This is a thread to allow discussions about how those lucky enough to have free will make decisions.
As materialism doesn’t explain squat, this thread is a place for explanations from those that presumably have them.
And if they can’t provide them, well, this will be a short thread.
So do phoodoo, mung, WJM et al care to provide your explanations of how decisions are actually made?
Alan:
That was poorly worded, but I think I know what you’re trying to say.
I agree that dualists tend to leap prematurely to explanations involving the immaterial, but what you’re doing is even worse: you’re trying to define the immaterial out of existence, just as you did the supernatural.
At best it’s equivocation. At worst, it’s effectively presuppositionalism, which is no better in the hands of an atheist than in the hands of a Godbot like fifth.
Chuckle. I look forwards to reading your rebuttal of that study. Unless, that was it?
Yes, that was it. To make it simple for you, it’s to do with what “conclusive” and “exception” mean. And what “study” means, particularly when formulated “…easy to imagine… this is a guess and no such relationship can explain other associations.”
I see I could just as well have answered “Chuckle. That was it?”
That’s true of how individuals think if they have already acquired a conceptual framework. I’m interested in understanding how a conceptual framework itself is acquired by someone who does not have one.
Whereas I think of mindedness as what comes into being as neuronal connections are shaped, sculpted, and pruned over the course of enculturation and acquiring a first language. In the absence of any enculturation whatsoever, there is no mindedness in the human sense (i.e. “sapience”). Even most mammals and all primates require socialization with parents and conspecifics in order to fully be the kind of animal that they are.
Here — as often — your tendency towards false dichotomies has once again led you astray. I never said that no one cannot revise or alter a conceptual framework that has been acquired. I said that no one has a conceptual framework prior to acquiring a first language and becoming enculturated.
You mean, “It sounds like a good theory, but I don’t believe it’s true.” Well, as with all theories, either you have a reason to believe it’s not true, or you haven’t. If you have no better theory, then this one is the best.
Our disagreement seems to be of degree, not of principle. I allow for a lesser degree of necessary communication with peers, so that more substantial innovations by prodigious individuals are possible and less miraculous. You want true innovations be more miraculous. You like it when emancipation from the chains of traditions of previous generations is bloodier and more traumatic. Okay.
That is by far the most absurd statement you’ve ever made about my views.
Do you even understand what the word “revise” means? Go back and see how I used it.
Yes. It means something like change a bit what has been handed down. Meaning, it does not quite allow genuine innovations. But my aim is to make it plausible that revolutions of science and technology occur, whole new civilizations and religions spring up in a single generation, etc. I submit that “revise” does not describe them.
Because it is possible to imagine impossible things. I’m astounded that you actually need that pointed out to you.
I can imagine giant, plump dragons with tiny wings flitting about the sky. Aerodynamically such things cannot exist. You can imagine normal, healthy human brains exactly like those we observe but without consciousness. There is no reason to think those are possible.
Basically all you’re doing is assuming your conclusion and calling it imagination.
I said that I don’t know what anyone here who claims that anything immaterial exists means by “immaterial” (or “exists”, for that matter).
I am asking for what you mean by “immaterial” and “exists” and for evidence and/or logic to support your claim.
No, it has not. You and others have simply claimed that this or that is immaterial. You haven’t clearly defined your terms nor have you supported your assertions.
I acknowledge that you have yet to define your terms or support your claims.
I’m happy to learn exactly what you mean by “immaterial” and “exists” and what you consider as support for your claim that anything immaterial actually exists.
I’ve seen no one make that claim. The closest I’ve seen is the observation that all available evidence supports the idea that consciousness is a physical process.
You and others are asserting that something immaterial exists and that it is a component of consciousness. You have provided no support for that claim thus far.
Burden of proof. You’re doing it wrong.
The material world is observable. Your immaterial whatever isn’t. You say it exists. You’re the one who has to support that claim.
An author conceives of a work in his or her physical brain.
An author records a work in a physical medium such as patterns on an SSD.
An author publishes a work by copying those patterns to other physical media.
An infringer copies those patterns to other physical media without the permission of the author.
So far no need for anything other than the physical.
In a legal system that enforces copyright, the author may seek redress against the infringer. The laws that allow that are conceived in physical brains, documented in physical media, and replicated to other physical brains and physical media.
Still no need for anything other than the physical. Intellectual property appears to be material.
Now, if I’m not grossly misunderstanding where you’re going here, we can consider if the right to seek redress is material. It is a consequence of a legal system composed of laws documented in physical media and organizations composed of physical people. The author’s decision to exercise copyright is made by his or her physical brain. The actions taken against the infringer are performed by physical people acting on the infringer’s physical body or physical assets.
If all the people and media ceased to exist, what would remain of copyright?
You’re correct. It would certainly help to have an operational definition of “immaterial” and “exists”.
Even in the best case, the way this usually goes is that those two words get defined in such a way that boolean logic, for example, can be called immaterial and existent. Then, in a flurry of equivocation, that’s used to “prove” that someone’s favorite gods exist.
In my eternal optimism I hope for better here. In my rational mind I don’t expect it.
Me either. 😉
That being said, if you do notice me starting to cackle (as per Terry Pratchett) or notice my hand edging toward a resting place in my shirt, call me on it. I generally find your views valuable.
I agree in general with you here, although I would also accept a rational argument for the existence of the immaterial. If it has no impact on observable reality even in principle, though, there is no way to confirm that it is real.
I’m sure that cognitive development, in the sense of the aptitude for abstract thought is dependent on the acquisition of a language. I know the evidence is somewhat compromised and sparse but stories of children raised in situations that prevented language acquisition indicate language is essential for proper development and socialisation.
I’ve downloaded the Kindle version of Cultural Origins… but I’ve only got as far as chapter 2. (Fits well with Norenzayan’s thoughts in Big Gods)
It’s like Jerry Coyne and PZ Myers! I can’t see how one could have evidence for the immaterial/supernatural/imaginary. It would have to come through the interface. Like recording noises isn’t evidence for poltergeists but only evidence for noises.
Neither of us deserves comparison to the odious Myers.
I would be persuaded by things like demonstrable efficacy of prayer or violations of physical regularities that our models of reality need significant revision. If the immaterial exists and never interacts with the material, though, there’s not much point in considering it.
I’m tempted to ask for marks out of ten. Only think? What’s happened to the mind-reading power?
I’m saying like it is. There is no immaterial or supernatural realm or there might as well not be for the impact it has on our world, on reality. So by my definition, something exists and is real or something is only an imaginary concept and doesn’t.
No point in arguing or debating that with me. Show me how the immaterial crosses the interface and impinges on the real world and then we can begin a debate on whether what you show me is in fact evidence for something immaterial. You know I’m no good at thought experiments. Why don’t you have a go and I’ll see if I can knock holes in your result?
Are you referring to the feminist political correctness? I never took much notice.
I have a difficulty with that. It’s the attribution. Supposing we could link prayer to a real outcome (that’s going to be hard enough), how do we link the outcome to a particular deity? Maybe enough double-blind controlled experiments with prayers directed to likely candidate gods?
Not much? Surely, Sir, you exaggerate!
No. Being consistent in your definition, what you are really saying is this:
All real things exist. Imagination exists. And things in imagination exist too. (You can be quoted on this.) Therefore imaginary stuff, goblins, gods, etc. are real and existent like all material things.
Thank you,Mung for your entirely ineffective thinking.Better?
If you think that is what I am saying, then I have explained myself poorly and/or you have badly misread me.
Let me try again. A thought is a real thing. It is brain activity. The subject of a thought may be concerning some real thing or about something completely fanciful and imaginary like a unicorn.
What are the objects of thought? Damned if I know. Being a strict Darwinian, I suspect thinking ability has (or had in the past) some evolutionary advantage.
I believe the claim many have for the immaterial is that it exists independently ,further the immaterial can preform independent actions,for instance the immaterial mind.
OMG, this thread does bumble along. No clear defs, no clear confab.
So here:
I don’t say those are great, but at least they’re SOMETHING.
Now, roughly half the people here are pretty sure that there are no immaterial objects, while the other half is pretty sure that there are.
But since not everything is entirely describable in the language of physics NOW, any view on this is either a matter of faith (in physics or in churchy stuff) or in the nature of foretelling the future. In sum, nobody has any right to be pretty sure one way or the other. Does that stop anybody? Oh no!
“There are immaterial objects!” “No there aren’t!”
O-TAY!!
Heck, I don’t think that ecology is reducible to fundamental physics — so I’m supposed to think that ecosystems are “immaterial”?
I find the concepts “material” and “immaterial” quite useless for doing philosophy. I use them when I’m teaching Descartes and Berkeley, but in that context, these notions make sense.
Why we should use 17th-century categories for doing 21st-century philosophy, is an issue that no one has endeavored to clarify.
Better to start over!
Alan Fox,
Can you try for some definition of what qualifies something as material, and what defines something as immaterial?
That seems overwhelmingly likely, though I regard the stories about feral children too contaminated by bias, speculation, and other confounding factors to make any of them reliable. Even in the most studied case, “Genie,” we have no idea what other kinds of mental disability were at work or how the abuse affected her emotional development.
Yes, I found that they worked quite nicely together — one about the origins of cooperation in hominids and the other about the transformation of cooperation and conflict with the rise of agriculture. We still very much live in the shadow of that revolution.
To cite my favorite line from Rousseau: “for the poet it is gold and silver but the for the philosopher it is wheat and iron that civilized men and ruined the human race”.
By the definition I gave, it doesn’t have to be reducible now, just ultimately. And if it can’t ever be, then why not call it “immaterial”? Seems as good a word as any.
The immaterial lost judicial standing for the most part after the Salem witch trials seemed to yield less than just results. Well, unless you count the implicit libertarian free will, but that’s tended to be whittled down to the theory of “able to respond to state threats” as well.
Yes, at some point we quit looking for monsters under the bed and ghosts in the attic. Could be there, yes. Hasn’t really been a good bet in hundreds of years, at least.
What’s the explanation for the transition to eukaryotes? Colewd’s pretty sure that we don’t know, so it could be the “immaterial,” or, I suppose, “unknown material agents” for the fig leaf that it could be aliens. Somehow it looks rather like evolutionary processes did it (that extremely derivative aspect, in particular) and it seems like we might be justified in supposing that it really was evolution, lacking any really good evidence for ghosts, aliens, or gods, while having decent evidence for evolution throughout.
Yes, I do expect the sun to come up tomorrow (using the old flat-earth/geocentrist language) and I don’t expect gods, ghosts, or souls to be much of a factor any time soon, even though it’s possible that they exist. Call me less than omniscient, but I will use what has worked for future expectations.
Glen Davidson
It’s mostly his libelous attacks against people like Michael Nugent, his doxxing of at least two commenters on his site, and his public fantasies about his students.
Why not? If there were any reason to think prayer worked I expect we’d investigate it like any other phenomena.
Perhaps. There’s no accounting for taste on the best way to while away an afternoon.
For starters, Alan, it probably makes sense to understand that “immaterial” means “not material.”
no
That’s the issue. I’m really only bothered regarding examples. An oft-touted example of an immaterial thing is a “soul”; another is a “god”. Now I happen to think both are human inventions, or imaginary, as I prefer to say. There may be a way of talking about other stuff that might be perfectly reasonably and meaningfully described as immaterial but then I’m wondering why we shouldn’t use “abstract”.
Simply, deciding whether unicorns are pink or blue seems to jump the gun on the existence of unicorns.
Others are a thought, an idea, a mind. Where are you on those?
The lightbulb is a human invention. Is it imaginary?
For one thing, the contrast between “reducible now” and “reducible ultimately” doesn’t really work for me. “Ultimately reducible” is just a worthless IOU that philosophers like to pass around.
If metaphysics is answerable to epistemology, then if you can’t specify the epistemic and semantic conditions of intertheoretic reduction, you’re not entitled to talk of ontological reduction. And epistemic and semantic reduction has to cash out in terms of the bridge laws and the revision to scientific practices that realizes the bridge laws. I mean, would we fire all the ecologists? Bring them into the physics department? Fund them from the same budget? These are the questions that actually make a difference!
I’d be much happier with a broad criterion of “empirical verifiability” that does the epistemological work that some folks want “materialism” to do here, and just not worry about the metaphysics.
Here are some things that exist: quantum fields, ecosystems, inflation rates, distortions of space-time, waves of civil unrest, social practices, political scandals, galactic rotations . . . . and I don’t see the importance of having a single unified metaphysics that these things all fit into.
And I certainly don’t see why the legitimacy of talking about any of these things would depend on translatability into fundamental physics.
For that matter, I really don’t think that “physics” can do any of the work that philosophers want it to. For there are many branches of physics. (Just look at the undergrad courses in a physics department if you don’t believe me.) Which of them is important? Fluid dynamics? Solid-state mechanics?
Clearly what people have in mind when they talk about “physics” is fundamental physics. Not all physics is fundamental.
But now, let us notice that we have at least two and possibly three* different theories of fundamental physics, conceptually incompatible, and we have no idea which will have to be replaced by some future theory. Heck, we don’t even know what the correct version of quantum mechanics is!
(* Quantum mechanics and general relativity, possibly thermodynamics. )
I submit that a field of inquiry in which so much is completely open to question cannot function as the basis for any metaphysical position.
Materialists should spend less time squabbling about “intuitions” and what is “in principle” reducible and more time talking with actual physicists and philosophers of physics.
I think that given your position above, you should be ok with holding that something things are immaterial. Also, there’s a difference between specifying the epistemic and semantic conditions of intertheoretic reduction and actually performing the reduction. Suppose I say, like the early Sellars, that the conditions are that one day everyone will depend solely on the terms of physics to talk of the other stuff and will think only in terms of basic physical properties and entites. That’s a prediction that may well be false (I think it is, myself, and I’ve posted Hall’s caricature of that position at least once). I don’t know that such a reduction will never occur, but the suggestion seems absurd to me. But I’ve provided the criteria: based on it, there are immaterial things just in case the reduction never takes place.
You are more sure than I am about the future. I therefore think you should just say, “Yeah, I countenance immaterial things.”
I’m not saying, allowing for the sake of argument, if there were some apparent coincidence between prayer and sick people getting better, it shouldn’t be tried. I just visited a friend in hospital who’s now severely paralysed following a brain haemorrhage who would benefit greatly from that miracle. Pragmatically, if prayer achieved that, it would be marvellous and I would join in with fervour.
But, even allowing that there appeared to be a causal link between people praying and sick people miraculously recovering, how does that add up to evidence for a god, any god?
OK I misspoke enough to allow the misinterpretation. The act of invention is, probably, initially a thought process, brain activity. A light bulb is real. Products of the imagination are not necessarily real. I’ve been distracted by my own petard!
Nail on head! Again!
Gotta stop using ‘immaterial’ to mean ‘unreal.’ Begging the question is a fallacy.
So you misspoke. And earlier you explained yourself poorly a number of times. If you use this excuse more, it will look like moving goalposts. It actually already is.
And you are only speaking in terms of individual examples: Such-and-such is real=material. Such-and-such is imaginary=does not exist.
Is there a principle by which you are making a distinction or are you just making stuff up as you stumble along?
That seems like a good start to an operational definition of “material”. I’m not sure how it works with one of the recent claims that the immaterial soul controls the material brain through some as yet unspecified interface. If the interface is empirically verifiable, does that make the soul material?
I don’t think it would directly support the god hypothesis, but it would suggest that our understanding of reality needed a rethink. It could be gods. It could be fairies. It could be some kind of healing telekinetic power of one of the prayers. It would at least have the virtues of being measurable and weird.
I’m more of a pessimist about the future, shall we say. I don’t see how the criteria for reduction to fundamental physics can ever be satisfied. Maybe it’ll all be obvious when we evolve into Time Lords and Time Ladies in a few million years.
If “immaterial” were to mean “things that can’t be reduced to fundamental physics”, then sure, I’ll buy that there are immaterial things in that (artificial, stipulated) sense. Here are some things that turn out to be “immaterial” in this sense: cellular metabolism, political revolutions, ecosystems, currency fluctuations, marathons, and predator-prey ratios.
On other hand, I’m not going to accept in the ontology any objects to which we would have epistemic access only by committing a version of the Myth of the Given. So every kind of Platonism about ‘abstract entities’ (numbers, sets, classes, propositions) is off the table for me.
We can slice the pie in a very different way and get almost identical entrenched positions if we pose the question: are the criteria of epistemic verifiability public or private? For one way of getting at the Given is that it trades on private epistemic criteria. My “seeing” outstrips what I can “say”, so if you don’t accept my saying that I see more than I say, and refuse to accept my authority as someone who is possessed of ineffable cognitive privilege, then so much the worse for you!
(I do not actually think that the Given in this sense is a problem with Plato; he’s very subtle. But I think that the Myth of the Given comes into full-flower with Descartes’s cogito argument. Likewise the critique of the Myth in Hegel and Peirce, which Dewey and Sellars inherited, is of a piece with their neo-Aristotelian anti-Cartesianism.)
The desideratum of science, as Peirce pointed out in “The Fixation of Belief”, is that its posits can be put on the gold standard of public verifiability, open to all. (This is why, as Dewey noted, science at its best is democratic and democracy at its best is scientific.)
If “materialism” were to mean, “only accepting into ontology the entities posited by fundamental physics and whatever is reducible to those entities”, then I am implacable opposed to materialism. But if “materialism” were to mean, “only accepting into ontology the entities that can be publicly verified by some means or other,” then I am a passionate materialist.
Which is another way of saying that the term “materialism” is just useless for serious philosophy.
walto admonishes Alan:
It’s amazing to me that Alan can’t see that.
But… but… numbers, sets, classes, propositions, when written down or spoken or thought about, are instantiated in matter and therefore material (even empirically verifiable)! How can you not accept them in your ontology?
Possibly it will be the right conclusion, but it can’t be the proper premise.
Presuppositionalism doesn’t seem to work well anywhere.
Glen Davidson