Radical Agnosticism

A few times I’ve referred to my view about “the God question” as “radical agnosticism.” I thought it might be fun to work through what this means.

For the purposes of this discussion, by “God” I shall mean follow Hart’s definition of God as “the one infinite source of all that is: eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, uncaused, perfectly transcendent of all things and for that very reason absolutely immanent to all things” (The Experience of God, p. 30).

Next, I shall stipulate that our assertions about the world fall into two classes: those that take a truth-value in all possible worlds and those that take a truth-value only in the actual world. This is a contemporary version of “Hume’s Fork”: there are “relations of ideas”, “truths of reason”, analytic a priori claims and then there are “matters of fact”, “truths of fact,” synthetic a posteriori claims. (There are some reasons to be skeptical of this neat distinction but I’ll leave that aside for now.)

Whether or not God exists would therefore seem to be either a “truth of fact” or a “truth of reason”.  I shall therefore now argue that it cannot be either.

Truths of fact are either directly observable phenomena or they are posited phenomena. (Though the boundary is strictly methodological and shifts over time.)  But there are many presumptive truths of fact — claims with truth-value about the actual world — which we know have turned out to be false. And we know that because of empirical inquiry, and in particular, in the collection of techniques of inquiry called “science”. (I shall not insult anyone’s intelligence by assuming that there is a single thing called “the scientific method”).

Central to disciplined empirical inquiry, including and especially the sciences, is the act of measurement: intersubjectively verifiable assignments of quantitative variation across some interval of spatio-temporal locations. (It might be said that “the Scientific Revolution” is the historical period during which measurement slowly becomes the dominant conception of objectivity.)

But with that notion in place, it is perfectly clear that it is not even possible to take measurements of a perfectly transcendent being. A being that transcends all of space and time cannot be measured, which means that no claims about Him can be subjected to the tribunal of scientific inquiry. And hence no matters of fact about God can be verified one way or the other.  That is to say that all claims about God that are restricted to the actual world have an indeterminate truth-value: they cannot be determined to be true or false

The epistemic situation is no better when we turn from a posteriori to a priori claims. In a priori claims, the tribunal is not science but logic, and the central epistemic concept is not measurability but provability. Can the existence of God be proven? Many have thought so!

But here two things must be pointed out: a proof, to be deductively valid, consists of re-organizing the information contained in the initial assumptions. One can generate a logically valid proof of the existence of God. (Gödel, for example, has a logically valid version of the Ontological Argument.)  The process of proof-construction is not going to give you more information in the conclusion than was present in the premises.

Logic is limited in another important way: there are multiple logics. What can proved in one logic can be disproven in a different logic. It depends on the choice of logical system. Once you’ve chosen a logical system, and you’ve chosen some premises, then of course one can prove that God exists. But neither the premises nor the rules are “self-evident”, inscribed on the very face of reason or of reality, etc.

Hence we cannot determine that God exists or does not exist on the basis of logic alone, since provability is no more reliable here than measurability is.

On this basis, I conclude that it is not even possible for beings such as ourselves to assign any truth-value at all to the assertion that God exists. This yields a radical agnosticism. Whereas the moderate agnostic can accept the logical possibility of some future evidence or reasoning that would resolve the issue, the radical agnostic insists that beings with minds like ours are completely unable to resolve the issue at all.

Radical agnosticism is at the same time compatible with either utter indifference to the question of the existence of God (“apatheism”) or some quite definite stance (ranging from theism to pantheism to deism to atheism). All that radical agnosticism insists on here is that all definite stances on the God-question are leaps of faith — no matter what direction.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

739 thoughts on “Radical Agnosticism

  1. Kantian Naturalist: My own view, as expressed a few times here, is that there are synthetic a priori truths, but once we get clear about their nature, we will see that they don’t allow us to make sense of classical theism.

    Is it still your view that Hume’s Fork can address (“allow for”) synthetic a priori truths and disprove classical theism?

    What is your view about the nature of synthetic a priori truths? What’s in their nature that doesn’t allow us to make sense of classical theism?

  2. Kantian Naturalist:
    If principles are normative statements (claims about what ought to be the case), and assertions are descriptive statements (claims about what is the case), then the distinction between ought-claims and is-claims is sufficient to show that principles are not assertions.

    If.

    Glen Davidson

  3. Kantian Naturalist: If principles are normative statements (claims about what ought to be the case), and assertions are descriptive statements (claims about what is the case), then the distinction between ought-claims and is-claims is sufficient to show that principles are not assertions.

    Laws of nature. Ought-claims or is-claims? Laws of thought. Ought-claims or is-claims?

    Grammar, Logic, Physics and Science. Ought or is? Why? And have you considered what follows given your answer?

    I say it’s all a big False Dichotomy you are doing here.

  4. GlenDavidson: Are you not asserting principles and propositions when you state them?In some abstract and non-useful sense they may exist without assertion, but when you bring them up in a discussion they’re being asserted.And we don’t know that “Hitchen’s Razor” is a principle.It seems more of a heuristic device.

    I don’t think that’s quite accurate. I would say that asserting the “truthy-ness” (or some other quality) about a principle or proposition is an assertion, but simply posting or noting such is not an assertion in and of itself.

    Assertions are statements of confidence of accuracy or validity about something. Principles and propositions are not, in and of themselves, statements of confidence, but rather conceptualizations or models that form the basis of something, usually a larger conceptual framework. .

    No, a principle or proposition becomes an assertion when it is used to assert that something or other isn’t right.

    Yes, on this we agree.

    But anyway, I don’t know why anyone thinks that the claim that we don’t have any obligation to listen to apparent made-up junk sans evidence does not itself have evidence backing it up.When has it ever paid off?

    “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence…”

    …or some similarly smug and vague retort. The point is, the claim itself is philosophically sound, but since it’s not actually an assertion about the “truthy-ness” of something else, it really doesn’t square against itself.

    It’s a “meta” claim, hence not sufficiently backed up by specific evidence (one could bring up specific instances, but these would only be examples, not able to establish a “principle”), but it’s fair for us to judge that “Hitchen’s Razor” is backed up by the totality of the use of evidence vs. non-use of evidence (in the appropriate circumstances, of course) in general.It is so judged in courts, and there is nothing that is different between judicial settings and the rest of life that warrants that judgment in court and not in the rest of life/experience.It’s more difficult in some areas, notably, when evidence is asked for with respect to “Hitchen’s Razor,” but the evidence does exist for it.It isn’t “scientific evidence,” true, but it is the sort of evidence that scientists also use to dismiss claims that lack proper evidence (usually, however, the dismissed claims lack the proper scientific evidence, since science isn’t in the business of producing “meta” claims, while it does rely on them).

    I think this is a fair point, but I still submit that a razor is categorically different; it’s “truthy-ness” comes from it’s philosophical soundness, not per se from quantifiable evidence.

  5. Erik: Is it still your view that Hume’s Fork can address (“allow for”) synthetic a priori truths and disprove classical theism?

    No; if there are synthetic a priori truths, then Hume’s Fork cannot be right.

    What is your view about the nature of synthetic a priori truths? What’s in their nature that doesn’t allow us to make sense of classical theism?

    I think of synthetic a priori truths as explicating the constitutive norms that organize any epistemic activity that has a non-formal or substantive domain. (Somewhat more technically: by “non-formal” or “substantive” I mean any conceptual framework that involves existence postulates.) They are synthetic by virtue of applying to non-formal domains and a priori by virtue of being constitutive of that framework.

    For example, to be engaged in the epistemic activity of predicting commits us to uniformity as a synthetic a priori principle, because the activity itself is guided by the norm of taking the world as uniform, and that norm is then explicated as the corresponding principle. To be engaged in the epistemic activity of intervention commits us to causality as a synthetic a priori principle, because the activity itself is guided by the norm of taking the world as populated by causal powers, and that norm is then explicated as the corresponding principle.

    (In historical terms — perhaps of interest only to Walto — my conception of the synthetic a priori is basically Lewis’s conception of the pragmatic a priori, as nicely updated by Hasok Chang. My quibble with Lewis is that I think of the pragmatic a priori as synthetic, not as analytic, when we are dealing with epistemic activities that have non-formal domains. That’s a separate question from whether all formal domains are extensional, though I think that Lewis was right to argue, against Russell and Whitehead, that intensionality cannot be purged from formal domains, even if set theory is purely extensional.)

    However, none of this vindicates classical theism. If synthetic a priori truths are understood as explicating the constitutive norms of our contingent epistemic activities, they cannot function as objectively valid assertions about how the world really is (or must be) independent of our epistemic activities.

  6. Kantian Naturalist: However, none of this vindicates classical theism. If synthetic a priori truths are understood as explicating the constitutive norms of our contingent epistemic activities, they cannot function as objectively valid assertions about how the world really is (or must be) independent of our epistemic activities.

    Well, whatever it is that explicates the constitutive norms of our contingent epistemic activities (I seriously doubt “synthetic a priori truths” is the right label for that), why would you think it cannot function as an objectively valid assertion about how the world really is? You see, we are part of the world. Whatever “explicates” us, “explicates” also part of the world. If we happen to be the microcosm, as the esoteric aspect of religion “explicates”, then whatever applies to us as microcosm, also applies to macrocosm.

    Why would you additionally insist on “independent of our epistemic activities”? Where does it come from? Why should it be admitted?

  7. Kantian Naturalist:
    If principles are normative statements (claims about what ought to be the case), and assertions are descriptive statements (claims about what is the case), then the distinction between ought-claims and is-claims is sufficient to show that principles are not assertions.

    Interesting point!

  8. Erik: You bet wrong.

    *waiting for evidence that principles, propositions etc. etc. are different from assertions, claims etc. etc. and why the statement of a rule about statements should not be applied to some statements*

    None forthcoming, of course. QED.

    Already provided the definitions showing they are not synonymous. Unless you can somehow demonstrate that the definitions I used are either a) incorrect, or b) actually synonymous, my point is made. That you keep insisting otherwise without any actually substantiation just makes your argument look all the more odd.

  9. walto: We can’t always get what we want.

    I can ask though. You can’t blame a guy for trying

    I will continue to ask especially when you act as if your worldview is the default or an equal or better option or less faith based than mine.

    Or if you act as though you do know how you know or as if I don’t.

    walto: You like your theory that God supplies warrant. I prefer mine that certain experiences have intrinsic warrant.

    The difference is that God can provide warrant by definition but there is no good reason AFAIK to assume that certain experience have intrinsic warrant and in fact there is good reason to doubt that is the case.

    peace

  10. Kantian Naturalist: What’s the evidence that minds and senses are not reliable truth-detectors?

    Several thousand years of often being mistaken as to the truth of various propositions

    and

    The fact that I could have swore that I already mailed that bill payment that I just found on the kitchen table 😉

    peace

  11. dazz: Yeah, it’s clearly contradictory. FFM starts with his unreliable nature to know thinks, and then posits a “god” than can “reveal” things to him

    You have it backwards I start with the presupposition that God exists and since he exists he can reveal stuff to me. This allows me to posit all sorts of things including the idea that knowledge is possible.

    peace

  12. Erik: Thanks. The big step forward here is the definition of evidence as objective and empirical. So, as long as no objective empirical evidence have been presented for Hitchens’ Razor, it can be dismissed without evidence.

    I presented both a logical defense of the razor and objective, empirical evidence of its usefulness.

    Then there’s the fact that anybody even remotely logical knows that objective empirical evidence is not the only kind of evidence, that it’s not always the most important kind, and that it’s at times unobtainable for various reasons.

    Usually because the claim being pushed can’t be supported.

    We have no objective empirical evidence that all unmarried males are bachelors, but we know it’s true.

    That’s because that is a matter of definition, not a positive claim about reality.

    So, Hitchens’ Razor is anti-philosophical, anti-intellectual, anti-logical. It’s physicalist scientistist rubbish.

    Since your premises are rubbish it’s not surprising your conclusions are.

  13. Kantian Naturalist:
    . . .
    But whereas the traditional atheist thereby concludes that theism therefore makes no sense at all, I think that the right way forward is religious existentialism, according to which linguistic (and non-linguistic) expressions of one’s experience of the divine are not really objectively valid assertions at all.
    . . . .

    That’s going to be a hard sell to the people in the pews.

  14. fifthmonarchyman: You have it backwards I start with the presupposition that God exists and since he exists he can reveal stuff to me. This allows me to posit all sorts of things including the idea that knowledge is possible.

    It may let you posit that claim, but it seems to interfere with you actually providing a logical argument to support it.

  15. Erik: Yeah, right. It doesn’t claim. It doesn’t assert. It doesn’t state. It notes.

    I have no idea what your complaint is. Conceptual principles can’t assert anything, by definition. Like models, they are simply tools people use to establish a system foundation. The definition establishes this. And no…the definition cannot assert such; assertions are made by people with opinions about the truth of given positions. Definitions, in contrast, have no opinions about the “truthyness” of anything, so in what sense could a definition assert anything? Oh…but I hear you cry, “didn’t say anything about that.” Yeah, you did, the moment you decided to quibble about my use of the word “notes” concerning the implication of a razor.

    You seem to be having some real difficulty with the differences between meanings of these terms.and why dictionaries do not use these terms as substitutions for one another. It would be because they mean different things and thus cover different contexts.

    It got boring and pointless very fast with you.

    Oh I’m sure. I bet you get bored whenever people don’t just accept whatever you just make up on the spot or when you decide to apply random meanings to words as you go along.

    Here’s the thing though – not every statement is an assertion. And principles and propositions are not synonymous with assertions and claims. Don’t like it? Take it up with those who came up with and defined those concepts.

    Of course, we are still left with the fact that FMM’s and your assertions about any particular deity(ies) is quite easily disposed of.

  16. Patrick: It’s so horrible that history shows that you were actually the ones oppressing, imprisoning, and killing in the name of your god when you had the power to do so.

    People like me have never had the power to do so. We have always been a little flock (Luke 12:32). We are always hated by the world (John 15:18-21).

    quote:

    For consider your calling, brothers: not many of you were wise according to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth. But God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to nothing things that are,
    (1Co 1:26-28)

    end quote:

    Patrick: Yet you are unable to provide a means of distinguishing between them.

    what????? I have repeatedly provided a means to distinguish them any time I’m asked..

    The means is revelation.
    I can know the difference if God reveals it to me

    Patrick: I, on the other hand, am assuming no authority. I’m simply pointing out that your claims are unsupported and incoherent.

    who gave you the authority to determine that my claims are unsupported and incoherent?

    peace

  17. fifthmonarchyman: Several thousand years of often being mistaken as to the truth of various propositions

    and

    The fact that I could have swore that I already mailed that bill payment that I just found on the kitchen table

    peace

    Funny how this god of yours didn’t change those situations. Guess his Revelation 5000 was still charging at those times…

  18. fifthmonarchyman: People like me have never had the power to do so. We have always been a little flock (Luke 12:32).We are always hated by the world (John 15:18-21).

    People like you have been in power more often than out of it, and have often used that power to harm others.

    what????? I have repeatedly provided a means to distinguish them any time I’m asked..

    The means is revelation.
    I can know the difference if God reveals it to me

    Again, this is indistinguishable from simple personal conviction. You have offered no objective, empirical means to distinguish between the two.

    who gave you the authority to determine that my claims are unsupported and incoherent?

    No authority needed (but thank you for the projection). It’s a simple observation of what you write. If you object to that characterization, support your claims with evidence and coherent arguments.

  19. newton: How can you be sure when that is?

    I can know for sure when and if God reveals it in such a was as I can be sure.

    newton: 2) unless the union with Christ makes you omniscient,you cannot be absolutely sure.

    1) are you absolutely sure this is the case?
    2) being absolutely sure is not necessary for knowledge

    3) The Holy Spirit within me is omniscient. My assurance is the byproduct of the union of his mind with mine.

    4) quote:

    The spiritual person judges all things, but is himself to be judged by no one. “For who has understood the mind of the Lord so as to instruct him?” But we have the mind of Christ.
    (1Co 2:15-16)

    end quote:

    peace

    peace

  20. fifthmonarchyman: You have it backwards I start with the presupposition that God exists and since he exists he can reveal stuff to me. This allows me to posit all sorts of things including the idea that knowledge is possible.

    peace

    And we come back to the point I made before about cancer cures and being persuasive.

    Put another way, if your god reveals stuff to you and (allegedly) the things he reveals are perfectly known even given your imperfect mind, how is it you could ever make any mistakes? Why are you leaving checks you meant to mail on the kitchen table? If you say, “well, this god doesn’t reveal everything to me” then your claim that said god can provide warrant for knowledge is clearly erroneous, because you can never actually establish what is known at all.

  21. Patrick: That’s going to be a hard sell to the people in the pews.

    Oh, yes indeed. But I am concerned here with what is most reasonable, not with what is most popular.

  22. Patrick: No authority needed (but thank you for the projection).

    Who told you that no authority was needed to make that sort of determination?
    Are you simply assuming that you have the right to do that sort of thing?

    Patrick: Again, this is indistinguishable from simple personal conviction. You have offered no objective, empirical means to distinguish between the two.

    Another pronouncement from Patrick’s personal decider throne. It must be nice to unilaterally declare yourself king of stuff when ever you choose to.

    I halfway expect you to use the majestic plural when you make this sort of proclamation .

    peace

  23. Robin: if your god reveals stuff to you and (allegedly) the things he reveals are perfectly known even given your imperfect mind, how is it you could ever make any mistakes?

    1) Because God doesn’t reveal everything to me
    2) Because I often don’t heed his revelation

    peace

  24. Robin: Conceptual principles can’t assert anything, by definition. Like models, they are simply tools people use to establish a system foundation.

    Do you have evidence for this claim? If not can I simply dismiss it?

    peace

  25. fifthmonarchyman: Who told you that no authority was needed to make that sort of determination?
    Are you simply assuming that you have the right to do that sort of thing?

    . . .
    Another pronouncement from Patrick’s personal decider throne. It must be nice to unilaterally declare yourself king of stuff when ever you choose to.

    I halfway expect you to use the majestic plural when you make this sort of proclamation .

    Ah, I see. Rather than engage in rational discussion you’re choosing to attempt to construct some kind of rhetorical structure where challenges to your claims and arguments, such as they are, are really oppression directed against you.

    Interesting approach. Given the incredibly poor quality of your responses thus far I see why you’ve chosen it. It will take you some time to learn to play the victim card as well as some online SJWs, though.

  26. Patrick: Rather than engage in rational discussion you’re choosing to attempt to construct some kind of rhetorical structure where challenges to your claims and arguments, such as they are, are really oppression directed against you.

    No just calling it like I see it.

    You have a habit of acting like you are the decider in chief.

    It’s impossible to have a rational discussion when your partner can simply declare from on high that he is right and you are not.

    It would be nice if you bothered to even once explain why you have the authority to simply declare yourself the victor.

    Does it have something to do with your moderator status?

    peace

  27. fifthmonarchyman: It’s impossible to have a rational discussion when your partner can simply declare from on high that he is right and you are not.

    Would telling someone they believe in God contrary to their own claim fall into that category? No offense, just food for thought.

  28. fifthmonarchyman:
    2) Because I often don’t heed his revelation

    This is new, you believe that God is absolutely revealing something to you and that often is not enough to motivate you to heed His revelation?

  29. newton: you believe that God is absolutely revealing something to you and that often is not enough to motivate you to heed His revelation?

    I am prone to wander a sinner from way back. Rebellion is in my DNA
    If it weren’t for the grace of God I’d never heed God’s revelation

    newton: Would telling someone they believe in God contrary to their own claim fall into that category? No offense, just food for thought.

    none taken.

    It’s not me who makes that observation it’s God. I would not presume to claim to be able to read minds or to have that sort of authority.

    quote:

    For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.
    (Rom 1:19-20)

    end quote:

    peace

  30. Erik: why would you think it cannot function as an objectively valid assertion about how the world really is? You see, we are part of the world. Whatever “explicates” us, “explicates” also part of the world. If we happen to be the microcosm, as the esoteric aspect of religion “explicates”, then whatever applies to us as microcosm, also applies to macrocosm.

    Why would you additionally insist on “independent of our epistemic activities”? Where does it come from? Why should it be admitted?

    On my view, any account of genuinely mind-independent reality has to be constructed through an imaginative “subtraction” from the thickness of lived experience.

    If we notice that the rich complexity of lived experience involves both

    (1) the complex epistemic practices and activities whereby joint and collective intentional agents ‘triangulate’ on the shared world for the unfolding of individual and shared projects, wherein the constituent norms of those practices can be explicated as synthetic a priori truths, and

    (2) lower-level cognitive abilities (and their affective/somatic correlates) whereby any sentient organism is able use its species-specific sensory organs to detect, track, and classify some features of its motivationally salient environment,

    then if we “subtract” the contribution of both (1) and (2) from lived experience, what we are left with is not much, but not nothing. For what we get, I think, is
    a characterization of the world in itself in terms of relatively stable dynamic structures, characterizable in terms of both regularities and irregularities, determinable but not determinate.

    Reality thus characterized is sufficiently fecund and generative of novelty as to produce, under favorable conditions, dissipative systems that are partially decoupled from the larger systems in which they are embedded and which can, under even more rare and favorable conditions, generate partial, tentative, and fallible mappings of those systems.

    That’s pretty much the best we can do, given what we do and don’t know, in terms of saying what the world in itself is really like.

    The big lesson here is that the more we subtract from the world what we bring to it, the less relevant it is going to be for anything that we care about. Metaphysics is almost, but not quite, useless.

  31. fifthmonarchyman: No just calling it like I see it.

    You have a habit of acting like you are the decider in chief.

    Tone trolling, the first refuge of those who can’t support their claims.

    It’s impossible to have a rational discussion when your partner can simply declare from on high that he is right and you are not.

    It would be nice if you bothered to even once explain why you have the authority to simply declare yourself the victor.

    Please provide any examples of me doing what you are accusing me of. I contend that I am addressing your claims, evidence, and logic. If you assert otherwise, prove it.

  32. Patrick: FMM: You have a habit of acting like you are the decider in chief.

    Patrick: I contend that I am addressing your claims, evidence, and logic. If you assert otherwise, prove it.

    Hahaha

  33. Robin: This right here illustrates how I know that FMM’s (and similar folks’) take on his omnipotent god is totally erroneous.

    Please share some of your absolute certainty with keiths.

  34. Kantian Naturalist: What’s the evidence that minds and senses are not reliable truth-detectors?

    Isn’t it right there in your OP? At the very least you ought to be a radical agnostic about the question.

  35. Patrick: Hitchens’ Razor has both logic and evidence supporting it.

    There is no objective empirical evidence for the existence of Hitchen’s Razor.

  36. Patrick: Just more on the list of charges your deity should face if it turns out to actually exist.

    Maybe God will appoint you judge. Since you seem to be so morally pure, and a know it all.

  37. Patrick: People like you have been in power more often than out of it, and have often used that power to harm others.

    Guano. Support this or retract it.

  38. People just like Patrick have been responsible for killing untold millions.

    It’s a shame that he refuses to see this is in fact the case.

  39. Patrick: Rather than engage in rational discussion you’re choosing to attempt to construct some kind of rhetorical structure where challenges to your claims and arguments, such as they are, are really oppression directed against you.

    Yet you’re the one trying to redefine ‘atheist’ and change the rules of the site to favor ‘skeptics’. You must feel so oppressed. Yes, you’re in a minority. So what. Suck it up and accept responsibility for what you are (or aren’t).

  40. Mung: Isn’t it right there in your OP? At the very least you ought to be a radical agnostic about the question.

    Nowhere in the OP do I say or imply that our cognitive and perceptual capacities are unreliable.

  41. fifthmonarchyman: It’s not me who makes that observation it’s God. I would not presume to claim to be able to read minds or to have that sort of authority.

    Nobody likes a tattletale, let God do His own observing

  42. Kantian Naturalist: The big lesson here is that the more we subtract from the world what we bring to it, the less relevant it is going to be for anything that we care about. Metaphysics is almost, but not quite, useless.

    …says the guy who just did a bunch of useless metaphysics.

    Your exercise of subtraction didn’t answer the question that everybody cares about. Namely, Why? If the world as it really is does not bother and should not be bothered about, then your exercise was in vain.

    It’s self-evident that when you take the universe without humans, you will get a universe without humans. Except that you will be a human mentally observing a universe without humans. Does it enhance your social or intellectual skills or give you a good sci-fi story at least? It certainly doesn’t give you the universe as it is. And it gives you no basis for agnosticism, because agnosticism is itself the basis of your exercise.

  43. Robin: Here’s the thing though – not every statement is an assertion.

    The point is – on what grounds is this particular statement an assertion. And you keep ignoring the fact that I don’t care what you call it, an observation or principle or razor.

    The only thing that matters is that it’s a statement that postulates a rule that I am applying to the statement itself. You have done nothing at all to show if I am doing something out of place.

  44. Oh look. Oh joy. Moldy old scum has reappeared on the walls. Gotta scrub harder to get it out next time.

  45. Aaaaand always look on the bright side of life (de-doo, de-doo-de-doo-de-doo).

  46. newton: Nobody likes a tattletale, let God do His own observing

    He does do his own observing and revealing.

    In this case he is using me in some small way to reveal his observation to those who might not have opened the book in a while

    😉

    peace

  47. fifthmonarchyman: He does do his own observing and revealing.

    In this case he is using me in some small way to reveal his observation to those who might not have opened the book in a while

    peace

    How is that going for him?

    I guess I’ve never been very impressed with his choices. Unless, just possibly, it isn’t really God who made those choices. I’d hate to blame God without good cause, after all.

    Glen Davidson

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