Why does the soul need the brain?

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Why does the soul need the brain seems like a logical question especially in the context of the belief held by the leading ID proponent of the Discovery Institute Michael Egnor. He has written extensively on the theme of the immaterial soul that, in his view, is an independent entity, separate of the human body. What Dr. Egnor consistently fails to acknowledge is the obvious connection or interdependence between a functioning brain and self-awareness or consciousness. I wrote about it here.

If certain parts of human brain are damaged or disabled, just like in case of general anesthesia, the human brain loses the sense of consciousness or self-awareness either permanently or temporarily. The immaterial soul fails to make up for the damaged or disabled brain…

Dr. Egnor’s personal experiences (and he has many) as a neurosurgeon convinced him that many people, including many of his patients, with the great majority of their brains missing have developed and function normally. Egnor is convinced that an immaterial soul makes up for the loss of brain mass that is responsible for normal brain function in people with normal brain size or no damage to any of the brain parts.

It appears Dr. Egnor believes that unlike a computer software that can’t function without the computer hardware, human brain has an ability to make up for the loss of the hardware with the computer software – the immaterial soul.

Is Dr. Egnor’s view consistent with the readily available facts?
I personally see Dr. Egnor building and supporting a strawman by his selective choice of facts…Hey! That’s my opinion and that’s why we have this blog full of experts to disagree with me or Dr. Egnor…(I kinda like the guy though).

Let’s see…First off, not all cases of patients with missing parts of their brains experience the supposed miraculous saving powers of the immaterial soul. It appears that the amount of the missing part of the brain mass doesn’t seem to matter… What seems to matter more is which part (s) of the brain is missing and not how much of the brain mass is actually missing. Some parts of the brain seem essential for consciousness and self-awareness and others do not.

However, the main point of this OP is:

<strong> Why does the soul need the brain? Or why would human body need a brain at all, if the immaterial soul has an ability to compensate for the brain losses?

If the software (the soul) can operate without the hardware (the brain) why do we even need the brain in the first place?</strong>

It seems like a faulty or at least a wasteful design to me…

1,372 thoughts on “Why does the soul need the brain?”

  1. This from the keiths who says that the definition of creationism doesn’t matter.

    This from the Mung who will stoop ever lower in an effort to discredit a superior opponent.

    As anyone who’s actually followed the discussion knows, I’m arguing that the precise definition of creationism doesn’t matter in the context of my argument, since the argument defeats guided evolution as well as creationism and common design. Stake an ID position anywhere along that spectrum, and you’ve chosen one that is defeated by my argument.

  2. CharlieM: An imaginary unchanging unicorn is certainly less real than a physical horse. But this bears no resemblance to the concept tetrahedron.

    Why not?

  3. keiths: But that’s a pure Mungism. It didn’t come from me. The error is yours.

    That’s a disappointment to you, of course. You were excited because you thought you had caught me in a Mungish mistake. How frustrating for you to realize that it was you who had blown it, yet again.

    Good. Actual progress. Your “Statement 2” isn’t a statement, it’s two statements. And you believe both statements to be true. However, you say, there is no logical connection between the two. But that’s absurd. You obviously think there is a logical connection between the two. So what is it?

    I wasn’t the one who said “therefore.” That was your fervid imagination at play again. I spoke of an argument by analogy. So the logical connection wasn’t “therefore” as you claimed, it was one of by the same or similar process of reasoning. Even you ought to be able to get that.

    Yet you fail to put forth the argument that would connect the two. They are just two statements that you believe to be true with no argument to support either one. You don’t have an argument. You just have your beliefs. Thanks for sharing.

  4. CharlieM: An imaginary unchanging unicorn is certainly less real than a physical horse. But this bears no resemblance to the concept tetrahedron.

    Why not?

    CharlieM: The concept unicorn horn brings up the concepts unicorn, mythical beast, human imagination

    It “brings them up”? Like phlegm?

    CharlieM: Thinking tells us that unicorn horns come from a source which has much in common with Tolkein’s map.

    I think you need to be a bit more wary about what “thinking tells you.”

    ETA: I note that the concept “black swan” also “brought up the concept” mythical beast–until they were discovered to exist. So what happened, was the concept “less real” than an actual horse until that time, but “more real” after?

  5. CharlieM: So obviously your imaginary potato does not accord with reality.

    keiths thinks that the ideal tetrahedron is imaginary. A fiction that someone created. Like Middle Earth. So, he reasons, since middle earth is not real, neither is the ideal tetrahedron real. He doesn’t seem to actually understand his reasoning though.

  6. Mung: keiths thinks that the ideal tetrahedron is imaginary. A fiction that someone created. Like Middle Earth. So, he reasons, since middle earth is not real, neither is the ideal tetrahedron real. He doesn’t seem to actually understand his reasoning though.

    I think he may actually be saying that the idea of middle earth is like the idea of a perfect tetrahedon. Neither has any physical correlates in the real world. No hobbits or perfect geometrical figures–anywhere.

  7. keiths: I’m arguing that the precise definition of creationism doesn’t matter in the context of my argument, since the argument defeats guided evolution as well as creationism and common design.

    You claimed that scientists create models and test those models. You claimed that one of the models created and tested by scientists is the “creationism” model. You haven’t supported that claim.

  8. Bruce,

    But are elements of social reality anything over and above their particular physical realizations?

    I don’t think so. If I did think that, then I wouldn’t be a physicalist!

    One could ask if moral norms are anything over and above the dispositions of individuals in situations calling for moral judgement or actions.

    Yes, because a mere disposition to act in a certain way doesn’t automatically qualify as a moral norm. Also, whether a situation “calls for moral judgment or actions” is itself a moral judgment.

    Moral norms are also distinct in that they are typically taken to be morally binding, even on those who don’t share the disposition in question.

    Having said all of that, I still maintain that moral norms are physical. If they weren’t physical, how could they exert causal influence over our physical brains?

    For example, if moral norms are social/cultural constructions, then presumably the dispositions of some individuals in the culture could be morally wrong or inapt according to their cultures norm. In what sense, if any, is that norm real?

    It’s real in the sense that the underlying phenomena are all physical. It’s ultimately about beliefs and the brain states that instantiate them.

  9. Bruce: One could ask if moral norms are anything over and above the dispositions of individuals in situations calling for moral judgement or actions.

    keiths: Yes, because a mere disposition to act in a certain way doesn’t automatically qualify as a moral norm.

    Is it clear that even “mere dispositions to act in certain ways” are reducible to non-dispositional physical qualities?

  10. walto: I think he may actually be saying that the idea of middle earth is like the idea of a perfect tetrahedon. Neither has any physical correlates in the real world. No hobbits or perfect geometrical figures–anywhere.

    Yet he believes we can create representations of them that are physical, and therefore real. If it’s physical, then it is real. If it is not physical, then it is not real. That’s his religion.

    How does he know that only physical “things” are real?

    It would seem that he believes that we each create our own reality. What is real for me may not be real for you. If I can imagine it, then it is not real. Until I create a physical representation of it in my brain. Then the representation of it is real. But the thing imagined remains not real. How odd.

  11. Mung: What is real for me may not be real for you. If I can imagine it, then it is not real.

    Not sure he’d agree with those.

    Mung: the representation of it is real. But the thing imagined remains not real. How odd.

    Pretty popular view, actually.

  12. Mung:

    So, he [keiths] reasons, since middle earth is not real, neither is the ideal tetrahedron real.

    No, that’s not my reasoning. I’m not stupid enough to make such a Mungish argument.

    walto:

    I think he may actually be saying that the idea of middle earth is like the idea of a perfect tetrahedon. Neither has any physical correlates in the real world. No hobbits or perfect geometrical figures–anywhere.

    That’s right. The representations are real, but their referents are not. They are similar in that respect.

    Mung’s error is to think that if I point to the similarity, I must be arguing that since Middle Earth is unreal, the ideal tetrahedron must also be unreal. That’s just Mungish goofiness.

  13. Mung:

    the representation of it is real. But the thing imagined remains not real. How odd.

    walto:

    Pretty popular view, actually.

    Mung, do you think Middle Earth is real? Why not book a plane ticket there and report back to us?

    The map I posted is real. Middle Earth is not. This is comprehensible to most fourth-graders, though evidently not to you.

  14. It would seem that he believes that we each create our own reality. What is real for me may not be real for you. If I can imagine it, then it is not real.

    Holy crap, Mung. Where do you get these ideas?

  15. keiths: That’s just Mungish goofiness.

    That’s just you, not reading what I wrote.

    Do you or do you not believe that the ideal tetrahedron is imaginary? Do you believe the ideal tetrahedron is fictional, like Middle Earth?

    These are very simple straight-forward questions which you ought to be able to answer.

  16. Neil Rickert: So you claim to be able to read the thoughts of dead people?

    So can you explain to us your concept of a tetrahedron and how it differs from the conception of anybody else?

  17. keiths: Mung, do you think Middle Earth is real? Why not book a plane ticket there and report back to us?

    Why don’t you book a plane ticket to the sun and report back to us once you’ve been there? So I guess the sun is not real. Or is your test for what is real or not real just utterly ludicrous. Yeah, probably the latter.

    How did you not see that coming. Seriously. Do you even think before you write?

  18. walto,

    Is it clear that even “mere dispositions to act in certain ways” are reducible to non-dispositional physical qualities?

    I would say yes. To say that someone is disposed to act in certain ways is just a shorthand. It cashes out in physical terms: the physical person, in certain physical situations, will behave in certain ways, all due to the laws of physics.

    Given that you accept the causal closure of the physical, what other possibility is there?

  20. keiths: Heh. Mung is getting about as wound-up as J-Mac.

    That’s funny. Why not just laugh with me about how silly your logic is.

    If you can’t book a plane ticket and fly there it must not be real.

    Hilarious.

  21. walto:

    CharlieM: An imaginary unchanging unicorn is certainly less real than a physical horse. But this bears no resemblance to the concept tetrahedron.

    Why not?

    Because in essence a tetrahedron is a 3 dimensional figure with 6 edges and 4 faces. It is not a human invention and does not depend on its relationship to humans. A unicorn is essentially the invention of human imagination.

  22. Mung,

    Do you or do you not believe that the ideal tetrahedron is imaginary? Do you believe the ideal tetrahedron is fictional, like Middle Earth?

    Let me repeat my recommendation:

    There is a process known as “reading comprehension”, by which brighter folks can discern the meaning of texts printed on paper or displayed on a computer monitor. It must seem impossible and magical to you, given your cognitive limitations, but it is actually routine for competent folks in many areas of expertise.

    I’ve suggested it before, and I’ll suggest it again: take a reading comprehension course. True, the acquisition of such skills might be out of your reach, but isn’t it worth a shot?

  23. Mung:

    the representation of it is real. But the thing imagined remains not real. How odd.

    For laughs, can you tell us why you think that is “odd”?

  24. keiths:

    Mung’s error is to think that if I point to the similarity, I must be arguing that since Middle Earth is unreal, the ideal tetrahedron must also be unreal. That’s just Mungish goofiness.

    Mung:

    That’s just you, not reading what I wrote.

    Mung, a few minutes earlier:

    So, he reasons, since middle earth is not real, neither is the ideal tetrahedron real.

    Oops.

  25. CharlieM: So can you explain to us your concept of a tetrahedron and how it differs from the conception of anybody else?

    There’s no basis for even being able to make such a comparison.

  26. walto:

    I think you need to be a bit more wary about what “thinking tells you.”

    ETA: I note that the concept “black swan” also “brought up the concept” mythical beast–until they were discovered to exist. So what happened, was the concept “less real” than an actual horse until that time, but “more real” after?

    So human concepts of black swans were enhanced due to human experience. In what way has the concept of tetrahedrons changed or in what way is it likely to change in the future?

  27. keiths: For laughs, can you tell us why you think that is “odd”?

    Sure. Because I cannot book a plane ticket and fly there.

  28. keiths:
    walto,

    I would say yes.To say that someone is disposed to act in certain ways is just a shorthand.It cashes out in physical terms:the physical person, in certain physical situations, will behave in certain ways, all due to the laws of physics.

    Given that you accept the causal closure of the physical, what other possibility is there?

    Not sure. Take “gullible”–I take that means something like easy to fool.Would you say that a complete description of the universe requires a reduction of that kind of thing (if there really IS any such thing) at all? If we wait long enough, will physics get to that?

  29. CharlieM: So human concepts of black swans were enhanced due to human experience. In what way has the concept of tetrahedrons changed or in what way is it likely to change in the future?

    We learn that there’s an example of a really nice one near Sydney, Australia. Much like the concept of black swan. If one has changed the other has too. If one hasn’t changed, neither has the other.

  30. walto: I think he may actually be saying that the idea of middle earth is like the idea of a perfect tetrahedon. Neither has any physical correlates in the real world. No hobbits or perfect geometrical figures–anywhere.

    We are in agreement that there are no hobbits or perfect geometrical figures anywhere in the physical world. What we still have to decide is how the physical world relates to reality.

  31. walto:

    Is it clear that even “mere dispositions to act in certain ways” are reducible to non-dispositional physical qualities?

    keiths:

    I would say yes. To say that someone is disposed to act in certain ways is just a shorthand. It cashes out in physical terms: the physical person, in certain physical situations, will behave in certain ways, all due to the laws of physics.

    Given that you accept the causal closure of the physical, what other possibility is there?

    walto:

    Not sure. Take “gullible”–I take that means something like easy to fool.Would you say that a complete description of the universe requires a reduction of that kind of thing (if there really IS any such thing) at all?

    To say that someone is gullible is a shorthand, just as it is a shorthand to say that they are disposed to act in certain ways. As was the case for dispositions, the shorthand cashes out in physical terms: the physical person, in certain physical situations (in which dumb ideas are being presented to him or her), will respond in certain ways (by adopting those dumb ideas, which amounts to a change in brain state), all due to the laws of physics.

    Again, I can’t see anything non-physical about it.

  32. Neil Rickert: There’s no basis for even being able to make such a comparison.

    You are avoiding the question. If certain of our concepts don’t align how is science possible?

  33. keiths: …all due to the laws of physics.

    Do you mean caused by the laws of physics?

    Gullible was a good choice walto. 😉

  34. walto: We learn that there’s an example of a really nice one near Sydney, Australia. Much like the concept of black swan. If one has changed the other has too. If one hasn’t changed, neither has the other.

    A really nice what near Sydney?

  36. Neil Rickert: We know that science is possible, because we see it in action.

    Can you give us a specific example of what we see in action?

  39. keiths:

    For the sake of convenience, I’ve gathered some relevant comments from our discussion in the old thread — a discussion in which you were trying to defend an externalist, causal history view of semantics.

    Bruce:

    I’m sorry but I have no interest in revisiting that discussion.

    There’s no point in rehashing it unless you have a better argument to offer this time.

    However, I wanted to remind you of the problems you ran into when trying to base meanings on causal history, and to point out that the problems aren’t merely scientific, but also philosophical. (And of course we want our explanations to be both scientifically and philosophically valid.)

  40. keiths: the physical person, in certain physical situations (in which dumb ideas are being presented to him or her), will respond in certain ways….Again, I can’t see anything non-physical about it.

    Maybe, but they’re obviously weird. I mean, first we have to suppose it’s a “will” there rather than a (is inclined to). Second, they’re counterfactual: there may never be any relevant situations with which the person is confronted.

    Please note that I don’t say they aren’t physical, I just say they are weird. I don’t know what they ARE. FWIW, I don’t share the general ethos at TSZ, that one must take a position on every freaking thing under the sun. (E.g., You attributed a position to me on something or other a day or two ago because I thought there might be a flaw in an argument in a paper to which Bruce provided a link (a paper which you said you hadn’t read, but indicated that my criticism of it contained an irrelevancy). I have no position myself on whatever the hell the main issue was–and am unlikely to ever have one.

    I’ll go further and say this: (i) that Charlie wants to enlighten everyone on the problem of universals (ffs!) based on his reading of one bad philosopher; and (ii) that J-Mac wants to enlighten everyone on the correct interpretation of QM based on watching a couple of youtube videos, are pretty funny. My own usual position on most difficult questions of philosophy and science is “How the hell should I know?” But those guys, with their crappy sources, are sure as shootin’!

  41. keiths: There’s no point in rehashing it unless you have a better argument to offer this time.

    Fuck off, keiths. {Not an ad hom!}

  42. Neil Rickert: One thing that we see in action, is CharlieM repeatedly shifting the goalposts.

    The goalposts are imaginary. It is the representation that is real.

  43. walto: example of a tetrahedron

    And how does this prove that our concept of the ideal tetrahedron has changed?

  45. Neil Rickert: One thing that we see in action, is CharlieM repeatedly shifting the goalposts.

    All I have done is ask a simple question, but of course you are not obliged to answer it.

  46. keiths is, rather obviously, far more intelligent than I can ever hope to be. I don’t even begin to aspire to such heights.

    But how does he know that representations are themselves real?

    How does he know that representations are themselves physical?

    And keiths, “what else could they be” is not an argument.

  47. CharlieM: And how does this prove that our concept of the ideal tetrahedron has changed?

    It’s not intended to prove that. I’ll say it again–if you think it has changed, then you must also think that the concept of black swan has changed, if you think it hasn’t changed, then you should also think that the concept of black swan hasn’t changed.

    You said they’re different–I’d like to know how.

  48. keiths:

    To say that someone is gullible is a shorthand, just as it is a shorthand to say that they are disposed to act in certain ways. As was the case for dispositions, the shorthand cashes out in physical terms: the physical person, in certain physical situations (in which dumb ideas are being presented to him or her), will respond in certain ways (by adopting those dumb ideas, which amounts to a change in brain state), all due to the laws of physics.

    Again, I can’t see anything non-physical about it.

    walto:

    Maybe, but they’re obviously weird.

    I don’t get why you think they’re “weird”.

    I mean, first we have to suppose it’s a “will” there.

    What’s wrong with that?

    Second, they’re counterfactual: there may never be any relevant situations with which the person is confronted.

    True, but that isn’t a problem. Counterfactuals are as routine in physics as they are elsewhere.

    Remember my “bowling ball on the wooden ramp” thought experiment from a recent thread? We can predict what the bowling ball would do in that scenario even if no one ever actually constructs the ramp and performs the experiment.

    “If the experiment is performed, the bowling ball will do this” is really no different from “If the gullible person is presented with this dumb idea, he or she will believe it”. It’s about what would happen in two specific physical situations, whether or not those situations ever actually obtain.

  49. Mung,

    keiths is, rather obviously, far more intelligent than I can ever hope to be. I don’t even begin to aspire to such heights.

    But how does he know that representations are themselves real?

    How does he know that representations are themselves physical?

    Someone presents you with a map of Middle Earth, printed on paper. Are you really unable to determine that the map is physical, and that it is real?

  50. walto: FWIW, I don’t share the general ethos at TSZ, that one must take a position on every freaking thing under the sun.

    I agree with that.

    I’ll go further and say this: (i) that Charlie wants to enlighten everyone on the problem of universals (ffs!) based on his reading of one bad philosopher; and (ii) that J-Mac wants to enlighten everyone on the correct interpretation of QM based on watching a couple of youtube videos, are pretty funny.

    And I also agree with that.

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