Why does the soul need the brain?

Why does the soul need the brain seems like a logical question especially in the context of the belief held by the leading ID proponent of the Discovery Institute Michael Egnor. He has written extensively on the theme of the immaterial soul that, in his view, is an independent entity, separate of the human body. What Dr. Egnor consistently fails to acknowledge is the obvious connection or interdependence between a functioning brain and self-awareness or consciousness. I wrote about it here.

If certain parts of human brain are damaged or disabled, just like in case of general anesthesia, the human brain loses the sense of consciousness or self-awareness either permanently or temporarily. The immaterial soul fails to make up for the damaged or disabled brain…

Dr. Egnor’s personal experiences (and he has many) as a neurosurgeon convinced him that many people, including many of his patients, with the great majority of their brains missing have developed and function normally. Egnor is convinced that an immaterial soul makes up for the loss of brain mass that is responsible for normal brain function in people with normal brain size or no damage to any of the brain parts.

It appears Dr. Egnor believes that unlike a computer software that can’t function without the computer hardware, human brain has an ability to make up for the loss of the hardware with the computer software – the immaterial soul.

Is Dr. Egnor’s view consistent with the readily available facts?
I personally see Dr. Egnor building and supporting a strawman by his selective choice of facts…Hey! That’s my opinion and that’s why we have this blog full of experts to disagree with me or Dr. Egnor…(I kinda like the guy though).

Let’s see…First off, not all cases of patients with missing parts of their brains experience the supposed miraculous saving powers of the immaterial soul. It appears that the amount of the missing part of the brain mass doesn’t seem to matter… What seems to matter more is which part (s) of the brain is missing and not how much of the brain mass is actually missing. Some parts of the brain seem essential for consciousness and self-awareness and others do not.

However, the main point of this OP is:

<strong> Why does the soul need the brain? Or why would human body need a brain at all, if the immaterial soul has an ability to compensate for the brain losses?

If the software (the soul) can operate without the hardware (the brain) why do we even need the brain in the first place?</strong>

It seems like a faulty or at least a wasteful design to me…

1,372 thoughts on “Why does the soul need the brain?

  1. Mung,

    Sure. It’s the same reasoning that you use.

    Actually, no.

    It’s not made of matter. It’s not physical. Therefore, it does not exist.

    Okay, then support the claim that information is non-physical.

  2. keiths: Actually, no.

    Then by what logic do you reason that Superman and Middle Earth are non-existent?

    Okay, then support the claim that information is non-physical.

    Already answered. Information is not made of matter. Also, information is not reducible to the laws of physics.

  3. KN:

    The physical” and “the non-physical” are not terms that I would use, so I can’t answer this challenge as posed here.

    Oh, please. From this very thread:

    Yes. Numerical differences between physical objects are physical differences, because the objects occupy different places in space and time. Space and time are physical.

    Be straight with us. If you don’t have a good answer to the challenge, just say so. Don’t pretend that you don’t use terms like “physical” and “non-physical”.

  4. Mung,

    Information is not made of matter.

    The physical encompasses more than just matter.

    Also, information is not reducible to the laws of physics.

    If by that you mean that information is not physically instantiated, then what is your evidence?

  5. keiths: The physical encompasses more than just matter.

    I’m sure KN is interested in hearing more.

    If by that you mean that information is not physically instantiated, then what is your evidence?

    The same as yours when you deny that Middle Earth and Superman are physically instantiated (whatever that may mean). And there you go again. If you are going to “physically instantiate” information you’ll need to explain how you overcome the instantiation problem.

    You didn’t answer my question:

    By what logic do you reason that Superman and Middle Earth are non-existent?

  6. Mung,

    If you are going to “physically instantiate” information you’ll need to explain how you overcome the instantiation problem.

    What “instantiation problem”?

    By what logic do you reason that Superman and Middle Earth are non-existent?

    Via the same logic by which I reason that Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny don’t exist. Damn, Mung. It isn’t difficult.

  7. keiths: What “instantiation problem”?

    I’ve already explained that. Assuming you were paying attention.

    Via the same logic by which I reason that Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny don’t exist.

    By what logic do you reason that Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny don’t exist?

    Via the same logic by which I reason that Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny don’t exist.

    If by that you mean that Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny have never been physically instantiated, then what is your evidence? I’ve seen physical instantiations of both of them.

  8. keiths: Oh, please. From this very thread:

    Yes. Numerical differences between physical objects are physical differences, because the objects occupy different places in space and time. Space and time are physical.

    Be straight with us. If you don’t have a good answer to the challenge, just say so. Don’t pretend that you don’t use terms like “physical” and “non-physical”.

    I do recognize a distinction between “theories that belong to fundamental physics” and “theories that do not belong to fundamental physics.” I think that distinction is much more important than a distinction between some branch of non-fundamental physics (e.g. fluid dynamics) and some other field of science.

    Here’s the point I was trying to get someone here to see, to no avail: just talking about “the physical” is meaningless without talking about physics, but when philosophers talk about “physics” they are very sloppy because they don’t take the time to specify what kind of physics they mean. You can’t use “physical object” by mere ostension the way you can use “table” or “baby”, because it’s a theoretical term to begin with.

    But if physicalism as bandied about by philosophers like David Lewis, Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, and Jaegwon Kim is not informed by what physicists themselves are actually theorizing, the result is simply what Ladyman and Ross call (pejoratively) a metaphysics based on A-level chemistry — hardly worth taking seriously.

    Just talking about “the physical” is meaningless without any specifics: are we talking about the entities posited by fundamental physics? If so, which theory of fundamental physics?

    When there are at least three different theories of fundamental physics (quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, and general relativity), they are incompatible and we have no idea how to reconcile them, and we don’t even have an agreed-upon understanding of quantum mechanics, I really cannot understand what philosophical work can be accomplished by simply talking about “the physical”. It looks like a flatus vocis to me.

  9. Mung:

    If you are going to “physically instantiate” information you’ll need to explain how you overcome the instantiation problem.

    keiths:

    What “instantiation problem”?

    Mung:

    I’ve already explained that. Assuming you were paying attention.

    I haven’t seen a valid “instantiation problem” in anything you’ve written. Are you talking about the following supposed problem?

    Would they address the problem of reverse interaction?

    How does a physical brain conjure up or construct something that is not physical and not real and which does not exist, such that it can then create a representation of it?

    If that’s the so-called “instantiation problem”, then I’ve already addressed it:

    Mung,

    How does a physical brain conjure up or construct something that is not physical and not real and which does not exist, such that it can then create a representation of it?

    It doesn’t. The brain constructs representations, not things-that-don’t-exist.

    I think you need to write it another 500 times:

  10. KN,

    This is becoming ridiculous. You’re making mistake after mistake, and dishonestly trying to cover them up. The sad thing is that some of the later mistakes aren’t necessary at all, but are only happening because you’re trying to cover up the earlier ones.

    Relax a little. It’s not the end of the world when you mess up and someone corrects you. That’s a feature of TSZ, not a bug. Wouldn’t you rather make your mistakes here than in a future published paper?

    You’re confused about the standard terminology used in philosophy of mind, as I’ve already explained. That’s OK, as long as you learn from your mistakes. Just acknowledge them, bone up on the terms you’re confused about (including “physicalism”, “reductive physicalism”, and “non-reductive physicalism”), and move on.

    You’ve also backed yourself into some corners regarding physicalism. Here are some dilemmas you’ve created for yourself:

    1. On the one hand, you’ve rejected physicalism, even dismissively comparing it to theology. On the other, you’ve actually declared yourself to be a physicalist, in that you think that everything is “physical-1”. You’ve since tried to CYA by arguing, with a straight face, that something that is “physical-1” isn’t also “physical”. Please.

    2. When walto asked you to identify some things that were physical-1 (“spatio-temporal concrete particulars”) but non-physical, you bailed out, claiming that you don’t like to use terms like “physical” and “non-physical”. That’s false, as I easily showed by quoting a comment you made in this very thread. Why lie about something silly like that?

    3. You’re still trying to avoid walto’s question, now by arguing that most philosophers aren’t sufficiently clear about what they mean by “physical” and “non-physical”. But that’s irrelevant. Walto is asking for examples of what you consider to be “physical-1” yet “non-physical” at the same time.

    If you’re telling us that you are fuzzy on what “physical” and “non-physical” mean, then the question arises: Whence your confident dismissal of physicalism, if you don’t understand it?

    On the other hand, if you do claim to have a good handle on what’s physical versus non-physical, then there’s no reason to avoid answering walto’s question.

    4. It’s clear to me that you’d rather not answer walto’s question because you think that doing so might lead to trouble for your position. I suspect that too. But so what? Why not just honestly acknowledge that your position has weaknesses” and that you need to work on it some more?

    (Specifically, if you acknowledge that “physical-1” things are also physical, then you undermine your earlier denial. But if you claim that “physical-1” things are non-physical, then you face the interaction problem.)

    This is just a blog, and this is just a discussion, and working toward the truth is a good thing, not a bad thing. Why let a sensitive ego spoil things?

  11. keiths: 4. It’s clear to me that you’d rather not answer walto’s question because you think that doing so might lead to trouble for your position.

    Ah. That must be why keiths would rather not answer my questions. Because he thinks that doing so might lead to trouble for his position. Noted.

    keiths: This is just a blog, and this is just a discussion, and working toward the truth is a good thing, not a bad thing. Why let a sensitive ego spoil things?

    Is that why you won’t answer my questions?

  12. keiths: working toward the truth is a good thing, not a bad thing. Why let a sensitive ego spoil things?

    Working toward the truth??? What truth??? As you see it?
    The truth as you see it first there is what you want to hear, then there is what you want to believe, then there is everything else… then there is the truth, which you obviously dread…

  13. walto,

    For grins, why not publish your list of Who May and Who May Not be criticized at TSZ, according to walto? You can also do a list of Whose Lies May and May Not be pointed out, and Whose Positions May and May Not be disputed.

    Then try to justify the double standard. It’ll be funny.

  14. J-Mac,

    Working toward the truth??? What truth??? As you see it?

    No, working toward the actual truth. Lying isn’t going to achieve that.

    The world doesn’t fall apart when people honestly admit their mistakes. It gets better.

  15. Mung,

    Ah. That must be why keiths would rather not answer my questions. Because he thinks that doing so might lead to trouble for his position. Noted.

    I answered.

    Still waiting for your response. Even if it leads to trouble for your position.

  16. keiths:

    Descriptions of theories, or of the world itself?I would go with the latter.The descriptions might be theory-laden, but they still describe reality.Do you agree?

    I’m going to assume Sean C is correct in the video when he says that information is helpful but not a necessary part of any of our scientific theories. Theories describe the reality covered by the domain of their science. Since information is eliminable from theories, I think the issue of whether it supervenes on the physical is moot. Only entities/structures/processes (no need to choose for this issue) which are ineliminable from theories are up for consideration as real for the domain in the science being considered.

    Okay, so if I’m understanding you, you agree that information is real and that it supervenes on the physical.Do you also agree that it therefore has causal power?

    I’ve dodged that by saying the issue is moot. But also because I do not know what you mean by “real”. What makes something real? What are causal powers? Do they supervene on the physical? What does it take for some thing or process or structure to have causal powers? Does it have to be real?

    I have not read all of the material you have posted in the thread, so if you already defined your usage of those words, let me know roughly where.

  17. Kantian Naturalist:

    When there are at least three different theories of fundamental physics (quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, and general relativity),

    I am not used to thermodynamics/statistical mechanics being considered as fundamental physics theory. Possibly a fundamental technique used in physics, but not a theory of the dynamics of the world. Why do you say it is?

  18. Mung: :

    BruceS: I am not interested in adding to it unless someone posts something informed and original.

    Mung: That leaves me out.

    I carefully worded my proviso so it says nothing about the originality or informedness of my posts.

    You are welcome to use the same loophole.

  19. walto: What is identical? First you say the idea of remains the same regardless of who is thinking about it. Then you say that what they are thinking about is the same thing. Are the ideas identical or what the ideas are of? Is my idea of a triangle the same as Neil’s or is it just that we’re “thinking of the same thing”?

    Your thinking is a subjective,personal activity.

    If your concept of a triangle is correct, irrefutable and universally agreed upon then by means of your thinking you have discovered the objective ideal triangle. If your concept of a triangle is say; a red, plane figure with three straight sides and three angles, then your concept “triangle” is incorrect.

    In an article On the Path Towards Thinking: Learning from Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Steiner Bo Dahlin writes:

    In a lecture given in Berlin in 1914, Steiner (1991a) characterizes human thinking in away which from a general point of view is similar to Heidegger. One of the first things hesays is that human beings seldom really think. Instead, we are content with words. Furthermore, the situation is such that in order to realize that we do not really think, we have to—think. It is evident that thinking for Steiner is different from the ‘‘mental talk’’ of everyday life, the major part of which, if one is honest, consists of associations of words and memories.For Steiner, genuine thinking is alive; it is an intense spiritual activity. It uses concepts and ideas not in static forms, but as dynamic possibilities. At the same time it is clear and precise. A concept according to Steiner is a particular potentiality of what may be called noetic movements. As a simple example Steiner takes the concept of the triangle.This concept encompasses all triangles in whatever shape. In thinking the concept triangle,and not of a particular triangle, we have to think of the sides of the triangle as in constant movement in relation to each other. This is what every mathematician or geometrician must do intuitively (consciously or unconsciously) if she wants her reasoning to be general and not just about one particular triangle. Yet this original intuitive experience of a concept seems, according to Steiner, not be accommodated within most academic philosophical systems. Philosophers have often been too intent on fixing the definition of words in static linguistic structures. Concepts are rarely understood as dynamic essences.

  20. Kantian Naturalist: The definition is the same, but that’s no argument for abstract entities. Should we conclude that there is Doghood or Dogginess, some abstract entity or Form of Dog, because different people can each recognize some particular animal as a dog as a result of having learned how to use the word “dog” and roughly agreeing on how to define the term?

    The concept “triangle” is simple and agreed upon. The concept “dog” is another matter. In order to approach the correct concept “dog” our thinking would have to include the morphing together of all breeds and species as well as everything else included in what it means to be a dog. Such as paths of individual development and evolutionary history. It would be a good exercise to undertake but how close to the correct concept someone reached would depend on the individual.

    Besides which, if you ask people to imagine a triangle — to construct a visual mental image of a triangle — you’re going to get isosceles triangles, equilateral triangles, and scalene triangles. Triangles can also be acute, right, and obtuse. Are all of these equally “the concept of triangle”? How can that be?

    (I should add this thought-experiment wouldn’t work in people who have aphantasia — the inability to form visual mental images.)

    None of your examples equate to the concept triangle. They are specific. See my previous post

  21. walto: It doesn’t actually mean anything, so it’s tough to be expected either to agree or disagree with it. If you define “triangle” as (I don’t know) a closed three-sided plane figure with three straight sides then, of course, whoever is thinking of a triangle must be thinking of that–by stipulation. But what the hell else are you talking about?

    You say you don’t know how to define a triangle and then you define a triangle! What don’t you know?

  22. keiths:
    CharlieM,

    At some point in the conversation you went from talking about the ideal tetrahedron to the concept of the ideal tetrahedron, and you are now talking about the concept of triangle.

    Why?The issue was whether the ideal tetrahedron is real, and if so, how that can be demonstrated.

    Yes I shouldn’t have used the phrase, concept of the ideal tetrahedron. It would have been better to say, the correct concept of the tetrahedron or something similar.

    I don’t see how discussing tetrahedra, triangles circles or any other basic geometric form would change the point I was making.

  23. keiths:
    J-Mac,

    No, working toward the actual truth.Lying isn’t going to achieve that.

    The world doesn’t fall apart when people honestly admit their mistakes.It gets better.

    Stop deceiving yourself, keiths!

    You can’t deceive anyone on this blog anymore about your motives though Dr. Swamidass has fallen for your hypocrisy once…
    Narcissistic traits are hard to eradicate especially when you get some kind of gratification from following them…

    The pursuit of truth means following the evidence wherever it may lead and not where you’d would like to lead…

    Can you see the difference? I doubt that very much…

  24. Looks like the J-Mac-in-the-box is getting wound up again.

    The pursuit of truth means following the evidence wherever it may lead and not where you’d would like to lead…

    Yes. A shame that you’ll probably never be able to do that fully.

  25. keiths:
    walto,

    For grins, why not publish your list of Who May and Who May Not be criticized at TSZ, according to walto?You can also do a list of Whose Lies May and May Not be pointed out, and Whose Positions May and May Not be disputed.

    Then try to justify the double standard.It’ll be funny.

    I’m ok with just my list of who should fuck off.

    Oh, and who has forgotten to fuck off.

  26. CharlieM: If your concept of a triangle is correct

    I don’t know what that means. In my world, statements, assertions, propositions, sentences and the like can be correct. Concepts aren’t the right sort of thing to be correct.

  27. CharlieM: Yes I shouldn’t have used the phrase, concept of the ideal tetrahedron. It would have been better to say, the correct concept of the tetrahedron or something similar.

    No better. You still really don’t seem to have much of an idea of what you actually want to say–except that you want it to be consonant with Steiner’s musings.

    If I have some concept of a triangle and you have a different one, then I may say that your understanding is incorrect and you may say mine is, but this will be true only to the extent that we are using a common language or one has agreed to accept the other’s terms or something like that. Concepts aren’t TRUE.

  28. keiths:

    For grins, why not publish your list of Who May and Who May Not be criticized at TSZ, according to walto? You can also do a list of Whose Lies May and May Not be pointed out, and Whose Positions May and May Not be disputed.

    Then try to justify the double standard. It’ll be funny.

    walto:

    I’m ok with just my list of who should fuck off.

    Oh, and who has forgotten to fuck off.

    It must deflate you to realize that your practiced dudgeon rests entirely on a double standard you can’t defend.

  29. keiths:
    keiths:

    walto:

    It must deflate you to realize that your practiced dudgeon rests entirely on a double standard you can’t defend.

    Question-beg.

    Plus, as I understand the term “fuck off” these repeated nasty nonsense posts of yours suggest to me that you actually haven’t.

    {Note to Charlie: Maybe he only thinks he has that concept.}

    If you’re not planning to fuck off as requested I merely ask you to put “But this is the Skeptical Zone!” (including the exclamation point if possible) in your future nasty nonsense posts. It would really aid me in my filing.

    Thanks!

    ETA: “After all, this is the Skeptical Zone!” or “Isn’t this the Skeptical Zone?” are OK too.

  30. keiths:
    keiths:

    CharlieM:

    Actually, no.You shifted to other criteria when your original criteria failed to handle the counterexamples I offered.

    What you need is a stable set of criteria that work across the board.You can’t just shift the goalposts every time you run into a problem.

    It was you who introduced the term “changelessness” into the conversation.

    In counterexample a) you are working from an incorrect concept of potato. In your “counterexamples” you have used the term, “perfect” which I have used specifically in relation to the concept tetrahedron.. This is an unjustified addition to the concepts you are using. What have your “counterexamples” to do with geometric forms?

    You introduced the general term “potential thing” when I was in fact discussing tetrahedra.

  31. keiths: I answered.

    No, you didn’t. I asked you for your reasoning, which you never provided. You merely provided another set of objects for which you say you employ the same logic. But we don’t know, because you refuse to share what that logic is. We don’t know if it’s the same logic or not, and we don’t know what your reasoning is in either case. You have not answered.

    Don’t be surprised if I ever respond in kind to your questions. We can have a discussion, but don’t think you get to plead the fifth and grant yourself immunity to cross examination.

  32. walto:

    Question-beg.

    The double standard is obvious, as is your failure to defend it.

  33. Mung: No, you didn’t. I asked you for your reasoning, which you never provided. You merely provided another set of objects for which you say you employ the same logic. But we don’t know, because you refuse to share what that logic is. We don’t know if it’s the same logic or not, and we don’t know what your reasoning is in either case. You have not answered.

    Don’t be surprised if I ever respond in kind to your questions. We can have a discussion, but don’t think you get to plead the fifth and grant yourself immunity to cross examination.

    Ask him what he means by “objective”: IIRC, that was fun.

  34. So according to my reading of Crane, he accepts non-physical objects that exist and non-physical objects that do not exist. As an example of the former he used a number.

    He also writes that Brentano’s ‘inexistent’ did not mean the object did not exist.

  35. walto: No better. You still really don’t seem to have much of an idea of what you actually want to say–except that you want it to be consonant with Steiner’s musings.

    If I have some concept of a triangle and you have a different one, then I may say that your understanding is incorrect and you may say mine is, but this will be true only to the extent that we are using a common language or one has agreed to accept the other’s terms or something like that. Concepts aren’t TRUE.

    My concept holds that a triangle is a two-dimensional shape with three sides and three angles. How is your concept any different?

  36. CharlieM: My concept holds that a triangle is a two-dimensional shape with three sides and three angles. How is your concept any different?

    It’s about the same at it’s core–dunno about the edges, though. So what? Does that mean that we’re CORRECT or that we’re both English speakers? What the hell are you trying to say, exactly?

  37. Mung: He also writes that Brentano’s ‘inexistent’ did not mean the object did not exist.

    They have what Brentano called “intentional inexistence”: people’s mileage varies one whether that means they exist. There was a ton of fun in Meinong and Russell regarding the golden mountain and the square circle.

  38. instantiation – something that represents or is an example of something else, or the act of producing something like this

    So to “instantiate information” is to instantiate a representation of something. It is the representation that is “physically instantiated.”

    Or do you say that information is just a certain kind of representation?

  39. keiths:

    I answered.

    Mung:

    No, you didn’t.

    Christ, Mung. I answered. Then I quoted the answer since you missed it the first time. Then I linked to the quote of the answer for good measure.

    Mung, if he were honest:

    But I don’t want an answer! I need to pretend that you’ve refused to answer me. I need that!

    Yes, dear. You need that. Unfortunately, reality has bitch slapped you again, by refusing to comply with your demands.

  40. keiths,

    All I’ve asked for up to now is a definition of “physical” such that there’s a difference worth making between

    (1) There are only concrete particulars.

    and

    (2) There are only concrete particulars and they are all physical.

    Every argumentative move I’ve made has been an attempt to request a clarification from you for a definition of “physical” that makes (2) distinct from (1).

  41. CharlieM: Yes I shouldn’t have used the phrase, concept of the ideal tetrahedron. It would have been better to say, the correct concept of the tetrahedron or something similar.

    Then I’ll go with the concept of banana as something similar.

  42. walto: It’s about the same at it’s core–dunno about the edges, though. So what? Does that mean that we’re CORRECT or that we’re both English speakers?What the hell are you trying to say, exactly?

    About the same? Are you prepared to argue about the definition of a triangle?

  43. keiths,

    Not that it’s any of my business, but I think you could have done a better job answering that question. Your manner of “answering” just invited the response you got. Over and over and over. It was entirely unnecessary–except for the fact that you actually enjoy these stupid skirmishes. A better response to mung–whose questions were nothing but fat lobs across the center of the plate–could have shut off that whole 200-post “debate” (Did too! Did not! Uh-huh! Nuh-Unh You’re lying! No you are!)

    But fun is fun. Charlie gets his from trying to paraphrase Steiner. You get yours from self-glorification, calling people liars and otherwise trying to embarrass them or make them feel bad. I get mine from making fun of your nasty nonsense.

    And who is anybody to judge that kind of thing? After all, this is the Skeptical Zone–am I right???

  44. Neil Rickert: Then I’ll go with the concept of banana as something similar.

    Obviously I am talking about a similar phrase in relation to tetrahedra. What have bananas got to do with tetrahedra?

  45. CharlieM: About the same? Are you prepared to argue about the definition of a triangle?

    For about the fifth time, What the hell are you talking about? We’re both English speakers, so naturally we associate roughly the same stuff with the word “triangle.” Why would anybody expect anything different? If you connected yellow oblong fruit with it, we’d say you didn’t understand the word, no? So what? That’s how language works.

    And of course our definitions may vary at the edges. I’m sure I can find a bunch on line that do that. Their denotations are expected to be the same, even if their connotations vary a bit. But even on the denotation side, weirdness may pop up in Riemannian spaces for all I know.

    What is the difference? What are you trying to say????

  46. walto: For about the fifth time, What the hell are you talking about? We’re both English speakers, so naturally we associate roughly the same stuff with the word “triangle.” Why would anybody expect anything different? If you connected yellow oblong fruit with it, we’d say you didn’t understand the word, no? So what? That’s how language works.

    It’s pattern matching.

Leave a Reply