This is a thread to allow discussions about how those lucky enough to have free will make decisions.
As materialism doesn’t explain squat, this thread is a place for explanations from those that presumably have them.
And if they can’t provide them, well, this will be a short thread.
So do phoodoo, mung, WJM et al care to provide your explanations of how decisions are actually made?
Right, but that means it’s not the “being composed of atoms” that makes the difference. It has to be something else. It’s not easy to say what that is…..
Not easy to say in detail, but the best available model is learning.
At any given moment, animals are doing stuff due to the momentary configuration of their neurons (which are comprised of atoms).
But the configuration of neurons is continuously being modified by feedback.
I don’t know. What exactly do you mean by “free will”?
Ahhh! Perhaps I was unclear.
My point has nothing to do with neurons or brains (or anything for that matter) being made of atoms. The issue is that lots of people analogize the behavior of atoms with billiard balls to try and visualize the atomic world as something familiar. But atoms don’t actually behave anything like billiard balls. Unrelated, but in terms of the same sort of bad analogizing, many people seem to think that neurons behave like computer circuits. They don’t. Neurons act nothing like computer circuits in fact. And then on yet another level, some people make another bad analogy mistake in thinking that brains behave like microprocessors. They don’t…at all.
That billiard balls are made of atoms is irrelevant; the atoms in the billiard balls are still not behaving like the billiard balls themselves. That both neurons and computer circuits are made of atoms is irrelevant too…just as irrelevant as noting that neurons and cars are made of atoms. Different systems of atoms behave very differently.
The point I was addressing though was the tendency for some people to make bad analogies between systems that on cursory look or shallow understanding seem to look or imply similar behavior when in fact they don’t behave anything like one another.
Here’s another near unforgivable example: sci fi writers and space. For some god-awful reason (I’d like to blame Star Wars or Star Trek, but it really goes back much farther), nearly all sci fi writers seem to think that space behaves like water or air, and more specifically, like a body of water or atmosphere on a planet (like Earth). AAAARRRRGGHH!!! It. Doesn’t. Behave. Like. That. AT. ALL!!!!
Watch pretty much any sci fi movie, tv series or read pretty much any sci fi book put out in the last 100 years and nearly all ships turn as though they are moving against friction (all ships bank to turn for instance). All ships ALWAYS orient themselves on the same plane. There’s always an “up” and “down” for example. Without exception, all ships come to a stop if they run out of power. There are a few exceptions (The Martian comes to mind), but they are waaaay in the minority.
The point is, most laymen really don’t understand how a number of things actually work and consequently make bad analogies that just muddy the concept further.
Robin made a similar point earlier and I think this is what blows strict determinism out of the water. People change: we develop, learn, grow, age. The “self” of a moment ago is a different self to the self of the present.
Yet Jerry Coyne wrote this just a month ago (H/T Origenes at UD)
See my bolding. There is no such “if” in reality. You can’t go back.
@ Petrushka
I see you were ignored in the comments. 🙁
Alan Fox,
Right. I take it that saying “feedback” or “learning” several times (perhaps with a furrowed brow) is supposed to constitute some sort of response to the claim “same prior conditions, same laws—same output.” But I’m not fathoming how it’s all managed, myself. Seems like hand-waving to me.
As I see it, there is hard determinism, libertarian free will, randomness (perhaps provided by quantum collapses), and compatibalism (according to which determinism doesn’t preclude free actions). The additional way being touted here is entirely unclear to me.
Feedback, shmeedback.
Yes. This is a key point to me. Everything changes not just in terms of configuration, but in terms of space-time as well. There is no deterministic pathway as far as I can see because the underlying framework that could be said to make up the pathway constantly shifts. So in effect, “you” are not the same “you” in the next second (or the second after that and so forth) so there could never be an “original “you” state” to ever go back to from which the same decision process could unravel.
I don’t understand your position. Whether or not the exact situation can be replicated or not, I read Coyne as saying “At any point in time, the configuration of one’s body, including the brain, and environment allow only one subsequent configuration to arise, despite the illusion of having a choice.” Do you disagree with that?
I’m thinking it is untestable. Because in this universe, there is no way to exactly replicate an identical situation.
Alan,
If you think that “people change” is an argument against determinism, then you don’t know what “determinism” means.
Ditto for feedback. Feedback is entirely compatible with determinism.
Oops. There must be a short-cut key for “post comment”.
Trying again:
Re-reading that, the self of a moment ago may disagree what the current self is thinking.
keiths,
Probably.
keiths,
Correct. That you would always do that given those circumstances. The fact that this you is not that you does not hurt determinism. Even the universe being non deterministic at the quantum level does not hurt determinism (for people).
But how do you know if you can’t test it?
I see it as an issue with the concept of “will”. If processes, systems, atomic structure, senses, stimuli, environment, and even the space-time itself that constitutes “me” (or any living thing) is in a constant state of change, the dynamic elements that “determine a given choice” in any given instant are clearly mechanistic in one sense, but are also unrepeatable and, I would submit, totally unpredictable. I certainly accept that as an acceptable model of “will”. Is it “free”? I don’t know how to measure that absolutely, but it’s certain “free” in that it’s not be influenced by any other “me” systems, divine or otherwise.
Coyne was really just saying what his position means, that there’s nothing causal left over if you account for everything in the brain plus the circumstances affecting one’s decisions (he cavils at the word “decision,” but I see no problem with decisions occurring under strict determinism).
Of course it’s untestable, hence one of the problems with such discussions (there are plenty of data supporting it, none for magic, though). But at least it tells one what one is arguing about.
Glen Davidson
Alan, Robin, Glen,
While we can’t “rewind the tape”, that doesn’t mean that determinism is untestable.
If the laws of physics are deterministic, then so is the universe. We can test for deterministic laws.
It is indeed untestable, but it has the merit of allowing that where tests ARE available, the results are relevant. That is, it has the merit of being comprehensible and keeping the world together as a sensible whole, as (to one extent or another) the rival theories I mentioned also at least try to do. But simply mentioning feedback, alternative persons/pathways, etc. is just, you know, musing. Not only are we left with non-testable theories, we may come to notice that we’re just kind of blathering incoherencies.
It makes sense to set forth the coherent alternatives and talk about which one(s) seem more plausible and for what reasons. We can, of course, also point out shortcomings of any or all of them where we find them. But it’s always nice to make sense, I think.
Right.
Yes.
Well I’m going for laws of the gaps. The “laws” of physics are descriptive models. That a good descriptive model is a deterministic description doesn’t make reality deterministic.
Its untestable for any freewill / determinism position.. although modern neuroscience is heavily leaning to “no free will” I believe.
Alan,
Then you reject gravitation on the same grounds?
The phenomenon described as gravity can be observed from its effects. Not quite the same, in my view.
To me, this is dualism.
“I do not make choices. My body makes choices.”
Implicit in that, is the view that I am distinct from my body (including bodily processes). And that’s what I see as dualism.
If “the gaps” are a function of quantum indeterminacy, all the relevant theories ought to be expected to handle that. If they are a result of libertarian free will, you are a libertarian free will supporter (and have magic to explicate). If they are something else, there’s a responsibility to indicate what.
Ignorance mixed with hope does not a theory make.
I agree. I’m not sure why people don’t see that.
I read him as saying that nothing actually makes choices: it’s an illusion.
They see it. It doesn’t matter.
Great. My views are provisional (and often turn out to be wrong). 🙂 Yet we don’t have (at least I don’t) have a clear idea what the issue is with “free will” and why arguing about it has any bearing on the concept of dualism. I’m happy to accept that an outcome from a unique set of patterns in the brain will result in a particular outcome. I don’t see how that prevents us choosing between available options.
Alan:
Neil:
People do see that. The mistake is to reject determinism on that basis, as Alan does.
No scientific hypothesis is guaranteed to be true, but we don’t reject all of science on those grounds.
I have no real idea what others think “libertarian free will” implies.
I’m only a critic, not a playwright.
I agree. Freedom is completely compatible with perfectly determined outcomes.
The idea is that “the will” which is thought to be entirely independent of the body just DECIDES; and Voila! bodies move! It’s an entirely dualistic position.
Of course you choose. You choose the only thing you were ever going to choose…
Neil,
That isn’t Coyne’s position. How did you get the impression that it is?
In my humble estimation, freedom is doing what one wants because one wants to. Period.
That is not inconsistent with determinism. In fact, it may require it.
In compatibilist free will do external factors influence the choice?
newton,
Yes, definitely. If I decide to run out of the building because there’s an earthquake, an external factor is influencing my choice. That’s perfectly compatible with compatibilism.
I agree with you here. I’m not anti-deterministic; I just think it’s not so simple as “free will” vs “determinism”.
Yet Coyne is an evolutionist, and is opposed to creationism. Determinism is just the creationist “front loading” expressed in different words. Coyne should be opposed to evolution.
But that has nothing to do with determinism.
Neil,
No, because determinism doesn’t imply that anyone is doing any “front loading.”
That would be dualism but it’s not what I see Coyne claiming, nor is it my personal view. Decisions, as I understand Coyne, are simply the result of the physical configuration of oneself in a particular environment at a particular time. I don’t see the dualism in that.
That’s a massive conflation. Gould’s ‘tape of life’ comment is likely true because early stellar formation and life were likely affected by quantum phenomena: Very small nudges early on. But that does not change that for any set of environmental phenomena you at a certain time can only collapse your external stimuli, accrued knowledge and internal state into one decision.
Would God revealing His knowledge be an external factor?
Eta: revealing His Knowledge of the outcome of your decision
Can you explain this?
newton,
Yes, and it could even be a deciding factor. For example, fifth might be hankering for bacon and eggs but decide to order pancakes instead after God reveals to him that he will choose pancakes.
What cannot happen is for God to reveal his knowledge that fifth will choose pancakes, followed by fifth choosing bacon and eggs. Why? Because then what God revealed isn’t knowledge at all, but a falsehood.
Neither does “front loading”; The designer remains unspecified.