Truth, Reason, Logic

Kantian Naturalist: You simply have not provided any account of truth, reason, and logic. Until you do, there is no reason for me to believe that a correct understanding of these concepts has anything at all to do with God.

Some initial first thoughts.

What would it mean to provide an account of truth, reason, and logic? Don’t all of us take all three of these for granted?

Can science settle the question of what would it take to provide an account of truth, reason, and logic?

If science cannot settle the question of what would it take to provide an account of truth, reason, and logic, what does that tell us about the question?

If science cannot settle the question of what would it take to provide an account of truth, reason, and logic, what does that tell us about science?

Who were the first scientists to ask and attempt to answer these questions and what answers did they offer?

Who were the first philosophers to ask and attempt to answer these questions and what answers did they offer?

Is the argument that because someone has not provided an account of truth, reason, and logic there is therefore no reason to believe that a correct understanding of these concepts has nothing at all to do with God a non-sequitur?

What is true. What is logical. What is reasonable. Are these not all inter-twined? Which of these can we dispense with while retaining the others?

675 thoughts on “Truth, Reason, Logic

  1. And some start out gracious but become less so when the damn pig won’t stop trying to sing.

  2. sean samis: Creationists like to ignore the fact that there was a time, from it’s inception through the early 1900’s that evolution could have been falsified.

    I have no idea what this means. It was falsifiable then, but not now?

    So do you agree that even rabbits in the Cambrian wouldn’t falsify evolution, because you could always just say that just needs an explanation that we are still looking for? Just like your side is now doing with epigenetics?

  3. Rabbits in the precambrian would falsify the standard phylogenetic tree and massively screw over our understanding of the history of life.

    It still wouldn’t falsify the fact that evolution happens, or the close relationships between man and chimp (for example).

    Evolutionary theory has many sub-branches, a falsification of one aspect does not necessarily carry over into another. You could, for example, falsify universal common descent, yet all the inferences drawn from the LTEE would still be true.

    I don’t think it is possible, with one single observation or experiment, to prove ALL of evolutonary thought false. You’d have to do several for many different subcategories.

    Well, unless you could somehow show that all organisms actually don’t reproduce or that there is no such thing as imperfect inheritance of characteristics. Or allele frequencies never change. Which I don’t think is practically possible.

  4. Rumraket: You could, for example, falsify universal common descent, yet all the inferences drawn from the LTEE would still be true.

    Indeed. Strictly, unambiguous evidence of lagomorphs appearing suddenly in the Cambrian period would refute common descent for lagomorphs, not other orders or species. But if one order was shown to have completely separate origins from all other terrestrial life-forms… There are many fundamental common features across terrestrial living organisms: based on carbon, chemistry in aqueous mediums, almost universal DNA code, RNA and protein as catalysts. Find some life-form not possessing some of these features would strongly suggest separate origin.

    I don’t think it is possible, with one single observation or experiment, to prove ALL of evolutionary thought false. You’d have to do several for many different subcategories.

    What might be an effective approach (if someone wanted to supplant evolutionary theory) would be to come up with an alternative explanation or hypothesis that fits the observed facts better than evolutionary theory does. Even if we were to find evidence of terrestrial (or perhaps extra-terrestrial) life having originated independently from life descended from the LUCA, it would still likely be subject to the same constraints of environment, resources and competition.

  5. phoodoo,

    Just like your side is now doing with epigenetics?

    There is nothing in epigenetics that poses any problem for evolutionary theory. Much though you might get the opposite impression from the way Creationists sites are humping it for all they are worth.

  6. keiths: Truth does not distnguish one from the other, as is obvious to anyone who is able to compare the word “true” in the first phrase to the word “true” in the second phrase.

    OK

    To rephrase yet again for the sake of appeasing the nitpickers

    When comparing the very special case of unjustifed true opinions and knowledge the distinguishing factor is knowledge of the truth instead of truth alone.

    happy now?

    peace

    ps what exactly does this have to do with the topic at hand again?

  7. fifthmonarchyman: To rephrase yet again for the sake of appeasing the nitpickers

    When comparing the very special case of unjustifed true opinions and knowledge the distinguishing factor is knowledge of the truth instead of truth alone.

    happy now?

    Whether I’m happy or not is another question (one daughter just headed on a X-country trip and the other is off to her first day of school–so bleh), but what you’ve written above isn’t right either.

    I don’t know what “the point” may be. I’m just telling you for whatever it may be worth (maybe nothing!), that some of the stuff you’re posting here is wrong. You can fix it or not as you please, but please stop insisting what you’ve put is right when it clearly isn’t.

    You may call it nitpicking, but presumably, you don’t want to be depending on stuff for premises in your arguments that are obviously false. You could be ending up with “God” because of a pile of confusions. That would be bad, no?

  8. walto,

    Or, you could just ask FMM read the Meno so that he understands that we have a whole tradition based on the idea that justification is independent of truth. One can have good reasons for one’s beliefs and yet those beliefs might be false — or one might have true beliefs by accident or “intuition”.

    I’m divided on the question whether we need truth as an independent constraint on knowledge. Presumably, if our theory of truth is deflationary, then truth can’t be an independent epistemic constraint on belief — in deflationary terms, “p is true” just means “p”.

    Does that count against deflationary treatments? Or does it tell us that deflationism, for all its merits, can’t be the whole story about truth? Or does it show us that truth just isn’t an epistemic concept at all, but only a semantic one — in which case knowledge isn’t justified true belief but only justified belief?

  9. walto: I don’t know what “the point” may be.

    This I get

    walto: I’m just telling you for whatever it may be worth (maybe nothing!), that some of the stuff you’re posting here is wrong.

    I do appreciate any correction you may offer. Comprehensiveness is important.
    I suppose I am too focused on the discussion at hand at times. For that I apologize

    peace

  10. Allan Miller:
    phoodoo,

    There is nothing in epigenetics that poses any problem for evolutionary theory. Much though you might get the opposite impression from the way Creationists sites are humping it for all they are worth.

    Really Allan? That’s a pretty specious hand-wave (I find that tends to be your standard go to line these days-“its not a problem, what makes you think it couldn’t happen?”) .

    Who in their right mind thinks random mutations could create a system of genes, which then tell other genes what to become ? How complicated exactly does a system have to become before you might finally admit that, perhaps this is a system which requires too many things happening at once to be put together piecemeal?

    Do you think ANY evolutionist has ever come up with a plausible scenario for a step by step-mutation, then selection, way to get a switchboard which tells genes what to do and when? You think evolution theory predicted something like this?

    Even one wrong command, and the entire organism is toast from the beginning.

    You are becoming the hand-waving specialist here Allan. How to hand-wave away this? You don’t think about? Its not a problem? We have know about this problem for years? What makes you think it can’t?….Any other strategies for denial?

  11. Rumraket,

    As Allan has shown, NOTHING is too big of a problem for those who really need to believe evolution. What could we possibly discover that hard core materialists would say, hm, that doesn’t sound possible from random mutations?

    There doesn’t seem to be anything.

  12. Kantian Naturalist: One can have good reasons for one’s beliefs and yet those beliefs be false

    That is an interesting topic.
    Can one really have “good” reasons for believing a lie?

    Kantian Naturalist: or one might have true beliefs by accident or “intuition”.

    I don’t believe in accident and intuition can be justification. If it is reliable and accurate

    peace

  13. Kantian Naturalist: Or, you could just ask FMM read the Meno so that he understands that we have a whole tradition based on the idea that justification is independent of truth.

    It’s not good form to assume that others are not familiar with the topics at hand. I’m sure that I don’t have the expertise of some but that does not mean that I’m ignorant.

    peace

  14. colewd:
    dazz,

    If you start with a yeast and transition to a vertebrate with your interim state invertebrates.You need to evolve many complex systems like respiration, digestion, muscles that have no precursors in single cell yeast. All these are major innovations that require large DNA sequences.Do you disagree?

    Yet we still find homology between yeast’s genes and every vertebrate out there, suggesting unmistakably that they all share a common ancestor. And the more closely related those vertebrates are, the higher the DNA homology. What are the odds? What are the odds of finding fossils of precursors of these vertebrates and that the dating of them is consistent with the phylogenetic tree?

    And your position requires that vertebrates were poofed into existence. Now let’s compare the evidence that you have for that with the evidence that vertebrates share a common ancestor with yeast, and lancelets, and tunicates… and everything else

  15. Decided to take a break for the long weekend. Sorry for the delay in response KN.

    Kantian Naturalist: What presuppositionalists (like FMM) and skeptics (like keiths) would insist on is “how do you know you can trust your senses?”

    Yes. I understand that’s their question. I’ve asked a counter question a few times that has thus far gone unanswered however: why should I can whether I know I can trust my senses. In point of fact, that strikes me as a contradiction of concepts: one generally establishes trust in spite of the fact of never being able to know with any certainty. That’s what trust is.

    So I trust my senses because thus far they seem to have provided amazingly reliable correspondence. Do I know they will continue to do so? No. Do I care? No. Do I trust they will. Yes. Done.

    I think the first step is to stop using “the senses” in an unreflective way, as if it were perfectly obvious what “the senses” meant.

    Quite so.

    Our senses are not tools or devices to be used; it’s not as if I need to trust my hearing in the same way that I trust the oil light in my car is working correctly.To perceive (in any of the sensory modalities) is, in the first instance, to perceive the world and one’s place in it.Perceiving is fundamentally intentional, in the philosophical sense that it is about or aims at the world (and oneself as a part of that world). (To suspend the intentional structure of perceiving is to have sensing, or in extreme cases — say, intense chronic pain — to be reduced to existing as no more than a sensing organism. The most extreme case here is that of being a victim of torture.)

    In the ‘normal’ cases, it is not that we choose to trust in our senses — it is rather that we find ourselves, primordially, in the existential state of trusting in the world. This primordial trust — Merleau-Ponty calls it ‘perceptual faith’ — is the material a priori condition of any possible act of reason-giving or responsiveness to reasons. It is not something that can be justified. Our social practices of asking for and giving reasons can get no grip here.

    The error of Cartesianism, as I see it, is to begin by severing the cognitive and affective bond that relates us, in existential trust, to the world (perceptually) and to others (socially and normatively). Once this is done, by assuming a position of fundamental alienation from the world and from others, does it even make sense to ask “but is there an external world? are there other minds?”

    And if one takes for granted the Cartesian starting-point — what Jay Rosenberg calls ‘the Myth of the Mind Apart’ — then the next step towards recovering the world is to find some way in which the world is Given to us in a fundamental re-founding cognitive act, whether this be the illuminatio of Augustine or Malebranche or the ‘simple ideas of sense’ or ‘sense-data’ favored by empiricists.

    If, however, one rejects the Myth of the Mind Apart and affirms the existential priority of our being in the world as beings that perceptually sensitive to and practically involved with the world, then the question of “how do you know?” becomes a question of satisfying the conditions for justification and for truth.

    As I see it, the conditions for justification as always context-dependent. What counts as a good-enough justification — what counts as adequate reasons — depends on the issue at stake. Perceptual knowledge is secured just in case I have adequate reasons to believe that I have done all I can reasonably be expected to do in issuing a perceptual report. This is a social achievement; whether or not I’ve fulfilled my epistemic duties is a status conferred on me by the recognition I am granted by others as a being that can make reliable perceptual reports and be held responsible for them.

    My position on truth is more complicated and still evolving, but generally, I think that there are two dimensions here: truth internal to a conceptual framework and the truth of the framework. “Batman is Bruce Wayne” is true within the conceptual framework of DC Comics, and “Superman is Arthur Curry” is false within that same framework. Like for “there is absolute space” — true within the framework of Newtonian mechanics and false within the framework of general relativity.

    But we still want to say — rightly, I think — that general relativity is a better conceptual framework than classical mechanics. And better and worse are assessment of degree. If one insists that truth cannot be a matter of degree, no matter — we can talk about adequacy or aptness of a framework. Assessment of the adequacy or aptness of a conceptual framework lies in comparing it with its rivals and predecessors (which is not to dismiss the possibility of genuine incommensurabilties, in which case the comparison will have to be done much more informally and gradually).

    And although all assessment of cognitive claims — both the first-order claims of science, law, and morality and the second-claims of epistemology and metaphysics — is provisional, tentative, and revisable, that doesn’t make knowledge itself problematic or mysterious.

    A MUCH better description of my perspective. Really well put! Thanks KN!

  16. fifthmonarchyman: This I get

    I do appreciate any correction you may offer. Comprehensiveness is important.
    I suppose I am too focused on the discussion at hand at times. For that I apologize

    peace

    No prob.

    I just wanted to mention, in response to phoodoo’s remarks about theory alteration that it’s a general fact about ALL scientific theories that an epicycle can usually be added here or there if there is sufficient reason for (or interest in) keeping a dominant theory kicking. That’s just the nature of theorizing in the presence of new data.

    But when a theory gets so swamped with ad hoc amendments that it’s little more than a Rube Goldberg thingy, it will usually collapse and be replaced by something at least as fundamental (having as much explanatory power) but more elegant. So there’s nothing special about evolutionary theory in that regard, and it’s hardly a forceful criticism.

    This is all in Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, etc. You really need a preferable substitute if you want something with so much utility to be dumped.

  17. dazz: And the more closely related those vertebrates are, the higher the DNA homology.

    Hahaha…you actually wrote this line. And it never occurred to you how absurd it was?

    Maybe someone will point out to you why its so absurd. I doubt it will be a fellow evolutionist.

  18. Kantian Naturalist: Does that count against deflationary treatments? Or does it tell us that deflationism, for all its merits, can’t be the whole story about truth?

    It seems trivially obvious that deflationism is not the whole story about truth. But while that is trivially obvious, I don’t think your example contributes much.

    Or does it show us that truth just isn’t an epistemic concept at all, but only a semantic one — in which case knowledge isn’t justified true belief but only justified belief?

    It always seemed to me that knowledge and belief are very different things.

  19. walto: You really need a preferable substitute

    No you don’t.
    walto,

    You are claiming that all theories are as unfalsifiable as evolution?

    And the only way to discredit a theory is if you have a replacement?

    We can’t discredit string theory until we have a replacement?

  20. walto: I just wanted to mention, in response to phoodoo’s remarks about theory alteration that it’s a general fact about ALL scientific theories that an epicycle can usually be added here or there if there is sufficient reason for (or interest in) keeping a dominant theory kicking. That’s just the nature of theorizing in the presence of new data.

    This is part of why I consider theories to be neither true nor false. We tend to be mostly concerned with goodness of fit, when it comes to our scientific theories. So making a small change to improve goodness of fit is usually welcome.

  21. phoodoo: ou are claiming that all theories are as unfalsifiable as evolution?

    And the only way to discredit a theory is if you have a replacement?

    We can’t discredit string theory until we have a replacement?

    It usually takes more than some random occurrence to blow up a long-standing fecund theory. I mean, do you think the theory of gravity would be falsified by somebody walking on water?

  22. phoodoo: No you don’t.

    Walto is right, and you are wrong.

    You are claiming that all theories are as unfalsifiable as evolution?

    I’m not sure if walto is claiming that. For myself, I never saw falsificationism as providing useful criteria. Theories aren’t really true or false, so falsificationism doesn’t fit.

    And the only way to discredit a theory is if you have a replacement?

    The only way to replace a theory is to have a replacement. A useful theory will continue to be used until something better comes along.

    We can’t discredit string theory until we have a replacement?

    String Theory isn’t an actual scientific theory. It is a speculative hypothesis.

  23. newton: Something that is false is not necessarily a lie.

    Right. One might have many good reasons for believing something that’s false. Heard it on TV, saw it in the newspaper, heard it from a trusted friend, etc. Could still be false. And it may not be that anybody was lying. The reporter could have made a mistake, or her transmission might have been garbled, etc.

  24. Neil Rickert: Walto is right, and you are wrong.

    I’m not sure if walto is claiming that.FOr myself, I never saw falsificationism as providing useful criteria.Theories aren’t really true or false, so falsificationism doesn’t fit.

    The only way to replace a theory is to have a replacement.A useful theory will continue to be used until something better comes along.

    String Theory isn’t an actual scientific theory.It is a speculative hypothesis.

    This whole reply is not even sensible enough to be wrong.

    “Walto is right, and I am not sure what he is claiming.”

    “String theory isn’t a theory.”

    ” A useful theory will continue to be used until something better comes along.”

    “Theories aren’t really true or false, so falsificationism doesn’t fit.”

    That is just one poor statement after another Neil. Not even good enough to be wrong I am afraid.

  25. phoodoo: Hahaha…you actually wrote this line. And it never occurred to you how absurd it was?

    Maybe someone will point out to you why its so absurd.I doubt it will be a fellow evolutionist.

    It’s observably true. Demonstrably true
    You’re an ape, and a fish, deal with it

  26. phoodoo,

    Really Allan? That’s a pretty specious hand-wave (I find that tends to be your standard go to line these days-“its not a problem, what makes you think it couldn’t happen?”) .

    Well, what DOES make you think it’s a problem? ‘It’s rilly complex’ is not an argument. Why should I be anything other than dismissive of the latest Creationist Big Deal, when I don’t see it as a big deal at all, and you’ve done nothing with it other than read it on some Creationist site and then regurgitate the word and some blether about complexity? We know biology’s complex.

  27. Basically, it is no more difficult for a gene product to bind and influence the production of another gene product than it is for a gene product to bind a substrate and catalyse its reaction. So, no surprise that people who think evolution plausible are not remotely fazed by epigenetics, even in the face of foaming-at-the-mouth ranters who say they should be.

  28. Rumraket:
    Rabbits in the precambrian would falsify the standard phylogenetic tree and massively screw over our understanding of the history of life.

    It still wouldn’t falsify the fact that evolution happens, or the close relationships between man and chimp (for example).

    Evolutionary theory has many sub-branches, a falsification of one aspect does not necessarily carry over into another. You could, for example, falsify universal common descent, yet all the inferences drawn from the LTEE would still be true.

    I don’t think it is possible, with one single observation or experiment, to prove ALL of evolutonary thought false. You’d have to do several for many different subcategories.

    Well, unless you could somehow show that all organisms actually don’t reproduce or that there is no such thing as imperfect inheritance of characteristics. Or allele frequencies never change. Which I don’t think is practically possible.

    Yes, unless somehow you could show that only evolutionary processes occurred, obviously any number of other processes could also have happened. Design, for one thing. Aliens came along and threw some rabbits (animals morphologically similar to rabbits, at least) into the mix. They’d probably die in the Cambrian (what would they eat. anyway?), but clearly something other than evolution is always possible.

    Otherwise it would be like IDists/creationists say, that “design” and other processes are simply ruled out a priori. However, not having seen other instances of aliens or gods putting organisms unrelated to everything else on earth, we’d first doubt that the rabbits really existed during the Cambrian (well, what would they eat? How would they have evolved?), and try to find out how more recent fossils were incorporated into older sedimentary rocks, or whatever. If that failed, well, one rabbit might end up just being an outlier. We don’t know why it was found there, but everything else fits the normal evolutionary scenario, so we’re not changing our theories (or concluding alien intervention) all because of one uncertain fossil. A bunch of rabbit fossils, many from widely separated regions, would certainly beg for hypotheses to account for them, yet if rabbits are the only mammals in the Cambrian, there might be no resolution of the question. Find some chunks of titanium dioxide and aluminum oxide in the shapes of spacecraft bits associated with the rabbit fossils, and you might suspect aliens.

    Evolution needn’t be the only game in town, after all. But we’d need the evidence to suppose that something else occurred in addition to evolution, let alone that evolution did not occur, rather that a whole lot of design instances are responsible for life’s forms. That lacks any meaningful evidence, while any chance of a bit of alien/supernatural intervention cannot actually be ruled out.

    Glen Davidson

  29. phoodoo: Hahaha…you actually wrote this line. And it never occurred to you how absurd it was?

    Maybe someone will point out to you why its so absurd. I doubt it will be a fellow evolutionist.

    I’m guessing you are claiming circularity that “closely related species are closely related”. The point is that [the phylogeny of]* relationships inferred from shared characteristics (evidence from taxonomy) is confirmed by the consilient evidence from comparing DNA sequences.

    *ETA clarity

  30. Alan Fox: The point is that relationships inferred from shared characteristics (evidence from taxonomy) is confirmed by the consilient evidence from comparing DNA sequences.

    Except for all the times when the closeness is not confirmed by comparing the DNA? Then what Alan?

    Oh well?

  31. phoodoo: Except for all the times when the closeness is not confirmed by comparing the DNA?Then what Alan?

    Oh well?

    Is it ever disconfirmed, Phoodoo?

  32. dazz,

    And your position requires that vertebrates were poofed into existence. Now let’s compare the evidence that you have for that with the evidence that vertebrates share a common ancestor with yeast, and lancelets, and tunicates… and everything else

    There is certainly evidence that supports common descent as the paper you sent me points out. The challenge is the massive innovations that need to occur from yeast forward and the complex sequences that need to be generated to support those innovations. The amount of intermediates is immaterial. Not having a defined mechanism is problematic for UCD. If the cell can generate its own sequences as James Shapiro hypothesizes then the problem is solved.

  33. phoodoo: Except for all the times when the closeness is not confirmed by comparing the DNA?

    All those times? What are you referring to? Have you an example or two?

  34. colewd,

    the complex sequences that need to be generated to support those innovations.

    And these are? And evolution cannot produce them because?

  35. phoodoo,

    I have no idea what this means. It was falsifiable then, but not now?

    So do you agree that even rabbits in the Cambrian wouldn’t falsify evolution, because you could always just say that just needs an explanation that we are still looking for? Just like your side is now doing with epigenetics?

    Interesting: If you protect your theory with the “God of the gaps” defense you are effectively making the theory unfalsifiable.

  36. Allan Miller: Much though you might get the opposite impression from the way Creationists sites are humping it for all they are worth.

    Is TSZ now a Creationist site?

  37. walto: This is all in Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, etc. You really need a preferable substitute if you want something with so much utility to be dumped.

    I agree.

  38. Alan Fox,

    You are unaware of the many instances in biology where the molecular phylogeny differs from the morphological?

    You mean I have to start at the very beginning of biology lessons Alan?

    That’s confounding.

  39. colewd:
    dazz,

    There is certainly evidence that supports common descent as the paper you sent me points out.The challenge is the massive innovations that need to occur from yeast forward and the complex sequences that need to be generated to support those innovations. The amount of intermediates is immaterial.Not having a defined mechanism is problematic for UCD.If the cell can generate its own sequences as James Shapiro hypothesizes then the problem is solved.

    Fact is, the evidence for common descent is there, and it’s undeniable, regardless of what “innovations” were produced in the process. Regardless of the “challenges” you want to imagine.

    Regardless of mechanisms: how many times do we need to tell you that the absence of a mechanism would not be problematic for UCD? and that the mechanisms are actually known?

    You can keep repeating all that to yourself as much as you need to suppress reality, but reality won’t go away

  40. Mung,

    You agree that we have to accept theories, however poor and inadequate they are for explaining phenomenon, simply because we have no alternative explanation? Why?

    Like if we have evidence that someone might have murdered someone, by the evidence is really flimsy, in fact downright fabricated, we still have to assume they were the murderer, until we have a better suspect? The suspect can’t just be unknown?

  41. phoodoo: You are unaware of the many instances in biology where the molecular phylogeny differs from the morphological?

    Indeed I am. Please enlighten me.

    You mean I have to start at the very beginning of biology lessons Alan?

    I wouldn’t have thought molecular phylogeny crops up right at the beginning of biology lessons. Just give me an example or two.

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