Presuppositions of Science

Given recent posts here at TSZ challenging the validity of presuppositions and self-evident truths I thought the following list might be worthy of debate.

Presuppositions of Science

1. The existence of a theory-independent, external world
2. The orderly nature of the external world
3. The knowability of the external world
4. The existence of truth
5. The laws of logic
6. The reliability of our cognitive and sensory faculties to serve as truth gatherers and as a source of justified true beliefs in our intellectual environment
7. The adequacy of language to describe the world
8. The existence of values used in science
9. The uniformity of nature and induction
10. The existence of numbers

When critics object to the Logos as a presupposition and offer instead 10 other presuppositions, Ockham’s Razor flies out the window.

788 thoughts on “Presuppositions of Science

  1. Strong scientism rules out these presuppositions altogether because neither the presuppositions themselves nor their defense are scientific matters. Weak scientism misconstrues their strength in its view that scientific propositions have greater epistemic authority than those of other fields like philosophy. This would mean that the conclusions of science are more certain than the philosophical presuppositions used to justify and reach those conclusions, and that is absurd.

  2. Patrick,

    I find it fascinating that the techniques to make cult members impervious to questioning their beliefs were around thousands of years ago and actively used by the authors of the bible.

    They seem to be among the most succesful memes ever.

    The “we’re so special that outsiders can’t even comprehend what we’re saying” meme is brilliant. It feeds vanity while simultaneously dismissing every criticism as the confused mumblings of the uninitiated.

  3. Mung: keiths could start his own brand of Christianity in which Christianity is false.

    keiths:
    Don’t need to. It already exists, and it’s called ‘Christianity’.

    Well, in the keiths brand, he would of course defend his claim. Because that’s what he does. Except when he doesn’t.

    So while the keiths brand may be possible, it seems probable that it will never become actual.

  4. If you have something original to say, Mung, say it. If I want to read passages pasted from a creationist tome, I’ll go to the master (BA77).

  5. Patrick: Sing it.

    That is what we Christians try to do everyday. We try to show Christ’s lordship by our behavior. We often fail that is where grace comes in

    Patrick: Are you admitting that Jesus exists only in your mind? If so, that doesn’t support your claim that “Jesus is lord.” If not, you’re just evading the question yet again.

    No I’m just trying to understand what you would consider evidence.

    in that vein

    What objective empirical evidence do you have for dark energy or dark matter?

    peace

  6. Reciprocating Bill: Etc. Same emptiness. Same bore.

    I did not say it was not boring but it is not the same emptiness. Do you agree that God if he exists could reveal something to me in such a way that it was impossible for me to doubt?

    peace

  7. fifth,

    This will continue indefinitely. I will never concede that I’m mistaken and you will never be satisfied with my answers. That is what it looks like to have mutually incompatible worldviews.

    You might never concede that you’re mistaken, but open-minded people do in fact change their views in response to evidence and argument. Give it a try!

    As for my eight questions, I’m likely to disagree with your answers, but that’s expected. Otherwise I’d still be a Christian. The problem is not that I’m likely to disagree — it’s the lack of answers to agree or disagree with. You’re avoiding my questions altogether.

    For example, we know you believe that Jesus physically mooned Moses long before he was borne by Mary. I’ve asked you why, if Jesus already had a body, it was necessary for Mary to give birth to him. You’ve avoided the question by pretending that ‘impregnate’ doesn’t mean ‘to make pregnant’.

    It’s understandable that you’d like to avoid the question, but why not do the honest thing and answer? And if the answer is something like “I don’t know, and I had never thought about it until you asked,” then say so. It wouldn’t surprise me, and I doubt that it would surprise anyone else.

    My questions are quite reasonable. Why not answer them, and when you can’t answer one, simply admit it?

  8. Mung:

    Neil Rickert: That “all” seems slightly exaggerated.

    Sorry, I meant to say ya’ll.

    You got y’all wrong. Sorry.

  9. keiths: I’ve asked you why, if Jesus already had a body, it was necessary for Mary to give birth to him.

    OK if you feel it necessary to beat a dead horse.

    As I already said a long time ago

    The reason Christ needed to be a fetus is that in order to be a perfect mediator he needed to be exactly like his people.

    quote:

    Therefore he had to be made like his brothers in every respect, so that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in the service of God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people.
    (Heb 2:17)

    end quote:

    next question

    Peace

    PS At this rate coding a webpage will never get done

  10. keiths: I’ve asked you why, if Jesus already had a body, it was necessary for Mary to give birth to him.

    You need to be careful with temporal terms like already here. From the perspective of a timeless God there is not already the universe is forever in in one static now.

    There is no before or after when God thinks about in the incarnation.

    From our limited perspective we perceive things like before and after but modern science if nothing else has shown us that our limited perception is not to be trusted and is not objective reality.

    peace

  11. The reason Christ needed to be a fetus is that in order to be a perfect mediator he needed to be exactly like his people.

    Why on earth would you need to be a fetus in order to mediate later? And do you think he was imperfectly mediating between God and Adam and Eve, God and Abraham, God and Moses, etc.? If imperfect mediation was good enough then, why not later?

    Also, Jesus wasn’t exactly like his people, according to you. He never sinned.

    Given all of the above, why was fetus-hood necessary?

  12. fifth,

    You need to be careful with temporal terms like already here. From the perspective of a timeless God there is not already the universe is forever in in one static now.

    You keep forgetting that Jesus entered into time, according to you. In fact, you’ve told us that Jesus had to enter time because a timeless being cannot communicate:

    1) two way communication is an active process (sending/receiving)
    2) a timeless being is incapable of change
    3) therefore a timeless being is incapable of two way communication

    So from Jesus’s perspective within time, he already had a body. Why then was it necessary for Mary to give birth to him?

  13. keiths: Why on earth would you need to be a fetus in order to mediate later?

    “All respects” is “all respects” Christ needed to be 100 percent man.

    keiths: Also, Jesus wasn’t exactly like his people, according to you. He never sinned.

    Sin is not a necessary part of humanity. If it was salvation would be impossible.
    The question that Christ was sent to prove was, could a human live a sinless life? Could he succeed where Adam failed?

    That is the whole point of the substitutionary sacrifice. The lamb must be without blemish.

    keiths: And do you think he was imperfectly mediating between God and Adam and Eve, God and Abraham, God and Moses, etc.?

    From our temporal perspective Christ did not mediate till the cross from God’s timeless perspective Christ has always been mediating.

    next question

    peace

    PS
    notice how one question becomes three and I’ll bet you are still not satisfied.
    This is exactly what I and the apostle Paul predicted

    quote:
    always learning and never able to arrive at a knowledge of the truth.
    (2Ti 3:7)

    end quote:

  14. keiths: You keep forgetting that Jesus entered into time

    Christ did not “enter into time” the Logos has always been here from the very beginning.

    quote:

    He was in the world, and the world was made through him, yet the world did not know him.
    (Joh 1:10)

    end quote:

    peace

  15. keiths: So from Jesus’s perspective within time, he already had a body. Why then was it necessary for Mary to give birth to him?

    again
    Hebrews 2:17

    Sin is not a necessary part of being human, birth is

    peace

  16. fifthmonarchyman: Do you agree that God if he exists could reveal something to me in such a way that it was impossible for me to doubt?

    You question has nothing to do with the regress I reproduced, which has to do with the impossibility of removing the doubt of a perversely repetitive, interlocutor-bot, not one’s own doubt. I transposed your self-referential regress to illustrate how easy it is, and how empty the rhetorical strategy you pursue has been, not to initiate a discussion about revelation, your presuppositions, etc. I don’t much care about any of that.

    You’ve complained times others here constantly challenge your Christian presuppositions. You should find my general lack of interest in same refreshing.

  17. Reciprocating Bill: You’ve complained times others here constantly challenge your Christian presuppositions. You should find my general lack of interest in same refreshing.

    Actually I do.

    I hope at some point we could discuss some actual science I find it a whole lot more interesting.

    Apparently first I need to answer some silly questions posed by an early teenage apostate

    peace

    PS maybe you could convince him to leave it lay

  18. keiths:

    Why on earth would you need to be a fetus in order to mediate later?

    fifth:

    “All respects” is “all respects” Christ needed to be 100 percent man.

    Why? What would have happened if Jesus had never been a fetus? According to you, he would have gone to mediate, and it wouldn’t have worked. He’d be saying, “Crap. I’m trying to mediate perfectly, but I can’t, because I was never a fetus!”

    The obvious question is: What the hell does fetus-hood have to do with it? In what specific way does mediation depend on having been a fetus at one time? Especially when you are the omnipotent creator of the universe?

    It makes no sense, fifth. It sounds like something a Christian would say.

  19. Reciprocating Bill: Does that not render the existence of a theory-independent reality something other than a presupposition? Why presuppose something that can be demonstrated?

    Because the demonstration is philosophical and not a conclusion of science. As such, it is a presupposition of science that has to be defended philosophically.

    The point, again, is that it subject to challenge, and thus science itself is undermined.

  20. Fifth, it wouldn’t take a God to make some proposition impossible for you to doubt. That’s a psychological state: a drug could do it. Inability to doubt something doesn’t make that thing true.

    The interesting question is whether God could present a proposition to you in such a way that belief in it requires that you not only must be right, but know that you are (since that’s approximately what we’ve meant by ‘certainty’ in these threads). I think that that might be possible for an omnipotent being to accomplish. I’m not sure about it though: I might be wrong.

    FWIW, Spinoza discusses that issue in his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect.

  21. Mung: Because the demonstration is philosophical and not a conclusion of science. As such, it is a presupposition of science that has to be defended philosophically.

    The point, again, is that it subject to challenge, and thus science itself is undermined.

    You are very confused.

  22. fifthmonarchyman:
    notice how one question becomes three and I’ll bet you are still not satisfied.
    This is exactly what I and the apostle Paul predicted

    You’re absolutely right.

    Woe to them who aren’t satisfied with the word of an evangelical epileptic who lived two thousand years ago. They need to STFU and quit their learnin’.

    When your religion specifically warns you that people are going to be skeptical of its doctrines then that should be a huge red flag that your ideology is doing everything it can to block the exits and insulate itself from criticism.

    “Wow….they think I’m talking rubbish….the Bible warned me about this….it must be true!!”

    PS: I do love the ‘Jesus needed to be a fetus‘ bit, I’d never heard that one before!

  23. keiths: What the hell does fetus-hood have to do with it? In what specific way does mediation depend on having been a fetus at one time?

    You need to understand what was going on in the great exchange. At the cross Jesus took on his peoples sins and his people took on his sinlessness. In order for that to occur the principles needed to be the same in every way.

    One of reasons that animal sacrifices did not work to remove sin is because there was not a perfect correspondence between the sinner and the sacrifice.

    quote:

    For it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins. Consequently, when Christ came into the world, he said, “Sacrifices and offerings you have not desired, but a body have you prepared for me;
    (Heb 10:4-5)

    end quote:

    Birth is a necessary part of being human. Data from Star Trek or Pinocchio are not human no matter how much they look and act human, One of the reasons why is that they were never born.

    next question

    peace

  24. walto: The interesting question is whether God could present a proposition to you in such a way that belief in it requires that you not only must be right, but know that you are

    That is a better way of phrasing the question. Thank you.

    peace

  25. OMagain: Do only humans have souls? What about aliens? Did Jesus’ sacrifice also cleanse aliens of their sins?

    What is a soul in your worldview? For me a soul is simply the essence of a thing. For example “brevity is the soul of wit”.

    So in that sense humans have a soul

    Aliens if they exist are assumed not to be human so Jesus death on the cross would not have cleansed their sins if they have any.

    Sin requires a knowledge of the law so I don’t see any reason to expect that aliens have sins.

    On the other hand the fallen nature of the universe is a direct result of the sinning of humanity so I would expect that if aliens exist they might have a bone or two to pick with us. That brings a whole other wrinkle to the SETI thing

    peace

    PS notice how one silly question becomes three which then becomes even more and folks are still not satisfied

  26. fifthmonarchyman: On the other hand the fallen nature of the universe is a direct result of the sinning of humanity so I would expect that if aliens exist they might have a bone or two to pick with us.

    That’s a somewhat arrogant attitude to have on behalf of humanity? The entire universe created just for us? Is that what you really believe?

    Out of interest, care to make an estimate as to what % of the volume of the visible universe the solar system takes up?

  27. Mung: Because the demonstration is philosophical and not a conclusion of science. As such, it is a presupposition of science that has to be defended philosophically.

    The point, again, is that it subject to challenge, and thus science itself is undermined.

    I think you will find that very few philosophers of science think philosophy can prescribe what science must be in order to be effective. Rather, they see philosophy either as a describer of science or as an extension of science (or both). So philosophy undermining science is a non-starter for them.

    But for fun, and while RB takes a break presumably to let dizziness subside, let’s try to form an actual argument to justify the position that
    1. The existence of a theory-independent, external world
    is a presupposition of science. I take presupposition to mean necessary, immutable assumption.

    Now the fact there are different philosophical positions does not on its own undermine science. One has to show further that one of those positions is incompatible with science to at least get a start. So let’s try to get a start.

    I think we have to consider “theory-independent” and “external” separately.

    Start with theory-independence. What could “theory-independent” mean?

    Perhaps it means that scientific theory can tell us nothing about the true nature of reality? But one does not need to presuppose theory-independence in that sense to do science. For one can be a scientific realist, ie one can believe science theory does tell us about reality, and do science successfully. So denying theory-independence on those grounds fails to undermine science.

    Perhaps “theory-independent” means science requires a view from nowhere? But such theory-independence does not undermine science. Many philosophers agree that such a Gods-eye view is impossible for humanity. But none I know of claim that undermines science, although some may view science as essentially instrumental because of that.

    Do you have another argument about “theory-independent”?

    Now what about “external”? It is not explicit, but perhaps that means that there must be an external material world. But since one can be an idealist and still employ science instrumentally, as many idealist philosophers do, the assumption of materialism is not necessary for science.

    So what about external per se? Can one be a solipsist and still do science? Or does solipsism undermine science? I don’t see how posting such a claim in a public forum can be anything but humour, as per above exchanges with the person from Jupiter (a county in the UK, I believe). Are you seriously putting forward for consideration by others the claim that solipsism undermines science?

    Are you aware of arguments that I’ve missed?

  28. OMagain: That’s a somewhat arrogant attitude to have on behalf of humanity? The entire universe created just for us? Is that what you really believe?

    No I believe that the entire universe was created to show the multifaceted glory of God. God’s wrath and his grace are big part of who God is.

    That is where we come in. From our perspective as the recipients of either grace or wrath that part of the glory of God takes on special prominence

    OMagain: Out of interest, care to make an estimate as to what % of the volume of the visible universe the solar system takes up?

    My brain makes up a relatively small part of my body. DNA makes up a relatively small part of the total volume of the matter on earth. A small amount of uranium can make a big boom

    Sometimes small things can have effects that are all out of proportion to their size

    peace

  29. fifthmonarchyman:

    Birth is a necessary part of being human. Data from Star Trek or Pinocchio are not human no matter how much they look and act human, One of the reasons why is that they were never born.

    Adam and Eve….not human.

  30. fifthmonarchyman: Sometimes small things can have effects that are all out of proportion to their size

    And it’s your contention that what humans did in the garden of eden caused the rest of the universe’s inhabitants to be destined for hell (as they were not saved by Jesus?)?

    And anyway, you don’t seem to appreciate how large the universe is. If you did you’d realize that “small” does not really describe our place in the universe.

  31. BruceS,

    I take it that what “theory-independent, external world” is supposed to capture is this: we cannot do science unless we can distinguish between when we are fitting models to data and when we are fitting data to models, such that we can avoid the latter (as much as we can) and pursue the former (as much as we can).

    Phrased that way, it seems like a piece of mere sanity — if we couldn’t tell the difference between those cases, we would no legitimate (however implicit) grasp on the concept of objectivity, let alone any (implicit) grasp on the concept of science!

    Put otherwise, we can’t be doing science unless we have some way of testing our theories against some sort of constraint — something Real — in such a way that we can distinguish between theories that are better and worse models of their data. Though one can be an instrumentalist and be a perfectly good (if not excellent) scientist, that’s largely because practicing scientists do not face the Achilles’ Heel of instrumentalism: how to give an account of scientific progress that does not make it seem like a mystery?

    (One could surrender the very idea of scientific progress, but then paradigm shifts look like shifts in artistic and literary movements. Very few besides Rorty have been willing to bite this bullet, and I would argue that his aestheticism cannot be reconciled with his naturalism.)

    So there are (I think) quite good philosophical arguments for scientific realism, though since they arise in how we give accounts of scientific progress across paradigm shifts, they are solutions to problems that practicing scientists, who are operating within a paradigm, do not need to confront.

    (I believe that this same basic argument works if we replace Kuhnian paradigms with Lakatos’ “research programs,” but I am not entirely sure.)

  32. Kantian Naturalist:

    Put otherwise, we can’t be doing science unless we have some way of testing our theories against some sort of constraint — something Real — in such a way that we can distinguish between theories that are better and worse models of their data.

    I think that may be so. But that is why I included in “immutable” in my definition of presupposition.

    The idea of testing and how to test are not immutable inputs to science. Rather they are continually being examined and revised by scientists. The recent issues with significance testing are one example.

    Even the role of testing itself is open to question, as in the arguments about multiverse theories and whether they are scientific.

    Though one can be an instrumentalist and be a perfectly good (if not excellent) scientist, that’s largely because practicing scientists do not face the Achilles’ Heel of instrumentalism: how to give an account of scientific progress that does not make it seem like a mystery?

    Although my sympathies are with scientific realism, I don’t think that its falsity would undermine science.

    It’s true that most practicing scientists don’t think about this. My theory is that they are instrumentalists if challenged by philosophers since it is easier to fall back on that position but realists in their hearts because otherwise why get up in the morning to do science? But that is just a pet theory with no evidence.

    .

  33. Mung: Strong scientism rules out these presuppositions altogether because neither the presuppositions themselves nor their defense are scientific matters. Weak scientism misconstrues their strength in its view that scientific propositions have greater epistemic authority than those of other fields like philosophy. This would mean that the conclusions of science are more certain than the philosophical presuppositions used to justify and reach those conclusions, and that is absurd.

    I don’t understand this at all. Why can’t there be a good philosophical argument for the claim that assertions about actual reality (i.e. logically contingent, non-necessary reality) established by well-ordered scientific practices have more epistemic authority than assertions about actual reality established by other means? Why is that “absurd”?

    To dispel the air of paradox, one should distinguish between the methodological norms of scientific inquiry as prescriptive claims about how scientific inquiry should be done and the empirically confirmed assertions embedded within scientific theories as descriptive claims about what contingent, non-necessary actual reality is like.

    And one can make that distinction perfectly intelligibly while maintaining the epistemic authority of descriptive claims established by scientific methods over descriptive claims established by other means.

    In other words, “weak scientism” is perfectly coherent — and, I think, correct.

    I would make one minor revision, though: I would say that the epistemic authority of science is defeasible.

    What I mean is this: for any claims p and q, where p and q both purport to describe roughly the same real processes at the same or similar specific spatio-temporal region and at the same or similar specific spatio-temporal degree of resolution, where p is a “scientific claim” and q is not, and where p and q are prima facie inconsistent, then the burden of proof is on those who prefer q over to p to show why q ought to be preferred to p.

    But said that way, I think there can be cases where the burden of proof can be met, especially in cases where there is a live debate over the methodology of science, or worries that the more “rigorous” a science is, the more data is actually lost. For example, it seems to me that communities of Black and Brown people can know things about the impact of broken windows policing on their communities that can’t be captured by a sociological analysis.

    And I also think that phenomenology is indispensable to a comprehensive philosophy of mind, so in that sense we do know things about subjective consciousness that cannot be described in the third-personal vocabulary of empirical science.

    But, apart from those caveats, I don’t see why attributing a defeasible but prima facie greater epistemic authority to scientific claims over non-scientific claims is problematic or absurd.

  34. BruceS: The idea of testing and how to testing are not immutable inputs to science. Rather they are continually being examined and revised by scientists. The recent issues with significance testing are one example.

    Errr . . . it is true that scientists are continually devising new tests, and new ways of thinking about tests, and so forth, but that’s about, shall we say, the content of testing. My remark was about the form of testing — that we can’t be doing science unless we have some way of distinguishing between fitting model to data and fitting data to model, however we do so.

    Even the role of testing itself is open to question, as in the arguments about multiverses theories and whether they are scientific.

    Yes, I’m willing to dig on my heels on this one. As far as I can tell, multiverse theories are just a nice bit of metaphysical speculation inspired by some pretty mathematics, and not a genuinely scientific hypothesis. If there’s no physically possible measurement that could confirm the hypothesis, then it’s not scientific. (ID is not scientific for precisely the same reason.)

  35. Kantian Naturalist: I take it that what “theory-independent, external world” is supposed to capture is this: we cannot do science unless we can distinguish between when we are fitting models to data and when we are fitting data to models, such that we can avoid the latter (as much as we can) and pursue the former (as much as we can).

    But often, science is doing neither of those.

    Put otherwise, we can’t be doing science unless we have some way of testing our theories against some sort of constraint — something Real — in such a way that we can distinguish between theories that are better and worse models of their data.

    That seems to be asking us to be able to compare with Darwinism is a better theory of biology than Big Bang is a theory of cosmology.

    Yes, that’s an extreme example to illustrate the point. But theories tend to define their own data, resulting in what Kuhn described as incommensurability.

    Let’s remember that by some measures, Copernican astronomy did worse than Ptolemaic astronomy, at least until Kepler and Newton. The main benefit of the Copernican system was not in how well it modeled its data. Rather, it was that it was more systematic and thus more easily extended beyond the initial problem of planetary motion.

  36. Neil Rickert: Yes, that’s an extreme example to illustrate the point. But theories tend to define their own data, resulting in what Kuhn described as incommensurability.

    I understand and accept Kuhn’s point that the implicit understanding provided by a paradigm constitutes what can count as a measurement or as a technique, and that in turn means that there won’t be some neutral yardstick by which to compare theories informed by different paradigms. However, I also remain largely convinced by Jay Rosenberg’s point that it is is possible to compare incommenurable theories. My main worry about his argument is that it works extremely well for fundamental physics — because it is tailor-made for fundamental physics. I am doubtful that his account works for scientific theories other than fundamental physics. Convergent realism (as he calls it) simply might not be true of biology or psychology.

    Let’s remember that by some measures, Copernican astronomy did worse than Ptolemaic astronomy, at least until Kepler and Newton. The main benefit of the Copernican system was not in how well it modeled its data. Rather, it was that it was more systematic and thus more easily extended beyond the initial problem of planetary motion.

    That’s a nice point — that we have reasons for preferring theories due to epistemic virtues over and above how well they explain present data and predict new data. However, if we cannot tell some retrospective story about how the new theory is also better than the old theory at explaining and predicting, then it’s hard to see how there could be anything like scientific progress at all.

    The price of giving up on scientific realism is that we are deprived of being able to give an account of how the shift from classical mechanics to general relativity is different in kind from the shift from traditional composition to Impressionism in painting. The question then is, are those shifts different in kind? (I think they are.) Is it important to given account of that difference? (I think it is.) That’s why I am interested in a version of scientific realism that also acknowledges the criticisms of metaphysical realism and of scientific realism in particular.

    On the other hand, if I became convinced that Rorty is right and there is no interesting difference in kind between changes in scientific theories and changes in artistic techniques, then I’d (reluctantly) abandon scientific realism.

  37. Kantian Naturalist: Errr . . . it is true that scientists are continually devising new tests, and new ways of thinking about tests, and so forth, but that’s about, shall we say, the content of testing. My remark was about the form of testing — that we can’t be doing science unless we have some way of distinguishing between fitting model to data and fitting data to model, however we do so.

    Sorry, but I’m still having difficulty seeing that as a real distinction based on my understanding of scientific practice (and of course excluding solipsism).

    You say we need to presuppose that we can distinguish fitting the data to the model from fitting the model to the data to do science.

    But it seems to me that all real world science does both at the same time. It fits data to model by rejecting outliers from the analysis and by accepting statistical tests involving error/variance. Or it can fit the model to the data, eg using Bayesian conditioning.

    How much of each to do for any given case is often a contentious issue.

    As best I can see, you are arguing that we need to be able to distinguish one case from the other, that is changing the model from changing the data. That sounds to me like nothing more than science needs the ability to form concepts and apply them to the world. Which I would grant, with the proviso that it is not telling us anything about science in particular; rather it is simply saying that science as we know it is a human activity.

    Anyway, if we you want to take want more shot at it, I’d be happy to read your response. In any event, I will stop.

  38. Kantian Naturalist:

    Yes, I’m willing to dig on my heels on this one. As far as I can tell, multiverse theories are just a nice bit of metaphysical speculation inspired by some pretty mathematics, and not a genuinely scientific hypothesis. If there’s no physically possible measurement that could confirm the hypothesis, then it’s not scientific.(ID is not scientific for precisely the same reason.)

    Still, my point is there are scientists who think otherwise but still claim to be doing science. And philosophers who write books saying string theory is science* regardless of the dearth of empirical tests for it.

    Yet science continues regardless of the outcome of this discussion. So the role of testing is not an presupposition, but an open issue.

    ——————-
    From a review of this book:

    “At the frontiers of physics and cosmology theoretical speculation proceeds without the constant confrontation with experiment often thought to be required for scientific validation….

  39. The problem for philosophers is that science evolves.

    Which is to say that changes and progress are not the result of rational analysis. There are methods, but no Method. Progress is measured not by analysis but by utility and heuristic value.

    The key activity in science is imagination, the creation of stories. The difference between science and art is not so much in the way new ideas come into existence, but in the way they are selected.

  40. BruceS: As best I can see, you are arguing that we need to be able to distinguish one case from the other, that is changing the model from changing the data. That sounds to me like nothing more than science needs the ability to form concepts and apply them to the world. Which I would grant, with the proviso that it is not telling us anything about science in particular; rather it is simply saying that science as we know it is a human activity.

    That’s all correct — or at least, if not correct, then I agree with you and don’t see anything there I’d disagree with. My point really wasn’t about science per se, but rather about how objectivity is built into human thought generally. Or, as you say, “our ability to form concepts and apply them to the world”. For we cannot understand ourselves as applying concepts to the world if we cannot distinguish between the world and the concepts we apply to it! And that includes our ability to detect and correct previous applications.

    As for what makes science distinct, here I’d go with the point made by Ladyman and Ross (though this point is not original with them): scientific practice depends on institutions, including institutions of scientific training, which function (ideally) as iterated filters for mitigating individual and cultural biases.

    The main problem with their approach is that it fails to consider the fact that it only works in so far as the institutions are “well-ordered,” in Kitcher’s terms — that there is not a systematic subordination of the values of science to the values of government or capital. The more the values of scientific research are subordinated to the values of government or capital, the less confidence we are entitled to have that the iterated filters are functioning correctly.

  41. petrushka: The problem for philosophers is that science evolves.

    I don’t know why that’s a problem for philosophers — except in the innocent of “problem”, meaning that philosophers want to understand how science evolves.

    Which is to say that changes and progress are not the result of rational analysis.

    Yes, but I never said otherwise — I’m interested in whether scientific progress can be understood rationally, not whether rational analysis is causing progress.

    The difference between science and art is not so much in the way new ideas come into existence, but in the way they are selected.

    That’s definitely right, but the difference in how they are selected makes a really big difference!

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