For many people, the idea of free will is bound up with the notion of “could have done otherwise”. By their lights, if only one future is possible for a person — that is, if the person cannot do otherwise — then free will is an illusion.
Philosopher Christian List — author of the recent book Why Free Will is Real — proposes an interesting species of free will based on the claim that while physics may be deterministic, behaviors at the agent level are not. Agents can do otherwise, according to List, and this is enough to ground free will even if physics is deterministic.
I think List is mistaken, but I’ll save my criticisms for the comment thread.
Readers can find List’s argument in this paper:
Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise
See you in the comment thread.
Just now, I wanted to reply to you on my computer, so I walked into our front room. If somebody had grabbed me and deposited me there, I’d have noticed the (fairly stark) difference. In one case I acted freely, the other case I’d have been compelled.
Again, I don’t care about that. I can tell the difference between doing something because I want to and being forced to do something that I don’t want to. I call the first free acts. I think you can tell the difference too: you just don’t like to call the first batch free acts. But I’m sure you can and do distinguish them sometimes (like when you’re giving an excuse for being late to your wife). You say neither batch is free because of some folderol about “choosing.” But neither I nor your wife cares about any of that bullshit.
Choose/Shmooze.
Evidence for what? I can tell the difference between the stuff I do freely (as I understand “freely”) and the stuff I’m compelled to do. You can too. Everybody can. Your variety of “freedom” is some kind of will of the wisp. It may very well be the case that nobody knows whether they have THAT or not. But, frankly, I don’t even know what it means. Could have done otherwise, if what? I didn’t want to? I wanted to do otherwise? I was floating in the ether?
Granted. So there can never be evidence either for or against determinism. That’s what makes these debates seem silly.
Can there be evidence for free will? That depends on what you mean by “free will”. In my opinion, the “free will” debates are mostly debates about the meaning of “free will”, though they often pretend to be debates about something else.
Bruce,
There’s an easy way out of the circle. Just take List at his word:
It’s hard to see how he could be any more explicit.
Totally agree.
phoodoo,
Then ask someone else. When they select a flavor, they have made a choice.
This is not difficult, phoodoo.
Who the hell knows? If morality is marginally coherent at best, “moral responsibility” will be all over the place. Hence, “guilty but insane”, “not guilty by reason of insanity”, etc. And if, as I suspect, “proximately responsible” means “responsible” and “responsible” means “morally responsible”–there’s not much illumination to be gained by throwing a “proximately” in there.
As Joni said, “Never mind the questions there’s no answers to.”
And, again, I think it’s pretty obvious that Huemer begs the question in his first premise. If we want it to be non-question-begging, we need to add “if we can” or “only if we can” at the end. Then it can be assented to, I think.
Charlie,
This is just a thought experiment. It’s not meant to be scientifically realistic. If you like, you can replace the gene combination with a viral infection that has the same effect(s) on behavior.
OK. Then assume, for the sake of the thought experiment, that reincarnation doesn’t happen. Or that the behavior is caused by a viral infection rather than a gene combination.
Charlie,
I don’t think heaven exists, so there is no way to “store up treasures” there.
keiths:
CharlieM:
Yes. People are free to make choices that we (or even they) might consider unwise in the long run.
But Keiths, in order for a test to prove evidence of a choice to have any meaning whatsoever, we have to know what would disprove the theory, right? I mean surely even you would have to acknowledge that right?
So, if they chose chocolate or vanilla, according to you, that shows that we have choices. So what would disprove that, if they chose neither? If they chose both, what would that be evidence for?
If you hiccup, did anyone force you to do that? If not, does that mean you chose it?
What about when you heart beats, is that a choice? How about when you fall asleep, no one forces you to do that, right? So that means its evidence of free will?
You really can’t tell the difference between hiccupping or having your heart beat and walking into the kitchen? I think you’re fibbing!
Some stuff we do because we want to. Other stuff we can’t help. There are close cases, but these ain’t.
phoodoo,
To make a choice, a person simply needs to do something that fits the definition of choosing. I’ve already presented that definition, and the person selecting chocolate or vanilla qualifies as choosing a flavor. Even if their selection is predetermined.
If you want to fight the dictionary, be my guest.
Since you think this begs the question, are you saying that asserting premise 1 assumes non-determinism? That is, only non-determinists can agree that reasoning (eg) has norms to enforce shoulds?
Why doesn’t his discussion about being determinist while engaging in a reasoning not address your concerns with premise 1? That’s the last two paragraphs before the notes at the end.
You do seem to get some kind of pleasure about needling people to revisit discussions they are trying to close. That happened in one of my vary first discussions with you, long ago at a TSZ much different than the one we have today.
I can only say:
Read the Butterfield paper/section I linked and that List cites to understand the way List is using “mapping” and the mathematical details of it. (ETA: again: mathematical is not metaphysical — metaphysics in NOA/NPR).
Think again about who is missing something: how can an experienced philosopher like List, plus all his peer reviewers, could miss something in the paper which (you say) contradicts the paper’s main claims.
Listen to more Joni
“She’s brilliant and tough and opinionated and slightly crazy and incredibly talented. She’s the best singer-songwriter that we’ve had in the past 100 years. She’s as good a poet as Bob (Dylan), and a way better musician.”
— David Crosby (jilted but still in love, perhaps, on some level)
https://www.tampabay.com/things-to-do/music/interview-david-crosby-talks-joni-mitchell-old-bandmates-and-stupid-donald/2303818
Bruce:
keiths:
walto:
You’re backtracking. Bruce is asking about your position, and you’ve made it quite clear:
The psychopath is morally responsible by your criterion.
Usually content. Not always. There are close cases and psychopaths take place in a bunch of them. My understanding of “free acts” tracks ordinary language, and sometimes we don’t know what to say. Did the psychopath or addict REALLY want to? No obvious answer in my book. Goes to court.
In the standard or garden variety case, I’m content. Throw in blackmail, who knows?
Well, I was not really asking Walt for clarification, just saying I did not know. I guess that is just a quibble, but I thought it worth mentioning in light of Canadian politeness.
Bruce,
I’m responding to you. You should expect that on a blog devoted to the discussion of ideas.
You pointed out that the discussion was going in circles, and I responded by giving a reason for that: you aren’t taking List’s words at face value.
But he clearly means what he says, and he spells it out explicitly and formally:
I don’t think “reasoning” is inconsistent with determinism. I think the “ought” in 1 is. Determinism allows for both good and bad reasoning, but we can’t FAULT someone for failing to reason well if doing so was beyond their control. It’s the “ethics of belief,” the epistemic axiology there that begs the question. I’m sure Huemer actually recognizes this, incidentally.
ETA: To be clearer, I should say
“the ‘ought’ in 1 is without something like an ‘if we can’ at the end”
Bruce:
List gives the mathematical details in his own paper. Do you think there’s something in the Butterfield paper that contradicts what List says? If so, shouldn’t we take List’s own words as representative of his position?
It’s because List, and perhaps his peer reviewers as well, doesn’t see the implications of his own premises — premises that he lays out explicitly.
Again, why shouldn’t we take List’s own words seriously?
walto,
Sometimes the answer is obvious. Suppose that in response to the offer the psychopath says “Hell, yes!”, immediately goes and kills the victim, enjoys doing so, and then happily returns to collect the money. No hesitation or remorse whatsoever.
That certainly fits your criterion for moral responsibility. Yet the guy/gal is a psychopath.
walto,
By Huemer’s reasoning, it doesn’t allow for both. If determinism is true, then only true conclusions are possible, by his logic.
That’s the glaring flaw in his argument. It leads to an absurd intermediate conclusion.
keiths,
Oh, sure. The pathology might have nothing to with the murder, e.g. maybe the guy thinks he’s a duck on Wednesdays.
You can stick various “should” statements in place of Huemer’s #1 and see the results:
1. We should call our mothers every week.
2. Whatever should be done can be done.
3. If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done.
Conclusion:
4. If determinism is true, then everyone calls their mother every week.
The same goes for flossing daily, being kind to animals, etc. The absurdity should be apparent.
walto,
That’s not psychopathy. Remember, we’re talking about a psychopath who enthusiastically carries out the killing and enjoys doing so. No remorse, no hesitation.
By your own criterion, that person is morally responsible. Despite being a psychopath.
In that case I would object to the statement that the gene combination causes the bearer do anything. I would not object if it was stated thus:
“Suppose we identify a particular gene combination/viral infection that correlates with its bearers being twice as likely to commit a particular crime, say murder, when compared to the general population”
Just because the correlation is clear, does not mean that the causal chain is equally clear.
It is where I come from.
And whether or not somebody like m is morally responsible is an open question. The guild of thieves thought he was.
keiths,
Right. We should call our mothers only if we can.
walto:
keiths:
walto:
Not unless the psychologists and psychiatrists are all incompetent in Massachusetts.
“Psychopathy” and “psychopathology” are not synonyms.
Okay, so what are your views on what Jesus meant by “storing up for oneself treasures in heaven”?
walto,
The psychopath I described is morally responsible by your own criterion. Despite being a psychopath.
If that conclusion bothers you, then you need to modify your criterion.
So you don’t think that the addicts are under any compulsion to feed their addiction?
CharlieM,
Sure they are, but the compulsion manifests itself in the form of a desire. They act upon that desire because they want the relief that the addictive substance will provide.
Note that I don’t think that addicts are ultimately responsible for their addictions, so the idea of retributive punishment makes no sense in this (or any other) context.
CharlieM,
He was appealing to self-interest:
Charlie,
Your objections are missing the entire point of the thought experiment.
Suppose it is known that the virus causes X percent of people to commit murder, and then answer the questions.
keiths,
Close enough for my purposes here. We won’t resolve issues of psychopath moral responsibility today–in spite of your delightful assurance.
walto,
You won’t resolve it unless you modify your criterion, at the very least.
As it stands, your criterion ascribes moral responsibility to the psychopath I described, and you’re clearly uncomfortable with that. You need some qualifiers. But which ones?
Not subject to complete “resolution” imo. It’s a fuzzy area.
I don’t know, but it seems to me that if reasoning involves anything like acknowledging the norms of material inference. It’s hard to see how there any be anything like norms in a purely deterministic universe, and no neither good nor bad reasoning.
Note that this is not to insist that a commitment to norms of reasoning (as well as norms of conduct) is incompatible with determinism. It’s just to say that some work would need to be done to get those commitments to cohere.
For what it’s worth, I think that determinism is too simple to be true. Once we start taking seriously the metaphysics of dissipative structures and autopoietic systems, it’s really hard to see why a metaphysics grounded in 17th-century billiard ball physics is the metaphysics that science requires.
I’m not making “good reasoning” a function of intention (or following) there: only of logical rules. It’s good if no rules are broken.
On that, I assume you’re probably right, but I don’t have any opinions really.
.
In my state one is the study of the other.
I didn’t ask you the definition of choosing, I asked you for evidence of a choice. I just proved your test for evidence wrong, and that is why you refuse to answer a simple question regarding your so called test.
I may be able to tell the difference, but then we are left with the case that your evidence for free will or choosing, is that you believe you can tell the difference.
Sounds not much different than the evidence people ascribe for God. Except in the case of evidence for a God we have other evidence as well.
I think it’s much closer to me thinking that there are blue objects when i see them than you thinking there’s an omniscient, omnipotent God when your tush tingles (or whatever happens to you). We can generally tell when we’re tucking in our shirts on purpose, just like we can see colors. That simple. Sometimes we’re mistaken: that’s life.
Yes, I agree with that.
I get that you believe your faith is better than others faith.
I also get that you think it doesn’t matter how chemicals can tell the difference.
I also get that many people “choose” what faith they find most convincing.