of the leash does that make it free to act other than its nature dictates?

    Same as us

    CharlieM: Nelson Mandela lose his free will by being locked in prison for all those years.

    Just like the dog, he can scratch himself, chew, etc.

  33. walto:

    CharlieM: So if we let a dog of the leash does that make it free to act other than its nature dictates?

    Same as us

    CharlieM: Nelson Mandela lose his free will by being locked in prison for all those years.

    Just like the dog, he can scratch himself, chew, etc.

    You and I have a very different understanding of what it means to have free will.

    IMO very few actions we perform are done in freedom. We normally scratch out of compulsion due to the itch. We can be said to be slaves to our desires.If you are acting because it gives you some sort of reward then it is not a free deed, it has strings attached.

  34. keiths, to walto:

    You’re contradicting yourself.

    Earlier you wrote:

    That’s just the common complaint about determinism: if it’s true there’s no moral responsibility. Every determinist has to deal with it–compatibalist or no. I accept that only those citizens who can should be expected to refrain from murdering each other.

    Now you say:

    I’m content to say he’s morally responsible if he pulled the trigger because he wanted to, and that he’s not morally responsible otherwise.

    walto:

    Those are obviously not contradictory.

    Sure they are, and that’s not the only place you’ve contradicted yourself. You also wrote this:

    We want to know if somebody is blameworthy when we ask if they’re morally responsible. I think, with phoodoo, that the determinist should answer No.

  35. walto:
    CharlieM,

    Hah. He’s parroting me. (And Steiner remains a poor choice for a hero.)

    Bugs Bunny and Snoopy, they are my real heroes. Does that meet with your approval? 🙂

  36. Charlie,

    It isn’t just you and walto who disagree. I think most people would object to your definition of free will. I certainly do.

  37. CharlieM: Bugs Bunny and Snoopy, they are my real heroes. Does that meet with your approval? 🙂

    You’d def do better quoting them here. They’re both much smarter than Steiner, for one thing.

  38. keiths,

    I’m sorry, keiths, those aren’t contradictory.

    And, again, that should be obvious.

    Eta: i’m referring to the first two remarks. The third one is a problem — unless i make a keithian move and throw in an “ultimate” someplace or distinguish blameworthiness from moral responsibility.

  39. newton:

    I agree, it is like there is some common basis for the standards of behavior.

    That hardly elevates the commonalities to the status of ‘objective morality’.

    Without an objective moral code , labeling things as immoral doesn’t really add much to it.

    That would be true even with an objective moral code, because people don’t agree on what that purported code says. Consider a hard-line Muslim who thinks it’s morally mandatory to stone adulterers. You presumably disagree. Who’s right? We don’t have access to objective morality, so there is no means of adjudicating the dispute.

    keiths:

    …and that a God who commanded us to do so [torture babies for fun] would be an evil God.

    newton:

    In my experience Gods never command humans to do things for fun, just the opposite.

    Didn’t know you were a polytheist.

    So if a God commanded the torture of a infant , could we conclude It is evil?

    Yes, unless he had a damn good excuse. But you’re missing the point, which is that an evil God is a logical possibility. You think an omnisicient God’s morality automatically trumps ours, but what if it’s an evil omniscient God?

    Your moral code allows others to act in what you consider as immoral ways?

    Moral codes just designate behaviors as morally right or wrong. They can’t prevent people from acting in immoral ways.

  40. walto,

    The third one is a problem — unless i make a keithian move and throw in an “ultimate” someplace or distinguish blameworthiness from moral responsibility.

    That’s right. You got yourself into trouble because you failed to make a necessary distinction. The solution is to make a “keithian” move and draw that distinction.

  41. Charlie:

    Bugs Bunny and Snoopy, they are my real heroes.

    walto:

    You’d def do better quoting them here. They’re both much smarter than Steiner, for one thing.

    Especially Bugs. He could kick Steiner’s etheric ass.

  42. keiths:

    Charlie,

    It isn’t just you and walto who disagree. I think most people would object to your definition of free will. I certainly do.

    I wouldn’t presume to be able to define free will. It’s a concept which has generated its fair share of debate over the ages. I gave my opinion on what is involved in having free will.

    I argued that we need to have knowledge of the motives for our actions. If we act in response to an urge then we are not acting out of free will. The urge impels us to act. In many cases we may think that we know our motives for acting but it is very easy to deceive ourselves. Only the truth will make us free.

    If you help the needy because of the good feeling it gives you then this is not a freely given act, it is done for self-gratification.

    Specifically what do you disagree with?

  43. keiths: Especially Bugs. He could kick Steiner’s etheric ass

    “What’s up doc” won’t sound the same to me ever again 🙂

  44. CharlieM: I wouldn’t presume to be able to define free will. It’s a concept which has generated its fair share of debate over the ages. I gave my opinion on what is involved in having free will.

    I argued that we need to have knowledge of the motives for our actions. If we act in response to an urge then we are not acting out of free will. The urge impels us to act. In many cases we may think that we know our motives for acting but it is very easy to deceive ourselves. Only the truth will make us free.

    If you help the needy because of the good feeling it gives you then this is not a freely given act, it is done for self-gratification.

    Specifically what do you disagree with?

    Almost of it. I think it’s useful from a psychological perspective to learn what motives are impelling us. (See Freud–and even [gasp] Dianetics), but the idea that you can rid yourself of them rather than just get new ones is feel-good woo. It is, fwiw, what impels YOU at present.

  45. walto:

    Specifically what do you disagree with?

    Almost of it. I think it’s useful from a psychological perspective to learn what motives are impelling us. (See Freud–and even [gasp] Dianetics), but the idea that you can rid yourself of them rather than just get new ones is feel-good woo. It is, fwiw, what impels YOU at present.

    I never said we should rid ourselves of motives. If we want to act at all then we will of necessity have motives. It is mainly selfish reasons that impels me to participate here.

    There are many ways in which we are not free but which are necessary for our further existence. We must eat, we must drink and we must breathe. And if we wish to advance spiritually we must take in knowledge. All of this is necessary for us to pass through on the road to freedom, in the same way as we must pass through childhood in order to be adults with relatively more freedom. Free will is not something that we can say we have. It is something to aim towards.

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