Barry’s immaterial mind muddle

Barry ‘Banny’ Arrington has a new, rather confused post at UD:

On Invoking Non-Physical Mental States to “Solve the Problem” of Consciousness

Many of us are banned at UD, and those who aren’t banned are in danger of having their comments purged at any moment. Let’s avoid that cesspit and respond here at TSZ, where open discussion is encouraged and Arringtonian censorship is anathema.

101 thoughts on “Barry’s immaterial mind muddle

  1. KN, I reflect critically on my beliefs.

    It’s something I learned from my family.

  2. In 1992 I authored the following, an attempt to capture a personal reflection. It is more intuitive and poetic than anything else:

    ***

    I was brushing my teeth, or doing something else as ordinary, when suddenly struck: I am arches of experience emerging from the workings of my body, a transparent structure of color and action, transacting with an environment that is itself built of both awareness and physicality. A reality that includes body and experience. I am a tower of mental and physical homeostasis and balance, built of many rooms of knowing and behavior, a structure of self.

    We are bodies that make consciousness. Bodies like our own, in turn, may be fashioned by evolution only because such a body can make consciousness. Not spirits dwelling in bodies, able to fly out, but a di-polar reality that rises and falls as one. This single self has, as one pole, the matter/energy/message that comprises body; as another, the consciousness/volition/memory that comprises self. Self is something aware body does.

    I am saying that our bodies are spirits. Our spirits are bodies.

    Identity requires memory, and memory is information-in-context that requires, in turn, form and complexity and temporality. The emergence of life, consciousness and identity in history have therefore both required and resulted from the capacity of matter and energy to support and retain complex form. It is the compartmentalized physical transactions of matter and energy, and the capacity of matter and energy to accumulate information over contingent history, that permit natural selection to construct, among myriad other things, bodies and conscious selves. In doing so, matter becomes as much like spirit as it is like clay or ash.

    Why do we resist the inclusion of matter/energy in our vision of soul? Because spirits constructed as bodies cannot be built to last. That I am conscious-body now, body-spirit now, and later will not be, packs both fear and poignancy into finite experience. From that fear emerges empathy and caring, because I know that you share the same untenable predicament.

    In return, by accepting that awareness emerges from bodies, we fully share the history our of bodies across deep time, and the strange and evocative structures of our human bodies and brains remain our own, rather than something merely inhabited. I fold the natural history of biological structure into my own experience, and rejoice that my soul arose in nature.

  3. An interestingly confused argument from Box:

    (1) rationality implies a thinker in control of thoughts.
    (2) under materialism a thinker is an effect caused by processes in the brain.
    (3) in order for materialism to ground rationality a thinker (an effect) must control processes in the brain (a cause). (1)&(2)
    (4) no effect can control its cause.
    – – –
    Therefore materialism cannot ground rationality.

  4. keiths,

    It is certainly an interesting argument. But I would say that (1) and (2) are false. Rather,

    (1′) rationality requires that a cognitive agent is [a] responsible to other people for what he or she thinks and does and [b] answerable to evidence about the truth of his or her beliefs;

    (2′) from a naturalistic perspective, a cognitive agent is constituted by a history of positive and negative feedback interactions between his or her brain, body, physical environment, and social environment (including culture);

    This makes it a bit trickier to see what work “grounds” is doing in the claim, “materialism grounds rationality”. I’m not sure what that would mean!

    I would prefer to say that the relevant empirical sciences (neuroscience and evolutionary theory) can explain how rationality is causally implemented and how a certain group of social animals evolved rationality. But I don’t think that either of those can tell us what it is to be rational in the first place.

    More generally, I don’t see why adopting a scientifically informed self-understanding entails that there’s no such thing as rationality, truth, justification, objectivity, intentionality, consciousness, or self-consciousness. The arguments for claims like that usually involves appealing to C. S. Lewis, Haldane, or Plantinga. But I think that those argument rely on misunderstanding what a scientifically informed self-understanding commits us to.

  5. Kantian Naturalist:
    keiths,

    (2′) from a naturalistic perspective, a cognitive agent is constituted by a history of positive and negative feedback interactions between his or her brain, body, physical environment, and social environment (including culture);

    Can you explain how an history of positive and negative feedback interactions can develope a concept?

  6. Blas: Can you explain how an history of positive and negative feedback interactions can develope a concept?

    I find this a deeply puzzling question, because I hear it as, “can you explain the role of positive and negative feedback interactions in how children acquire language?” — and I would have thought that would be fairly obvious! But if you’re not asking that question, then what question are you asking?

  7. Kantian Naturalist,

    if you’re not asking that question, then what question are you asking?

    I expect Blas will answer in due course, but it would appear that, by implication, if you don’t have a detailed causal map of how mental concepts form ‘under materialism’ (implied by asking a question to which one knows there is no answer) it can only happen immaterially.

  8. Kantian Naturalist: I find this a deeply puzzling question, because I hear it as, “can you explain the role of positive and negative feedback interactions in how children acquire language?” — and I would have thought that would be fairly obvious!But if you’re not asking that question, then what question are you asking?

    How a brain can reach a concept given that the brain are only a big set of positive and negative interactions? If you can´t explain that you cannot state #2.

  9. Allan Miller:
    Kantian Naturalist,

    I expect Blas will answer in due course, but it would appear that, by implication, if you don’t have a detailed causal map of how mental concepts form ‘under materialism’ (implied by asking a question to which one knows there is no answer) it can only happen immaterially.

    No, no a detailed but, just a big picture of how a net of neurons can make a concept as simple as I received an external signal.

  10. Blas: No, no a detailed but, just a big picture of how a net of neurons can make a concept as simple as I received an external signal.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Brain_Project

    Now that the column is finished, the project is currently busying itself with the publishing of initial results in scientific literature, and pursuing two separate goals:
    construction of a simulation on the molecular level,[1] which is desirable since it allows studying the effects of gene expression;
    simplification of the column simulation to allow for parallel simulation of large numbers of connected columns, with the ultimate goal of simulating a whole neocortex (which in humans consists of about 1 million cortical columns).[contradictory]

    You may have to wait a little while yet.

  11. Blas,

    No, no a detailed but, just a big picture of how a net of neurons can make a concept as simple as I received an external signal.

    A small picture

    74 lines of code, with a ‘learning’ capacity. It would be near-impossible, even for the programmer, to untangle the causal pathway that led to a particular ‘9’ being recognised as such, although of course they could track it and print it out.

  12. I love http://cs.ucf.edu/~tommy/p3.pdf An evolved circuit, intrinsic in silicon, entwined with physics,in large part because it turned out that several gates nominally unconnected to the evolved circuit were required: some unexpected (emergent?) interaction made them a part of the system.

  13. Blas,

    As I see it, a concept just is a functional element of a cognitive system that coordinates sensory awareness of affordances with mostly successful behaviors.

    I count as having the concept “horse” just in case I am able to reliably classify the right objects as horses and recognize that, on encountering a horse, I should be prepared to act in the appropriate ways. My cat counts as having the concept of his water bowl just because he engages in the appropriate behaviors — walking over to it when thirsty, nudging it when it is empty, and so on.

    In the case of “abstract concepts” — concepts of numbers, for example — the story is far more complicated. Probably metaphor plays some role here.

    Humans have, so far as I can tell, a distinct kind of concept that non-humans don’t have. Many (if not all) of our concepts can be thought of as a “node” in an inferential network. The concept of “horse” does not involve merely being able to reliably classify objects in the right ways, but also being able to track the right kinds of inferences (e.g. “if X is a horse, then X is an animal”), and recognize that if someone asserts “that’s a horse!” then she is committed to “that’s an animal!” and entitled to assert it. If she were to say, “that’s a horse, but it’s not an animal” we might suspect that she doesn’t understand what “horse” or “animal” mean.

    I said above that a concept just is a functional element of a cognitive system that coordinates sensory awareness of affordances with mostly successful behaviors. The cognitive system is not just the pattern of neural activity but the pattern of neural activity in its ongoing dynamical transformations with body and world. The mind is not just “in the head” — although, since the brain is in the head, the mind is not the brain.

    For language-users, the system of affordances and behaviors is expanded to include norm-governed social practices. This allows us to track and correct each others inferences in ways that non-humans cannot. We seem to be unique in having shared intentionality — a human being is an “I” by virtue of being relationships with a “We” and a plurality of “Yous”. Shared intentionality transforms the kinds of concepts that we can have, and I think it is also plays a big role in our ability to entertain “abstract concepts,” such as concepts of numbers.

    I don’t suppose this answers your question, but I’d like to know why it doesn’t.

  14. Blas: You mean the mind it is not “matter”?

    What I said is that the mind is not the brain. The mind is the whole suite of environmentally-situated, object-sensitive sensorimotor abilities and the cognitive and affective mechanisms that systematically relate perception with action. And the whole suite is not itself the brain; what the brain does is a part of the whole, not itself the whole, of what the mind is.

    I don’t find “matter” a helpful term, and it isn’t one that I use when expressing my own views. I’m OK with “mind,” though there are different aspects of mindedness — intentionality, consciousness, affect, sensation, etc. — that require their own conceptual analyses (as transcendental structures) and empirical confirmation (as causal structures).

    I don’t identify with “materialism” for reasons I gave earlier, but since I can’t find that post right now, here’s the basic thought again:

    “In the context of contemporary science, ‘nature’ does not consist of basic particulars but fields and processes . . . there is no bottom level of basic particulars with intrinsic properties that upwardly determines everything else. Everything is process all the way ‘down’ and all the way ‘up’, and processes are irreducibly relational — they exist only in patterns, networks, organizations, configurations, or webs. . . . ‘up’ and ‘down’ are context-relative terms used to describe phenomena of various scale and complexity. There is no base level of elementary entities to serve as the ultimate ’emergence base’ on which to ground everything. Phenomena at all scales are not entities or substances but relatively stable processes, and since processes achieve stability at different levels of complexity while still interacting with processes at other levels, all are equally real and none has absolute ontological primacy”. (Evan Thompson, “Mind in Life” pp. 440-441)

    In other words, I don’t accept “materialism” if “materialism” means that the entities postulated in fundamental physics have absolute ontological primacy, because I don’t think that any entities have absolute ontological primacy. Rather, dynamical processes are disclosed as objects relative to the social practices that we adopt. I can treat someone as a rational agent, or as an organism, or as a collection of particles — depending on whether I am trying to persuade them of a claim, cure them of a disease, or send them into orbit.

    What we cannot do — and this is where my deflationary attitude towards metaphysics really comes to the fore — is decide which of those interest-relative attitudes really capture The Truth of what anything is. To do that, we would need to have an attitude or perspective from which we could determine which attitude or perspective is the right one. We would need to have a meta-perspective — an absolute. And that, I think, does not make sense for the purposes of doing epistemology, metaphysics, or ethics.

    We must do philosophy from our position as embodied, finite, situated cognitive agents who occupy a plurality of perspectives (biological, historical, cultural, political, religious, and individual), by reflecting as best we can on those perspectives we occupy — the absolute is inaccessible to us.

    If you’re looking for someone who thinks that fundamental particles are more real than organisms or minds, I’m afraid I cannot oblige.

  15. Kantian Naturalist,

    But then Box comment is right.

    You said :

    (1′) rationality requires that a cognitive agent is [a] responsible

    (2′) a cognitive agent is constituted by a history of positive and negative feedback interactions between his or her brain, body, physical environment, and social environment (including culture);

    (2) According to what I understood in the river of words you said is all about processes, then as Box said a process can´t be responsible.

  16. Blas,

    I accept that rational cognitive agents hold each other responsible for what they say and do (as we are doing here). On my account, cognitive agents are constituted by various different kinds of dynamical processes. You seem to think that the latter point undermines the former. I don’t see how. In any event, Box’s argument relies on two concepts that I don’t use — “materialism” and “grounds” — so I’m not clear on how his/her argument applies to my view. (It might, with suitable refinement, apply to Alex Rosenberg’s view.)

  17. Kantian Naturalist:
    Blas,

    I accept that rational cognitive agents hold each other responsible for what they say and do (as we are doing here). On my account, cognitive agents are constituted by various different kinds of dynamical processes. You seem to think that the latter point undermines the former.I don’t see how.

    Kantian Naturalist
    I do not see how a process can be hold responsible. (I understand responsible as free to choose, not as simple material cause).

    In any event, Box’s argument relies on two concepts that I don’t use — “materialism” and “grounds” — so I’m not clear on how his/her argument applies to my view.(It might, with suitable refinement, apply to Alex Rosenberg’s view.)

    But you said that Box´s #1 and #2 are false, then I understand that your view is an answer to his view. That is why I´m making a pararel between both.

  18. Blas: But you said that Box´s #1 and #2 are false, then I understand that your view is an answer to his view. That is why I´m making a pararel between both.

    Fair enough — and in the course of responding to Box, I seem to have veered away from the argument that Box was making.

    The point I’m trying to make here is that our freedom and responsibility are not undermined by denying mind-body dualism. Instead I’m using enactivism, as a relatively new paradigm of cognitive science, to re-conceptualize what freedom and responsibility are.

    My rejection of materialism is a related but different point, and one I made simply so that I’m not cast in the role of Defender of Materialism.

  19. I have seen hylomorphism offered as an explanation for mind-brain duality, but I was unfamiliar with the concept so unable to comment. Do any of the more philosophically literate have a response to this?

  20. TristanM,

    I have seen hylomorphism offered as an explanation for mind-brain duality, but I was unfamiliar with the concept so unable to comment. Do any of the more philosophically literate have a response to this?

    I discussed this once with vjtorley, who is an advocate of hylomorphism. I can’t find the original conversation, but I did find this comment from last November:

    Barry,

    I’m surprised that Christians such as you and vjtorley are attracted to hylomorphic dualism.

    For most Christians, the separability of the soul from the body is an important concept. Jesus said to the thief on the cross, “Truly I tell you, today you will be with me in paradise”, which makes no sense unless the soul is separable.

    Yet under hylomorphic dualism, the soul is just the form of the body, and so presumably not separable.

    I remember asking vjtorley about this once, and he gave an answer that sounded bizarre to my ears. (I can’t find the conversation, so this is from memory.) He proposed that when the body died, the soul ceased functioning — except that God intervened and created an immaterial body that the soul could attach to and thus continue functioning.

    Not a very satisfying answer.

    Do you believe that the soul continues to function after the body has died? If so, how do you reconcile that with your rejection of substance dualism?

    Unsurprisingly, Barry had no answer.

  21. JonF,

    I like this example too. It shows how “evolved design” differs from human design. Human designers think in terms of a transparent hierarchy of functional modules and usually don’t try to exploit messy complex interconnections or co-opt accidental subtle interactions — things that are difficult to understand, analyse and control.

  22. TristanM:

    I have seen hylomorphism offered as an explanation for mind-brain duality, but I was unfamiliar with the concept so unable to comment.

    Full circle: I participated in a very lengthy discussion of Aristotelian notions of mind/body and their implications for dualism at Telic Thoughts a few years ago. I composed my original comment, to which Barry responded with his muddle, for that discussion.

    I saved it as a Safari archive, but unfortunately TT itself is long gone so I can’t link to it. Here is the OP, and my opening comment:

    ID: the Ship of Theseus and the “Mind-body Problem”
    by Euphrates_

    Most travellers who are even cursorily familiar with modern philosophy, the ID movement or teleology in general will be acquainted with the so called “mind-body problem”.

    Descartes was the first to identify the problem in the modern sense. It is clear that when the notion of matter being comprised of colourful, odorous, tasty, etc. particles is abandoned (as it was at the birth of modernism) these properties would have to be redefined from objective external qualities to subjective experiences in the mind of the beholder. However, once redefined these qualities may no longer be material; hence the rise of dualism (and arguably the birth of the “mind-body problem”).

    The Ship of Theseus:
    ““The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty oars, and was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same.”

    Scientists have put forth a hypothesis stating that the material the neurons in our brain are made from is replaced regularly over the course of a human lifespan. Consequently, as with the Ship of Theseus, if the essential components of our brain are (completely or not) replaced with new material, are we the same “self”? This question is interesting because the overwhelming majority of people report experiencing a continuous sense of self throughout their lifetime.

    So what possible answers are there? I have listed a few that have been proffered:
    – At the heart of the mind-body problem is a faulty view of matter (i.e. the problem is the relic of a false modern philosophy)?
    – The experience of continuous self is a delusion or trick or the mind, similar to the apparent appearance of design in nature (i.e. materialistic monism)?
    – There is an Aristotelian formal cause which retains the “self” even as the material cause changes?
    – Or are mind and matter two ontologically separate categories, with neither mind nor matter reducible to each other in any way (i.e. dualism)?

    And most importantly: which answer is the most “ID friendly”?

    My initial post in response:

    Reciprocating Bill
    March 17, 2011

    R. Buckminster Fuller invoked an illustration similar to that of the ship of Theseus. He imagined creating a loose single knot in a rope. One can then slide the knot along the rope, feeding rope in one side and drawing it out the other. Perhaps one then attaches twine to the rope and sides the knot onto the twine. Then a chain, then perhaps cooked pasta… and onward. He concluded that to the extent we consider the pasta knot to be the “same” knot as the knot on the rope, the knot must be something other than the materials of which it has been composed, and exists at a higher level of abstraction.

    Yet I don’t see that the construction of a dual ontology around this example would be intelligible – an dual ontology in which there exists one ontological kind that includes physical things like ropes and pasta and other in which we find the patterns displayed by platonic objects like knots – which then somehow mysteriously coexist and interact across an ontological divide. What is “dual” about the phenomenon is the dual level of description, one at a higher level of abstraction than the other, not a dual ontology. It is only when we reify levels of abstraction into ontological classes that we find ourselves puzzling over the “knot-pasta” problem, wonder how they interact, and suppose that the knot has “gone somewhere” once the pasta is eaten.

    I think a self with continuity has the same relationship to the constantly replaced material substrate (e.g. the constant replacement of atoms within neurons) that the sliding knot has with the rope, chain, pasta, etc. Self described at that level is a pattern or gestalt of activity we sustain in spite of – or perhaps even by means of – the constantly replaced material substrate (not to mention the constantly fluxing energy transactions within our bodies and brains), and is described at a level of abstraction that differs from a description of the properties of the material and energetic substrate. Self is something one does rather than something one has (hence Fuller’s famous “I seem to be a verb.”) Although dual levels again obtain, those are dual levels of description, that differ in their level of abstraction, not ontologically. In fact, I find a dual ontology is really no more intelligible in this instance than it is in the instance of the knot and the rope. And once we commit the error of reifying our descriptions into a dual ontology, we are again left to puzzle over how one ontological kind (abstract or immaterial selves) can interact with the other (highly organized physical brains and bodies).

    The discussion that followed is striking for its civility.

  23. Keiths:

    Barry,

    I’m surprised that Christians such as you and vjtorley are attracted to hylomorphic dualism.

    Barry, in his recent muddle, advocated an Aristotelian view of mind body as a more “robust” metaphysics (the passage by Hart), in an attempt to evade the “interface problem.” But I don’t believe for an instant he actually holds those views. Ultimately, he requires a soul that can “fly out” and persist apart from bodies and brains, an idea that can’t be reconciled with hylomorphic dualism.

  24. A few notes on hylomorphism, based on my limited understanding:

    (1) In Aristotelian metaphysics, everything that can change — everything that is not permanent, eternal, and unchanging — has two different aspects: form (morphe) and matter (hyle). (Think of this as the distinction between structure and stuff: how something is organized or arranged, vs. what something is made out of.)

    (2) By contrast, unchanging things are pure form, without any material. This would include mathematical objects and the centerpiece of the Aristotelian universe, the Unmoved Mover. Everything else that Aristotle talks about — the act-potency relation, the different kinds of causal explanation, and so forth — is all couched in terms of the form/matter relation.

    (3) The “soul” (psyche) is the specific kind of form that all and only living things have. There are different kinds of soul that correspond to different biological functions: the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul (nous or intellect). The function of the vegetative soul is to sustain basic metabolism — taking in nutrients, excreting waste. The function of the sensitive soul is to be aware of objects in perceptual consciousness and move towards or away from them as necessary. The function of the rational soul is to control the passions, allowing us to live in deliberate over ends in common (in shared governance or democracy), and also in rare cases allowing us to understand the basic structure of reality.

    (4) Thomists, much more than Aristotle himself, were very concerned to show that the rational part of the soul is immaterial and eternal. The basic idea seems to be that the intellect must be immaterial because otherwise it would face an interaction problem with regard to abstract or immaterial ideas.

    (5) Aristotelian hylomorphism is not a Cartesian dualism, in which the mind is one kind of substance or thing and the body is another, and then the problem is how these two different things interact. Rather, there is one substance or thing — the human person. But, the human person is a unity because of the top-down unification that the soul imposes on the material substrate of the body. Without the power of the soul to gather together the material and organize it, there is no body (at least no living body) at all. But — according to Thomism, anyway — there is a part of the soul which persists past the death of the body, since it was essentially immaterial (hence immortal) to begin with.

  25. KN,

    (4) Thomists, much more than Aristotle himself, were very concerned to show that the rational part of the soul is immaterial and eternal. The basic idea seems to be that the intellect must be immaterial because otherwise it would face an interaction problem with regard to abstract or immaterial ideas.

    They eliminate one interaction problem at the expense of creating another.

    But — according to Thomism, anyway — there is a part of the soul which persists past the death of the body, since it was essentially immaterial (hence immortal) to begin with.

    To the extent that the soul can function independently of the body, the Thomists are really just substance dualists. Vincent Torley tries to avoid this by invoking a temporary, divinely-provided heavenly body that effectively keeps the soul on life support until it can be reunited with an earthly body.

    Apart from the kludginess of that “solution”, it does nothing to explain how the soul can be the seat of a truly libertarian free will, which is a necessity for most non-Calvinist forms of Christianity.

  26. keiths,

    That’s right. You can’t have libertarian freedom without mind-body dualism, in which the intellect makes decisions within its own sphere of influence and the body is the vehicle for carrying out those decisions (except insofar as it resists, etc.). I came to the conclusion that I don’t believe in free will as a result of thinking:

    (1) libertarian freedom is the only concept of free will that makes any sense;
    (2) libertarian freedom presuppose mind-body dualism;
    (3) mind-dualism dualism is false;
    (4) so, libertarian freedom is false;
    (5) so, there is no such thing as free will.

    However, it should also be pointed out that Aristotle himself, in his distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions, did not think that we had libertarian freedom. To the best of my knowledge, neither Plato nor Aristotle had anything like the concept of “free will” in their conceptual frameworks. The concept seems to have become central to Western philosophy with Augustine, though there are traces of it in the Stoics.

  27. Kantian Naturalist: Since I’m in the process of re-inventing myself with an specialty in philosophy of mind and philosophy of biology.

    Good luck on your journey of re-invention, KN. Would you be willing to share any reading list that you have been using on the way?

    In return, here are some items I have been reading that may interest you and that relate to topics you’ve recently posted about.

    KN: The concept [of libertarian free will] seems to have become central to Western philosophy with Augustine

    I just finished Ravven’s Self Beyond Itself which argues Augustine’s role in the invention of free will in detail. She traces the rational free will approach from Augustine to Kant then ends her history with her preference: Spinoza’s determinism and his description of true moral agency as the full exploration and understanding of one’s place in the universal web of determinism (or something like that).
    After this history, her book turns to modernizing Spinoza’s basic ideas by exploring a list of related results in psychology and neuroscience that she claims show that our decisions are shaped by culture and context, not by rational choices under free will. Caveats: I thought the first half of the book on the history of free will was more closely argued than the second half on modern science and free will; the second half reads more like a laundry list of scientific results rather than a sustained argument. Also, she gives little attention to compatibilism, confining her brief comments against it to endnotes.

    KN: Rather, dynamical processes are disclosed as objects relative to the social practices that we adopt. I can treat someone as a rational agent, or as an organism, or as a collection of particles

    I think you’ll get a kick out of the ideas on John MccCrone’s web site. He hits many of the same philosophical hot buttons as you: he’s scientifically informed, a Peircean pragmatist, a non-reductionist, and he embraces Aristotle’s four causes including of course both formal and final causes. His approach to formal causes is based on Peircean semiotics as modernised by Pattee. His approach to final causes is based on dissipative systems thinking extended beyond a role in living process to provide an approach to assigning purpose throughout the universe (he uses ideas from Salthe).
    Here’s part of a recent post of his at another forum that may whet your appetite to explore his site.

    So in a modern theoretical biologist’s view of the world, the issue is how constraints emerge immanently. How does that information accumulate as a historic process?

    To continue to frame the metaphysics in terms of classical concepts like determined vs random is to presume that life lacks mindful intelligence. That is very old hat. Life exhibits its autonomy by being able to regulate the conditions of its own existence – including the degree of inheritable variety it offers to its world.

    Lastly, you may want to look through the second edition of Andy Clark’s Philosophy of Cognitive Science. He gives a nice overview of the embodied, extended, and enactive approaches as well other recent topics in cognitive science, like of the predictive mind. I’m sure the discussion in the main text will be mostly old news to you, but you may find some of the newer references he provides to be helpful.

  28. KN,

    I came to the conclusion that I don’t believe in free will as a result of thinking:

    (1) libertarian freedom is the only concept of free will that makes any sense;
    (2) libertarian freedom presuppose mind-body dualism;
    (3) mind-dualism dualism is false;
    (4) so, libertarian freedom is false;
    (5) so, there is no such thing as free will.

    My take is a bit different. I see libertarian free will as incompatible with hylomorphism due to the constraints of physics, but I also think that LFW is incompatible with substance dualism. In moving from hylomorphism to substance dualism, we’re simply taking the constraints imposed by physics and replacing them with the constraints imposed by the nature of the immaterial mind or soul. In either context, LFW is impossible.

    Compatibilism makes much more sense to me, and I intend to do an OP soon explaining why one of the main objections to CFW depends on an implicit dualism.

  29. BruceS,

    Thank you for all those references!

    As to what I’ve been reading lately: I’ve been getting interested in what’s called “enactivism”, as a research paradigm in cognitive science. Lately I’ve read Radical Embodied Cognitive Science by Chemero, The New Science of the Mind by Rowlands, Action in Perception by Noe, and I’ve recently bought some new anthologies about enaction. In philosophy of biology I’ve started (but haven’t finished) The Disorder of Things by Dupre and Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature by Godfrey-Smith. Right now I’m 2/3 done with The Evolved Apprentice by Sterelny and I’ve been told to read Godfrey-Smith’s Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection as a follow-up.

  30. keiths: I also think that LFW is incompatible with substance dualism. In moving from hylomorphism to substance dualism, we’re simply taking the constraints imposed by physics and replacing them with the constraints imposed by the nature of the immaterial mind or soul. In either context, LFW is impossible.

    Huh! That seems like a really interesting argument I’d love to see spelled out in more detail!

  31. KN,

    Huh! That seems like a really interesting argument I’d love to see spelled out in more detail!

    Here’s how I put it in an exchange with Paul Amrhein last year:

    Paul:

    I think this presupposes that there is such a thing as a choice which does not reflect one’s nature. But how is that possible?

    keiths:

    I actually don’t think it’s possible, unless the choice is totally random. That’s why I think that libertarian free will is incoherent. A choice is either determined by our natures, or by random factors, or by some combination of the two. But our natures aren’t freely chosen (in the libertarian sense), and neither are the random factors. So libertarian free will cannot exist.

    Note that the above argument does not depend on an assumption of physicalism. It works equally well against the idea of a soul as the source of free will, for example.

  32. The older I get, the more I think Freud got it right with the Id, ego and superego.

    I think perhaps these have physical correlates.

    ETA:

    The Id would be that part of the brain that decides before we become aware that we have decided.

  33. keiths,

    Interesting. I suppose a libertarian might say that the choice is constrained by her reasons, rather than constrained by anything causal. Rational constraint — constraint by reasons — allows for genuine constraint, and the action wouldn’t be entirely arbitrary (“random” in your sense?). But this would commit the libertarian to a hefty internalism about reasons, and that’s problematic on other grounds.

  34. KN,

    I suppose a libertarian might say that the choice is constrained by her reasons, rather than constrained by anything causal.

    But then the reasons themselves take on the causal role. And how did she choose her reasons? Well, she either chose them (not necessarily consciously) according to her nature, or randomly, or some combination of the two. Again,

    But our natures aren’t freely chosen (in the libertarian sense), and neither are the random factors. So libertarian free will cannot exist.

  35. keiths:

    .And how did she choose her reasons?Well, she either chose them (not necessarily consciously) according to her nature, or randomly, or some combination of the two.Again,

    No, free will it is not about how we choose but it is about of we can choose. So if it exists a “soul” “mind” that can choose your point is only valid with materialism.

  36. Blas,

    No, free will it is not about how we choose but it is about [if] we can choose.

    We can choose under both materialism and dualism. The question is whether the choices are free, and if so, in what sense.

    The usual objection to (libertarian) free will in a materialist context is that our choices are constrained by physics and therefore cannot be free. In other words, our choices are constrained by our natures, and our natures are physical.

    What most people don’t realize is that similar reasoning applies in a dualist context. Even if dualism is true, our choices are constrained by our natures, and we are not the ultimate authors of our natures.

  37. keiths:

    We can choose under both materialism and dualism.The question is whether the choices are free, and if so, in what sense.

    Please explain how a material mind can choose?

    keiths:
    What most people don’t realize is that similar reasoning applies in a dualist context.Even if dualism is true, our choices are constrained by our natures, and we are not the ultimate authors of our natures.

    If our choices are contrained are not choices. Why a soul cannot choose against the nature?

  38. Blas:

    Please explain how a material mind can choose?

    In the same way that an immaterial mind would, by evaluating the alternatives and selecting one of them.

    If our choices are contrained are not choices. Why a soul cannot choose against the nature?

    It depends on what you mean by ‘nature’. Consider someone who surprises everyone by going on a killing spree. “But he has such a gentle nature,” shocked friends and relatives might say.

    Are they right? Does he have a gentle nature that he happened to act against, or were they mistaken about his nature in the first place?

    The real question is “Why did he kill?” If he chose to kill because of a hidden dark side to his nature, then his choice was constrained by his nature. If the choice was purely random then it wasn’t really his choice at all — it was just the product of randomness. Either way, it doesn’t amount to libertarian free will.

  39. keiths:

    In the same way that an immaterial mind would, by evaluating the alternatives and selecting one of them.

    .

    Do you mean that exist a maerial process (evaluating) that given the same starting point can give two results? As far as I know science says that given the same conditions you get the same result unless you believe “chance” exist.

    keiths:

    The real question is “Why did he kill?”If he chose to kill because of a hidden dark side to his nature, then his choice was constrained by his nature.If the choice was purely random then it wasn’t really his choice at all — it was just the product of randomness.Either way, it doesn’t amount to libertarian free will.

    No keits, the question is not if “Why did he kill?” but “Could he not kill?” At the end the question of free will is a question of if we really “wiill”. we feel like we do things because we “want”. Is that real? or we act as our chemistry is settled to act? If we feel that we can want.why a soul cannot “want”‘?

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