KN
It’s central to the ideological glue that holds together “the ID movement” that the following are all conflated:Darwin’s theories; neo-Darwinism; modern evolutionary theory; Epicurean materialistic metaphysics; Enlightenment-inspired secularism. (Maybe I’m missing one or two pieces of the puzzle.) In my judgment, a mind incapable of making the requisite distinctions hardly deserves to be taken seriously.
I think your analysis of the driving force behind ID is way off base. That’s not to say that persons who advocate ID (including myself) aren’t sometimes guilty of sloppy use of language, nor am I making the claim that the modern synthetic theory of evolution is synonymous with materialism or secularism. Having made that acknowledgement, though, it is demonstrably true that
(1) metaphysical presuppostions absolutely undergird much of the modern synthetic theory. This is especially true with regard to methodological naturalism (of course, MN is distinct from ontological naturalism, but if, as some claim, science describes the whole of reality, then reality becomes coextensive with that which is natural). Methodological naturalism is not the end product of some experiment or series of experiments. On the contrary it is a ground rule that excludes a priori any explanation that might be classed as “non-natural”. Some would argue that it is necessary for practical reasons, after all we don’t want people atributing seasonal thunderstorms to Thor, do we? However, science could get along just as well as at present (even better in my view) if the ground rule is simply that any proposed causal explanation must be rigorously defined and that it shall not be accepted except in light of compelling evidence. Problem solved! Though some fear “supernatural explanation” (which is highly definitional) overwhelming the sciences, such concerns are frequently oversold. Interestingly, the much maligned Michael Behe makes very much the same point in his 1996 Darwin’s Black Box:
If my graduate student came into my office and said that the angel of death killed her bacterial culture, I would be disinclined to believe her…. Science has learned over the past half millenium that the universe operates with great regularity the great majority of the time, and that simple laws and predictable behavior explain most physical phenomena.
Darwin’s Black Box pg. 241
If Behe’s expression is representative of the ID community (which I would venture it is), then why the death-grip on methodological naturalism? I suggest that its power lies in its exclusionary function. It rules out ID right from the start, before even any discussions about the emprical data are to be had. MN means that ID is persona non grata, thus some sort of evolutionary explanation must win by default.
(2) In Darwin’s own arguments in favor of his theory he rely heavily on metaphysical assumptions about what God would or wouldn’t do. Effectively he uses special creation by a deity as his null hypothesis, casting his theory as the explanatory alternative. Thus the adversarial relationship between Darwin (whose ideas are foundational to the MST) and theism is baked right into The Origin. To this very day, “bad design” arguments in favor of evolution still employ theological reasoning.
(3) The modern synthetic theory is often used in the public debate as a prop for materialism (which I believe you acknowledged in another comment). How many times have we heard the famed Richard Dawkins quote to the effect that ‘Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist’? Very frequently evolutionary theory is impressed into service to show the superfluousness of theism or to explain away religion as an erstwhile useful phenomenon produced by natural selection (or something to that effect). Hardly can it be ignored that the most enthusiastic boosters of evolutionary theory tend to fall on the atheist/materialist/reductionist side of the spectrum (e.g. Eugenie Scott, Michael Shermer, P.Z. Meyers, Jerry Coyne, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Peter Atkins, Daniel Dennett, Will Provine). My point simply stated is that it is not at all wrong-headed to draw a connection between the modern synthetic theory and the aforementioned class of metaphysical views. Can it be said that the modern synthetic theory (am I allowed just to write Neo-Darwinism for short?) doesn’t mandate nontheistic metaphysics? Sure. But it’s just as true that they often accompany each other.
In chalking up ID to a massive attack of confused cognition, you overlook the substantive reasons why many (including a number of PhD scientists) consider ID to be a cogent explanation of many features of our universe (especially the bioshpere):
- Functionally-specified complex information present in cells in prodigdious quantities
- Sophisticated mechanical systems at both the micro and macro level in organisms (many of which exhibit IC)
- Fine-tuning of fundamental constants
- Patterns of stasis followed by abrupt appearance (geologically speaking) in the fossil record
In my opinion the presence of FSCI/O and complex biological machinery are very powerful indicators of intelligent agency, judging from our uniform and repeated experience. Also note that none of the above reasons employ theological presuppositions. They flow naturally, inexorably from the data. And, yes, we are all familiar with the objection that organisms are distinct from artificial objects, the implication being that our knowledge from the domain of man-made objects doesn’t carry over to biology. I think this is fallacious. Everyone acknowledges that matter inhabiting this universe is made up of atoms, which in turn are composed of still other particles. This is true of all matter, not just “natural” things, not just “artificial” things – everything. If such is the case, then must not the same laws apply to all matter with equal force? From whence comes the false dichotomy that between “natural” and “artificial”? If design can be discerned in one case, why not in the other?
To this point we have not even addressed the shortcomings of the modern synthetic theory (excepting only its metaphysical moorings). They are manifold, however – evidential shortcomings (e.g. lack of empirical support), unjustified extrapolations, question-begging assumptions, ad hoc rationalizations, tolerance of “just so” stories, narratives imposed on data instead of gleaned from data, conflict with empirical data from generations of human experience with breeding, etc. If at the end of the day you truly believe that all ID has going for it is a culture war mentality, then may I politely suggest that you haven’t been paying attention.
Yes, I disagree. Why? First, because I attribute positive meaning to the term ‘non-natural,’ whereas you seem not to attribute to it anything but negativity, i.e. something that doesn’t exist. It is something that *cannot* be tested in your view, instead of something that can. ‘Natural’ therefore appears to completely define the extent of your view of ‘reality,’ i.e. naturalism; there is nothing ‘non-natural’ that is ‘real’ and thus could be tested and explored.
Second, because there are multiple scientific methodologies, not just a single monolithic one as you suppose with your personal philosophy of science. Do I sense some stubbornness to admit multiple scientific methodologies? In the more mature and contemporary PoS, among the multiplicity of methodologies, ‘non-natural’ causation *is* measurable, testable, able to be investigated. But again, this depends if one even allows ‘non-natural’ as a legitimate category, which many ideological naturalists do not.
Nevertheless, Elizabeth, since I directly answered your question, will you now address mine: “there are multiple methods of ‘doing science,’ which are used depending on the object/subject of study. It should not be uncomfortable to agree with this. Do you agree, Elizabeth?”
Multiple methods: yes or no? Just say you currently believe there is *only* ONE single ‘scientific method’ and that will suffice as a ‘No’ answer.
So, do you confine your personal definition of *all legitimate sciences* to the ideology of ‘methodological naturalism’? That’s what I interpret so far from our words. As I said, I don’t think de Vries would go as far as you, if that is your view.
Likewise, if ‘art,’ ‘philosophy’ and even ‘theology’ deal *only* with what is ‘natural’ because the only thing considered ‘real’ is that which is ‘natural,’ then you aren’t really moving forward from ideological naturalism.
I would simply encourage you to pluralise, Lizzie; instead of ‘scientific methodology,’ write ‘scientific methodologies.’ Instead of ‘the scientific method,’ write ‘scientific methods.’ Once you do this, once you internalise the meaningful difference this makes, you will see how unnecessary it is to insist that ‘science = methodological naturalism.’ It may also lead to the recognition that ‘science’ can study ‘non-natural’ entities, *if* first you personally assent to their reality.
Yes, I agree. I don’t think IDists are consistent. They talk out whatever side of their mouth they want in any given situation. They annoy scientists, philosophers and theologians due to their well-documented duplicity and claims to ‘scientific revolution.’ They haven’t solved the problem of MN in a way that can help us move forward. But they have at least identified MN as ideologically problematic, which undoubtedly it is. The top pro-ID person who reveals the vacuity of MN as an ideology is Steve Fuller, who is also fluent in contemporary philosophy of science.
It’s unfortunate, Lizzie, that you haven’t read Feyerabend or Lakatos. Especially the former would help you to see how empty the claim of defending a ‘single monolithic THE scientific method’ is now in our current era. Below are some texts, one from Feyerabend, the other a review of his “Against Method.” Many scientists abhor Feyerabend without really understanding him. Methodological anarchism and ‘anything goes’ are not ‘relativistic’ and do not destroy science, but rather science should be understood as pluralistic, which allows it to responsibly flourish without permitting the pretensions to ‘scientism’ that many natural scientists in the 20th century attempted and which some people in science, philosophy, theology/worldview dialogue still display today. The bottom line shows that people need not accept either the tyranny of scientism or MN.
This may sting some pro-scientism skeptics here.
Review of Feyerabend
Feyerabend
For their part, most IDists haven’t read Feyerabend or Lakatos either, so they’re not really ahead of Lizzie. Most IDists stick with Kuhn and call ‘Big-ID’ a ‘scientific revolution.’ Of course, the joke’s on them as conservative revolutionaries.
If, as you said you agree, Lizzie, that “the limits of naturalism are intrinsic to natural scientific methods,” then the only way to understand/describe ‘non-natural’ objects/subjects scientifically or otherwise is to use alternative methods. First, however, it would help to recognise that such methods and fields exist.
Thanks for that. Obviously I disagree, along with other non-naturalists. If it is ‘for the life of you,’ then so be it.
We are still waiting to see OMagain’s answer: “Can you give an example of something that in your view is ‘non-natural’ that is nevertheless still ‘real’?”
Lizzie’s issue with Optimus is mainly about science (and knowledge) demarcation, but she hasn’t yet read important texts to prepare herself for the discussion. That is why she equates MN with ‘science’ and ‘scientists,’ even though that is unnecessary. Perhaps after acquainting herself with the relevant literature, she will reconsider her position.
The clearest demarcation occurs in what it takes to actually begin scientific research; namely write a competitive research proposal that outlines a research program that answers a question.
We were pointing this out on another thread just recently, using a classic example from ID/creationism.
The example challenge was to write a proposal outlining a research program that answers the question “Is HIV designed?”
So I would suggest that if a person wants to know if it is science, he should sit down and think through a research program that answers a particular question. If that person starts engaging in apologetics or making excuses, the question either doesn’t deal with science or that person doesn’t know what science is. “Philosophizing” is of little help here.
No, I do NOT regard the “non-natural” as “something that doesn’t exist”. If you are reading that into my words, I am not making myself clear. The only “negativity” I attribute to it is the attribute that means it cannot, by definition, by tested by the means normally used by people who call themselves scientists, namely predictive hypothesis testing. That’s why we call it “non-natural” – because it can’t be tested by natural scientific methodology. That’s not because scientists are prejudiced but because the methods that scientists use don’t work for non-natural phenomena. If they did – if scientists found, for instance, positive confirmation of the hypothesis that phenomenon X was caused by a ghost, then that ghost, would, by definition, become a natural phenomenon. Things whose existence can be revealed by predictive hypothesis testing are natural. Things that aren’t, aren’t. That doesn’t stop them existing.
It’s a perfectly legitimate category, but not one, I suggest, that can be detected by predictive hypothesis testing. If you have some other method, fine. And if you want to call it science, fine.
It depends entirely on how one defines science. There are certainly multiple methods of acquiring knowledge, and not all of them are predictive hypothesis testing.
I’m not going to get into a semantic argument about which methods come under the label “scientific”. What I am saying, as I’ve already said many times, is that the method usually regarded as “the scientific method” cannot, by definition, detect non-natural phenomena. But if you want to include some other methods in the umbrella label of “scientific”, that’s fine with me.
I don’t have a “personal definition of *all legitimate sciences*”. I think there are many “legitimate” (whatever that means) ways of acquiring knowledge, and not all of those are predictive hypothesis testing. Please read my words.
I didn’t say that theo nly “real” things were “natural” things. I said that we call things “natural” if they are the kind of thing that can be detected by predictive hypothesis testing. God could well be real. I believed so for 50 years. I never thought that God was detectable through predictive hypothesis testing. My knowedge of God was acquired through prayer.
No, it doesn’t. You are completely missing the point of what I have been trying to say. Let me say it one more time: I do not care what you want to label as “science”. You can label prayer as science if you want. I do not think that the boundary of the natural is necessarily the boundary of the real. All I am saying is that we define “natural” as “can be detected through predictive hypothesis testing. As is evidenced from widespread usage: “scientists cannot explain X; it must be supernatural; doctors were mystified by Y’s cure; it must have been a miracle”.
MN is certainly “vacuous as ideology”. It’s not supposed to be an ideology. It’s a methodology. So, clearly, it will be “ideologically problematic”. The solution is easy: don’t regard “methodological naturalism” as an ideology. Indeed that’s why people talk about “philosophical naturalism” – which usually refers to the philosophical position that the natural is coterminous with the real. I don’t take that philosophical position, and nor do lots of scientists (although some do, as do some non-scientists). We use methodological naturalism (better termed natural methodology) because it is an extremely useful tool for finding out extremely useful things. But it can’t tell you whether non-natural things exist, because the best it can do faced with a non-natural thing is to say “can’t explain that within our current model”.
But I’m not a “scientism-ist”. I’m just a scientist. You are tilting at windmills here, or at least at a straw woman that isn’t me. I don’t need to read Lakatos or Feyerabend, because I have no dog in that fight. If they, or you, want to include other methodologies under the banner of science, fine. And, if so, I will be careful to specify the methodology I am talking about when I refer to “science”, which will be predictive hypothesis testing.
But I’m glad we agree that methodological naturalism is not capable of detecting ID. Good. Perhaps you could tell the Discovery Institute 🙂
Yup. They need a different methodology.
I have never denied it!
No, it’s not because I haven’t read those texts. It’s just that I was defining science in the most usual way. As I have said, I have no dog in the labelling fight.
I’d be interested to know if there have to date been any discoveries – significant or otherwise – that owed their genesis in any part to the influence of Feyerabend or Lakatos – or Popper or Kuhn? Science that, in other words, was done differently thanks to the contributions of philosophers?
Allan Miller,
Where are your philosophical digital watches?
Can anyone in the ID movement give an example of something that is real and non-natural. Can anyone in the ID movement write a brief research proposal dealing with such an entity or phenomenon?
I didn’t think so.
Lizzie,
Perhaps someone can give an example of something that is non-natural and yet exists. Anyone?
Well, I don’t know that God doesn’t, and lots of people think God does. The God I used to think was real wasn’t natural (not testable using predictive hypothesis testing), and for good theological reasons, I thought that made sense. A God detectable using predictive hypothesis testing would be part of the natural world, not the ground of being itself.
In other words, I think IDists make God too small.
Lizzie,
That pretty much stretches the usefulness of the word real out of shape. Which god?
Can a solipsist design a research program that will answer the following question: “Can a solipsist commit suicide?”
‘Science’ means
That definition of ‘science’ is rather narrow. According to it, historical sciences are not ‘sciences’ because they do not make ‘predictions’ that they test on new data. Do you consider historical sciences as ‘sciences’?
Again, Lizzie, the main point I have been making is quite clear and simple. Usually you are quite flexible and willing to think things through and even reconsider your position when faced with contrary evidence or alternative perspectives that make sense and have the support of leading scholars (not IDists). For some reason, however, on this topic, most likely because you have not read the relevant literature to educate and enlighten yourself, it is like pulling teeth to get you to admit that *multiple sciences* and *multiple methods* puts the lie to definitions that say MN is exclusively what science does , i.e. what scientists do.
However, you did write: “There are certainly multiple methods of acquiring knowledge.”
Now will you go one step further and actually answer the directly stated question: There are multiple scientific methods: yes or no?
Unfortunately, Lizzie, you would fail a Philosophy of Science 100 course; there simply is no entity called “the scientific method.” There are multiple scientific methods. They still teach ‘the scientific method’ to grade school children, but natural scientists such as yourself should be held to a higher standard.
Accepting ‘widespread usage’ and ‘normally used by’ wrt defining ‘science’ in this case is to accept the lowest common denominator. Eventually, however, the trickle-down affect will take place, more science studies and philosophy of science knowledge will be diffused in society, in education and people will change their ‘normal, widespread usage’ to speak of multiple scientific methods. Why? Because to those who actually do research in science studies and philosophy of science, i.e. those who work on these things professionally, can easily show this to be the obvious reality of what ‘science’ is and what ‘scientists’ do.
Then please, stop beating around the bush: what is ‘non-natural’ that exists? So far you’ve mentioned ghosts and God and hinted at miracles.
So, you call something ‘non-natural’ based on the limits of natural scientific methodologies? Iow, once natural scientists admit they cannot study something, then that thing counts as ‘non-natural’? Is that your natural/non-natural demarcation criterion?
I suggest instead that we call something non-natural because it isn’t natural (and if we are brave or just clear with our talk of ‘identities,’ we use an alternative word that doesn’t begin with ‘non-’) and that we don’t require natural scientists to dictate this to us as post-modern pseudo-priests. The methods that non-natural scientists use work for non-natural phenomena. But if a person wants to believe that non-natural scientists are ghosts or a category error, then by fiat according to their ‘science demarcation game’ (which Lizzie claims not to be playing), non-natural scientists cannot be real.
‘Natural scientific methods’ or ‘methods of doing natural science’ are not ideologies; they are simply methods. But methodological naturalism *is* by definition an ideology; it is not just a method. Otherwise, there would be no significance to adding the –ism and involving method in the ideological conversation with ‘naturalism,’ i.e. the qualified term. You seem to recognise this as well, Lizzie, when you write that MN is “better termed natural methodology” (although that formulation raises difficulties too). That way, one can avoid the challenge of ‘naturalism’ as an ideology that deeply influences scientists, especially natural scientists.
To be fair, de Vries did not mean MNism as an ideology when he coined the term. But then again, de Vries is rather unqualified to speak about ideology, as far as I can tell, and likely wouldn’t even dare offer a definition of ideology in order to distinguish it when it becomes entangled with science. For de Vries, as for so many others in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, as if existentially spooked by Marx, talking about ‘ideology’ seems to be a highly daunting proposition, one not easily and only reluctantly embraced. Ideology is like a swear-word for many ‘western’ scholars!
The position that ‘science’ can *only* study nature, however, is an ideological position. It is an ideological position that privileges natural sciences over other sciences. You may reject “the philosophical position that the natural is coterminous with the real,” and I surely agree with you about that. Where we’re having trouble is that from my work in science studies and philosophy of science, I reject your definition of ‘science’ as outdated; i.e. that which can *only* study nature.
Again, to concede the point: natural science studies natural things; it does not study non-natural things. However, other sciences study non-natural things.
To be fair, many IDists are ‘scientism-ists’ (as you call them), but outright deny that to be true. As it seems, you are not ‘just a scientist,’ but a particular kind of scientist, i.e. a ‘natural scientist.’ That distinction is relevant to this conversation, Elizabeth, because otherwise academic imperialism and attempting to monopolize a single meaning of ‘science’ is what natural scientists often try to do. You appear to be perpetrating this view also, but the door is open to simply admit multiple methods and multiple sciences (including sciences of the non-natural). Will you go through this door?
What’s ‘most usual’ for you is evidently the ‘old way,’ which has now given way to discoveries by scholars in science studies and philosophy of science. If you truly have no dog in the labelling ‘fight,’ i.e. if you don’t care what labels mean, then my insistence that there are multiple scientific methods, multiple sciences, and that contending that MN cannot rightfully stand in as a monolithic definition of ‘science,’ shouldn’t be that hard for you to accept.
Yes, a naturalised God isn’t much of a ‘god’ at all; neither is a created God. The uncreated God does not fit into the category ‘natural.’ Some people choose, however, on the Easter celebrations to naturalise the man who came down from the cross. Dostoevsky was amazed and deeply moved by Holbein’s painting here and considered the resurrection the pivot on which Christian faith or unbelief rests: How can that ‘natural’ dead body be also living ‘divine’?
In Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, the character Ippolit speaks of Holbein’s painting:
Yes, I tend to agree that is what their ‘theory’ does, albeit without directly referencing God. So, how big (enough) do you make God, Elizabeth, as a non- or anti-IDist?
Well, big enough to be not a denizen of the universe, nor an intermittent tinkerer with it, but rather the ground of its being.
But Gregory, I’m no longer a theist (or not any any sense that you would probably recognise, notwithstanding that I am listening to Bach’s St John Passion, and being as deeply moved by it as ever, this Easter Sunday). But when I was a theist, the God I believed in was the one I characterize above. I honestly believed that God was real, and that religions and their scriptures were the history of mankind’s fallible search to find out just who and what God really is.
Is not tiktaalik a phenomenon predicted by a historical science? How about the sequence leading to the inner ear bones?
Gregory, you ask:
No, because my answer would depend entirely on what definition of “scientific” is meant. And, as I keep saying, I don’t have an axe to grind over what definition is correct. It’s changed over the centuries anyway.
I’m not sure why you are so hung up on whether I call only methodology X “scientific” or whether I call methods X, Y and Z,” scientific”. I’ve never insisted on one definition of science. My entire point is that the method usually called “the scientific method”, namely predictive hypothesis testing, isn’t any use for acquiring knowledge of non-natural events. But mathematics, philosophy, logic, or subjective introspection may be. I don’t mind which of those, or which others, you want to call science.
Beats the hell outta me. My own position is that the term ‘non-natural’ is more-or-less synonymous with “this thing doesn’t even exist,” so from where I sit, your question is about as incoherent as “who is a married bachelor?” or “what are the properties of a four-sided triangle?” If you think there is at least one ‘non-natural’ entity of whatever sort which does exist, how about you answer your question?
“what are the properties of a four-sided triangle?”
One property is that two of the sides are congruent and coincident. 😛
I must confess that I cannot grasp much of this discussion since I do not know what the term “non-natural” means or what could even be classified as non-natural. Could someone provide a definition of “natural” and “non-natural” and an example of something non-natural? Thanks!
To be natural, a phenomenon has to produce a measurable effect in some kind of existing “sensor” that makes use of – directly or indirectly – one of the four “forces” in the universe.
It’s presence has to produce a gravitational effect, or an electromagnetic effect because we are made up of what is called baryonic matter. We – and the stuff we make – respond to those forces.
Effects due to the strong force and the weak interactions show up indirectly in the particles they produce that interact with baryonic matter.
If you try to ask how something like “information” pushes atoms and molecules around, you are already asking for a phenomenon that competes with electromagnetism and gravity. At the level of atoms and molecules, this should be easily detectable; but it is not detected.
There was a time way back in history when radio and television would have been considered “supernatural.”
The hope held out by the ID/creationists is that someday their “supernatural” being will be detectable. If that happens, it will have to couple to the electromagnetic force and show up in the way it pushes electrons around in the nervous systems of “deity detectors.” Furthermore, the “signal” will have to be objectively agreed. But then it will be natural.
So far, all self-proclaimed deity detectors have produced thousands of mutually conflicting results; so we don’t know what to believe.
Just as a follow-up, some years ago I described a set of design criteria for a deity detector.
I’ll repeat them here.
I should note that other “phenomena” – such as ghosts and poltergeist – need some kind of detector. The detector will have to couple to baryonic matter either through gravitational effects or electromagnetic effects.
To separate the “experiences” of supernatural phenomena that some people purport to have from the natural phenomena that take place within their nervous systems, sensors of some sort will have to be able to discriminate between the effects produced by natural causes and those produced by supernatural causes.
So far, nobody knows how to do that; and it doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. If it were possible, then how do we distinguish between the supernatural and the natural?
Mike Elzinga,
It should be possible to produce the much simpler smoke detector to determine when ID proponents are blowing smoke. Yet even this seems beyond current technology, due to theoretical limitations. Our theory currently is incapable of distinguishing assertions of the nonexistent from assertions of the merely indetectable.
Thanks Mike! I kind of figured that something “natural” was something either detectable through it’s interaction with the four forces of nature, or more loosely something that was subject to those laws.
What I can’t fathom is what a non-natural object would be. How could we even describe such a thing or know anything about it?
Robin,
There seems to be a complete inability of ID advocates to provide a specific example of a thing or phenomenon that is non-natural and yet real. Why is this?
Well, I can do it, but that is because I have a clear definition of “natural” – that which can be detected by predictive hypothesis testing.
There could be real things that can’t be detected by predictive hypothesis testing, for example a creator god who created a universe in which ran according to a set of discoverable laws. Even one who occasionally over-rode those laws, but in as rare one-offs. Or one who selected the starting parameters for the universe in such a way that the creator’s desired outcomes would eventuate.
So it is philosophically possible for something to be real but have no regular physical attributes, nothing that could be detected by any possible instrument, and no behavior that could be described as regular or predictable,
The behavior of the hypothetical entity sounds like miracles, and I suppose the Catholic Church has made a “science” of validating miracles. Pretty much along the lines of Dembski’s Filter.
Of course the filter is rubbish, because it depends on ignorance.
I still don’t understand Lizzie. If a thing can’t be detected by predictive hypothesis testing, how could anyone even consider its existence?
Are you suggesting that an Invisible Pink Unicorn is a non-natural thing? Seems to me that most rational people accept that at some point, absence of evidence relegates some concepts to a realm of dismissal for lack of any practical impact.
Now let’s not let the designer out of the bag…
😉
But seriously, I don’t get where the concept can make sense to anyone unless we are merely discussing imaginary hypotheticals.
This reminds me of a a discussion I had a long time ago with a creationist. He was basically trying to argue one of Greg Bahnsen/WCL apologetic points that without God as a premise, we have no way of actually knowing anything. He kept insisting that my worldview was clearly fabricated and false because as a materialist, everything I thought I knew could be an illusion and this thing I call “reality” might be something else entirely. I kept asking him to describe to me what characteristics in this hypothetical illusion were different from the supposed “real” reality, but he just could not grasp the significance of the question. He kept repeating that the illusion might be so perfect that it exhibited every possible feature of reality, to which I kept responding, “then why would I care whether it’s an illusion or not?” He seemed to think that the idea of living in an illusion was inherently devastating, and I kept noting that if one could not tell the difference, it would be “reality” for all intents and purposes.
That’s exactly how I see this whole “non-natural” concept. To me, if such an object is in any way detectable at all, then as far as I’m concerned, such an object would be indistinguishable from “natural”.
If, otoh, such an object could never be detected, then I can’t quite fathom why it would not be categorically “imaginary”.
Robin,
I forget the relevant verses, but isn’t that standard Christian theology?
http://www.web-church.com/articles-christian/spiritual-reality-illusion.htm
Well, that might be a mystery, Robin, but plenty of people have. After all, it’s not obvious that the question “why is there anything rather than nothing?” doesn’t have an answer. And if there is an answer, the answer must be a real thing that cannot be demonstrated to exist by means of predictive hypothesis testing.
Also, people experience stuff that seems pretty real. Perhaps it is.
I’m not terribly interested in individual experience except as the subject of art and entertainment. I suppose we could add consciousness to the list of real things that can’t be replicated or modeled, but it can be studied. We just lack the means to observe it in great detail.
But many problems are difficult to model or study. Come back in 400 years and ask if consciousness is beyond replication and modelling.
Consciousness belongs to the broad class of evolutionary phenomena, and we may never be able to predict the direction of consciousness, just as we cannot predict the direction of biological evolution.
Both are steered by complex feedback loops, and we cannot catalog everything that is going on. Even if we could, we cannot anticipate all the possible emergent phenomena.
Yes it is. I just don’t know why he thought it would be devastating to me.
I find this to be philosophical question begging. But, ok, I’ll go along for the sake of an argument. Does this conclusion predicate a non-natural explanation? I certainly don’t think so. If anything, it strikes me as not unlike the initial reasons for conceptualizing black holes; the math worked. In essence, I see the answer to the question, “why is there something rather than nothing” as hypothetical until it’s not, in which case it would then be natural. I don’t see the fuzzy grey area in between as “non-natural” as adding anything meaningful to the concept or discussion.
First, a quick wave to everyone who may remember me. I know my participation is intermittent at best (working towards a PhD in biology has the tendency to be all-consuming), so I hope that my vacillations between popping up for a while and going back into lurker mode is not too annoying to anyone…
Now to the current discussion:
My take on this is in line with Robin’s. The concept of a “non-natural” answer does not seem to allow for a distinction between a “real thing”/”something” and “imaginary thing”/”nothing”. At least not in any meaningful way I can think of.
Thus a question for Lizzie: why do you think that if there is an answer, that it cannot be demonstrated by means of predictive hypothesis testing?
Yes, and the key is ‘scientifically detectable.’ They want to ‘detect’ the so-called ‘effects of intelligence/Intelligence’ using natural scientific methods. They (think they) don’t have any other option than to speak of ‘supernatural’ because according to them, i.e. in the approach of P. Johnson who founded the IDM, they are against naturalism (not just PN, but also MN…sometimes :-).
That is not the approach I take and it seems to me they (IDists) have willfully backed themselves into a corner that cannot be escaped from with the persons they currently have on their Big-ID roster. Their ideology is both necessarily narrow scientistically (i.e. ID *in* natural science) and unusually broad religiously (read: implicationistically). The ‘intelligence/Intelligence’ they seek to explain must be natural scientifically detectable to count as IDM-ID theory, which is why they argue from effects to causes, and from non-human intelligence (leap over gap or poof) to human minds.
A different problem of skeptics, however, is elevating the term ‘natural’ way out of proportion to reality. Indeed, some people simply equate ‘natural’ with ‘real,’ as we have seen here in this thread. This move allows the terms ‘natural’ and ‘nature’ to be grossly exaggerated, thus making it almost impossible for certain people, i.e. naturalists, to recognise *anything* that is non-natural. I’ve even heard people insist that ‘technology’ is natural, even if it mechanical. But technology certainly is not ‘organic;’ plant a seed and a SUV appears, given enough ‘evolutionary’ time!
Yes, that’s a decent definition. Personally, I wouldn’t include in my definition the ‘four forces,’ but would speak more anthropically (that can be defined another time or elsewhere, just to say that cosmologists and physics hold no monopoly over the term). Nevertheless, the use of ‘sensors’ makes sense to me as a human being.
Lizzie has not stepped up to the plate with wisdom about the most current meanings ‘science’ (which we use as a tool/process to ‘measure’ things). Indeed, she has directly avoided it: “I don’t have an axe to grind over what definition [of science] is correct.” This allows her to slip away from her over-the-top claims about methodological naturalism, even to the point of denying its ideological features.
‘It’s just a method, THE method;’ that’s Lizzie’s grand view of science (by which she actually means specifically ‘natural science,’ i.e. science limited to studying *only* nature) in a nutshell.
She repeats her matra, “the method usually called “the scientific method”, namely predictive hypothesis testing,” but I’ve already explained to her and provided links showing that her myth of ‘the scientific method’ should not be taken seriously. Prediction is surely one feature (among many) of some sciences, but it is likewise not the only criterion on which scientificity is defined.
Lizzie wrote:
When believing that “God is real,” one doesn’t need to be a comparative religions scholar. One just needs to believe what the religion one professes says and ‘knows’ in its fallible search for God. The naturalisation of God, as I mentioned above, can be one explanation for why a person who once believed “God was real” would change their mind and heart and lose faith.
Going back to the beginning of this thread, Lizzie asked:
Yes, offer a positive alternative concept/percept to ‘natural’ and give it a name. The only name I’ve seen offered here so far is ‘supernatural.’ Does anyone here have anything else to propose, i.e. something that is ‘non-natural’ but not ‘supernatural’?
I wrote: “natural science is a limited endeavour, i.e. limited to the natural world.
Lizzie answered: “Sure. That would do.”
Thus, once one considers that sciences can study more or other than what is *only* ‘natural’ the discussion can take a new turn.
There are many questions left unanswered by Lizzie here, so I guess that’s about as far as we can go now.
Adios,
Gregory
Gregory,
It’s still unclear to me if anyone is proposing, or has proposed, a viable method for investigating that which (for the sake of discussion) is commonly called “supernatural”.
Nor do I see why it is that if a supernatural force/entity (let’s call it a god) interacts with the nuts and bolts, forces and energies of the natural world, we cannot detect that interaction distinct from the nuts, bolts etc. interacting all by themselves.
Plus I think that a god worth the worshipping, or even belief, must interact with the natural (detectable and measurable by ordinary science) world.
Merely asserting that there is a supernatural (or whatever word is used) and that it should be studied does not seem to get us very far forward. I’m sure there are many highly intelligent and able people who would be only too delighted to study the supernatural if only they knew how.
It doesn’t seem that anyone is proposing that here. Most ‘skeptics’ do not believe in the ‘supernatural,’ do they?
Do you likewise notice how nobody here is answering my questions? G.E.M., KF, is an attractive ‘opponent’ at TSZ because he is quite obviously ‘No Contest.’
“Do you have a suggestion for how one would investigate non-natural causation? Other than failing to find a natural cause?” – Lizzie
Yes, offer a positive alternative concept/percept to ‘natural’ and give it a name. The only name I’ve seen offered here so far is ‘supernatural.’ Does anyone here have anything else to propose, i.e. something that is ‘non-natural’ but not ‘supernatural’?
It should not be too difficult to see how MN = ‘science’ is a useful fiction for primitive philosophy of science and science studies once one faces the proposition that there are more living alternatives to ‘natural’ than just ‘supernatural.’
I find this game rather boring. If you have a point to make, please make it.
Some folks want to distinguish artifacts from natural, but within the scientific method, artifacts are a subset of the natural world.
I would expect not, because most skeptical people tend to require testable evidence. But if by “skeptical” you mean (and I do) – don’t trust everything you read, check things out for yourself, well not necessarily. I hope I have always been a skeptic. I have certainly not always been a non-believer in the supernatural.
No, I’m not noticing that, Gregory. I’ve been trying to answer your questions for some time, but you keep saying I haven’t! And no, KF is not an “attractive ‘opponent’ – I started that thread because he specifically called out this site, and me as blog owner, in a place where I do not (ironically) have right of reply. So I loud-hailed him from here.
. No – I wasn’t distinguishing the two concepts – are you?
I don’t see anyone here insisting on that equivalence, although it follows common usage in the 20th century. But tell me what alternatives to “Natural” there are, other than “super” or “non” natural. I’m lost.
May I add my plea to Lizzie’s?
“But tell me what alternatives to “Natural” there are, other than “super” or “non” natural”.
I’m lost, too.
Artificial?
All ‘science’ has to be capable of is investigation which can be independently verified, or working that can be independently assessed. The set of ‘real’ phenomena [A] wholly contains the set of phenomena that have a sufficient regularity to enable that investigation [B]. There are various subdivisions of A that may or may not intersect with B: different definitions of ‘natural’ may encompass all of A or form another subset C, which may or may not intersect with B.
It’s just semantic argumentation. The bottom line is, in order to be in B, one has to be able to interact with the phenomenon in some way, and so does someone else.
*Waves at Madbat*
Good to see you around again! Good luck on the PhD!
Time passes and we have no examples of something that is real but not natural.
Well, I gave one: “hypothetical”. Scientists in theoretical fields actually use that term. However, in using that term to define something as-yet-undetected to explain a given phenomenon, there is – at least in most cases – the assumption that the hypothetical will either be imaginary (false) or natural (true).
This does require an actual phenomenon one wishes to explain however, something a few of the folks from your links don’t seem to find necessary. That lead to my questioning the concept; it seems to me that some of your link authors think that opinions and stories are sufficient for methodological inquiry and I can’t imagine why one would wish to engage in such structured analysis for something so unstructured. It reminds me of an old saying:
“Talking about music is like dancing about architecture”
It’s not that it can’t be done, but I just don’t see the point.
Gregory, I haven’t answered your questions because I can’t see that there’s any “there” there. If someone has doubts that “red” is a quality that is associated with real objects in the RealWorld, I can point them to a number of things, including ripe cherries; metal that’s been heated to a particular temperature; the car I drive; some of the shirts I own; etc etc. And assuming they’ve got more-or-less normal vision, they can look at the things I point them to, and they can see for themselves that those real things possess the quality of “red”.
As it happens, I very much doubt that this “non-natural” (or “super-natural” or whatever you want to call it) schtick of yours is a quality that is associated with real objects in the RealWorld. What can you point me to as a concrete instance of a real thing which possesses the quality of “non-natural”) or whatever you want to call it)?
Ah. Perhaps that’s what he’s getting at. In which case, MN can find those things.
Things may possess qualities that we perceive as red, but it is not possible to predict all things that may induce the perception of red. It can be induced, for example, by a certain flicker rate of non red monochromatic light.
There is, of course, spectral red, which is a fairly broad band, but objective.
I have seen attempts at UD to define ID science as the detection of artifacts.
The SETI example doesn’t help them because there have been dozens of surprising signals that turned out to have natural or local sources. In all cases where we are confident that an object or phenomenon is an artifact, it is because we can compare it to known manufactured objects or to phenomena having known causes.
Yes. That’s usually the response when anyone suggests that ID might be about God.
But we already have good design detection methods, whereas the methods proposed by ID proponents don’t work.