There’s a lot of (mostly very obscure) talk about “the soul” here and elsewhere. (Is it supposed to be different from you, your “mind,” your “ego” etc.? Is it some combo of [some of] them, or what?) A friend recently passed along the following quote from psychologist James Hillman that I thought was nice–and maybe demystifying–at least a little bit.
By soul I mean, first of all, a perspective rather than a substance, a viewpoint toward things rather than a thing itself. This perspective is reflective; it mediates events and makes differences between ourselves and everything that happens. Between us and events, between the doer and the deed, there is a reflective moment — and soul-making means differentiating this middle ground.
It is as if consciousness rests upon a self-sustaining and imagining substrate — an inner place or deeper person or ongoing presence — that is simply there even when all our subjectivity, ego, and consciousness go into eclipse. Soul appears as a factor independent of the events in which we are immersed. Though I cannot identify soul with anything else, I also can never grasp it apart from other things, perhaps because it is like a reflection in a flowing mirror, or like the moon which mediates only borrowed light. But just this peculiar and paradoxical intervening variable gives one the sense of having or being soul. However intangible and indefinable it is, soul carries highest importance in hierarchies of human values, frequently being identified with the principle of life and even of divinity.
In another attempt upon the idea of soul I suggest that the word refers to that unknown component which makes meaning possible, turns events into experiences, is communicated in love, and has a religious concern. These four qualifications I had already put forth some years ago. I had begun to use the term freely, usually interchangeably with psyche (from Greek) and anima (from Latin). Now I am adding three necessary modifications. First, soul refers to the deepening of events into experiences; second, the significance soul makes possible, whether in love or in religious concern, derives from its special relation with death. And third, by soul I mean the imaginative possibility in our natures, the experiencing through reflective speculation, dream, image, fantasy — that mode which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or metaphorical.”
James Hillman — Re-Visioning Psychology
One point about my views about this stuff that I should have made a bit more clear: I think of the relation between mind-talk and brain-talk as the relation between person-level descriptions and explanations and subpersonal-level descriptions and explanations. That’s why I find the talk about “identity” to be really not at all helpful.
I understrand the identity theorist to push the first view. Same process.
So do I. And when it’s the same process, what’s the distinction between physical and mental? What is the brain process and what is the thought? How is the conflation or equivocation avoided?
Erik,
Sometimes things have properties of which we’re unaware. Think of the morning star and the evening star or heat and molecular activity. They were always identical–we just failed to realize it.
That’s the claim, anyhow.
Eric
“And immaterial is that which is NOT made up of matter, or a product or effect of it. How is that unclear?”
Seems pretty clear
And that statement is in your opinion the same as saying “Material processes cannot cause immaterial stuff”?
“made of” = “cause” to you?
A car is made of iron, wheels, wires, etc. = A car is caused by iron, wheels, wires, etc.
???
Yes, it looked to me like your objection to me boils down to an argument from ignorance. Which is underwhelming.
I can fully grant to you that you can’t tell the difference between physical and mental because “sometimes we’re unaware”. I can grant that you don’t know. It’s a whole different thing to insist that I don’t know either.
I may have made a fallacy in the process and I would have wanted to know what it was. Unfortunately you could not point to one. I did not do equivocation. Instead, you insist on failure to distinguish between physical and mental because “sometimes we’re unaware”. Now, that’s a conscious conflation, worse than equivocation.
And still there’s no example. What I have had instead is Patrick, Robin, etc. saying there’s no such thing as “immaterial” whatsoever. Whatsoever. They say material is everything there is. Anybody up for an example?
I’m sorry, but that’s just dumb. That’s allowing semantics to do all the work and neglecting pragmatics and epistemology. If we actually look at the contexts which license or authorize asserting that those identities obtain, it’s impossible to see how the mind-brain relation could satisfy those criteria.
The identity of Hesperus and Phosphorous is warranted by patient astronomical observation and calculation, and the identity of heat and mean kinetic energy is warranted by the application of statistics to experiments and inventions. In those cases the identity is warranted by scientific practices: manipulation, disciplined observation, experimentation, theory-building, hypothesis-testing, all within a community of inquirers.
There would have to be an objective, third-personal stance that we could take on mental phenomena in order for us to even imagine that mental phenomena are related to neurophysiological processes just as heat is related to mean kinetic energy. We would have to — as it were — step outside of our own minds.
I’m not saying that there can’t be a science of mental phenomena — that is, I’m not denying that there’s psychology. But psychology would have to be sufficiently objective, third-personal and open to experimentation in order for us to be warranted in identifying mental phenomena with neurophysiological phenomena.
Nor are the prospects for eliminativism any good, for quite different reasons.
Far better, I think, to recognize that the vocabulary of person-level agency — the vocabulary in which we talk about thoughts, beliefs, desires, expectations, needs, as well as what we see, hear, feel, etc. — is just too deeply constitutive of the human form of life for it to be identified with any vocabulary of the natural sciences or replaced by any such vocabulary.
The best we’re going to be able to do is develop increasingly more fine-grained correlations between phenomenological explications of the personal level and neuroscientific explanations of the subpersonal level.
What physicalists ROUTINELY say this? Citation please. I did a perfunctory search and came up only with your statements to this effect.
My take on the metaphysical implications is rather moot if no one actually holds the view you are attributing.
Ironically, you have admitted you can’t detect the immaterial either. Must be a case of the blind leading the blind…
Way to botch that one, Erik!
Wait…so I shouldn’t go to a cobbler to fix my soul? Damn…been doing it wrong all these years!
When I read posts like this, I wonder whether you actually know what these words mean: “equivocation” “conflation” “appeal to ignorance.”:
You like to use those words and others of that kind, I know, but that’s not actually dispositive here, I’m afraid.
Yes. That’s why I use the term.
Not really. Unrealistic is a conclusion, not a premise.
Your opinion I suppose. Given that you are having some serious difficulty with the concepts you want to declare by fiat, such as “soul” and “immaterial”, I’m not all that concerned about your opinion of my qualifications to discuss metaphysics. Do let me know when you’re ready to humbly concede that you aren’t exactly some leading expert or authority on metaphysics either.
OK, all the identity theorists are “just dumb.” I suggest you and Erik write a paper about how they’ve “conflated ratio essendi with cheese macaroni” here.
Yes, because one of the definitions of “produce” is cause and because one of the definitions of “effect” is cause.
Did you mean otherwise, why not just say so?
Ok, give me an example of an immaterial thing
[ Please excuse my delays in responding. RL work is kicking my ass. As much as I sometimes find you abrasive (Why can’t you be charming like me?), I am finding the discussion interesting. ]
This may be the root of our disagreement (or not). When you say “immaterial” do you mean something that we currently haven’t detected through physical/material means or do you mean something that is undetectable in principle?
Fair point. I’m not entirely comfortable with the word either, but it seems clear enough in context. My physicist friends would start talking about fields at this point, but I think it would confuse the issue. Until someone provides a good explanation of what they mean by “immaterial”, it seems reasonable for now.
I’d like to point out to the confused here that the claim that the referents of two names can be identical without anybody realizing it, is not a statement of the mind-body identity theory. It is simply an explanation of why simplistic attacks like Erik’s fail. It’s a relatively obvious statement that must be true for anybody to propose an identity theory. And it is true.
KN tells us that any such theory as Smart’s or Hall’s or Lewis’s or Davidson’s or Dennet’s is dumb, however, so I suppose that takes care of that.
Like suggesting that someone’s heavy handedness chased people off this site? Oh, wait, that was a claim you made about me and have still not substantiated.
Nicely and succinctly put.
Oh what a mess…
Hallucinations are thoughts. Drug induced thoughts are thoughts. Thoughts made when you have an empty stomach are thoughts and wacky thoughts you get after eating too much spicy pizza are thoughts too. The differences between them are due to the changes in chemical arrangement of the neurons and the inhibition of neural pathways due to chemical interference. This is all pretty well-known Erik and all quite readily distinguishable. Methinks you might want to read up a bit before outright denying that which is well-studied and well-documented.
Actually, what I’m saying is that there is no evidence for anything other than the material and no one, including yourself, has provided a rigorous description of “immaterial” nor any reason to think that word describes any extant entities.
BZZZZZZT! I have not said “there is no such thing as “immaterial” whatsoever. If you wish to understand my position, please address the words I actually post, not what you presume I mean by them.
So let me be clear: I do not believe there is any such thing as the “immaterial”, mostly because the folks who claim there is can’t seem to define it, but also because (as you’ve readily noted) there’s no way to directly perceive it and it has (apparently) no entailments. Given the latter, it strikes me that even if it does exist, it’s properties are such that there is little difference between it existing and not existing. At best, it’s a Schroedinger’s substance, and thus it is of no use to me.
Robin,
I don’t understand this, Robin. Suppose, for the sake of argument that desires are immaterial. Why would the existence of one at some particular place and time (say me now) not have any detectable entailments?
A couple of thoughts on this. 1) “immaterial” would need to be defined in such a way that desires meet the definition while the physical processes surrounding the hypothalamus and pituitary (to say nothing of the kidneys, adrenals, heart, pupils and ocular nerves, lymphatic system (to name but a few)) do not. 2) what does defining desires (or any emotions) gain one in terms of understanding and being able to better explain the world around us?
That said, in principle all emotions have entailments. All those physiological processes and organs I mentioned are certainly entailments. The question is, what is an inherent characteristic of this “immaterial” category that makes it a definitive entailment of those processes. In other words, what makes desire definitely “immaterial” as opposed to material? Where’s the dividing line or key characteristic that makes desire easily fall into this particular category.
To me, I just don’t see the point. I don’t see “immaterial” as providing anything but an arbitrary distinction at best, and at worst a muddled non-differentiation that doesn’t help us make predictions or better understand the underlying mechanics behind emotions in general.
For me, categories help us better understand not just he essence of things, but their relationship to one another. “Birds” are a pretty darn good category, even for the most simple layman. Those who want to better understand the relationship and behavior of birds not only get, but can extrapolate a great understanding of behavior and phenomenon between birds in accepting why barn owls are not categorized in the Strix genus. Similarly, it’s really helpful in terms of modelling physics to understand and accept the category “space-time”.
Based on the way the term is used however, I don’t find that for “immaterial”.
All the problems with “immaterial” that Robin points out, also apply to “supernatural”.
We know that ID is an invented term that actually means creationism. Is it not also obvious that IDers would use the term “immaterial” as a covert code for “supernatural” ? (As they don their fake lab coats and masquerade as scientists)
Both words should be banned and people should be forced to explain their ideas in more fundamental terms.
In this instance, what makes it definitely immaterial is that we were assuming it is for the sake of argument. I was just asking why you thought they could have no entailments, not filing a brief on behalf of immaterial entities.
Take that up with patrick.
Let’s suppose they can be identical without anybody realizing it.
Now, who are you that you realize that and nobody else does? What’s the reason why identity (without anybody realizing it) should be considered as a possibility here? What is there in the nature of mental and physical so that you can say they CAN be the same? Would they always be the same or just sometimes? How do you know without anybody realizing it?
But that’s the whole point to me: there’s no validity – nothing to gain – by first assuming something fits a category and then determining whether that thing is detectable through entailments. Analyzing entailments tells you something about the category the entailed item should belong to. That’s what science and model building is all about. That’s how we get a better understanding of the world, universe, and reality around us.
But fine – for the sake of argument – , as I noted, desire (all emotions/feelings actually) have entailments. What now?
And I’m not the one insisting that the “immaterial” has no entailments. Talk to those who believe in this…whatever…called the “immaterial”; there seems to be some consensus among them that “immaterial” things (like the “soul”) have no entailments. Ask them why that is.
What if “predictions” and “mechanics” are not applicable to emotions? Do you always react to the same stimulus the same way? No, you don’t. So if you require something mechanically predictable from emotions, you have something completely different coming.
Who said nobody does? And your use of “possibility” here is ambiguous. Identities are generally thought to be either necessary or impossible, so the only “possibility” here is epistemic.
Of course, you have no interest in learning about these matters, sure, as you always are, about everything already.
This is an interesting issue. I’m personally less concerned about a conspiracy in this case as I am at simply understanding what people mean when they use a term like “immaterial”. Frankly I don’t care if it’s a term some folks want to use for some spiritual property – fine by me. My original comment was simply to note that if that is the case, if someone using the term wants other people to accept his or her claims about it, then he or she has the burden to establish it. Now, if said person either isn’t making claims regarding the truth or validity of the term in question, or simply doesn’t care if anyone accepts his or her claims regarding said term, then whatever. The use is simply for conversational purposes and we can all agree on the context and just discuss away in the abstract.
But yes, you are right FW: I have the same issue with “supernatural” as I do with “immaterial”; it’s just a vague term for “supposed unexplainable phenomenon that results from spiritual entity behavior/activity that might or might not have actually occurred”. I just don’t find that particularly meaningful or valid, nevermind credible.
I was going by this:
Just trying to understand you is all.
You: “…without anybody realizing it…”
I’m listening. Go on.
So, epistemic possibility. What is there in the nature of introspection that entitles you to say that it’s a material process? You know the topic by now, and you have said I need to learn, so this means you have volunteered to teach. Do it.
That makes utterly no sense. As a former ad exec and consumer behaviorist, I can tell you that the basis of the industry (and it’s continued ridiculously lucrative success) is predicated on understanding the predictability and mechanics of emotions and being able to manipulate them to some extent.
But even beyond the industries built around this recognition, most people (and many sociopaths are particularly good at this) become pretty good and predicting how their actions will affect people’s emotions and how to mechanically influence people’s emotions.
Really, I have no idea what you are thinking of in your sentence above.
Of course I do. But I don’t think you really understand the question you asked. Outside of a lab, there would be no way to ever encounter a single stimuli situation.
I think you really need to do some reading on neurological research.
I honestly have no more idea what you’re talking about than you do. I’m not “entitled to say that it’s a material process.” I don’t know whether it is or not. And neither do you.
The “(as you already noted)” was meant to provide the context of my clarification. The claim that the “immaterial” has no entailments comes from the folks who think that there is such a thing as the “immaterial”, not from me or from the folks who don’t believe in the “immaterial”.
I mean let’s face is, why would someone who is skeptical of some concept insist there were specific characteristics about that concept? Clearly I don’t know what characteristics this “immaterial”…whatever…actually has. That’s why I’ve been asking those folks who claim that this “immaterial” actually does exist to define the characteristics it possesses. Oddly, those folks seem to have some trouble with this…
You obviously misunderstood that too. My claim was about beliefs de re, something which you either cannot or will not understand. Before the molecular theory of heat, nobody realized that heat could be identical to molecular activity. And no such identity of mental and physical processes can be “realized” today, since there are just competing theories on the matter, (including whatever your crazy parallelism or occasionalism or whatever cuckoo theory claims: just because you have no good reason for it doesn’t mean it’s not true.)
Do they really say that? That’s surprising to me. I suppose they might say that they have no entailments involving physical objects–but I don’t think they all say that either. That’s why I mentioned a particular desire (assuming for the sake of argument that it’s immaterial).
So you have no idea. Then you have nothing to teach.
Which never was the topic.
This either applies to introspection or it doesn’t. You are not showing it does.
So you know nothing about introspection. I’ll remember that and not ask again.
Do Erik, FMM, or Charlie ever state anything directly about their non-material perspectives? C’mon Walto…have you actually read the exchanges you’ve been engaged here for the past few years?
To my knowledge none of them have explicitly made the claim. However, if you go back and read the exchange between me and Erik yesterday, I ask in three places about the entailments of the “immaterial”. Here are his collective responses:
I’m waiting for Erik to get back with a citation on physicalists and unicorns, but regardless his avoidance on the subject of entailments strikes me as telling.
And this from your exchange with FMM:
This exchange, if you recall, went on for several days like this. Again, I’d say kinda telling that FMM avoids any examples of entailments.
But hey…ymmv…
Well, I’ve not received a clear and concise explanation for this “immaterial” at all, so what can I say?
Good plan. Discussion is absolutely wasted on those who think they already know everything, especially those who think these issues were all settled in medieval times. Every minute I’ve spent discussing anything with you–from what “marriage” means to this stuff–has been an utter waste of time, and I wish I had it all back.
Robin,
You’re right that if you’re looking for clarity or consistency (or indeed anything but crabby disagreements and weaseling) from Erik, you’re wasting you’re life. Getting people to do that often seems to me to be his main goal.
Ehh…could be.
Personally, I don’t see the discussion (or the lack there of) as a waste of my life. I’m interested in the Erik et al’s perspectives on such things. I’d genuinely like to understand what ideas, pictures, concepts, feelings, and impressions go through their minds when they use terms like “immaterial”. What does that word mean to them.
I have a very concise impression when I think of the world, universe, and/or reality around me. I envision everything in terms of atoms, the interaction of molecules, and the processes involved in quantum entailments. To me, that’s all there is. Could I be wrong? Sure. But so far, there’s no implication of anything else.
And that to me is the issue. I don’t create categories of reality because I think that some category sounds cool or I find the implication of it interesting; I create categories when I come across some phenomenon that doesn’t fit in the other categories I already have. So for me right now, the category “Immaterial” is unnecessary. I’ve just never come across anything to put into it. So I’m interested in hearing about ideas from that people who hold such categories. I don’t necessarily get their concepts, but I find it interesting nonetheless.
That might be interesting if Erik would actually tell you. But he prefers to crab and weasel. Straight answers are not exactly his stock in trade.
ETA: I note too that ideas, pictures, concepts, feelings, impressions, and minds are not usually among the stuff found in materialists’ closets.