This post is inspired by a phrase appearing in the latest Discovery Institute essay, in which they worry about the direction being taken by the new “Cosmos” TV series.
The DI quotes Cosmos producer, Seth MacFarlane, as promoting “…the advancement of knowledge over faith.”
This quote seems to come from an interview in Esquire Magazine.
There really isn’t much to the interview, but the phrase does kind of jump out and beg to be discussed.
I think you’ve misunderstand WJM quite badly, in that case. WJM is arguing against (2′), since he thinks that (2′) — what I would call “scientific realism” — is “scientism”. (Of course I’ve also argued at some length here that one can be a scientific realist without succumbing to scientism, but that’s a different question.)
I hate to break it to you, but with regard towards pragmatic instrumentalism, Neil, you and WJM are on the same side!
In fact, I’m the only one here arguing in favor of (2′), because I think that our comparisons between T1 and T2 allow us to do something very interesting — it allows us to develop a wholly naturalized, historicized, and secularized conception of absolute truth.
More likely, this is just a miscommunication.
I read WJM as saying that (2′) is the requirement, but that science can never meet that requirement. Apparently you had a built in assumption that (2) and (2′) refer to scientific theories, and I failed to recognize that.
I’ll be interested to see that. I hope it will be in your book.
It won’t be in my book, I’m afraid, since my book is about the relation between language and experience (mostly in terms of how C. I. Lewis, Wilfrid Sellars, and Merleau-Ponty thought about that relation, but my work gets developed through my criticisms of theirs).
But I do think that “a wholly naturalized, historicized, and secularized conception of absolute truth” is, in fact, one of Sellars’s more significant philosophical accomplishments — especially in the version defended by his student Jay Rosenberg. I don’t have anything written about this just now but I do plan on writing something about it by the end of the month for a conference I’m applying to. So I could write something up here at TSZ as a preparatory exercise for the conference.
I would appreciate that, if you manage to find the time.
My argument is that while scientific realism works inasmuch as it produces models of experience that are predictable and consensually verifiable, it may or may not be an accurate description of the general nature of reality. IF reality is confined (or at least largely confined) to such phenomena and patterns that can be adequately described by scientific realism (IOW, that’s what reality “really” is), then scientific realism is what KN thinks it is and is capable (more or less) of what KN thinks it is capable of.
My point is that reality may not be – at its root, or in general – what SR (scientific realism) portrays, but rather mind-primary and to varying degrees depending on certain aspects of mind – individual, group and universal. Theism – for the most part – is a mind-primary worldview (with mind being mixed up with “spirit” or “spiritual”) – IOW, it is the will of god (mind) that created and maintains the physical world. Most mind-primary worldviews consider the physical world more or less illusionary, like a dream or a lower or preliminary form existence.
Most theisms have some means of using mental/spiritual prayer/meditation/affirmation/controlled thought that is believed to be able to affect the physical world in dramatic ways that defy scientific/rational explanation, either directly or through theistic agencies.
If some form of mind-primary reality is true, then scientific realism would not be an adequate representation of “reality” at all, but only a self-fulfilling mind/world experiential relationship, one of possibly many variant such relationships. Scientific realism would be describing a small subset of potential experience sets in such a reality.
Scientific realism would also be functionally incapable of accessing, describing, proving, or even allowing that which may exist outside of its subset if it is essentially describing not reality, but (generally speaking) kinds of minds and the kinds of experience those minds perceive/allow/accept.
Whether scientific realism is true or false, scientific realism cannot disprove itself, because the nature of proof under scientific realism is that in order for a thing to be scientifically “proved”, so to speak, requires that the thing first be subject to scientific scrutiny, which is a fatal catch-22 and why scientific realism is a circular commitment.
It may be true, but there is simply no way to scientifically evaluate or disprove it.
But then, to you, “reality” must mean something other than what people take it to mean. And it is difficult to see how the word “reality” could acquire such a meaning.
I take “scientific realism” to refer to a stance that we (or some of us) adopt. If it is a stance, then it is not a proposition and it doesn’t make a lot of sense to ask whether it is true or false.
I accept that scientific realism relies on what Kant called “transcendental realism” and what Hilary Putnam calls “metaphysical realism”: the thought that reality is not mind-dependent. The mind-independence of reality cannot be established by scientific realism. But that doesn’t make it a mere arbitrary assumption or dogmatic imposition. In fact, there’s a rather good argument for this.
The key idea is this:
(Ken Westphal, “Rational Justification & Mutual Recognition in Substantive Domains” in Dialogue: Canadian Journal of Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie, 2013.)
In other words, we couldn’t even be self-conscious unless we were also conscious of spatio-temporal particulars that are both sensibly detectable and intellectually classifiable. This means that idealism, insofar as it denies the existence of physical things, cannot be true.
This doesn’t give us scientific realism per se; it gives us direct critical realism about perceptual objects. The route from direct critical realism about perceptual objects to scientific realism requires, in my view, a theory of technology whereby devices and instruments are thought of as prostheses that augment our perceptual and practical comportments and abilities. So we end up concluding that electrons are real for exactly the same reasons that we conclude that tables and computers are real.
This argument does not, of course, establish that all and only the objects posited in our best scientific theories are real. Scientific realism tells us only that scientific entities are real; it does not tell us that non-scientific entities are not real. If you like, we could distinguish between “weak scientific realism” (the entities posited by our best theories are real) and “strong scientific realism” (only the entities posited by our best theories are real). I would certainly defend weak scientific realism but not strong scientific realism.
It also must be pointed out that weak scientific realism is compelling with regard to the best method for getting us into reliable cognitive contact with reality. It does not tell us, all by itself, what the ultimate character of that reality is. It certainly does not lend itself to supporting “materialism” or “naturalism” in a metaphysical sense. Rather, weak scientific realism only says that the entities posited by our best theories, whatever those entities happen to be, are real.
William,
I get the impression that you would like for your ideas about “mind-primary reality” to fall outside the scope of science, because then they would be immune to scientific disconfirmation.
I never said or implied that it would fall outside of the scope of “science”. The entire debate has been contextualized repeatedly by myself (and others) as being about scientism, materialist science, or scientific realism.
Wrong. All one needs is the experience of what appears to be a distinct physical world and a self. Dreams, for example, provide a sense of identity because the “self” and the “world” it inhabits appear to be two different things, when it is all a mental projection from the same mind. Idealism doesn’t deny the appearance of identifiable, distinct physical things, only that physical things actually exist as such outside of that experience.
What people are you referring to? There are quite a few people that consider physical reality to be an illusion or a lesser version of existence one way or another.
“Reality” has meant just that to billions of people for thousands of years. Are you really this uninformed about the spiritual beliefs about various cultures throughout history?
Here’s one rather serious problem: it is quite central to my view that scientific realism and scientism are different notions, and neither entails the other. I am definitely a scientific realist, and I am strongly hostile towards “scientism” (as I understand it). And this too is orthogonal to naturalism-vs.-theism, since one could be a scientific realist who opposes scientism on either naturalistic or theistic grounds.
keiths:
William:
Yes, you did:
The main problem here, KN, is that you don’t think one can be a theistic realist. Or at least you have either ceased from being one or never were one. You think one can only be a naturalistic realist.
And you are not a scientist, but a philosopher who doesn’t seem to believe in Sophia, your secular transcendental.
Opposition to scientism is a growing wave. Pinker can’t stop this, nor can the ‘brights’. Those who refuse to face this ideology will be left behind. And both empiricism and naturalism, which you hesitate to embrace are also ideologies.
Theism is too and it is vertical, not horizontal. It is meaningful and monumental. One doesn’t need the Discovery Institute to tell them this. But what then does one need for that light to shine through the quasi-nihilist darkness?
keiths,
Keith,
I was talking about scientific realism/materialism. I just don’t add those qualifiers every time. But, I’m quite sure you already knew this.
William,
Don’t blame us for pointing out your inconsistencies and sloppiness. You’ve contradicted yourself, and as KN pointed out, you’re also conflating “scientism”, “materialist science”, and “scientific realism”. (At this point RTH would add: “Big boy pants, William.”)
Yes, it is. And that’s a bit of a puzzle, because there isn’t much scientism going on and what little there is doesn’t really cause anybody problems.
So maybe the opposition to scientism is really a proxy for opposition to science. Maybe when people use the word “scientism”, they really mean the parts of science that they don’t like (such as climate change and biological evolution).
With regard to my own views, that’s utterly and completely false.
2013 was a watershed year for discussions of scientism, most identifying it as a problem, but a small few (usual suspects) defending it. Stephen Pinker’s article in the New Republic was a flash point, that elevated recognition of scientism to a new level. If you’re not in tune with this, that’s on you; the reality remains for those who care to explore.
That’s what those who either promote scientism as their worldview-supported ideology or who try to spin scientism into a positive ‘philosophy’ say.
Those who reject scientism as a dangerous and damaging ideology (see links below), a dehumanizing risk, have gone to great lengths to clarify that they are *not* opposing science (several of them are practising scientists!), but rather opposing science that is exaggerated into ideological scientism. The difference is important, it is being discussed by top thinkers around the world, not just an Anglo-American thing, and it is freshly engaging for those of us sick and tired of the ‘science uber alles’ condescending and unrealistic attitude that grew wild and untamed in the jungle of the late-modern period. It’s time for some pruning in the Academy and facing scientism honestly, openly and in a constructive manner.
These links help, but there’s much more out there for those who’re curious:
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-folly-of-scientism (biologist)
http://biologos.org/blog/what-is-scientism (philosopher of science)
“Utterly and completely,” really KN? Surely then you’ll explain how you think one can be a theistic realist, right?
Nonsense. Stephen Pinker was just expressing his opinion, something which is considered an exercise in free speech.
As far as I know, Pinker has not picked up a large following over this.
Personally, I have never been a Pinker fan-boy. He works in “evolutionary psychology”, which I see as a dubious field.
They might believe that, but believing it does not make it so.
Or you could perhaps give an example of such a event that changed the physical world in dramatic ways that defy scientific/rational explanation?
Or even a trivial event?
It’s easy to say things, not so easy to back those things up with specifics is it WJM?
Whether or not you are “a Pinker fan-boy” is irrelevant, Neil.
The literature is out there and expanding on ‘scientism’. You can huff and puff that it’s a house you want to try to blow down from a computer science/mathematics background all you want. It doesn’t change the reality you seem to wish to avoid.
I agree that eVo psych is a dubious field, not entirely, but mostly. Maybe you’ll write about that here? You claim to “look at things from a more evolutionary perspective.” I assume you consider yourself an ‘evolutionist,’ that is an ideologue for evolutionism. So what’s with your opposition to eVo psych?
And while you’re at it, you could still explain what you meant about ‘Intelligent Design’ being so prolific in philosophy. Imo, you don’t seem to know enough about philosophy to support your position. You just go on faith that people here will believe you. That is, you’re not even a ‘heretical philosopher.’ Claiming the mantle of philosopher is well above your pay grade.
Nor do you seem willing to explore ideology openly and honestly. Just de-ni-al of scientism is all you’ve shown capacity for. Why?
The facts of a growing opposition to scientism are available to anyone who is willing to look, even Neil Rickert. Some are too enamoured with their heresy or ‘skepticism’ to even try to discover.
http://scholar.google.lt/scholar?q=scientism+2013&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5 (10,700 results)
http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000042/article.pdf (2013)
Others taking clips out of context of the whole discussion in contradiction to repeated qualification otherwise, and insisting that one’s inferences or assumptions are true in the face of correction by the author doesn’t constitute either inconsistency or sloppiness on my part.
What does vanishing when you get asked questions you don’t want to answer come under then?
So? I was responding to Neil’s all inclusive “what people take it to mean” and how the term could “acquire” such a meaning, as if my view about what reality is, and how the physical world fits in that perspective, was unique or – in general terms – idiosyncratic.
First, to qualify, in context what I meant was that those things defy scientific/rational explanation from the scientific realism/scientism perspective. There are other perspectives that such phenomena wouldn’t be a problem at all for science or logic to accommodate.
I’ve already provided such an example with my wife’s faith healing. I don’t know how much more dramatic you an get than “terminal” cancer one day and then clean of cancer a week or two later, and then – with a family history of cancer and early deaths – no cancer for over 20 years now. That’s pretty dramatic. Not as dramatic as people coming back from the dead (Lazaraus, Jesus), but still pretty awesome as far as my world goes.
Then there is the wealth of examples and information & research available about psychic phenomena, mediumship and reincarnation.
It seems to be all over the map as to what “scientism” even means. The results returned by your suggested google-scholar search seem to confirm this.
You assume wrongly.
Free will. If I don’t want to answer a question, I don’t answer it.
Cancers go into remission all the time for no discernible reason. That you happened to visit a faith header prior to that remission is neither here nor there. Your story is not dramatic. Nor even unusual.
This type of “evidence” is exactly the sort of thing that humanity should be trying to move away from, not towards. It leads to a dark path you are already on, where those who are “worthy” are saved and those who are not, are not. How do we know who was worthy?
Simple, if you are saved you are worthy!
Do you think the reason your wife got cancer in the first place was because of some evil she had done in her life?
It also seems to be ‘all over the map’ as to what ‘science’ even means. That doesn’t invalidate it, as your attempts toward ‘scientism’ are aimed. You haven’t shown yourself worth taking seriously on this topic, Neil, since the evidence of a flurry of writings on scientism in 2013 contradicts your obvious de-ni-al.
I just took a few seconds to read it on the ‘About’ at your blog, that’s all.
So, we’ve established that “self-worth” is causal in if you live or die. It might not be the only reason, but it’s causal.
Do please let people suffering from a loss know that it could all have been prevented if the person who died just believed in themselves more!.
Again, despicable.
William,
Actually, that’s quite trivial. I’m sure it meant much to you at the time, but people live and die every day. There is nothing remarkable there, no dramatic (except obviously to the people involved) effects on the world.
A thing that happens all the time is only dramatic when it happens to you.
The remission of cancer, while not fully understood, I’d guess has more to do with ideas like training the body to “see” the cancer (as recent treatments have shown with dramatic sucesss) then the “magic” you claim as the cause.
We have theory’s as to why remissions happen. Therefore this does not rise to the level of an event that changed the physical world in dramatic ways that defy scientific/rational explanation. If we have a theory for it it is hardly “defying scientific explanation” is it now?
Care to try again?
Unless that begins and ends with your personal experience (as it currently appears to) then feel free to withdraw/amend that statement…
Or give an example that actually does defy scientific/rational explanations!
I guess it’s just coincidence then that the questions you don’t want to answer seem to be the questions you can’t answer….
One last question then.
If faith healing works, then could you put the name up of this healer who can cure cancer as I believe there are one or two other people out there who might need their assistance….
Now, a limb regrowing in a human. That would be something a little, well, unusual.
http://whywontgodhealamputees.com/
Hence why we have remissions but no limb regrowth.
I’m sad to learn that you have serious problems with reading comprehension.
Fair enough, Neil. And I’m sad to learn you’re so intellectually stunted in your semi-retirement and lacking curiosity to deny actual evidence (that anyone else can see) right in front of your nose. But then again, no one is responsible for the de-ni-al you continue to write except for you.
That is, of course, assuming that cancer was even present in the first place. this is hte problem with personal anecdotes on cancer being cured. In order to effectively evaluate the veracity of WJM claim for his wife’s miraculous case of cancer, terminal even, being present to gone in two weeks certainly screams for a much more detailed accounting of this bit of history. However, I doubt that WJM would be amenable to providing this much needed detail in his wife;s medical history.
As you point out it is not an uncommon occurrence to have claims of miraculous cancer cures being effected from faith healers, physic surgeons to supplements (list not at all inclusive).
Here is a good primer (Peter Moran is the author) on how to judge a claim of cancer being cured. Does WJM’s testimonial fit the criteria? Doubtful at this point in time..
http://www.users.on.net/~pmoran/cancer/how_to_read_a_testimonial.htm
edit to add: Correlation does not always point to causation.
I’m sure it’s not a coincidence that it seems that way to you and some others here.
I think that one has the intellectual right to be a theistic realist. I don’t think that being committed to theistic realism involves “shirking one’s epistemic duties”, in Plantinga’s lovely phrase. More precisely, I don’t think that being committed to theistic realism violates any canons of evidence or reasoning. I am, as I’ve said numerous times, a Jamesian about such matters, in the “Will to Believe” sense. Theism doesn’t violate the “ethics of belief” (PDF). (Though creationism does.)
But, since theistic realism isn’t actually my position, defending it isn’t my responsibility. Hence I won’t explain how one can be a theistic realist, even though I think one has the intellectual right to be a theistic realist.
I never claimed anything about magic, and your guesses do not rise to the level of an explanation; your guesses are simply reiterations of your faith in scientism.
Claiming that there are scientific theories about why remissions occur – or even why the placebo effect works – is not the same as showing it. As far as I’ve been able to tell, nobody can actually explain the placebo effect or spontaneous remission. Such phenomena apparently defies attempts to understand why it happens in some people and not in others, and – in the case of placebo and nocebo tests – why the beliefs (about the drug) of the administrators matter, not just the patients, when it comes to the overall results.
If you don’t consider the disappearance of supposedly terminal cancer a dramatic effect on the world, then we’ll just have to disagree on what constitutes a “dramatic effect on the world”.
No.
Kantian Naturalist,
Thanks for clarifying that. I suspect 95%+ other ‘skeptics’ here would disagree with you about the possibility of being a theistic realist, but at least you’re honest.
You wrote:
I had said:
I guess that means I was correct and not “utterly and completely false.”
We are agreed that one can “oppose[s] scientism on either naturalistic or theistic grounds,” although on strictly naturalistic grounds it is much more difficult when it comes to ‘natural science.’ I’d agree with de Vries (who coined ‘MN’) on that, while rejecting his naïve philosophy of (read: natural) science.
William,
Acknowledging your mistakes is part of being a big boy. Your sulky refusal to do so reflects poorly on you.
Don’t confuse scientific realists with scientific realism itself. I’m a scientific realist, and yet I have no trouble at all conceiving of, understanding, and teasing out the implications of “mind-primary” theories of reality.
Scientific realism is not an axiom for me, nor for most scientific realists, as far as I can tell. We are scientific realists because we think that scientific realism fits the evidence better than “mind-primary reality”.
Got any persuasive evidence for the latter?
Gregory, to KN:
I suspect that most of the skeptics here see no necessary conflict between theism and realism.
We reject theistic realism because we see theism as untenable, not because we think that theism clashes with realism.
OK, fair enough on that particular point — except that there’s a huge difference between my personal decision to not be a theistic realist, and whether I think it is rational for anyone else to accept theistic realism.
Which de Vries do you mean?
I’m curious as to what you mean by this: “on strictly naturalistic grounds it is much more difficult [to oppose scientism] when it comes to ‘natural science.’” Is the thought here that the scientific realist should think that natural science is the whole truth about nature?
I’m still sorting through the two poles that orient my thinking about these issues — Sellars and Adorno. (What looks to you like an “eclectic mess” feels to me like a productive tension that yields positive results!) On the one hand, I’m attracted to Sellars’s conception of scientific realism; on the other hand, I’m attracted to Adorno’s thesis that the modern conception of nature is produced by the technological domination of nature (Naturherrschaft).
As a result, I’m inclined to think that science does tell us some truths about nature, but not all of the truths about nature. But I also don’t think — and here’s where my Deweyan pragmatism comes to the fore — that science is committed to the disenchanted, modern conception of nature. On the contrary, I think that a conception of nature as “liberated,” as “enchanted,” is not only compatible with the general orientation of scientific realism but also would result in better scientific theories.
Ah, yes, but if theism is realistic, you are simply dancing to call it ‘untenable.’ You’ve admitted now that it can be realistic. That dance you make is why entering a science, philosophy, theology/worldview conversation is so desperately needed by your ‘skepticism.’ And it is also why so many here refuse to open that triadic door of entry.
Gregory,
Who said that theism is realistic?
I merely said that theism (the belief in a god or gods) doesn’t clash with realism (the belief in an observer-independent external reality).
Actually, this is interesting — I’d assumed that “theistic realism” is just the view that God is real, not a fiction or construct or metaphor or whatever. But the Wikipedia article redirects from “theistic realism” to “theistic science” and says
If that’s what Gregory is talking about, I might have to modify my remarks somewhat. But I doubt that Wikipedia is neutral on this point, so I’d much rather that Gregory present his own characterization of “theistic realism” for our purposes here.