Why does the soul need the brain seems like a logical question especially in the context of the belief held by the leading ID proponent of the Discovery Institute Michael Egnor. He has written extensively on the theme of the immaterial soul that, in his view, is an independent entity, separate of the human body. What Dr. Egnor consistently fails to acknowledge is the obvious connection or interdependence between a functioning brain and self-awareness or consciousness. I wrote about it here.
If certain parts of human brain are damaged or disabled, just like in case of general anesthesia, the human brain loses the sense of consciousness or self-awareness either permanently or temporarily. The immaterial soul fails to make up for the damaged or disabled brain…
Dr. Egnor’s personal experiences (and he has many) as a neurosurgeon convinced him that many people, including many of his patients, with the great majority of their brains missing have developed and function normally. Egnor is convinced that an immaterial soul makes up for the loss of brain mass that is responsible for normal brain function in people with normal brain size or no damage to any of the brain parts.
It appears Dr. Egnor believes that unlike a computer software that can’t function without the computer hardware, human brain has an ability to make up for the loss of the hardware with the computer software – the immaterial soul.
Is Dr. Egnor’s view consistent with the readily available facts?
I personally see Dr. Egnor building and supporting a strawman by his selective choice of facts…Hey! That’s my opinion and that’s why we have this blog full of experts to disagree with me or Dr. Egnor…(I kinda like the guy though).
Let’s see…First off, not all cases of patients with missing parts of their brains experience the supposed miraculous saving powers of the immaterial soul. It appears that the amount of the missing part of the brain mass doesn’t seem to matter… What seems to matter more is which part (s) of the brain is missing and not how much of the brain mass is actually missing. Some parts of the brain seem essential for consciousness and self-awareness and others do not.
However, the main point of this OP is:
<strong> Why does the soul need the brain? Or why would human body need a brain at all, if the immaterial soul has an ability to compensate for the brain losses?
If the software (the soul) can operate without the hardware (the brain) why do we even need the brain in the first place?</strong>
It seems like a faulty or at least a wasteful design to me…
CharlieM,
Ah, that’s a question-beg. You were trying to show there IS some “entity” by appealing to the fact that you and I use the word “triangle” basically the same way. No reason to suppose that.
Better start over. Move some more goalposts around or something.
Triangle – a 2 dimensional enclosed figure with 3 edges and 3 vertices. What would you like to add or take away from that definition?
I’m not asking for synonyms of words in common use, I am asking for definitions.
Whatever way he wants to take me is fine by me, so long as it isn’t physical 🙂
What about the concept of a concept of a brain? Is that a concept? You’re playing with words again. “Brain” and “meat” are much harder to define than “triangle”.
Suck it keiths.
By basically do you mean fundamentally or do you mean roughly?
I’m not asking for synonyms of words in common use, I am asking for definitions.
The definition of “bachelor” is thought by many to be “Unmarried man” But let me ask you this, for about the fiftieth time: why do you want definitions? Are you planning on working on a dictionary?
I mean roughly. I can’t use “triangle” in quite the way Neil (a geometer) can. It’s close enough for us to still be said to have the same concept, but, at the edges, our usages are likely to vary. (Actually “fundamentally” is basically (fundamentally, roughly) the same thing, anyhow. So stupid, this conversation.)
Look, I’m bored with this. What are you getting at? What is the difference?
Charlie, suppose I stipulate a definition for “triangle.” I say “triangle” means this and only this: “a closed plane figure with three straight sides and three angles.” And I’m absolutely serious about it. Any divergencies, and I say you’re talking about something different. Got it?
So now for anybody to be talking about what I’m talking about when I use the term “triangle” they absolutely have to share my definition. We must have exactly the same concept. OK? This is an example of what you want, right?
What can you do with it? What does it prove? Who the fuck cares? {I’m just about done with this, since you seem to have no idea at all where you’re going.}
I’m not sure we have in mind the same concept. Can you define that?
Not specifically. Just thought I’d throw it out there. I think it was walto who brought up “inexistent.” And I wonder how keiths handles numbers in his ontology.
The Mechanical Mind. Second Edition. p. 12 and p. 31.
I haven’t looked to see what’s changed in the third edition yet.
You miss the point.
What I particularly objected to in your prior post, was: “I am talking about an accurate definition.” There’s no such thing as an accurate definition. If there is a way of determining that your definition is accurate, then it really isn’t a definition because whatever sets the standard for accuracy has already defined the entity.
The purpose of a definition is to specify standards, rather than to follow already existing standards.
So, 1000+ comments in, is it possible to get a precis of why the soul needs the brain?
OMagain,
Not from the bullshit on this thread no.
Utter waste of time.
Mung,
I’m a fictionalist. I don’t think that numbers actually exist. We talk as if they exist because to do so is a convenient descriptive shortcut, but the actual metaphysical situation is more complicated.
People, including fictionalists, will commonly say things like “three is an integer”, but a more accurate rendering would be something like “the fictional entity ‘three’, if it actually existed, would be a member of the set ‘the integers’, if it too existed.”
That’s an awkward locution, so people stick with “three is an integer” unless they are trying to make a philosophical point about fictionalism, as I just did.
KN,
No, KN. I haven’t criticized you for asking those questions. I’ve been quite clear (in this comment and elsewhere) about what the actual problems are and where your knowledge is insufficient. Resist the temptation to lie about your interlocutor. It just makes you look pitiful.
Also, do you really not see how goofy it is for you to argue that “I am an active member of the profession; therefore I cannot be underinformed about it”? Part of your job is to teach undergraduates about logical fallacies, right? If so, they should be fresh in your mind. The above is simply a fallacious argument from authority. How can you fall into that trap and not recognize it?
TSZ tends to puncture the pretensions of certain people, so it isn’t surprising that you aren’t a fan. The people who like TSZ the most are the ones who are secure, not prone to dishonesty, able to state and defend their viewpoints, and willing to admit their mistakes and learn from them.
CharlieM,
I’ve noticed that you tend to flip between “ideal tetrahedron” and “concept of tetrahedron”, or more generally between “ideal X” and “concept of X”, whatever X happens to be.
That’s a mistake, and I think it’s behind much of your confusion. An ideal tetrahedron (if any such thing existed) would be a tetrahedron. The concept of tetrahedron is not a tetrahedron, ideal or otherwise.
walto, to Mung:
Noting the irrelevance of Mung’s demands hardly amounts to “running and hiding”, walto.
It’s quite possible that you didn’t understand the irrelevance. As you’ve told us, you aren’t a science guy. But it would be silly for me to let your personal confusion dictate which demands of Mung’s I respond to.
CharlieM:
Yes, of course. Damn, Charlie. This isn’t difficult.
Here’s your clue. Look at the words in bold:
If you are speaking of “the concept of X”, whatever X is, isn’t it freaking obvious that you are speaking of a concept?
Argument from authority is an informal fallacy. It’s a fallacy only when the authority or expertise is not relevant to the argument. For example it would be wrong of a plumber to decide which teeth of yours have to be pulled out, but not of a dentist.
In case of KN, he would be quite a formidable authority in matters philosophical, were it not for occasional weird remarks like he does not know what physical means. When he says things like that, it’s fallacious of him to next turn around and declare himself an authority. It’s a fallacy, but probably has some different name.
Correct. I suspect I was not clear on this in some of my posts.
Looking at middle of page 12, I think you are right about numbers. However, I do not see how that page justifies the view that Crane accepts “non-physical objects that exist”.
But in Elements of Mind Chapters 16, 17, 18, 29 he defends a view which I read as follows: (he also hints at this at end of The Mechanical Mind):
1. He reject causal closure of physics.
2. He rejects mind-brain identity theory and non-reductive physicalism.
3. He accepts the zombie argument and so rejects the metaphysical necessity of physicalism. In particular, he rejects arguments for a posteriori physicalism sometimes used by NRPs.
3. He rejects substance dualism.
4. He supports emergentism of mental causal properties as emerging from sufficiently complex matter. He argues for downward causation of such mental properties on the brain. But his view of emergence leads to a position which is not that different from some forms of NRP: see here for details (esp p. 20 et seq).
5. He thinks minds nomologically supervene on brains, but this involves new psychophysical laws that lead to the emergentism he supports.
So does that make minds non-physical objects that exist? I would say he believes in their non-physical causal powers. I’ll let you read those chapters and come to your own conclusions.
Ah, keiths, what a way to live. First, not ever entirely content unless you’re insulting someone. Second, dependent on the highly irrational hope, not only that everyone who reads your posts was born at night, but that it was last night.
Also, incidentally, re this:
Not everybody agrees with that. Frege didn’t, e.g.. He famously wrote that the concept horse is not a concept. So, on his view at least, the matter was actually not so simple as you say.
But please don’t think I’m suggesting that Charlie is a closet Fregean! Apparently, reading a decent philosopher is thought to be cheating on your loved one where he comes from. He wouldn’t need to be punished: the personal shame would be sufficient.
I think this psychological observation of Crane’s in that paper is probably right:
When I thought about this stuff a few years back, after reading Davidson’s paper on anomalous monism, it seemed to me that a number of the key issues were bound up in how one defined “supervenience”–it is a very vague/fluid concept–sometimes seeming to mean this, sometimes being required by us to mean that. I haven’t read the Horgan paper on “superdupervenience” but I generally like his stuff, and in any case, if Crane is right that there’s really only an attitudinal or psychological difference between emergentism and NRP, then I’d have put myself in the NRP camp.
Not as scientistic as RP, but having more faith in science than emergentists (as Crane categorizes them) do. But on the strictly metaphysico-philosophical merits, I’d have said it all comes down to how we nail down the concept of supervenience–and I found that too difficult myself.
I don’t think about that stuff anymore, though.
I’m not seeing anything weird about that.
I know what “physical” means well enough to use the term in ordinary language. I do not know what it means precisely enough to commit to “everything is physical”. And I assume that KN is saying something similar.
The guy who claims philosophical authority should be comfortable with basic philosophical terms, such as “physical”.
KN is an educator. He may disagree with the philosophies he teaches, but he should still be clear on them. Hiding behind physicists the way he does is completely ridiculous. With every next generation, physicists know less and less philosophy and logic; they are thus less and less capable of handling abstract terminology and they are less and less able to comprehend the entailments of their own theories.
Physicists resort to experiment, to trial and error. People capable of rational thought should be able to figure stuff out without having to go through the effects and consequences the hard way. Philosophers used to be those who figure stuff out rationally. KN keeps underappreciating his own profession for his own detriment.
So they should just ignore reality and “live in their heads” ? Is that how you figure out what is real, Erik ?
Almost all innovation requires trial and error, Erik. You can’t know how the universe works by instinct.
Just blowing smoke, but my observation is the more you know about physics, the less you know what “physical” means.
petrushka,
That seems about right.
Here is a whole SEP section devoted to the issues with understanding what it takes to be physical. So being uncomfortable seems reasonable to me.
keiths,
Have you ever noticed that every single person you have a standing disagreement with about anything turns out to be a big liar? Weird!
Moved a post to guano
DNA_Jock,
Remember the Detroit Pistons old defensive philosophy under Chuck Dailey. If you foul every time they can’t call it every time 🙂
walto,
No, I haven’t noticed that.
What I’ve noticed is that some people lie, and some people don’t.
DNA_Jock:
Pointlessly and inconsistently. But at least you linked to it, which is better than nothing.
keiths,
Oh man then you should def notice the extremely hi correlation between the liars and the people who disagree with you about anything! The r-square is off the freaking charts!!!
walto,
When I see people lying, I disagree with them, so obviously there’s a correlation. I also disagree with people for other reasons.
Are you arguing that I shouldn’t disagree with people when they lie? If so, why not?
And if you want to defend KN, then make your case. Respond to my comment.
keiths, to CharlieM:
walto:
Frege was saying that what we refer to as “the concept of horse” isn’t really a concept at all. It’s a misnomer.
Charlie obviously does not think that “the concept of X” is a misnomer. He’s been using it right and left.
Charlie is simply confused by the notion of “a concept of a concept”:
He misinterprets his confusion as a sign that there is something questionable about the notion. There isn’t. It makes perfect sense.
Charlie’s head would probably explode if he were exposed to computer languages in which it is possible to define data types such as “pointer to a pointer to a pointer to an integer”.
But it gets worse. The integer isn’t even real.
keiths, to KN:
Erik:
If a plumber declares that he cannot possibly be “insufficiently informed” about plumbing since he is “a member of the profession”, then he is making a fallacious argument from authority.
Ditto for dentists and philosophers. Membership in a profession does not guarantee competence or sufficient knowledge.
keiths believes that calling someone out will cause them to change their behavior. He, however, is immune. For example, it’s utterly pointless to guano his posts.
Mung,
No. Sometimes it does, sometimes it doesn’t.
What is clear is that most people find it unpleasant when their lies are pointed out. You certainly do.
If people come to associate their decision to lie with the consequent unpleasantness of being called on it, and if that unpleasantness outweighs the perceived benefits of lying, then they are less likely to lie in the future. That’s good.
Not sure they’re even really beliefs at this point. I used to think it was a bit of an act, but now I actually worry about the guy.
But it gets worse. The lying isn’t even real.
Heh. Ask walto to defend his position, and he shouts “You’re crazy!” and curls up into the fetal position alongside Neil.
Also issues about what would constitute an explanation, for example as addressed in the Block&Stalnaker 1999 paper.
On supervenience, as you enjoyed Becker’s book covering locality, Einstein, and Bell, you might also like Lewis’s short 2016 paper Quantum mechanics, emergence, and fundamentality.
I enjoy the intellectual puzzle of working through such papers. It’s also true that, unlike Kim’s ideas on supervenience, which are derided by Ladyman&Ross as KN notes, papers like Lewis’s do not depend on ignoring modern physics. As a bonus, Lewis provides some analysis of J-Mac’s reverse causality obsession, as espoused by Huw Price.
But for how seriously to take this metaphysical work, my sympathies are with Wallace’s view of related philosophical controversies of instantiation and emergence and supervenience.
–The Emergent Universe p. 58
Sure, as long as you are not a philosopher. It’s a basic concept. Basic concepts work via their definitional framework. If you are a philosopher, you are supposed to be able to handle that. Non-experts are free to be uncomfortable.
The point that this is an informal fallacy is rather important.
You know KN’s track record and credentials. You cannot say to him that membership of a profession does not guarantee competence. Your statement is in abstract, whereas the actual track record of the concrete person we are talking about actually guarantees more than sufficient competence and knowledge.
KN’s competence is beyond dispute. What you can still call him out on are his disingenuous turns like when he says he does not know this or that simple thing in philosophy even though his expertise overabundantly ensures that he knows it very well. He is no fool. He is just playing the fool, hoping to dupe you.
Take your pick, KN!
Before, I was only accused of being inconsistent when I voiced some criticism of an established position called “physicalism” and then asked keiths what he meant by “physical” in order to open up a philosophical conversation about the relation between metaphysics and science, especially in light of recent work in philosophy of physics that’s informed by physics.
There are really interesting and serious philosophical problems that are usually papered over by people who call themselves “physicalists”. I think that the Ladyman and Ross criticism of physicalists like David Lewis is exactly right: physicalists don’t know enough physics to justify their reliance on physics for metaphysics.
In any event, I was only trying to get a philosophical discussion going. We all see where that went. But now apparently I’m deliberately trying to dupe keiths out of some sort of weird ploy. I just can’t win.