At Evolution News and Views, David Klinghoffer presents a challenge:
Man needs meaning. We crave it, especially when faced with adversity. I challenge any Darwinist readers to write some comments down that would be suitable, not laughable, in the context of speaking to people who have lived through an event like Monday’s bombing. By all means, let me know what you come up with.
Leaving aside Klinghoffer’s conflation of “Darwinism” with atheism, and reading it as a challenge for those of us who do not believe in a supernatural deity or an afterlife (which would include me), and despite lacking the eloquence of the speakers Klinghoffer refers to, let me offer some thoughts, not on Monday’s bombing, specifically, but on violent death in general, which probably touches us all, at some time. Too many lives end far too soon:
We have one life, and it is precious, and the lives of those we love are more precious to us than our own. Even timely death leaves a void in the lives of those left, but the gap left by violent death is ragged, the raw end of hopes and plans and dreams and possibilities. Death is the end of options, and violent death is the smashing of those options; Death itself has no meaning. But our lives and actions have meaning. We mean things, we do things, we act with intention, and our acts ripple onwards, changing the courses of other lives, as our lives are changed in return. And more powerful than the ripples of evil acts are acts of love, kindness, generosity, and imagination. Like the butterfly in Peking that can cause a hurricane in New York, a child’s smile can outlive us all. Good acts are not undone by death, even violent death. We have one life, and it is precious, and no act of violence can destroy its worth.
Oh.
Oh, well…
If you must exercise your free will…
I hope you take moral responsibility for unintended adverse consequences…
It would require evidence to prove such a moral system actually exists. It doesn’t require evidence to show that it is the only option that provides for a rationally coherent moral system.
I never said or implied I could prove it actually exists. This argument was about the rational coherence of competing moral systems derived from two different assumptive bases (theism and Darwinism), not about whether or not either of them are actual.
I can’t prove there is a god. You cannot prove atheistic materialism. Both are fundamental, metaphysical assumptions. The point is, if you would rather have a rationally coherent moral system and not be, essentially, a hypocrite every time you feel moral outrage or make moral judgements on others, or buck against the social code, you need objective (as absolute) moral basis. Only theism can provide that.
I don’t see why I (an atheist materialist) should feel “hypocritical” if, for example, I lived in a society that harmed gay people and I stood up and said that I believed that gays should not be harmed.
I’m more likely to think you the hypocrite, William, for “passing the buck” to an entity whose very existence is highly questionable.
May I just say in passing that you have mentioned above that you “don’t have an altruistic bone in your body”
I think that that is rare amongst humans; and I’m glad of it.
That would be true if humans were mental automatons that had no choice but to conform to the moral landscape of the mind. What you fail to consider is that there is more to the mind than just moral architecture, and that there is (obviously) more to being a human than conformity to the mind of god.
Humans have free will. This allows them to disbelieve, deny, and irrationally justify anything, which is why humans disagree with each other on moral issues – and on any other available issue.
From Merriam Webster, definition of incoherent (the first definition refers to coherence):
Synonyms: choppy, disconnected, disjointed, unconnected
Definition of coherence:
Note: neither of these definitions say anything about non-contradictory.
Synonyms:
Note: nowhwere in the definition or synonyms does “non-contradictory” or “contradictory” spring up. Yes, if I pointed out a self-contradiction, that would make Darwinistic morality incoherent, but that is not the only thing that makes a worldview incoherent.
However, I did point out just such a contradiction. When a Darwinist chooses any moral idea, maxim or definition to organize their behavior around, they can do so only by certain fundamental principles. They do not have the principle of an objective (absolute) moral basis, so they cannot use that. What does that leave?
Unless you have an alternative, that only leaves “because I think so” (choosing definitions or maxims, such as “altruism” or “do the least harm”), or “consensus” (Liz’s verson of “objective”), which is just a collective version of “because I think so”. If one – consciously or unconsciously – using the “because I think so” principle, they have no basis by which to argue that any other “because I think so” morality is “wrong”. Therefore, nothing anyone does can be said to be “wrong” because they would be using the same “because I think so” principle. And so, Darwinists couldn’t say that anything anyone else does is wrong – but they do. Contradiction and hypocrisy.
I further showed Darwinist morality to be incoherent (as defined by Merriam-Webster) by describing how it is non-functional (haphazardly and often erroneously consequential). When immoral behavior can as easily result in personal gain and reward, and moral behavior can as easily – or more easily – cause negative results.
Please also note how the basis offered by Darwinists is empathy; they claim that they act morally because harming others causes them physical or emotional pain. One would assume that actions that do not cause them physical or emotional pain would then be okay. In essence, they are avoiding certain behaviors because it makes them feel guilty, sick, or pained; so such avoidance is self-serving, because they offer no reason to avoid doing anything that doesn’t make them feel guilty, sick or pained. If one performs altruistic acts because it makes them feel good to do so, they are again serving their own interests. Either way, Liz’s “altruism” and “do no harm” moral maxims are contradicted by the very tool she claims to employ to fashion them: empathy. When we behave according to empathy, we are essentially behaving in a self-serving way by doing for others because that is what we would want done for ourselves, and in so doing we (1) avoid empathetic pain & suffering, and/or (2) make ourselves feel good.
So, If a person does not feel guilty, sick or pained to harm others or act non-altruistically, then by the very reason the Darwinist has justified their moral behavior, another person can justify doing exactly the opposite.
Another contradiction, and more incoherence.
Then we get to, how does a Darwinist challenge the “because I think so” from another person, authority (scientific, law, government), or consensus? Is “because I think differently” a suitable basis for making such a challenge? The only way to resolve between two “because I think so” moralities is rhetoric, bribery or intimidation, because there is no presumed absolute standard by which such disagreements could even hope to be successfully arbited rationally.
So yes, I’ve demonstrated the incoherence of Darwinistic morality – at least to my satisfaction, even if not to your “because I think so” definition of “incoherent” or “because I think so” projection of your theism as if it were mine.
William J. Murray,
BTW, the above comment I made is why I don’t consider Altruism to be a sound basis for any moral system; Altruism is, essentially, doing for others what you think is in their best interests, which is just serving your empathetic feelings, balming your conscience and making youfeel good. Me, me, me, my, my, my – stripped of the pretension, “altruism” and “empathy” can be seen for what they truly are; self-service dressed up as service to others, objectifying what makes you feel good or bad and dressing up corresponding activity as “morality”.
Without an objective moral basis, it’s pure narcissism. Me, me, me, my, my, my.
Because the only principle you have available to justify your challenge against the social norm – “because I think so” – is the very principle that authorizes society to harm gay people in the first place.
My metaphysical assumption is no more “highly questionable” than the metaphysical assumptions of atheistic materialists. Also, what I’m doing is not “passing the buck”, it’s employing a necessary principle. You might as well say I “pass the buck” when I resolve an issue by referring to the Law of Identity or the Law of Non-Contradiction. There is no evidence those things exist, either.
…and I acknowledged this. You’ve established quite clearly that you need your god for your moral system to be rational. What you have not established is the existence of your god or any other absolute moral standard. The established the need for such a thing for your morality, but you have not established that such a thing exists in reality.
Thus there’s actually no rational basis for your morality.
Here’s the thing William – given that any omnipotent and omnipresent god is a logical impossibility to me, your moral system is, by default, completely irrational. If there is no god, it makes no difference how rational a given system looks on paper; it only matters if it is actually rational in reality.
Actually, the above is absolutely not altruism. What you’ve provided is the definition for operating a service business. This might be why you are having issues with Lizzie’s definitions.
Altruism, in its simplest form, is being concerned with the welfare of others such that one works to promote others’ welfare based upon their needs. It has nothing to do with what the altruist thinks is needed and everything to do with continuing to work with those in need to both determine what is actually needed and how to fulfill it.
Yes, it’s true the despite thousands of years of recorded talk about morality and despite hundreds of religions and millions of churches, people do pretty much what they want to do.
I would only point out that sectarian governments don’t really have much to brag about.
I hate to be a kill-joy, but is there any reason to think that the nth iteration of naturalism vs. non-naturalism or compatiblism vs. incompatibilism is going to get us anywhere?
I’ve been following these conversations for years, around and around and around they go, with never so much as a faint glimmer of resolution. So it seems doubtful to me that this time will be any different.
Absolutely spot on.
In the first place, the argument concerning the incoherence of Darwinistic morality doesn’t rely upon any god or any alternative whatsoever. It stands by itself. I only make the case about theistic morality to show that a rationally coherent morality is possible, but only if God exists. It’s not a claim that god actually exists.
In the second place, since in general I posit a god whose qualities of omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence are constrained by logical consistency to each other and to any other innate characteristic of god and to any other existent phenomena, your objection is functionally and necessarily rebutted.
You might argue that what I call “omnipotence” etc. is not what you would call “omnipotence”, but then all we can simply agree that I am not positing an “omnipotent” god by your definition. That doesn’t change my arguments about God one bit; it only changes what words I would agree to use in describing my proposed God to you.
William J. Murray,
I’l readily agree that both our posited bases of morality are highly questionable. I disagree with your point about the “Laws” you mention. As far as I can see, (and I’m no logician or philosopher), these can be the subject of logical and rational analysis. Gods cannot be tested in this way.
Agreed. Where’s the voting button? 😀
Who gets to decide what others need? Those others? If those others say they need meth, or booze, or automatic weapons, or a million dollars, or some slaves, or a mansion, or a quick and painless suicide, are those expressed needs taken at face value and considered to be equal to individually expressed needs such as food, shelter, medicine?
You act as if a “need’ is an objective commodity. Need .. for what end? You might say that someone needs medical assistance, but for what end? If a group of religious zealots refuse medical treatment for themselves and for their children because they need to please their god, who gets to decide which need is valid, based on what criteria? Who gets to decide the criteria? Who gets to decide the metaphysical assumptions that authorize such criteria?
You cannot “determine” what a need is unless you have some criteria for making such determinations, and such criteria is always based in your own belief structure that sorts through the data and picks which items are “needs” and which ones are “not needs”, overriding the individual perspectives, beliefs and feelings of those who claim to be in need. IOW, you will provid for the “needs” of those whose expressed needs match your concept of need, and you will not help meet the needs of those whose expressed needs do not match your concept of “need”.
All of this is you, the supposedly altruistic one, deciding what are valid needs and what are not, based on your metaphysical conception and resulting criteria of what is a “need”, and what is not a need. .
This is nothing but narcissism dressed up as selflessness. If you were truly selfless and only concerned about what others need, you’d bring meth and automatic weapons to those who claim to need it with equal, selfless judgement as you would bring medicine and food to those claim they need it. When you bring your own judgement about “what they really need, and do not need”, you are only meeting your own needs about what you should and shouldn’t allow into your “altruistic” equation.
You cannot logically analyze the principles by which logic is employed. What would you “logically” examine them with, other than those selfsame principles?
You cannot use a ruler to check the accuracy of that same ruler.
Logical axioms are taken on faith; they cannot be proven. They are used to prove other things. IOW, without the assumption of the validity of logical axioms, there is no means by which to make any rational argument – even about logical axioms.
Some things you have to accept as valid for no reason other than that without the assumption, your proposition fails.
If one holds that a meaningful and logically coherent morality exists, one must assume (logical necessity) that absolute morality (and thus god) exists. If you’re content with a “who cares”, logically incoherent, “because I think so” morality, then an assumption that god exists is not necessary to your view.
You are probably right 🙂 It’s just that I glimmered dramatically about 5 years ago, so I reckon if it’s possible for me, it’s possible for anyone 🙂
William, I’m not sure why you are not seeing the very clear distinction I keep trying to make between the principle that moral behaviour is behaviour in which benefit to self does not take precedence over benefit to others, which I suggest is definitional (not “consensus”), and what I am calling the domain of ethics, which is the complicated business of trying to figure out what constitutes benefit/harm to self/others.
I mean, you may disagree that there is a distinction, or disagree with the way I have made the distinction, but you seem to be treating my posts as though I have not even attempted to make a distinction!
This is called begging the question. Sorry William, but just because you insist the qualities of your god are constrained by logic, you have actually demonstrated they are. So, unless you can demonstrate this supposed logical consistency, your god is just as fallacious as any other with the characteristics of omnipotence and omniscience.
Incidentally, omnipresence is irrelevant to the issue; any entity with the characteristics of omniscience and omnipotence cannot not logically exist in a finite reality with a contingent space-time. Such would be a contradiction in conditions.
It’s not begging the question, it’s part of the premise of a necessarily rationally consistent god. If it is true that “omniscience and omnipotence cannot not logically exist in a finite reality with a contingent space-time.”, (whatever that means) then those qualities as defined by the contradiction do not exist in whatever god exists. That doesn’t matter to my argument about morality.
If you insist that any rational concept of god **must include** what you hold are impossible attributes, then you are simply demanding the impossible as a condition for godhood, ensuring the failure of any proposed concept of god.
Again this is irrelevant to the point that Darwinistic morality is necessarily incoherent.
And again, you’re missing the point. Altruism isn’t about someone saying “I need X!” or “you need Y!”; it’s about a much bigger picture. Altruism is not about short term “fixes” or simple “wants” or pleasures. That you can’t seem to grasp this certainly supports your claim that you do not have an altruistic bone in your body. Be that as it may, what you wrote above is not about altruism.
Altruism is about striving for the enrichment of others to thrive over a long time period, even a life time. Altruism is not handing money to a begger; altruism is working towards an understanding of why people beg, whether people are content begging or whether they’d be happier if they didn’t have to beg, and then working to create social societal contracts and systems that support those long-term needs.
William,
I pointed out that sincere people can disagree on moral issues, including “self-evident” ones. You responded:
That doesn’t help your case. If humans can deceive themselves on moral issues, including “self-evident” ones, then no one, including you, can ever be sure that something is objectively immoral — even if it seems “self-evidently” so. You’ve shot your argument in the foot.
Second, you claim that it’s unnecessary to point out a contradiction in order to demonstrate that something is logically incoherent. You cite definitions of “incoherent” (not “logically incoherent”), and triumphantly declare:
Problem is, you failed to read and understand one of the definitions you cited:
What do you think “inconsistent” means? Do you think you can have logical inconsistency without a contradiction?
Think for a minute, William. People can disagree on moral issues. If that means that “Darwinist morality” is inconsistent, then it means that your morality is also inconsistent.
Here’s what you’re not getting:
1. If morality is subjective, then there is no single, objectively true morality. So of course people can disagree on moral issues, including “self-evident” ones.
2. If morality is objective, but people can deceive themselves about moral issues, including “self-evident” ones, then of course people will end up disagreeing on moral issues.
It happens either way.
Seriously, William — why not take a break, think things over carefully, and come back when you have a coherent argument that is supported by the evidence?
Do humans not invent definitions, agree upon them, and change them from time to time, culture to culture? How is the above definition of morality arrived at or agreed upon?
Ethics which follow from the presumed definition. If I disagree with your definition (and I do), how do we resolve our differences?
No, I’m treating your distinction as a distinction which makes no difference to my argument.
1. You have an ethical rule or law based on Altruism.
2. I say, “I disagree the rule is moral.”
3. You say, “Okay, let’s figure out if the rule is Altruistic or not.”
4. I say, “I disagree that that morality is based on Altruism.”
You have nothing left to say to me, and we have no rational debate left. Your “because I (we) think so”, “I (we) have defined morality as altruism” simply definitionally installs altruism as the basis of morality. I disagree that altruism is the basis for morality.
What principle allows you (and whomever else) to define morality as “altruism”, and disallows any alternative definition I come up with?
All of this is you, the supposedly altruistic one, deciding what are valid needs and what are not, based on your metaphysical conception and resulting criteria of what is a “need”, and what is not a need.
Your rejection of what you think is altruism is a reject of superficial business practices that some charities and some religious people engage in. That’s not altruism. The altruist does not focus on simple objects as “needs”; the altruist instead focuses on engaging in behaviors that help others feel more human and more content over long periods of time.
Not at all. Being certain something is objectively immoral is irrelevant to the argument I’m making about whether or not such a system is logically coherent. Being certain of something is not necessary (or even possible) in virtually any human endeavor based on logic, and always requires faith commitments to unprovable assumptions – even if just to the validity of logical axioms.
You’re apparently confusing the word “or” with “and” in the list of meanings for the word “incoherent”. And, as I said, I’ve already pointed out the contradictions.
That’s the definition of begging the question William – your conclusion (an absolute moral authority (“god”) who is omnipotent and omniscient (as you define them)) – is assumed in your premise. And here’s the kicker:
Thus you are saying, “any characteristics that gods are defined to possess that make said gods logically impossible must not exist in my god because it exists”. That’s question begging William, particularly since you’ve yet to provide any evidence to even support your god, other than your basis of morality relies on such to be considered rational.
Now, you can of course believe in whatever you wish of course. Who am I to argue? But as far as being a logically supported concept, ‘fraid it’s not so much.
And this just a big old no, no, no, no, no, no, and no. That’s called a false dichotomy in this case. Whether “Darwinistic” morality is coherent or not has nothing to do with with whether your moral system is logically sound. “Darwinistic” morality may well be the worst excuse for morality, but that would not improve the issues shown above that your morality faces.
The difference is that under (1), anything goes and is as valid as anything else, and there is no principle by which to challenge whatever anyone claims as moral; also, there is no objective standard to “work towards’ or “try to figure out” even if so there is no expectation of a rational course to moral agreement.
Under 2, there is a proper principle for moral challenges and judgements and there is a basis for believing that we can rationally work out moral agreement, even if the process is prone to mistakes and self-deception (as is any process).
I also think you are conflating “collective” with “consensus”. I am not saying that what is of benefit to others must be what consensus tells us is of benefit to others – I’m saying that collectively, we have a different set of interests to our individual interests, with the twist that our individual interests are also connected, long-term to our collective interests. Here is wiki on The Prisoners’ Dilemma:
Here we can put to one side the ethical issue as to what constitutes “benefit” to each – that is fixed, and it is to minimise the prison sentence.
And as you can see, the purely self-interested “rational” strategy is non-altruism: to betray the other for the potential personal benefit of getting off free. But if both prisoners are non-altruistic, both will receive the maximum sentence.
In other words, truly self-interested behaviour is altruism, but that only works if both are altruistic.
And I suggest that this is the basis for morality in a social species – if all behave in a way that seeks the welfare of all, all benefit, including those who don’t give a toss about the welfare of all. For this reason, we erect a rational structure, called “morality” or “laws” in which those who seek self-benefit at the expense of the welfare of others are penalised. In other words, it is rational to have a system in which the “prisoners” both tend to do the “right” thing – consider the other – and can trust each other to do the “right” thing – be considered in turn.
That way the Prisoners’ dilemma is solved. So there’s your rational basis for morality: it’s a collectively devised structure that promotes, by social or legal means, altruistic behaviour within the collective, and thus the welfare of all members, an outcome that would be less likely in its absence.
William,
Either you don’t understand the concept of logical incoherence (aka logical inconsistency), or else you’re pretending you don’t. Either way, somethin’ needs fixin’.
You claim that atheist morality is “logically incoherent” (your words). To demonstrate that, you need to show that it leads to a contradiction. How else could you possibly do it, given the meaning of “logical incoherence”?
You aren’t merely arguing that your system is logically coherent. You’re claiming much more:
By your own admission, people can deceive themselves. Therefore, even if your assumptions are correct, “self-evident” moral intuitions cannot be relied upon as indicators of objective morality.
So we could argue that “objective” morality is a rational outcome of game theory and that cultures have approached the ideal game theory solution to greater and lesser degrees, by trial and error.
No, the conclusion the argument is trying to reach is “a rationally coherent and meaningful moral system”. Not just one with god.
So, in one case, we “presume” theism is true in order to see IF it can produce the conclusion of “a rationally coherent and meaningful moral system”.
In the other case, we “presume” Darwinsm is true in order to see IF it can produce the conclusion of “a rationally coherent and meaningful moral system”.
Honestly, god isn’t even an assumption in the theistic argument – the only assumption was the existence of an absolute moral standard. One could say that the two arguments begin with (1) assumption of an absolute moral standard, and (2) assumption of a non-absolute moral standard. It just so happens (1) can only be achieved via a god of some sort, and that (2) is the Darwinian position.
No question-begging involved, just you not understanding the argument or the conclusion.
I’m saying, much like you have already said, that no god which is logically impossible actually exists. Further, nothing that is logically impossible actually exists. Why would I believe in, or posit, a logically impossible god?
If you were to prove that some aspect of the god I believe in is logically impossible, I would change my notion about the characteristics of god; it wouldn’t change the necessity of a god (to provide an absolute basis for morality) for a rationally coherent and meaningful moral system.
That was worth the price of admission right there.
You were arguing that “atheist morality” was self-contradictory because individuals could reach different moral conclusions. My point was that by that standard, your moral system is also self-contradictory. People can reach different moral conclusions under it, just as they can under mine.
Of course there isn’t. That’s what “subjective” means! I don’t believe in an objective morality, so of course I’m not surprised that people can disagree on moral issues.
Moral agreement is possible without assuming the existence of an objective morality, to the extent that people can agree on certain fundamental moral principles.
Assuming the existence of objective morality doesn’t change anything. You still need to get people to agree, and it may not be possible.
Remember, people don’t have perfect access to objective morality under either of our systems. Under mine, it’s because I don’t think objective morality exists. Under yours, it’s because people can deceive themselves about moral issues, including “self-evident” ones.
The result is the same either way: people have to discuss moral issues and try to come to agreement based on commonalities in their moral intuitions.
Rational basis? The question isn’t if you have a rational basis, but rather if your basis produces a rationally coherent and meaningful moral system.
Answer my question: if I disagree with your position that Altruism is the basis of moral ethics, by what principle do you get to say I’m wrong and enforce your moral judgement (in terms of ethical laws based on altruism) upon my behavior?
It’s the same thing William because as you keep noting, your “rationally coherent and meaningful moral system” relies on the existence of the is absolute moral authority you call “god”.
robin saidd:
It relies upon it because that is the premise!
Just as, had the premise of a Darwinian morality been able to produce a logically coherent morality and theism not, a logically coherent morality would have relied upon Darwinism being true.
If both had been able to generate a logically coherent morality (conclusion), then the argument would have resulted in a draw – both premises would have been able to generate the conclusion (a rationally coherent and meaningful moral system).
Two problems: 1) you’ve only stated that your god is necessary in order for your moral system to be coherent, but as far as you or anyone else knows, your god does not exist and your moral system is actually incoherent as a product. You keep assuming your premise anyway, ergo your conclusion that your moral system is rational is circular. You can’t get away from this unless and until you can establish your god or any other absolute moral authority. 2) Since you freely admit you can’t do this, there’s nothing for me to demonstrate as a logical impossibility; you’ve demonstrated that yourself with the circularity of your argument.
And that’s the whole point – the only way any “god” of any sort of ability over matter and who can know things outside space-time can be propped up is through some form of fallacious argument. That you insist you aren’t trying to prop up any god, but rather support the notion that your moral system is rational doesn’t address the underlying issues simply because your argument regarding a coherent moral system relies on the same arguments because it relies on such a god.
It hardly takes “my admission” to recognize the trivially true statement that people can deceive themselves about just about anything – including both theism and Darwinism.
Because we are mistake-prone and error-prone doesn’t mean that there is no reason to try and discern true statements, nor does it mean we cannot make headway in finding reliable ways to reduce error and self deception; the existence of an absolute moral code at least gives the opportunity to discern binding, morally true statements from false, even if subject to error.
If we assume the moral code is relative, there is no means by which to even hope to find error or prevent self-deception, because there is not even the postulate of an absolute standard. What would “error” or “self-deception” even mean under relative morality? It’s basically “anything goes”.
Exactly! Thus it’s circular because that’s also your conclusion – e.g., that your moral system is rationally coherent.
No – I’ve shown that in order for a logically coherent and meaningful moral system to exist, an absolute morality (or, absolute good) must exist. I’ve argued that absolute morality can only exist in the mind of a purposeful being. I consider it fair to call such an absolute good/absolute moral mind, which necessarily created humans for a purpose (“oughts”, or morality, requires a purpose) – “god”.
In this argument, no other qualities are necessary in any “god” to justify the necessary conclusion that a god – of some sort, at least as described as the mind that holds absolute good and created humans for a purpose, and in that mind we all inhabit the same moral landscape (making morality universal) – is necessary for an absolute morality to exist. What I personally believe in addition to this about god is irrelevant to the argument.
Furthermore, whether or not god actually exists has no bearing on the logical coherence of a moral system that is based on the assumption that god exists.
Are you familiar with hypothetical arguments at all?
Quite so, and that approach would be equally circular. But no “Darwinist” is trying to argue that “Darwinism” is X, thus any morality system based on it is rationally coherent since X is required for rational coherence. Such is self-referential; i.e., circular.
Well, I’ve just shown, I think that the principle of altruism is also “logically coherent and meaningful” for a social species.
What’s incoherent or illogical or meaningless about a system that maximises the probability that everybody benefits, including those who don’t even care whether anyone else benefits except them?
I do not begin with the premise that theism produces a rational moral system. Premise = theism, (insert argument and inferences here), conclusion = rational moral system. In good logical arguments, the conclusion always depends upon the premise.
There’s no categorical or conceptual difference between my wording and yours. You’ve just added superfluous justification for calling “absolute morality” “god”. You have substantively changed anything that I’ve noted. Removing all the fluff, your statement boils down to:
How is that any different from what I noted above?
I’ve asked this same question twice now and you haven’t answered:
If I disagree with your position that Altruism is the definitional basis of moral ethics, by what principle do you get to say I’m wrong and enforce your moral judgement (in terms of ethical laws based on altruism) upon my behavior?
Quite true. The question of your god’s existence and the apparent lack of said existence is a completely separate issue for your claim. That issue boils down to even if your argument was sound regarding the coherence of your moral system, the fact that your god cannot be established means your argument is moot. In other words, what good is a logically rational moral system that can’t possibly actually exist?
But that’s not the issue I’m addressing above. I’m merely addressing the circularity of your argument.
I don’t think a rationally coherent moral system is possible or even desirable. I’ve given my reasons several time.
It’s a bit like trying to have a rationally coherent theory of art or music.
Oh, good. So you do agree that it is perfectly possible to have a rational basis for morality without reference to a deity?
You just don’t like the case built on that basis?
What do you mean by “moral ethics”? I have told you what I mean by both those words, and by the definitions I am using, ethics is the domain of figuring out what exactly constitutes harm and/or benefit in a given scenario. But let me assume by “moral ethics”, you mean what I mean by “morality”, and you, or, more plausibly, Ayn Rand, comes along and says that morality consists of working out what is in your own self-interest, then I say: well, that morality will probably work fine for you on a desert island, but it’s not a reliable guide even to your own self-interest in an interdependent society. Better to adopt altruism, if for no other reason than that you are far more likely to be better off yourself.
That’s the lesson of the Prisoner’s Dilemma – if everyone follows their own self-interest, everyone is worse of than if everybody didn’t. Societies with systems of trust and verification end up with better-off members than societies without such systems.
Hence the Tragedy of the Commons.