A propos my banning from UD, Dr.Jammer (aka Jammer at UD) wrote at AtBC:
As for the discussion of morality, kairosfocus was right on the mark. Liz put up a valiant fight, but her argument for morality ultimately boiled down to argumentum ad populum.
If the members of NAMBLA (I suspect a few of you are card-carrying members) decided to start their own nation, with their own set of laws, and they all determined pedophilia to be not only legal, but moral, would that make it so? According to Liz’s reasoning it would.
With no ultimate source of objective morality, morality becomes nothing more than a popularity contest. It’s might-makes-right. That majority opinion becomes the might, and they decide what is right.
Even worse are the non-democracies, where might isn’t represented by the majority, but by a small section of the elite. This is what we witnessed in the early 20th century with the eugenics movement, where the elite decided that it was moral to decide who could and could not reproduce. That’s one of the more tame examples.
kairosfocus’ point isn’t that we can’t reason to right and wrong. We can, in large part because morality (seems to be) an attribute inherent to most human beings, which acts as our guiding light, so to speak.
His point is that the might-makes-right mentality that arises when one denies an objective, ultimate source of morality, is often a very dangerous thing. A look through any history book will confirm that he is correct.
I’ll post my response in the thread.
Well, my first response is a request for clarification, which I hope Dr. Jammer will provide:
What, in this context, do you mean by “an objective, ultimate sources of morality”?
Specifically, by the word “objective”? Because that seems to trip us up every time.
May I ask a few, too?
a) What evidence is there that objective moral standards exist?
b) By what method do we discover these objective morals standards?
c) How do we know when we are in possession of objective moral standards?
he means “The Bible”. Something “given” to humans and not “created” by humans. Because, you know, the bible is an objective external question. Sorry. I know you are looking for a response from Dr. Jammer, but i’d be interested if he said anything different.
I meant an external objective document, not an external objective question (whatever the heck that would be!)
Expected answers:
a) the bible
b) we open it and read the words
c) we are holding it in our hands
I suggest that what “objective” means is that (1) an intentional behavior is right or wrong regardless of what anyone thinks or believes about it, and (2) there are necessary (not arbitrary) consequences to moral and immoral behavior.
Woodbine,
a) Whether or not there is any evidence that morality describes an objective good is irrelevant in regards to understanding the logical ramifications of either premise. Some things must be believed, or accepted as axiomatic, whether they can be proven or not.
b) First, by discerning moral statements one holds as self-evidently true; second, by using logic to infer from those self-evidently true statements necessarily true moral statements, conditionally true moral statements, and general moral maxims.
c) You know you are in possession of correct moral perspectives the same way you know most other things – provisionally, to the best of one’s ability to discern such things rationally.
William J Murray
In which case … what sets the Christian’s moral standard above that of (a) a Hindu or Buddhist (b) an atheist?
I consider myslef a pretty ‘moral’ guy, but I expect I’ve done some things that you would regard as immoral. Perhaps you have too. You presumably believe we are going to be held to account for all that. I don’t. But in the meantime, the difference between us appears to be that you are trying to second-guess What God Wants. You personally may not find something immoral, but you feel you know that God does. So you decry it.
I don’t care what God wants, because I don’t think there is anything there. And yet (you don’t know me) I consider my behaviour no less moral than that of the vast majority of Christians. Not just the Big Stuff; I look after my kids, I’m a staunch friend, I try to be polite and kind and hospitable … I just don’t need to live in fear of some almighty tyrant in order to conduct myself well, and pass that on to my kids.
I think what you perceive as an objective external sense simply rationalises an innate sense we all share deriving from our sociality as a species.
This avoids the question. Do we have any evidence that objective moral standards exist? The consequential argument is separate.
So the method by which we discover objective moral standards is by subjective reflection? What might be self-evident to you may be ludicrous to me, and vice versa. No, introspection is not a reliable method of discovering objective moral standards.
“You just know”. Again, this is not acceptable….at least if one wants to claim objectivity.
My questions remain un-answered.
On re-reading my post I find that….
Allan Miller,
I don’t believe I said anything to that effect. I suggest you set your assumptions about my perspective aside and re-frame commentary, arguments and questions accordingly – without the assumption that I’m a Christian or belong to any organized faith.
Whether or not there is a god, and whether or not morality actually describes an objective good, we must choose to either believe it does, or that it does not. It is my contention that choosing the latter belief has necessary logical consequences that are existentially unacceptable to any reasonably sane person.
While it is certainly possible to hold the academic, intellectual position that morality is subjective; it is IMO impossible for non-sociopaths to employ such a maxim in any practical manner in day to day life, work, relationships, and conversation. IOW, while one may intellectually believe that all behavioral “good” is subjective, they cannot physically function as if that is true (which might count for indirect evidence that morality attempts to describe an objective good).
It’s like trying to think and act as if one doesn’t have free will. It just cannot be done by any reasonably sane person.
I don’t see the point in holding a belief that one must act, in day to day life, as if that belief is false.
William J Murray,
Thanks, William. Yes, that’s why I asked Jammer.
Can you say how you would determine whether objective morality exists, by your definition?
Apologies if you have already explained this, and a link will do, but it would be useful to have it in this thread.
ETA: Sorry, have now read further, and understand that you regard it as axiomatic.
That’s what I thought at first, but that doesn’t seem to be what people who talk about “objective morality” in this way actually mean.
See William’s response above.
Just because morality cannot be shown to exist independently from the mind does not mean that morality itself does not exist.
The vast majority of the cogs and springs that animate human life are very much “only in the mind”. Nations, ideologies, literature, music, marriage, war….all these things have no objective existence whatsoever – that doesn’t mean they are un-important, nor does it mean that we cannot speak rationally about those things.
William J Murray,
You’ve made a case for the existence of laws that apply equally to everyone, but you haven’t made a case for an objective good or morality.
Laws that prohibit going through red lights are “good” for air-bags and occupants but there is no morality involved at all.
On the other hand, no law forces me to run to a burning vehicle to save anyone inside, but I would do it
Does a moral code that exists outside of me compel me to save someone?
I’d say no because a pre-existing moral code would not know whether I was a pregnant woman in my thirties or a 70 year old man with a heart condition.
Would I be morally justified in risking my unborn child or making my elderly wife a widow?
These sort of questions are too difficult to be resolved by an external code of behaviour.
Like it or not, we all have to decide on our own, what is “right” for the unique conditions under which we make any decision.
Woodbine,
I didn’t say otherwise. I my argument is that a rational, non-sociopathic person cannot live as if morality does not refer to an objective value.
Again, I didn’t say that subjective morality would be unimportant, or that one cannot speak rationally about subjective morality.
Then what is the fascination, the advantage, the lure of an objective standard of morality?
I take it from your posts that you admit that we cannot in actual fact discern an objective standard. Still, you claim that we must posit such a standard as if it were true. But to what end?
What is the difference, in practical terms, in believing the Golden Rule is mind-independent rather than subjectively sourced? Surely it’s the content of ethical directives that matter, and not their metaphysical status? If I could logically prove that we should kill every first born son would you do it? Of course not. Would you feel guilty about disobeying said command? Of course not.
We have, and always will, accept and reject moralities based on our nature and the culture we live in. Just flick through Leviticus….there are literally hundreds of allegedly objective moral commandments in there; and barring a few hyper-orthodox types they are uniformly ignored.
How many different iterations of the One True Objective Morality do we have to reserve shelf space for in the religious section at the library before we admit that we are on our own?
William J Murray,
I am a rational, non-sociopathic person who gets by fine without my morality referring to an objective value.
Would anyone advocating the existence – even in principle – of an objective standard of morality care to propose and defend just one proposition that is objectively moral in all circumstances?
Woodbine,
I have no idea what you’re asking me or why.
I take it from your posts that you admit that we cannot in actual fact discern an objective standard.
I did not admit that. My point was that whether or not we can is irrelevant to the debate.
To the end of having beliefs consistent with our actual behavior, and to the end of preventing our beliefs about morality from necessarily endorsing (via logical inference and conclusion) might-makes-right moral relativism.
In practical terms, people can believe all sorts of crazy, unsupportable nonsense and still live happy, successful lives. I’m not interested in debating people who don’t care whether or not their beliefs are rationally justifiable.
Debates are so much easier when you ask and answer the questions, don’t you think?
“I take it from your posts that you admit that we cannot in actual fact discern an objective standard. “ – should be blockquoted above.
Amadan,
It is wrong in all situations to torture children for personal pleasure.
Try reading for comprehension next time.
Was it moral to burn Michael Servetus and Giordano Bruno at the stake? Were the Salem Witch trials moral? Was killing the Boston Martyrs moral?
Does morality change with the times? Are certain acts moral during some eras and then not moral in others? Does morality evolve?
If what is considered a moral act changes with time, aren’t moral acts subject to analogous laws of evolution and natural selection?
William J Murray,
A better response would have been to clarify what you meant.
William J Murray,
Why?
Why
William J Murray,
It is wrong to mock people who lisp.
Show me an absolute moral code that has correctly predicted that some people would do this and explicitly forbids it.
You won’t find any and you will never find a code that forbids every single human behaviour that the “average” person would consider to be “wrong”.
Why not?
William J Murray,
Then presumably you can provide one (just one!) example of an objective moral fact. Please provide the evidence of its objectivity, how you came to apprehend this fact, and how you rationally justify it.
Quoted from Jammer at UD:
There’s no reference there to precisely what Elizabeth said, so I’m not quite sure what is intended. But it seems to me that the NAMBLA issue raised misunderstands our situation.
Members of that NAMBLA nation might consider it moral. But I am not thereby required to consider it moral. For example, I certainly disagreed with apartheid when it was the position that South Africa subscribed to.
Even members of that NAMBLA nation would not be required to consider the pedophilia moral. They could argue against it, and attempt to persuade other members of that nation to change their view.
Those of us who deny that there is an objective morality are not saying that anything goes. Rather, we are saying that there is no standard that can be referred to in order to resolve disagreements. It is something that a population must work out for itself. And there will likely always be disagreements over that.
I’m not under any obligation to support something I haven’t claimed.
Once again, whether or not morality actually describes an objective commodity is irrelevant to my argument here. You either believe it does, or you believe it does not. My argument is not about whether or not it can be proven one way or another, but rather what the logical ramifications are of either position.
IF morality describes a subjective good, THEN it can be anything I think it is, including torturing children for pleasure. If you agree that torturing children for personal pleasure is morally good for the torturer as long as they consider it good, then we do not have an argument.
IF, however, one holds that it is always wrong, in any case and in any society, to torture children for personal pleasure, then they cannot rationally hold the belief that morality refers to a subjective good.
They can certainly hold the belief that morality refers to a subjective good, AND hold the belief that it is always wrong to torture children for pleasure, but those are not rationally reconcilable beliefs. As I said, people can believe anything, whether it is rational or not.
It would seem that the notion can be determined by just looking at the rationale that people give under different circumstances and in different cultures and different eras.
For example, John Calvin’s rationale for arresting Michael Servetus and recommending that he be put to death for heresy is available in the historical record. So, if Calvin’s rationale for recommending the death penalty for “heresy” stands up to today’s standards, then we might conclude there is some kind of objective morality; in this case, morality coming from a proper reading of a proper holy book.
But if we agree that the death penalty for “heresy” cannot be objectively agreed, then who is immoral, Calvin, or secular law today?
So all we have to do is go back and look at history and consider the various arguments for, say, the death penalty at various times in the past. Do we agree today? Does the death penalty for heresy offend us today or not?
If we reject such past “justice” today, doesn’t morality change? If it changes, then why does it change?
Would the “objective measure of morality” have something to do with the evolution of society and the emerging human understanding of behavior and relationships?
William J Murray,
It seems your worry stems from the possibility of disagreement; that subjective morality is a potentially more dangerous avenue because of the inevitability that some people will disagree on what is right or wrong.
But in what practical sense is that any more dangerous than assuming an objective basis for morality? How does simply asserting (for that is all we can ever do) that torturing children is objectively wrong inoculate us from disagreement?
History is littered with religions. Each and every one claiming to possess the absolute last word on what is right and wrong. Each and every ethical system disagreeing with the previous one. How has the belief in their objective status made any difference to anything?
Quiz: Here are two moral commandments, one is subjective, the other objective.
1) Thou shalt not murder.
2) Thou shalt not murder.
Can you tell which is which?
William J Murray,
Neither.
Since a murder verdict is the result of a legal process, and legal processes have jurisdictional scope, you might be prohibiting someone from doing something that may be legal in Texas, while not permitted in New York.
That’s the problem with claiming the existence of absolute moral codes.
Toronto,
You’re right…murder is by definition un-lawful, I should’ve just gone with my instincts and written ‘kill’.
William J Murray
It is hard to pin down what you consider to be the ‘objective’ part of this argument if you would divorce it from religion and its lack. If it does not reside in the metaphysical realm, it must reside somewhere else – and what options are available for the manifestation of this objective stuff in the physical realm, outside of our heads but inside the universe? It is my subjective experience that there is an objective quality in the world I call “red”. It derives from the physical interaction of certain wavelengths of light with my rhodopsins, further processed by my brain. I believe that this subjective experience is shared by most other humans, and indeed by many other related species. There is an objective fact that ‘red’ is a subjective experience shared by many individuals. But red does not, in any other sense, exist.
And to me, morality must be of the same stripe, if you insist that it is divorced from religion. There is an objective fact that a sense of ‘right-and-wrong’ is perceived as a subjective experience by people, and most people are in broad agreement oas to what goes into which box. I’m not sure why I demonstrate a lack of sanity in considering that to be the “objective source” of morality – shared subjective experience, evolved in a social animal. To an atheist, it cannot reside anywhere else, and the logical consequences of that are no different from those deriving from believing its origin to be some holy fiat. It guides our behaviour, however sourced, and does not stop guiding it simply because we differ as to its location.
OK, I think I understand why for the purposes of this argument, you are not concerned with the veridicality of any putative objective moral principle. You’re all about how one’s belief drives action, and how beliefs and actions resolve in practice. But the only substance on that point, from all you’ve said on this thread — and I grant that much of what you’ve said was just responding such that you could narrow things down to your particular claim here — is “but those are not rationally reconcilable beliefs”.
So let’s get to the substance here: why are the two beliefs you cite above not rationally reconciliable?
That is, what reasoning principle is broken in holding those two together?
I thought perhaps you were keying on “always”, but “always” is not a problem for a subjective belief. Subjective just implicates the subject in the foundation for the proposition; subjective beliefs can and often are “universal” in scope.
So it’s not the “always” that’s a problem for you, which I suspected might be at first glance. What IS the problem between these two, in terms of coherence or rational behavior/thinking?
\Woodbine,
I’m not trying to resolve any disagreements about what is moral or immoral under either premise. I’m examining the necessary logical consequences of the two different premises.
If “good” is subjective, and a person considers it “good” to torture a child for personal pleasure, then it is good for that person to torture a child for personal pleasure. Thus, in that instance, torturing children for pleasure is good for that person, even if we, observing the situation, consider it wrong. Therefore, it is not always (in every situation) wrong to torture children for pleasure.
If “good” is objective, then regardless of what any individual thinks or believes or feels, it is wrong to torture children for personal pleasure.
The belief that it is always wrong to torture children for personal pleasure even if you are the person who believes it to be right is irreconcilable with the idea that “good” is a subjective commodity.
Extending this, what principle allows us to justify telling the person who enjoys torturing children to stop? Since good is subjective, we cannot access a principle of good that is itself not simply subjectively chosen. In the end, the only principle we can ultimately refer to in condemning that behavior as wrong and telling them to stop, or forcing them to stop, is might of some sort.
We cannot tell them that what they are doing is wrong by principle, because we have no more right than they to make such a claim about the behavior or to choose a convenient principle that supports our preference. We can only tell them that we don’t like their behavior, and then, if we have the power, we can try and force them to stop.
One’s principle in such a scenario is nothing more (ultimately) than might makes right – the might of will of preference to choose whatever principle (if any) of good we will adhere to, and which we expect others to adhere to, and the might (rhetorical, manipulative, emotional, physical, social, tribal, legal) to get them to stop.
So, the belief that what is good is relative necessarily, logically implies an endorsement of might makes right as one’s ultimate moral principle (whether one realizes it or not, as many do not investigate their beliefs very deeply), and so if the church has the might and preference to forcibly install Bible-centric morals on the populace, it is no different in principled essence than any other moral system – if what is good is indeed subjective.
I submit that it is a self-evidently true moral statement that “might-makes-right” is not a sound moral principle, and if someone agrees that either “it is always wrong to torture children for pleasure”, or that “might-makes-right” is not a sound moral principle, then they cannot rationally reconcile those views with the belief that morality refers to a subjective good.
Alan Miler,
Where or how the objective-ness of good exists isn’t germane to this particular debate. It either is objective, or is subjective, regardless of whether or not we can “figure out” how or where it exists.
I suggest that it would be as difficult to prove that the moral good is an intrinsically subjective commodity as it would be to prove it objectively exists, which is why that argument, IMO, is fruitless, and a much better argument would be to examine the logical ramifications of each premise.
William J Murray,
That does not reflect the way people think about these sort of things.
As someone who does not believe in an objective good, I never sat down and thought about whether I should believe it exists.
In the case of the belief in gods, I never thought about the evidence for or against Zeus.
A Christian may however consider the evidence against God but not the evidence for, since he is already of the mind that a God exists.
This is a distinction that should be considered since it completely changes how we apply our logic to a problem.
In your case, you talk about your objective good in a way that ..implies it exists.. but it is really the ..belief.. in its existence that needs to be addressed.
This is completely different from the approach taken by someone who does not believe in an objective good to begin with.
In order for your position to hold, you have to show that there is a reason for your objective good to exist at all.
When pressed on any of your implicit claims, you back away and claim that you are not claiming anything.
I think that you’re right – most people haven’t sat down and thought about whether or not they should believe the things that they believe (or the things they do not believe); they either “find” the thing in question believable, or they do not, and that’s pretty much the extent of their introspection on the matter.
However, that’s exactly what my argument requires, so if you don’t want to sit down and consider whether or not you should believe in a subjective or objective good, this is not the debate for you.
William J Murray,
First things first we cannot choose what to believe.
With that out of the way can you explain why you think it is important to take a stance on whether we should regard morality as objective or objective?
Can you outline the practical, real world difference between believing that:
Thou Shalt not Kill
…is objective or subjective?
William J Murray,
I will have to disagree here, and risk the implications of the parenthetical sneer that people who reach opposite conclusions have invariably not thought it through.
To some degree, there must be some impositional aspect to broader applications of moral code within society. That’s what laws are for. But there are milder forms of imposition – censure, ostracism – or internal checks and balances: guilt and empathy. These are things that people do almost instinctually, but there are inevitably exceptions – and that’s why we formalise these checks. One can only truly know one’s own code, but that does not force the conclusion that might makes right – one’s own moral code is not subsumed by the majority view, or that of the stronger party. One undeniably has a personal sense of right and wrong. This is part-genetic and part-cultural. But one does not choose, ad hoc, from a full range of equally possible components to this code. If one sees injustice, or an affront to one’s ‘personal’ code, and one has the power to do something to stop it, one would act. The child-abuser who attempted to spin me a line about moral relativism would receive a relativistic fat lip for his trouble! As a collection of individuals, we collectivise our individual moral senses into some kind of a consensus. This is possible because there are not as many moral positions as there are individuals. We tend to agree, because we share the same genes and we share the same culture.
My cat thinks nothing of torturing mice and birds. It clearly has no moral sense in that regard (or perhaps in any other). But I do, because I can empathise. I can stop it, because I am stronger. Might does not make right, here, it just allows me to sort the evil little bastard out! But if it was a lion, I would not interfere. Lions (and cats) have to eat – but that would hardly be the reason why I subsumed any instinctive queasiness at seeing another creature suffer!
If we look at a religious imposition, we are not looking at the consensus view of a current set of individuals, but often a very distorted view of a few individuals (the writers of the Book) reflecting THEIR prejudices, and THEIR times, frequently filtered by the prejudices of the interpreters of this holy screed. I consider capital punishment to be wrong, yet – despite THOU SHALT NOT KILL being pretty unequivocal (or is it …!) – the frequently highly conservative and fearful Moral Majority find that conveniently dispensed with when the person being dispatched has themselves killed. Or if you are at war with someone. Or … The fact that a particular proscription is inscribed in a holy book does not make that an objective standard. It’s just adherence to someone else’s subjective preference, and making it one’s own. All manner of injustice can be justified on such a ticket, based on the degree of conviction that the intent is God’s, not Man’s.
And the solution is?
Give details.
William J Murray,
It is germane to the atheist position, since there is nowhere for it to reside other than inside the head. Therefore, to an atheist, it can only be subjective. If one is forced to believe in something simply in order to find somewhere for ‘objective morality’ to exist, due to some difficulty perceived were it subjective, one would indeed be struggling.
Yes, but you are confusing subjects, here.
If:
1. Person A believes action X is morally wrong, and
2. A->~X is subjectively held by A, and
3. Person B believes action X is morally good, and
4. B->X is subjectively held
It then remains true for Person B that X is morally good, and it remains true for Person A that X is morally wrong. That means that for A, X is always wrong, in every case. It doesn’t matter what B believes, B is a different agent, here.
You do not have any context, any basis from which to deliver your “always” or “not always” here, as you’ve done, because that is detached from a subject, and these are subjective beliefs. It’s an error to talk about subjective beliefs and then talk about them as objective principles. You’re on the money when you qualify with “good for that person”. Your “Therefore, it is not always (in every situation) wrong to torture children for pleasure:” is NOT COHERENT in this context, because there is no objective basis for such an assessment. “In every situation” has to be qualified for each subject, each person forming their own beliefs, if we are stipulating that these beliefs are subjective. This is an entailment of that stipulation.
Hold on, I thought you were at pains here to set the actual status of objective moral principles aside, in order to make the point that true or not, a rational person MUST believe in objective moral good in order to be rational and/or act morally? Your statement here is trivial true — it’s a tautology (objective good is defined as good which is objective — independent of any mind or will). Tautologies can be useful, but the actual existence of objective moral principles is irrelevant to the point you are making.
Why would you suggest that? That doesn’t follow at all. Maybe I’m not parsing your sentence correctly.
1. Person A believes X: it always wrong to torture children for personal pleasure. OK, so far.
2. Person A believes X, but also believes for them ~X: such torture is NOT morally wrong.
1 and 2 are self contradictory. Person A, if making an exception for themselves (or for anyone else) on X per 2), necessarily does not support 1), because any exception allowed by 2) negates the “always” qualifier in 1).
I think there is a key problem signaled in the way you’ve finished that: “good is a subjective commodity”. Consider:
3. Person F believes “good is a subjective commodity”, and believes this as a subjective belief.
4. Person G believes “good is an objective commodity”, and believes this as a subjective belief.
3) and 4) are both subjective beliefs, but the OBJECT, the TARGET of their beliefs are different, exclusive with respect to each other. Person G, fully subjective in their position, can say “that is objectively wrong”. “I subjectively believe X offends objective moral principles” is a coherent formulation, correct?
Why is a “principle of good that is itself not simply subjectively chosen” not qualified in that case? Subjectively chosen principles would be what’s called upon, short of force. So what’s the problem? I can only think that you are predicating this on the premise that only an objective moral principle can provide justification for objection. I don’t see the necessity or soundness of this premise.
And, think a bit on that, as it’s a bit of trick question. As I understand you, you are Person G, above, one who has subjectively chosen the belief that objective moral principles obtain. If you are predicating any justification for objection on objective beliefs at the root, well, you are cutting your own legs off. We humans are all subjects, subjects at the root. We can and should endorse beliefs in the value of objective principles where they obtain and can be useful, but demonstrably, our ‘objective beliefs’ are utlimately the product of our subjective choices. I think you may have overlooked that human handicap, there. Maybe not, but I’d be interested to see if you really do claim to come by your beliefs without the influence of your mind and will, regarding the putative existence of objective moral principles.
This no different than someone who believes in objective moral principles. Person G can tell someone they are doing wrong, that they don’t like their behavior because it offends what they believe to be objective moral principles, but this no more forceful than Person F complaining, while believing that “good is a subjective commodity”.
Person F and G are in precisely the same position with respect to their objections, and any utility of invoking force.
Ultimately yes, but F and G are in the same boat. I think you understand F, but have missed out that G (and that may be you) is in the same predicament. You don’t “objectively believe” in the existence of objective moral principles. You “subjectively believe” in the existence of objective moral principles. “Objectively believe” is an oxymoron, incoherent, and “subjectively believe” is redundant. We just say “believe”, and the subjectivity of that is implicit, entailed.
Just to apply this to myself on a different topic, I believe that gravity is an objective fact of the dynamics of the physical world around me. But I don’t, I can’t “objectively believe” it, that’s a divide-by-zero in my use of terms for me to claim that. Rather, I believe (subjectively, necessarily) that gravity obtains objectively, and would look to provide an investigative paradigm and epistemology that should you adopt it, will produce the same belief in you.
I think you’re failing to investigate your beliefs deeply here, if you think your beliefs are not exactly in the same position as the most “relativist” position you might find elsewhere. That is, the belief that “good is objective” necessarily, logically implies and an endorsement of might makes right as one’s ultimate moral principle.
Unavoidably.
The “unavoidability” obtains from the belief being a BELIEF, not from whether the propositions that are contained in those beliefs identify objective realities or not. Person F and Person G are at perfect parity in their liability to ‘might makes right’ as the ultimate pragmatic arbiter. That’s because both BELIEVE, and belief itself, not “what is believed” is what forces a reduction to force, ultimately.
It seems you’ve seen half of the problem, but only half.
Why not? Are you saying it’s just “self-evidently true” that those ideas cannot be rationally reconciled? I hope not! If not, what prevents them from being reconciled? A subjective good may assert that “it’s always wrong to torture children for pleasure”, right?
I think you have gotten your frames of reference confused, and are thinking people “objectively believe”, rather than “subjectively believe in objective principes or entities”. If you are stuck on the former, then what you write here, I can understand. If you understand the latter, I can’t make sense of your post, here.
William J Murray,
The fact that your argument requires X does not make X any less debatable in regards to your argument.
Here’s you proving my point that I don’t have to sit down and consider the existence or non-existence of an objective good since all I have to do is believe it.
That is where your argument fails, right at the input to your logic.
We can run premises through logic to see if the those premises themselves are sound.
For instance, we can assume as a premise, the existence of a god who can see into the future as the Christian god does.
Logic suggests that we could never see an output that concludes with a surprise event to this god, but the Bible says God gets angry at our behaviour.
Logically, If the premise, (input), is sound, the conclusion, (output), isn’t,
OR, the exact opposite is true.
We clearly have a paradox between premise and conclusion.
It is your premises that are not valid and your logical conclusions fail because of that.
I’ve told you before that your logic is very good so apply that logical effort at checking your premises.
You will find they don’t hold up for the conclusions you are claiming.
Just an illustration….compare these two people.
Obj – “I believe might makes right”.
Sub – “I believe might makes right”.
The believer in objective morality can in no way logically justify her position any more than the subjectivist can. She has to simply assert it as an axiom and hope that no one cries foul or disagrees. The subjectivist freely admits that “might makes right” cannot LOGICALLY be preferred above any other ethical maxim.
So what advantage, in the REAL world, does one position have over the other? Both positions can be embarrassed easily when scrutinized. Thankfully, though, ethics do not exist in a vacuum, and I’ve yet to hear of any ethical statement that ever lived or died based on its perceived metaphysical status.
Personally speaking I’m not remotely convinced that morality is under any obligation to conform to logic any more than music, or art, or our taste in food. But that’s just me.