Why does the soul need the brain seems like a logical question especially in the context of the belief held by the leading ID proponent of the Discovery Institute Michael Egnor. He has written extensively on the theme of the immaterial soul that, in his view, is an independent entity, separate of the human body. What Dr. Egnor consistently fails to acknowledge is the obvious connection or interdependence between a functioning brain and self-awareness or consciousness. I wrote about it here.
If certain parts of human brain are damaged or disabled, just like in case of general anesthesia, the human brain loses the sense of consciousness or self-awareness either permanently or temporarily. The immaterial soul fails to make up for the damaged or disabled brain…
Dr. Egnor’s personal experiences (and he has many) as a neurosurgeon convinced him that many people, including many of his patients, with the great majority of their brains missing have developed and function normally. Egnor is convinced that an immaterial soul makes up for the loss of brain mass that is responsible for normal brain function in people with normal brain size or no damage to any of the brain parts.
It appears Dr. Egnor believes that unlike a computer software that can’t function without the computer hardware, human brain has an ability to make up for the loss of the hardware with the computer software – the immaterial soul.
Is Dr. Egnor’s view consistent with the readily available facts?
I personally see Dr. Egnor building and supporting a strawman by his selective choice of facts…Hey! That’s my opinion and that’s why we have this blog full of experts to disagree with me or Dr. Egnor…(I kinda like the guy though).
Let’s see…First off, not all cases of patients with missing parts of their brains experience the supposed miraculous saving powers of the immaterial soul. It appears that the amount of the missing part of the brain mass doesn’t seem to matter… What seems to matter more is which part (s) of the brain is missing and not how much of the brain mass is actually missing. Some parts of the brain seem essential for consciousness and self-awareness and others do not.
However, the main point of this OP is:
<strong> Why does the soul need the brain? Or why would human body need a brain at all, if the immaterial soul has an ability to compensate for the brain losses?
If the software (the soul) can operate without the hardware (the brain) why do we even need the brain in the first place?</strong>
It seems like a faulty or at least a wasteful design to me…
Which part of the string theory do you like the best, Bruce?
My personal favourite is that is calls for or requires 11 dimensions for it to be even considered it as a unifying theory…
If you are really interested in the unification theory of GR and QM, you might as well consider the crank arm theory… It requires the existence of some kind of power or energy that connects or transmits information instantaneously no matter what the distance and time…
To picture it try to I magine a bicycle crankset that affect instenteneously each pedle on both sides of the crank arms when it changes its properties or location no matter what the distance is between the pedals…
Can you imagine quantum entanglement using something like a crankset energy to deal with the issues of no time, no distance on quantum level?
Do you have an imagination, Bruce?
https://goo.gl/images/DAKKQs
Let us know if he responds to that, J-mac! It’s only his answer, and he may be wrong, but still!
What happened? Did you two clash, again?
Why do you think there can be two Bruces in the same universe (in the mulitverse theory)? And what makes you think that the minds are the same when the bodies are in different universes?
As for two Bruces being in the quad, if you are asking me indirectly whether there is only one God observing all the quads in the many universes, then I don’t know. But I appreciate the Easter egg.
ETA: and when are you going to answer my question about the difference between souls and minds and how that difference is related to brains and the interaction issue for substance dualism?
Yes, I imagine I could be. But I cannot imagine how, because I imagine that would lead to an infinite regress (assuming I avoid error always). But I guess I could be wrong about that, too. In both cases.
I don’t any favorites in the integrating GR/QM category. (I do like MWI for QM; the first part of that post with the “humorous” footnote was a serious expression of how I understand Wallace’s take on MWI).
The “crank”arm theory of QM — that’s rich. Good for you, J-Mac.
QM is mysterious. But QM explains the crank arms of our world, not the reverse. Trying to translate the mystery of QM into something mundane like crank arms is just wrong, as far as I am concerned. (Feynman has a video on explaining magnetism that makes a similar point in the end bit about elastics). ETA: listen to this too.
However, due to decoherence, QM mysteries are not part of our experience of the world. There is no non-locality or reverse causation in our ordinary experiences of the world. Those mysteries only can be inferred from observations made under very special conditions. That is why building quantum computers is so hard. That limitation on reverse causation was the basis of Timothya’s point about causality that I agreed with.
Quantum mysteries do not show up if you only can experiment with part of the entangled system. So that is why it is impossible for two people, each with part of an entangled system, to violate SR by FTL signaling.
Do I have a good imagination? Well, I don’t consider imagination to be a one-dimensional thing, so it depends what you mean. I was a programmer at one time and was very good at imagining what the program was doing when it screwed up with certain inputs. OTOH I have no 3D imagination at all, and I am terrible at parallel parking, among other things that depend on that.
Hameroff and Egnor — the Fox news of QM popularizations.
Penrose understands physics, so his popularizations are well worth it. As I recall, he is open about situations where he is going beyond the consensus to give his personal theory (like Orchestrated Objective Reduction). But AFAIK, his popularizations are more than 20 years old.
These days, you are better off with the likes of Brian Greene or Sean Carroll or Max Tegmark.
Ever since Galileo, we have known that physics is written in the language of math. QM is no exception. Only people that understand the math can be reliable sources of popularizations.
You are fooling yourself if you think you can develop a new interpretation of QM and its mysteries without a deep understanding of the math.
I was not discussing the multiverse theory. I was discussing a thought experiment where two identical bodies exist side by side in the same universe.
You indicated that Physicalists had no problem with duplicated minds in that case and I was exploring the implications of that.
1) I don’t think there is a difference between souls and minds
2) I don’t think that minds are limited in the way you seem to believe. ie I see no reason to conclude that they must cease to exist when a particular body ceases to function.
3) Substance dualism does not adequately describe my position on the soul’s relationship to the body
4) I think that the thought experiment you proposed is hopelessly flawed in that two identical bodies are impossible and the souls relationship to the body is different than the experiment suggests.
hope that helps
peace
I’m going to add same branch for MWI, in case that is relevant to your thoughts.
These people are not numerically identical as I understand your idea.
So two bodies, two minds, and assuming independent causal history (after conception), two persons. No issues for physicalism that I can see (assuming the hypothesized situation is possible).
Excellent!
But I wanted J-mac to tell us. And not only because of our re-clash.
FMM, As I’ve pointed out to you before, two identical bodies are NOT impossible. You should read the classic Max Black paper on the subject instead of repeating falsehoods, willy-nilly.
You have prompted me to look at this article by Pitman: “MeaningAndReference”.
from Wikipedia
This is no argument against the Steiner quote I gave. It actually confirms what he was saying. Pitman’s philosophy is coming from the point of view of the modern scientific outlook.
What Steiner is saying is that it is all very well to take this position if you are studying the external world which includes the brain and nervous system, but not if you want to study the soul.
In the quote Steiner demonstrates that the findings of modern science did not bring about a materialistic world view, it was the other way round. Materialistic thinking has determined the course of modern science. The developing modern science from the 19th century was not in a position to make judgements on the human soul because it was looking in the opposite direction. It dealt with the external world of nature. And anyone who still follows this materialistic path is not in a postion to make pronouncements on the reality of the soul. A person should study the soul by looking within with the same objectivity as natural science aims for in its external studies.
The Buddhism of Nagasena was a genuine science of the soul whereas in the development of ancient Greek philosophy there is a move towards the science of external nature. And this external science if it is regarded as the only legitimate science leads to the one sided materialism of modern times. But IMO the modern scientific discoveries will in the end lead us to a more balanced understanding where an inward view will become equally as necessary as the current outward view in our search for reality.
Iain McGilchrist quotes Isaiah Berlin speaking about death and other profound concepts:
Were we arguing about “Pitman”?
Neuroscience deals with the external world so rather than being a reason to dismiss Steiner its empiricism would be welcomed and mostly agreed upon by him. It certainly cannot be used in evidence against his proposed method of inner investigation.
Any philosophy of mind that begins with the belief that the mind is a product of the brain is making an unjustified assumption right from the start.
I would say that they are neither numerically nor qualitatively identical. Simply because two separate objects can’t be qualitatively identical because God can tell them apart.
Once again that means that minds are more than matter they include causal history in some way.
So that two physically identical brains won’t produce the same mind. This seems to defeat physicalism outright. What am I missing?
Peace
They are not impossible in your worldview in mine they just can’t happen.
No paper classic or not can take away God’s omniscience.
peace
No no no. You didn’t get it. The point is that you could be wrong when you think the soul/mind ISN’T identical to the brain.
And it’s Putnam, not Pitman. (Did KN make you do that???)
No no no no no no no. Go read the Pitman (KN!!!!) again, and maybe you’ll see who it is who is actually making assumptions.
What the hell are you on about now?
That’s a question-beg, incidentally, because if they’re indiscernible, then God CAN’T tell them apart. You need there to be individual essences to make that claim that God can tell them apart. So what you are doing is making a (kind of silly, but what the hay) argument for haecceities.
ETA: And I’ll add that since you have no problem with God not being able to move the immovable, there’s no reason why should have have a problem with God not being able to discern the indiscernible. You should be consistent on the matter (at least).
Bruce,
That was his name on Twin Earth. 🙂
hahaha
walto, to fifth:
But God can tell them apart, and so can we. They’re in different locations, after all.
It’s no different than my snow tire example. Even if the two tires are atom-for-atom copies, they can easily be distinguished by virtue of being installed on different vehicles in different snowy locations.
fifth,
Again, you’re missing the obvious. Physicalism doesn’t predict that identical brains will produce the same mind.
The problem is with you, not with physicalism.
For my post, I read you as confusing concept of minds with concept of personal identity.
Now history is important to some naturalistic explanations of representation and meaning. But that is not the subject here. See the Walto/CharlieM exchange about meaning and in particular Putnam twin earth.
And that discussion is still compatible with naturalism. Although Putnam might not want to call his version of naturalism “physicalism.”, other philosophers would not have that quibble.
But then Pitman=Twin Putnam would not be “him”, assuming rigid designators for “Putnam”(I think but open to corrections on that one).
Roll with it, Bruce. It was a joke.
Funny enough (or not), AFAIK the last and only time we clashed was about Putnam/Kripke-style externalism, where I was defending a view of externalism with the dial turned up to 11 (yes that is the Spinal tap clip). But I did admit I was playing devil’s advocate on that one.
Yes I know. So was mine. But my joke only works if my understanding of Putnam is right.
Bruce,
Well, if you insist on spoiling the joke, Twin Putnam would have to be known as “Putnam”, or else Twin Earth wouldn’t be Twin Earth.
However, there is a Twin Charlie on Twin Earth who insists on calling Twin Putnam by the name of “Pitman”.
It was not intended as a spoil, but rather as an appreciation by playing along and extending. As is your post, I think. If so, well played.
Sure–if there are relational properties in which they differ they’re discernible. But in the Black example there are no such properties.
Don’t remember.
http://home.sandiego.edu/~baber/analytic/blacksballs.pdf
Bruce,
Bingo. 🙂
walto:
The topic was fifth’s scenario, not Black’s:
Again I take mind/soul to by synonymous with self.
So there is no confusion the two concepts are joined at the hip
It’s pretty strait forward.
No two objects are indistinguishable because God can tell them apart.
That is the point since there are no two objects that God can’t tell apart there are no indiscernible objects.
It’s not a question-beg because God’s existence is not at issue.
If there were immovable objects God could not move them but there aren’t because God is omnipotent.
By the same token if there were indiscernible objects God could not tell them apart but there are not because God is omniscient.
Remember we are dealing with created things “objects” and since God is by definition sovereign over his creation there can’t be immovable or indiscernible objects.
This is pretty simple stuff.
peace
Anyhow, I still think you should have let J-mac inform us of your attitude. That was my request, and more in keeping with an imagination failure IMHO. Plus which, I’m ready to re-clash again at a moments notice.
Just so you know. And if you don’t think I’m grumpy, you can ask keiths.
There’s the question-beg again. You really should try to stop that.
He can only know stuff that’s knowable. If there are indiscernible objects, which is which is simply not knowable.
And please don’t beg the question again. It just makes everybody’s eyes tired.
Then Black is confused. In any two objects there are relational properties which they differ. Even if the difference is only in the mind of God.
peace
Bruce, to walto:
Your emphasis on causal history led to some absurdities. I commented at the time:
Do you still hold that view regarding causal history, despite the absurdities?
walto,
Something upon which we wholeheartedly agree. 🙂
Again If we are talking about created things there is nothing that for God is unknowable .
God knows everything about them by virtue of his being God.
I think you are confused about what question begging is.
It’s not question begging to point out that the Creator of a universe will constrain what is allowed in that universe.
peace
This is just a variation of the old smart alec grade school atheist question.
“Can God create a rock so big that even he can’t lift it?”
The answer is of course
“No, now go away and come back when you have something intelligent to say”
peace
Do you still hold that view regarding causal history, despite the absurdities?
Well, the devil’s advocate stuff that I later admitted to was meant to imply that I did not hold it; I only wanted to see how far I could defend it for the intellectual challenge.
I’m not interesting in revisiting the topic right now, but I will say these days I am more sympathetic to a Jackendoff-style skepticism regarding purely philosophical takes on language and meaning. But I have not give that enough thought to get into a discussion; the reading time I would need to prepare for such a discussion is taken up with other things, right now.
In any event, I never would have said that was the ONLY time you and I clashed!
We call that sort of thing a presupposition.
The funny thing about presuppositions is that everyone has them but lots of folks are unable to see their own even when you point it out to them.
peace
That’s why I avoid getting too deep into the weeds on fundamental physics myself. I can follow the basics of biology and neuroscience well enough but even then there’s a point where the math eludes me.
Since walto mentioned Putnam above, I thought it would be worth mentioning that Putnam has an interesting article on Aristotle called “How Old Is the Mind?” (this is in the collection Words and Life). He argues that there’s nothing in Aristotle that corresponds to our (Cartesian/empiricist/Kantian) concept of “the mind” and that this should make us question the obviousness of the very basic categories in which we attempt to make sense of the world.
I think that’s exactly right, and the point could be amplified dramatically by considering non-Western philosophies, esp. Indian philosophy. There are distinctions and arguments in Buddhist philosophy that don’t map neatly onto anything in Western philosophy, and a little reflection on this point should make us question how much of the supposed universality of philosophical questions and problems is itself contingent and parochial.
Bruce,
No, you were actually quite sincere in your defense. For example, you wrote:
Anyway, I’m glad that you’ve since backed off that position. It isn’t tenable.
Nor I. 🙂