A few times I’ve referred to my view about “the God question” as “radical agnosticism.” I thought it might be fun to work through what this means.
For the purposes of this discussion, by “God” I shall mean follow Hart’s definition of God as “the one infinite source of all that is: eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, uncaused, perfectly transcendent of all things and for that very reason absolutely immanent to all things” (The Experience of God, p. 30).
Next, I shall stipulate that our assertions about the world fall into two classes: those that take a truth-value in all possible worlds and those that take a truth-value only in the actual world. This is a contemporary version of “Hume’s Fork”: there are “relations of ideas”, “truths of reason”, analytic a priori claims and then there are “matters of fact”, “truths of fact,” synthetic a posteriori claims. (There are some reasons to be skeptical of this neat distinction but I’ll leave that aside for now.)
Whether or not God exists would therefore seem to be either a “truth of fact” or a “truth of reason”. I shall therefore now argue that it cannot be either.
Truths of fact are either directly observable phenomena or they are posited phenomena. (Though the boundary is strictly methodological and shifts over time.) But there are many presumptive truths of fact — claims with truth-value about the actual world — which we know have turned out to be false. And we know that because of empirical inquiry, and in particular, in the collection of techniques of inquiry called “science”. (I shall not insult anyone’s intelligence by assuming that there is a single thing called “the scientific method”).
Central to disciplined empirical inquiry, including and especially the sciences, is the act of measurement: intersubjectively verifiable assignments of quantitative variation across some interval of spatio-temporal locations. (It might be said that “the Scientific Revolution” is the historical period during which measurement slowly becomes the dominant conception of objectivity.)
But with that notion in place, it is perfectly clear that it is not even possible to take measurements of a perfectly transcendent being. A being that transcends all of space and time cannot be measured, which means that no claims about Him can be subjected to the tribunal of scientific inquiry. And hence no matters of fact about God can be verified one way or the other. That is to say that all claims about God that are restricted to the actual world have an indeterminate truth-value: they cannot be determined to be true or false
The epistemic situation is no better when we turn from a posteriori to a priori claims. In a priori claims, the tribunal is not science but logic, and the central epistemic concept is not measurability but provability. Can the existence of God be proven? Many have thought so!
But here two things must be pointed out: a proof, to be deductively valid, consists of re-organizing the information contained in the initial assumptions. One can generate a logically valid proof of the existence of God. (Gödel, for example, has a logically valid version of the Ontological Argument.) The process of proof-construction is not going to give you more information in the conclusion than was present in the premises.
Logic is limited in another important way: there are multiple logics. What can proved in one logic can be disproven in a different logic. It depends on the choice of logical system. Once you’ve chosen a logical system, and you’ve chosen some premises, then of course one can prove that God exists. But neither the premises nor the rules are “self-evident”, inscribed on the very face of reason or of reality, etc.
Hence we cannot determine that God exists or does not exist on the basis of logic alone, since provability is no more reliable here than measurability is.
On this basis, I conclude that it is not even possible for beings such as ourselves to assign any truth-value at all to the assertion that God exists. This yields a radical agnosticism. Whereas the moderate agnostic can accept the logical possibility of some future evidence or reasoning that would resolve the issue, the radical agnostic insists that beings with minds like ours are completely unable to resolve the issue at all.
Radical agnosticism is at the same time compatible with either utter indifference to the question of the existence of God (“apatheism”) or some quite definite stance (ranging from theism to pantheism to deism to atheism). All that radical agnosticism insists on here is that all definite stances on the God-question are leaps of faith — no matter what direction.
Let me check my holy book…
No, apparently that will take a couple virgins too. Preferably mamals
I am, in fact, very close to the logical positivists here — and t I think that Carnap (for example) did not make the mistake that Popper accuses the positivists of making. But that is a digression.
Here is the main point: in the OP I am talking about assertions, sentences where the truth-value is independent of who is making the assertion or the subjective conditions of uttering it. “That stone looks white to me” is not an assertion, but a report of one’s subjective orientation on the world. “The stone is white” is an assertion, since it is a claim about how the world is independently of how anyone takes it to be.
I am perfectly fine with religious language as expressive of one’s lived experience, or as disclosing a value-laden existential orientation. (I have in fact defended that use of religious language here at TSZ in a long-running argument with keiths.) But in the OP I am talking about assertions, not about other kinds of meaningful language or non-linguistic symbolism.
Let me see if I understand.
The opening post consists of these parts:
A. Definition of God
B. Disproof of the truth-value of God’s existence
B.1 There’s no truth of fact about God
B.2 There’s no truth of reason about God
First, the definition of God is taken to be “the one infinite source of all that is etc.” Then, it’s stipulated that God cannot be either truth of fact or truth of reason.
Next, it’s argued that God cannot be measured and “hence no matters of fact about God can be verified one way or the other” and therefore there is no truth of fact about God. But wait a moment. Didn’t we just define God as “the one infinite source of all there is”? Do infinites lend themselves to measurement? Should the infinite source of all there is lend itself to measurement?
So, the fact that God cannot be measured is not disproving God as defined, just like the fact that we cannot see behind a wall does not disprove anything behind the wall.
Next, there’s this statement, “Once you’ve chosen a logical system, and you’ve chosen some premises, then of course one can prove that God exists… Hence we cannot determine that God exists or does not exist on the basis of logic alone, since provability is no more reliable here than measurability is.”
Okay. How is this specially about God? Isn’t this true about anything which we undertake to examine by means of logic alone? Your conclusion should be rather the more sweeping “Provability is no more reliable than measurability is” – about anything, not just about God. Here you end up dismissing the value of logic, not the truth-value of God.
Didn’t you set out to (logically) prove that there’s no truth of reason about God? Then stick to logic. Instead, you are arguing that anything can be proven by logic, once you opt for the appropriate kind of logic. Rational people do not accept this ludicrous attitude about logic. For rational people, logic really proves things and reveals truth, but different logics do it in different ways according to their appropriate nature.
Your sense of hearing reveals the world to you in one way and your sense of vision in a totally different way, the two being hardly reconcilable, because the world as revealed by hearing lacks colour and the world as revealed by vision lacks sounds. Does this disprove the world? No. This calls you to examine the nature of the senses. Even with their limits, they reveal some aspects of the world. Similarly, logic reveals truths and exposes flaws of reasoning when used appropriately. Dismissing logic does not selectively dismiss “the one infinite source of all there is” while leaving other aspects of reality somehow hanging in there. If you refuse the sense of vision, you don’t just stop seeing this or that visual object. You will stop seeing all visual objects.
In other words, religion is okay as long as it’s “a report of one’s subjective orientation” and not “a claim about how the world is independently of how anyone takes it to be.”
How about the following: Radical agnosticism is okay as long as it’s a report of one’s subjective orientation and not a claim about how the world is independently of how anyone takes it to be. I disprove radical agnosticism by stating that it cannot be measured and that provability is no more reliable than measurability is.
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Kn says no, are you saying you have a way to measure God?
Exactly right, just as measurement does not prove God, lack of measurement does not disprove God. That is the point, you can’t prove existence or non existence.
Never understood the appeal (of the first, mammals I’m fond of). If you want to reward someone, experience is helpful.
See, I really like this as KN has articulated it. While I don’t necessarily hold to the perspective myself, his explanation presents a very clear and clean concept imho.
Given what I’ve been through, I can no longer give serious consideration to the World-Is-An-Illusion, Turtles-All-The-Way-Down, gods, or what-have-you. Such considerations just don’t add anything to life, living, family, death, or…anything as far as I can tell. So, I just can’t be bothered any more, except as an abstract exercise for purely conversational purposes.
re: Kantian Naturalist: That doesn’t affect the point I was making, which is that it is irrational to begin with Christianity (or any organized religion). It is also, for parallel reasons, irrational to begin with atheism.
Descartes attempted that approach, and without success I may add.
Is there an epistemologogist in the house?
It is showing that the existence or non-existence of God cannot be a truth of fact. But since no one seriously believes that the existence of God is a truth of fact, refuting that position was just an intellectual exercise.
It’s whether the existence of God can be known wholly a priori, by logic alone, that’s the more interesting and serious question. The problem is that, precisely because there’s no single correct logical system, we cannot know a priori that any a priori proof or disproof will not be refuted by some subsequent system. Kant was correct to observe that the existence of God can be both proven and dispoven by logic alone. The situation has not improved in the 235 years since Kant published the Critique of Pure Reason.
I’m not a logician and don’t give logic much credit for figuring out how things work.
It’s a bit better for organizing things that have been figured out by trial and error.
Someone who wants to be persuasive about the existence of god first needs to explain why some particular god story is more persuasive than the thousand alternate god stories.
Hmmm…I bet FMM would argue that claim. I really do think he holds that the existence of God is an indisputable fact. That there are literally billions of folks who do in fact dispute such seems to be dismissed by claiming that we are all in denial, or worse, outright lying.
I don’t think the point is to disprove god, but to point out that it can’t be a “truth of fact”, just like nothing behind that wall can be a “truth of fact” if you have no way of knowing what may be behind it.
Exactly so. We cannot measure whatever transcends space and time, so there is no verificable truth of fact about it.
Not all claims require evidence. There’s no evidence that there isn’t a largest prime number. We don’t need evidence for claims that can be known wholly a priori, through logical proof. That’s why I was trying to point out, when I argued that there is no a priori proof for the existence of God.
The Loch Ness Monster is conceptually specified as the sort of being for which empirical evidence is appropriate. Whatever else is true of it, the Loch Ness Monster exists within space and time, has causal relations with other spatio-temporal entities, and so forth. That’s precisely why empirical inquiry into whether the Loch Ness Monster is actual or not is the right kind of inquiry.
My point in the OP is that God is conceptually specified — by classical theism, no less — as the being for which empirical inquiry is completely inappropriate. We cannot take measurements of something that transcends space and time.
The Loch Ness Monster and the largest prime can be ruled out precisely because they are the right kinds of concepts to be addressed by empirical inquiry or logical proof, respectively. God — as the classical theist conceives of Him — is nothing at all like either the Loch Ness Monster or the largest prime. We therefore cannot say that He does exist or that He does not.
Bingo!!!!!
As I see it KN has proven the Presuppositionalist’s point for us. That is one of the reasons I find his argument interesting
peace
Bingo again. Is it just me or is it raining presuppositionalists all up in here? 😉
peace
Not at all I find his claim to be perfectly rational and reasonable given his starting premises.
I would disagree with his premises and argue that they are self refuting but that is a different kettle of fish.
peace
Does that claim transcend space and time? If so is there no verificable truth of fact about it?
Things that make you go hmmm
peace
No.
where and when is it right now?
where and when is it valid exactly?
how do we go about measuring it?
peace
Here and now. Just like your epistemology was proven to be inconsistent within space time
So it’s not valid then and there? That is good to know.
When you say “here” do you mean where you are at or were I am at?
When you say “now” do you mean when it was written or when it was read?
and
How exactly do you measure the boundary between “here and now” and “then and there”?
How so? Please be specific.
peace
If something is valid at any time and any place, it doesn’t transcend space time.
You missed those posts? How convenient
How do you know that? Do you have a way to know that the hypothetical “something” is limited to spacetime? Can you measure it?
No I read them they just don’t seem to do much but complain that I said you know that God exists.
I’m not sure how that shows that my epistemology was proven to be inconsistent or even what it has to do with my epistemology
peace
You’re polite and stuff, but you’re going on ignore right now. Sorry everyone else
sorry to hear that.
Can anyone else help Dazz out on this one?
How does one “know” that something that’ s valid at any time and any place doesn’t transcend space time given KN’s argument?
quote:
A being that transcends all of space and time cannot be measured, which means that no claims about Him can be subjected to the tribunal of scientific inquiry.
end quote:
Our buddy KN
peace
My response is much the same. But I have to say that we could not have kicked the ladder away without climbing it first. (Apologies to Wittgenstein.)
quote:
It is like a child sitting on her father’s lap and slapping his face
end quote:
Cornelius Van Til
peace
Can you help me understand how your “Gotcha! Gotcha!” God would evoke anything other than revulsion?
It is like a cowardly homebody telling tales of crusades in faraway lands.
I don’t believe you.
How do folks here measure love? Just wondering. If you can’t measure love, does that mean that love does not exist?
What does it mean to say that something is valid or not valid? Are you saying that something that is true in all possible worlds does not transcend space and time?
Sorry, my mistake. I thought you were saying something important.
So, now we know that God is not a truth of fact, but we also know that saying that something is not a truth of fact is saying nothing important about the “something”.
And again, how is this specially about God?
To have any relevance, I suggest that the opening post should approach the subject matter by means of a different theory of truth, the kind that would actually address the subject matter.
Agree!
[wrong thread, meant to post in Tom English’s Thread on the DI. Sorry!]
By observing the behavior of organisms and communicating with them. How do we know whether A loves B? We see how they behave and/or we ask them and then we put 2 and 2 together and see if it corresponds to what we would call love.
All we have is the claim that “the creator” reincarnated itself into our reality and became one of us. Even if it actually did so, how does it follow that we can be “sure” about anything just because “the creator” took this action?
Interestingly your inference here also seems to contradict your presuppositionalism, which you have stated many times requires revelation for knowledge. Manifesting itself in human form is not a revelation.
What’s worse, according to your presuppositionalism it would require revelation for us to know that “the creator” manifested itself in human form. But we can’t trust our senses, we can only trust revelation by god. But all I have is my senses, and merely seeing another human being is not a revelation, that’s just observation.
Presenting oneself in human form is not a revelation, that is a physical act one can potentially observe. By the way, how can we be certain that some particular human being presenting oneself as “the creator” is in fact the creator? Couldn’t it just be a liar? Or a lunatic?
And you’re saying nothing can be known without revelation, because merely observing physical actions could all just be illusions. Or lies or what have you.
So merely observing a human being appear (by the way, “the creator” was supposedly born, it didn’t just spontaneously appear from nothing) does not in any way prove that observed human being is “the creator”. Nor does the mere appearance of “the creator” in human form (supposing we took it for granted some particular man was “the creator”) in any way entail certainty of knowledge.
If that observed human being worked miracles, how does that prove it is “the creator”? How do we know there aren’t other beings that can take the form of humans and cure the ill and raise the dead? Wouldn’t that also require revelation to know?
I don’t think your “ready made answer” is much of an answer at all. It raises more questions and problems than it solves. It seems to me one must presuppose (hence, presuppositionalism) some particular literal interpretation of christianity. But what justifies this presupposition in the first place? Nothing at all.
I do think that he would evoke revulsion in any rebel determined to usurp his authority and replace him on the throne.
On the other hand for those of us who are the recipients of his gracious mercy and who have experienced his amazing forgiveness when we finally surrender and give up our tin-horn rebellion he evokes a far different emotion
peace
Are you saying that revelation and observation are mutually exclusive concepts?
I’m not sure why you would think that
for example
You just revealed that you are not fond of my answer to Neil’s dilemma and I know that because I observed your comments on my computer screen.
no that is not what I’m saying
I’m saying that if my knowledge depends on my sensory and cognitive abilities then I can’t trust it because my sensory and cognitive abilities are finite and prone to error.
On the other hand if an omnipotent God chooses to reveal something to me infallibly then he can do it regardless of the method he employs
I never said it did.
I said incarnation provides a solution to Neil’s dilemma. Whether the incarnation actually happened is another matter entirely
peace
Revelation…….
That is the only sufficient justification for any knowledge that I’m aware of. Do you have another candidate?
peace
Fifth has already stated that justification of knowledge by revelation can be mistaken in this sense: It is possible that what he believes to have been revealed to him by God was not, in fact, a revelation, due to his (Fifth’s) fallibility.
Which is to say that, even if we grant arguendo that an omnipotent God can reveal things to him in a way that justifies belief, Fifth does not, and cannot, know which of his beliefs he has mistakenly ascribed to that sort of revelation.
From that it follows that one, more, or all of the things he “knows” through revelation may be false. God may never have revealed anything to him.
I’m talking about this claim:
You don’t believe your god’s existence is a truth of fact within your worldview. Note, he’s not making that claim about his worldview; he’s making that claim about all people with whatever worldviews. I don’t think you are quite getting that.
Except that no claim, by definition, transcends space and time (I wonder if FMM actually understands most of the words used here sometimes.) What do you think a “claim” is, FMM? Are all “claims” just hanging out “in reality somewhere” for people to pluck out of the void and paste them into message board text boxes?
More than you apparently realize…
If you cannot determine this, then there can be no gods. And gods cannot establish such since one must have a foundation of conceptual existence in order for “gods” (or “now” for that matter) to have any meaning. You’ve just defeated your own basis of argument.
…and this would then be an internal contradiction. LOL!
what exactly is the “valid” thing of which you speak when you can’t establish “where and when” without a mythical god? Therein lies the defeat of your entire worldview; it is completely internally unsound simply because nothing outside can ever be established without assuming the consequence that you are attempting to show is invalid. And you can’t assume such without begging the question of your god in the first place, which then invalidates your very argument.
However, you still have the problem of deciding whether you have received a revelation. And wouldn’t that also be error-prone?
Not being able to measure something simply means it cannot be established as a truth of fact. It has nothing to do with whether it exists as a concept or description. And no surprise, the vast majority of people feel pretty vague and confused about love…mostly because it cannot be determined to be factual in any way.
In fact, this is a great concept to demonstrate the silliness of FMM and some of your claims. Nothing KN, I, or most other people here on have posted dismisses accepting or embracing concepts that have nothing to do with science. There are very few things that I need to actually know scientifically to live a great life. Do I care if I can measure the difference in levels of enjoyment I get from a 1982 Pichon Longueville Comtesse de Lalande vs ashe-e reshteh? Given that I can’t measure that difference (or really even my level of enjoyment of either one), does that mean neither of those two items exist or does it mean that my enjoyment doesn’t exist or that I don’t exist? The answer is no to all of those questions. Measurement of enjoyment is irrelevant. And so is the need for some god or magic invisible pink kumquat to ground experience and knowledge.
Would my enjoyment of anything change if gods do not exist? No. On the other hand, would my enjoyment of things change if gods actually do exist? Possibly. Here’s why: if gods actually did exist, there is always the possibility that at some point such an entity could intervene in the world and change some parameter that either enhances or diminishes enjoyment. That such has never occurred does not imply that gods do not exist of course, but it does imply they are completely unnecessary the evaluation of phenomenon around me.
It is if someone claims God is a truth of fact, ID for instance. A measure of complexity is a measure of a Designer.
All positive claims require support. There is a proof that there is no largest prime.
Any assertion that a particular entity exists in the real world requires objective, empirical evidence to support it. Without that evidence, the only rational position is lack of belief. That’s not “starting with atheism” as you wrote earlier, it’s simply recognizing there is no warrant for belief.
I find your definition to be idiosyncratic, at best. It does not reflect the actual beliefs held by the vast majority of theists. A significant fraction of those people believe that their holy books are the inerrant word of a god or gods. A near majority of believers in the U.S. believe that their god created the universe less than 10,000 years ago. Catholics believe in saints and miracles, including transubstantiation. All of these claims about gods have entailments in reality. The gods people actually worship are nothing like the abstract to the point of non-existent deity you posit. They have “causal relations with other spatio-temporal entities, and so forth.”
We can, however, say that there is no evidence or reasoned support for such an entity so the only rational position is lack of belief.
Good point. But we are discussing God as defined by KN (Hart rather), not the d/Designer of ID. So, not really to the point.
And that is precisely the inference that I think is utterly mistaken, precisely because it takes for granted the solipsist conception of one’s epistemic condition.
I don’t want to explore this idea any further in this thread but I’d be willing to start a new thread if there’s interest.
I wasn’t interested in addressing what the majority of theists actually think. What that turns out to be is a question for sociology of religion. I was only proceeding as a philosopher with regard to the most philosophically rigorous conception of God that I am aware of.