Why does the soul need the brain?

Why does the soul need the brain seems like a logical question especially in the context of the belief held by the leading ID proponent of the Discovery Institute Michael Egnor. He has written extensively on the theme of the immaterial soul that, in his view, is an independent entity, separate of the human body. What Dr. Egnor consistently fails to acknowledge is the obvious connection or interdependence between a functioning brain and self-awareness or consciousness. I wrote about it here.

If certain parts of human brain are damaged or disabled, just like in case of general anesthesia, the human brain loses the sense of consciousness or self-awareness either permanently or temporarily. The immaterial soul fails to make up for the damaged or disabled brain…

Dr. Egnor’s personal experiences (and he has many) as a neurosurgeon convinced him that many people, including many of his patients, with the great majority of their brains missing have developed and function normally. Egnor is convinced that an immaterial soul makes up for the loss of brain mass that is responsible for normal brain function in people with normal brain size or no damage to any of the brain parts.

It appears Dr. Egnor believes that unlike a computer software that can’t function without the computer hardware, human brain has an ability to make up for the loss of the hardware with the computer software – the immaterial soul.

Is Dr. Egnor’s view consistent with the readily available facts?
I personally see Dr. Egnor building and supporting a strawman by his selective choice of facts…Hey! That’s my opinion and that’s why we have this blog full of experts to disagree with me or Dr. Egnor…(I kinda like the guy though).

Let’s see…First off, not all cases of patients with missing parts of their brains experience the supposed miraculous saving powers of the immaterial soul. It appears that the amount of the missing part of the brain mass doesn’t seem to matter… What seems to matter more is which part (s) of the brain is missing and not how much of the brain mass is actually missing. Some parts of the brain seem essential for consciousness and self-awareness and others do not.

However, the main point of this OP is:

<strong> Why does the soul need the brain? Or why would human body need a brain at all, if the immaterial soul has an ability to compensate for the brain losses?

If the software (the soul) can operate without the hardware (the brain) why do we even need the brain in the first place?</strong>

It seems like a faulty or at least a wasteful design to me…

1,372 thoughts on “Why does the soul need the brain?

  1. Alan Fox: But here is an interesting TED talk about the divided brain by neuroscientist Iain McGilchrist

    OK, in your opinion are brain and the mind and the self the same thing??

    peace

  2. Neil Rickert: My disagreement with KN would apply just as well to that Piccinini article.

    I don’t have a problem with his definition of “computation”, except that “certain degrees of freedom” seems hopelessly vague.

    When it boils down, Piccinini is talking about homomorphisms between neural states and states of the world.But those states of the world are presumably what KN refers to as empirical states.And those are precisely what I am say are human artifacts.And if they are human artifacts, then you cannot just use them in your arguments and theories without giving a hint as to where they come from.

    Piccinini has a whole book explaining that definition that addresses the vagueness issue (among many others). Also many online articles that I can cite if you are interested.

    I’m not sure what KN meant, but I understand your concern is that the only way to talk about states of the world is when we already have a conceptual system in place. So to avoid that, we need a theory that avoids that assumption and builds representations from a reasonable genetic inheritance plus bottom up sensorimotor perceptions.*

    Predictive Processing has been advanced as addressing that issue. I found these articles helpful.
    Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars

    Predictive coding and representationalism

    Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Intentionality
    (KN also cited that last one as I recall in other posts).

    These articles detail how PP (a form of Bayesian modelling) addresses the issues with representation, including the issue I understand you to be concerned with. Roughly, it involves building structural representations with a structure that maps to a reliable ( not the) causal structure of the world which is relevant to the perceivers evolved environmental niche.

    Of course, you also need to show how neural processes implement PP/can be explained by PP and that too is ongoing work.

    —————————–
    * I think Fodor solved this issue by claiming concepts were in innate, at least at one point career

  3. Neil Rickert: As far as I’m concerned, any mention of “mind” is metaphorical.

    So in your opinion the mind is a fiction.
    Do you think it’s the same for the self?

    peace

  4. BruceS: Oops, maybe I screwed this up — it was the NYT article I was referring to.

    My mistake, actually.

    As far as I know, the NY Times does not paywall “The Stone”. Or, at least, I have never had a problem there.

  5. BruceS: Right now, both Prinz style neurofunctionalism (close to identity theory) and Dennett’s illusionism make the most sense to me as attempts to explain phenomenality In The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett there are papers by Prinz and by Clark (extending illusionism) where they each try to show that their approaches are what Dennett should believe in light of his past work.

    That’s an excellent collection. I also think the articles by Kukla and by Huebner extend the Dennettian project in really powerful ways.

    I’ve been thinking about the Piccinini article on the cognitive neuroscience of intentionality and how it relates to my Sellarsian worries.

    The shortest version is that I think the way to “naturalize intentionality” is by giving a naturalistic explanation of socio-linguistic practices (as Joe Rouse and Mark Okrent do in their work), and that intentionality can be naturalized but not (if you will) “neuralized”. The role of picturing as distinct from intentionality is to explain the cognitive role of neural representations without taking them as symbols, concepts, meaningful tokens, etc.

    The impossibility of assigning intentional states to neurocomputational states the main reason why I reject the mind-brain identity thesis. It’s also my main complaint against Fodor and Churchland, who only disagree about architecture of neurocomputational states (classical vs. connectionist).

    walto: Keep in mind (as it seems KN did not) that “my argument” was not that identity theory is true, but that it is popular.

    I apologize if you thought I was attributing mind-brain identity theory to you. Rest assured, I was not taking you to be asserting that mind-brain identity is true! I only responded at length as I did — giving my own reasons for rejecting mind-brain identity — because I wanted to clarify my own position, not argue against yours.

  6. BruceS: I’m not sure what KN meant, but I understand your concern is that the only way to talk about states of the world is when we already have a conceptual system in place.

    Okay, that’s a fair enough summary.

    So to avoid that, we need a theory that avoids that assumption and builds representations from a reasonable genetic inheritance plus bottom up sensorimotor perceptions.

    No, that would not solve the problem. That would only attempt to explain away the problem.

    What we need, is a theory about how we build a useful conceptual system.

    Predictive Processing has been advanced as addressing that issue.

    I’ve looked through the articles that you linked. I don’t see them as solving the problem. Or, to say it differently, I see them as attempting to explain away the problem.

    In some sense, they are arguing for “The Systems Reply” to Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument. While I agree with “The Systems Reply”, I don’t see those articles as successfully making the case that what they propose could be implemented and would perform in the way that is needed for “The Systems Reply.”

    The issue is intentionality. There’s the old saying “Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it.” Likewise, all philosophers talk about the intentionality problem, but none of them does anything about it.

  7. Kantian Naturalist:

    The shortest version is that I think the way to “naturalize intentionality” is by giving a naturalistic explanation of socio-linguistic practices (as Joe Rouse and Mark Okrent do in their work), and that intentionality can be naturalized but not (if you will) “neuralized”. The role of picturing as distinct from intentionality is to explain the cognitive role of neural representations without taking them as symbols, concepts, meaningful tokens, etc.

    I apologize if you thought I was attributing mind-brain identity theory to you.

    On my understanding of Dennett’s thoughts on Brandom, Dennett takes the bottom up view (ie explain content and intentionality bottom up first via Millikan telesemantics, then bring in language) whereas Brandom takes view that intentionality (or at least human intentionality) can only be understood by starting with language and the social practices which make it possible. ( I probably need some more weasel words to cover my on that opinion, like “on my very rough understanding”).

    I think that is a right vs left Sellarsian sort of thing.

    These days, I am not really sure whether Dennett’s embracing of PP means he is now closer to a realist about intentionality, or whether he is sticking to the anti-realism (?) of at least his initial take on the intentional stance.

    As for mind-brain identity, that reminds me I need to cover my behind on my exchange with FMM on that.

  8. Neil Rickert: The issue is intentionality. There’s the old saying “Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it.” Likewise, all philosophers talk about the intentionality problem, but none of them does anything about it.

    What do you take “doing something” about intentionality to consist of? What is “the intentionality problem”, and what would “solving” it look like?

    I ask because I’ve written a good deal on intentionality (one article and one book) and I don’t see intentionality as being a “problem” to be “solved”. I’m curious as to why you do.

  9. fifthmonarchyman: So in your opinion the mind is a fiction.

    I prefer “metaphor” to “fiction”.

    Roughly speaking, “mind” is supposed to be the thinking organ. In my view, it is the whole person that thinks, not some part of the person.

  10. Neil Rickert: Okay, that’s a fair enough summary.

    No, that would not solve the problem.That would only attempt to explain away the problem.

    OK, thanks for the response. I guess I am not clear on why you say “explain away” rather than (make a start at) a scientific explanation That is, why the “away”. What is missing?

    FWIW, I see PP as more akin to the Robot reply and with more details about the how the robot would work. But even better, the structural representation approach is trying to dissolve Searle’s issue by refusing to separate syntax and semantics.

  11. BruceS to fmm: I’d prefer that if you have an argument to make, you just make it.

    I’ve left out something important in my input on this mind/brain stuff.

    Many physicalists would deny that the mind supervenes only on the brain. Many would demand that the body be included as well as the brain. Externalists about meaning or phenomenality would want to add the environment. And those that wanted to use history as well, eg for teleosemantic approaches to representation and meaning, might add those events in the past light cone of the environment, although that attempt can definitely lead to arguments in my past experience at TSZ.

    However, for the sake of the history of our discussion, we can stick with mind supervening only on brain.

  12. BruceS: On my understanding of Dennett’s thoughts on Brandom, Dennett takes the bottom up view (ie explain content and intentionality bottom up first via Millikan telesemantics, then bring in language) whereas Brandom takes view that intentionality (or at least human intentionality) can only be understood by starting with language and the social practices which make it possible. ( I probably need some more weasel words to cover my on that opinion, like “on my very rough understanding”).

    That all seems right to me.

    I think that Brandom is very difficult in his methodology. At times he’ll say, “look, I’m doing philosophy the way David Lewis did — start off with the simplest set of assumptions you can get away with, then see how far you can get with them.” But then it’s pointed out to him what his account leaves out that needs to be explained, and he just says, “oh, I don’t see why we need that.” We can see this in his response to Dennett: Dennett objects that Brandom’s treatment of intentionality leads him to treat the discursive community as one big skyhook, and Brandom just shrugs his shoulders.

    I can see Brandom’s point that the human form of intentionality (“sapience”) is constituted by involvement in socially instituted linguistic patterns. But he denies that non-human minds (“sentience”) have a kind of intentionality, and he doesn’t have to.

    I think that is a right vs left Sellarsian sort of thing.

    Yes, that’s right.

    These days, I am not really sure whether Dennett’s embracing of PP means he is now closer to a realist about intentionality, or whether he is sticking to the anti-realism (?) of at least his initial take on the intentional stance.

    I’m happy that Dennett has embraced a version of PP but I don’t know if this makes him any clearer about realism vs anti-realism about intentionality.

    I think there’s a worry to had here about whether predictive processing can be an explanation of intentionality. If intentionality is constituted by socio-linguistic practices, then predictive processing cannot be an explanation of intentionality.

    It can be a model of the kinds of representations that brains need to implement in order for them to contribute to cognitive processes — which is valuable in roughly the same way that you need to have a model of what a transmission does in order to explain how cars work.

  13. BruceS: FWIW, I see PP as more akin to the Robot reply and with more details about the how the robot would work. But even better, the structural representation approach is trying to dissolve Searle’s issue by refusing to separate syntax and semantics.

    Maybe. I think that a good deal of cognitive neuroscience has gotten confused because it tries to answer Searle’s challenge. I don’t think that the syntax/semantics distinction is a helpful way of understanding what cognitive neuroscience, even predictive processing, is actually doing.

    Even if it’s helpful to model brains as Bayesian hierarchies, that’s a far cry from what Searle had in mind when he talked about “syntax”: he was talking the symbols printed on the tape of a universal Turing machine.

    It’s helpful to point out that the Chinese room is supposed to be an illustration of the syntax/semantics distinction. But in the formal presentation of the argument, the syntax/semantics distinction is a premise. Searle doesn’t argue for it. The Chinese room is supposed to be an intuition pump that gets us to see that the syntax/semantics distinction is obvious.

    The argument itself, formally presented, is rather this.

    1. Syntax is neither necessary nor sufficient for semantics.
    2. Computer programs are syntactical structures.
    3. Mindedness involves awareness of meanings.
    4. Therefore, no program could be a mind.

  14. BruceS: Many would demand that the body be included as well as the brain. Externalists about meaning or phenomenality would want to add the environment. And those that wanted to use history as well, eg for teleosemantic approaches to representation and meaning, might add those events in the past light cone of the environment, although that attempt can definitely lead to arguments in my past experience at TSZ.

    That’s definitely the direction in which I’d want to go.

  15. Neil Rickert: Roughly speaking, “mind” is supposed to be the thinking organ. In my view, it is the whole person that thinks, not some part of the person.

    Cool, I agree.

    If you were a physicalist do you expect that you would think two identical brain/bodies would constitute one mind or two?

    Peace

  16. BruceS: Externalists about meaning or phenomenality would want to add the environment. And those that wanted to use history as well

    None of that is important for the thought experiment.

    It it stipulated that the two brain/bodies are indistinguishable. From the perspective of the observer that would entail that their environment and history would be indistinguishable as well.

    one mind or two??
    same person or not??

    peace

  17. Kantian Naturalist:

    I think there’s a worry to had here about whether predictive processing can be an explanation of intentionality. If intentionality is constituted by socio-linguistic practices, then predictive processing cannot be an explanation of intentionality.

    It can be a model of the kinds of representations that brains need to implement in order for them to contribute to cognitive processes — which is valuable in roughly the same way that you need to have a model of what a transmission does in order to explain how cars work.

    My hopes would be to go with Boone and Piccinini’s* multilevel neurocognitive mechanisms in The Cogntive Neursoscience Revolution These mechanisms extend beyond the individual so as to model individuals as components in the mechanism of social-linguistic practices. That aligns with your car metaphor as I understand it

    Then use PP to explain the causal interactions of the components of the mechanisms in individuals.

    But I don’t know if that sort of hope can be given any sort of solid philosophical or scientific basis. Clark gestures at some of it in section 9.5 of his Surfing book.

    ———————–
    * Yes him again. I admit to playing favorites in my reading.

  18. BruceS: y hopes would be to go with Boone and Piccinini’s* multilevel neurocognitive mechanisms in The Cogntive Neursoscience Revolution These mechanisms extend beyond the individual so as to model individuals as components in the mechanism of social-linguistic practices. That aligns with your car metaphor as I understand it

    Then use PP to explain the causal interactions of the components of the mechanisms in individuals.

    But I don’t know if that sort of hope can be given any sort of solid philosophical or scientific basis. Clark gestures at some of it in section 9.5 of his Surfing book.

    That would be exactly my strategy, too. In fact it’s pretty much the strategy that Sellars advocated, if my interpretation of him is correct.

    It might interest you to know that Bryce Huebner has some worries about whether predictive processing can really do the work of picturing as I argue. I think his worry is that predictive processing separates out the hierarchy into levels too strictly, so that it would have to be the case that each level is a separate picturing of the levels below it. But he’s waiting on me to publish my piece before he publishes his criticism.

  19. fifthmonarchyman: If you were a physicalist do you expect that you would think two identical brain/bodies would constitute one mind or two?

    I’m not sure that even makes sense.

    For two brains/bodies to be physically identical, they would have to both be in the same physical location (exactly the same, not just adjacent). So how could they be two if they are in the same location?

  20. BruceS: FWIW, I see PP as more akin to the Robot reply and with more details about the how the robot would work.

    I’m okay with the Robot reply. But it does need details on how the robot would work, and I’m skeptical that enough detail is given.

  21. fifthmonarchyman: None of that is important for the thought experiment.

    It it stipulated that the two brain/bodies are indistinguishable. From the perspective of the observer that would entail that their environment and history would be indistinguishable as well.

    one mind or two??
    same person or not??

    peace

    Umm, I already answered that and I have not changed my mind
    (or my brain in such a way that would have changed my mind) in the last day or two.

    Two, not.

    What about my post asking you to provide a complete argument rather than asking me to define stuff like mind and self and, as part of that, to explain why you see any contradiction in the physicalist position.

    I will be happy to comment further once I see such an argument.

    ETA: add more “humor” and mind/brain stuff

  22. Neil Rickert: I’m okay with the Robot reply.But it does need details on how the robot would work, and I’m skeptical that enough detail is given.

    I won’t argue with that type of skepticism. It’s definitely still a work in progress on many fronts, and there are competing research programs in both science and philosophy.

  23. Neil Rickert: I’m not sure that even makes sense.

    For two brains/bodies to be physically identical, they would have to both be in the same physical location (exactly the same, not just adjacent).So how could they be two if they are in the same location?

    My view is that if I can argue with FMM about the quantum immortality thought experiment, I will not quibble regarding such details on this one.

    Look how far I have got with that approach to FMM discussions!

  24. Neil Rickert: For two brains/bodies to be physically identical, they would have to both be in the same physical location

    You might need to ask walto about this one.

    It has something to do with a Symmetric universe or the multiverse or the many worlds hypothesis.

    The point is that there was a paper demonstrating that it was possible so we need suspend disbelief and follow through with the thought experiment.

    😉

    peace

  25. Kantian Naturalist: What do you take “doing something” about intentionality to consist of?

    Giving an account of how language statements connect to reality.

    Most science does this well for the specific instances that the science deals with. However, String Theory in physics seems to have completely failed here and that is why it often criticized.

    The general problem is that connecting statements to reality typically involves ad hoc pragmatic decisions, and it has an unavoidable subjective component.

    I’ve been posting on this on my own blog, since around January this year.

  26. BruceS: What about my post asking you to provide a complete argument rather than asking me to define stuff like mind and self and, as part of that, to explain why you see any contradiction in the physicalist position.

    I don’t have complete argument.

    I have an impression that claiming that the mind is nothing but the brain/body and at the same time that two identical brain/bodies will yield two different minds is a brazen logical contradiction.

    You claim it’s not so I assume I’m confused as to your definitions of mind or self.

    hence I need to ask for clarification

    peace

  27. fifthmonarchyman: I don’t have complete argument.

    I have an impression that claiming that the mind is nothing but the brain/body and at the same time that two identical brain/bodies will yield two different minds is a brazen logical contradiction.

    You claim it’s not so I assume I’m confused as to your definitions of mind or self.

    hence I need to ask for clarification

    peace

    Ok, understood. I am bowing out now.

  28. Kantian Naturalist: That would be exactly my strategy, too. In fact it’s pretty much the strategy that Sellars advocated, if my interpretation of him is correct.

    Good luck with your work. I’d be interested in reading once published so please let us know.

  29. BruceS: I will be happy to comment further once I see such an argument.

    So you won’t clarify your position until I provide a complete argument as to why it’s wrong??

    Does that approach prove fruitful very often?

    peace

  30. BruceS: Ok, understood. I am bowing out now.

    Interesting

    That seems to be a popular tactic lately. At least you refrained from spouting nonsense syllables and mocking Christianity.

    That is something I guess

    peace

  31. fifthmonarchyman: So you won’t clarify your position until I provide a complete argument as to why it’s wrong??

    I am not at all asking for you to show my position is wrong. I am asking you to state a position and argue for it. I don’t want to continue to elaborate mine in dribbles until I understand what you are arguing for. I promise to be constructive in my reply: I want to show where we differ, not simply argue against whatever you post.

    I tried to help by providing sources for the definitions you might use but I cannot help you formulate a position and justify it; in fact, I am not even sure if you have presented something explicit on the issue of physicalism, mind, and brains.

    Does that approach prove fruitful very often?

    Yes, in the type of discussion that interest me, I believe it is fair to ask the person I am having a discussion with to provide some attempt at definitions of terms as premises and then to present a clear argument for a position they are defending.

    Those are certainly the standards that I see implied by in the Mertonian Norms and that is the approach one sees in the philosophical and scientific literature I read.

    That’s my encore and now I am definitely bowing out.

  32. Bruce:

    Ok, understood. I am bowing out now.

    fifth:

    Interesting

    That seems to be a popular tactic lately.

    …says fifth, who is hiding behind his Ignore button.

  33. fifth,

    I don’t have complete argument.

    I have an impression that claiming that the mind is nothing but the brain/body and at the same time that two identical brain/bodies will yield two different minds is a brazen logical contradiction.

    The brighter folks recognize that there is no contradiction, much less a “brazen” one.

    I’ve explained your error here.

  34. BruceS to FMM,

    I thought about this and decided maybe I was asking you to do something I had not done, at least not as explicitly as I could have. So:

    1. Physicalism says all that exists is physical or supervenes on the physical.
    2. Brains are physical. Minds supervene on brains.
    3. Your thought experiment postulates two brains which are not numerically identical.
    4. Hence there must be two minds as well.

    1. Personal identity is a philosophical issue, not a scientific one.
    2. The philosophy I am familiar with would say personal identity depends on brains and causal history (and maybe bodies, but maybe not). Of course, depending on brains means minds are there too from the above argument.
    3. Since your thought experiment postulates separate brains and causal histories, and in particular there are no complications like splits or fusions, then I think most philosophers would agree there are two persons.

    I don’t see the concept of self as relevant to the argument and I see no value in adding it.

    Over to you.

  35. BruceS,

    It’s good that you point out to fmm (for all the good it will do) that the two bodies would not be numerically identical, whether they are discernible or not. And it takes a particularly weird world for that to take place–i.e., weird enough, apparently, that neither fmm nor his omniscient buddy can fathom it.

  36. BruceS: 3. Your thought experiment postulates two brains which are not numerically identical.

    Now perhaps we are getting somewhere. Yes that is correct.

    From what I understand “Numerically identical” is an attribute that would not be of any interest to the physicalist.

    Since for the physicalist all that exists is the physical, physically identical is in fact identical.

    As far as I can tell numerical differentiation would only come into play if there was a corresponding physical difference. Am I missing something?

    BruceS: Since your thought experiment postulates separate brains and causal histories, and in particular there are no complications like splits or fusions, then I think most philosophers would agree there are two persons.

    Again unless I’m mistaken,

    The physicalist is not concerned with different causal histories unless there is a corresponding physical difference.

    If things like numerical identity and an objects particular causal history are important here we are clearly moving beyond the physical and what ever supervenes on the physical.

    Do you disagree? If so, why?

    peace

  37. BruceS,

    BruceS,

    I think you need to keep in mind that it was you who brought up the idea of physically identical brains as a potential way to falsify dualism.

    I am only pointing out that such a thing is more of a problem to physical monism than it is to dualism.

    peace

  38. keiths: Dude

    Hmmm…
    Did the limit of the speed of light proposed by Einstein in the theory of special relativity change when Einstein proposed the general theory of relativity? Is that what you are insinuating?

    Or, you just wanted to write at least something to appear as if you understood the issues discussed here…
    The latter seems more likely to me…

  39. fifthmonarchyman: Am I missing something?

    Yes.

    Numerical identity is just identity simpliciter. Numerical distinction means you’ve got two things, not one. None of it has anything at all to do with physicalism.

  40. BruceS: It’s actually the math (and physics!) in General Relativity and QM/QFT that needs to be revisited, most likely.SR math is high school algebra.

    I don’t know enough to make any personal judgments about what types of math or physics are needed to integrate GR and QFT.

    When it comes to this level of advanced math and physics, I rely on visualizations in popularizations.Brian Greene has a nice YT video on string theory.

    Carlo Rovelli on Loop Quantum Gravity.

    But don’t try to invent a new theory starting from the pretty pictures in these videos!

    There is also the view that physics currently relies too much on new, beautiful, “natural” math, rather than just extending current but less beautiful theories.Sabine Hossenfelder has a book on that.

    The Edge piece you link seems correct in the sense that whatever way we go, the GR notions of spacetime will no longer work.

    ETA:correct “Hossenfelder”

    I’m glad you’ve changed your mind about math because Einstein wasn’t that good at math at all…at least initially… He had other mathematicians work out his math for him…
    What Einstein had was a great imagination; he could think in pictures just like most people with Asperger’s can…

  41. BruceS: These days, there is no need to invent thought experiments. The issue of Identity of Indiscernibles can be explored using real systems in Quantum Theory, eg as in
    The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and Quantum Mechanics (Ladyman & Biga 2010) since certain quantum entities share all properties but are not numerically identical. ETA: At least, according to some interpretations.
    Black gets a cite, of course. ETA: His spheres example is used as a starting point for some quantum situations that are explored.
    Bonus for J-Mac if he is reading: entanglement is involved.

    There are many QM interpretations and just as many, if not many, many more, of those confused about what those interpretations mean if they mean anything at all…

  42. walto: Numerical distinction means you’ve got two things

    For the physicalist to say we have two things there needs to be a physical differentiation between them.

    In this case there is none.

    That is the point

    peace

  43. What’s a differentiation? Numerical differences don’t imply qualitative differences. Furthermore, there’s no reason for physicalists to take a position on metaphysical– even scholastic–issues of that sort. Most of them would just snort at the entire matter. In my experience, they don’t give even a shit and a half about possible world scenarios.

  44. walto: In my experience, they don’t give even a shit and a half about possible world scenarios.

    That is my experience as well.

    If I was having a conversation with an actual consistent physicalist I would be taking another tact entirely.

    I find that folks like that (and there are several here) rarely engage in philosophical or theological discussions except to poke fun at those who of us who actually do give a S@$t.

    peace

  45. walto: Furthermore, there’s no reason for physicalists to take a position on metaphysical– even scholastic–issues of that sort.

    I don’t expect them to take a position.

    I expect the rest of us to realize the inconsistency and contradictory nature of their worldview in this regard. That is all.

    peace

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