Naturalism & the Laws of Nature.

Theoretical physicist Paul Davies wrote:

But what are these ultimate laws and where do they come from? Such questions are often dismissed as being pointless or even unscientific. As the cosmologist Sean Carroll has written, “There is a chain of explanations concerning things that happen in the universe, which ultimately reaches to the fundamental laws of nature and stops… at the end of the day the laws are what they are… And that’s okay. I’m happy to take the universe just as we find it.”

Assuming that Davies is correct, I find it odd that there is little interest for understanding the laws of nature. There are some interesting questions to be answered, such as: Where do the laws come from? How do they cause things to happen?

Physicist Neil Turok once posed the question:

What is it that makes the electrons continue to follow the laws?

Indeed, what power compels physical objects to follow the laws of nature?

The question I would like to focus on is: what would a naturalistic explanation of the laws of nature look like?

Frankly, I don’t know where to start. What I do know is that a bottom-up explanation runs into a serious problem. A bottom-up explanation, from the level of say bosons, should be expected to give rise to innumerable different ever-changing laws. Different circumstances, different laws.

But this is not what we find. Again, Paul Davies:

Physical processes, however violent or complex, are thought to have absolutely no effect on the laws. There is thus a curious asymmetry: physical processes depend on laws but the laws do not depend on physical processes. Although this statement cannot be proved, it is widely accepted.

If laws do not depend on physical processes, then it follows that laws cannot be explained by physical processes. IOWs there is no bottom-up explanation for the laws of nature.

But what does it mean for naturalism if there is no bottom-up (naturalistic) explanation for the laws of nature? How does the central claim ‘everything is physical’ make sense if there is no physical explanation for the laws of nature? What if it is shown that the laws of nature control the physical but are not reducible to it?

 

 

 

364 thoughts on “Naturalism & the Laws of Nature.

  1. Origenes,

    Put another way: if the moon produces a cosmological constant, and the earth produces a cosmological constant, and the sun, and Jupiter, and so forth, then it cannot be the case that we arrive at one single immutable universal cosmological constant. That’s what I mean when I say that “a universal cannot be caused by local matters of particular fact”.

    The cosmological constant represents the energy density of the vacuum. It isn’t associated with objects like the earth, sun, and Jupiter.

    And in case you’re tempted to argue that different volumes of space should have different vacuum energies under naturalism, the same question arises as before: Why on earth would you expect that?

    What is it about naturalism that demands a non-uniform vacuum energy density? Nothing. That would be just another weird, unsupported Origeneal assumption.

    “Origenes is confused, therefore naturalism is false” is not a persuasive argument.

  2. Origenes,

    (C) Each of those conglomerations is to be expected to produce its unique value.

    You’ve said this again and again, but you’ve never answered my question: Why do you expect each of those ‘conglomerations’ to produce a unique value under naturalism?

    Note: Repeating your assertion ten more times will not answer the question. I’m asking “Why do you believe this?”, not “What do you believe?”

  3. keiths: Why do you expect each of those ‘conglomerations’ to produce a unique value under naturalism?

    Because I assume there to be a relationship between cause and effect.

  4. keiths:

    But you are the source of that incoherence, because you are the one insisting that different ‘conglomerations’ should produce different ‘constants’. Knowledgeable folks understand that constants are in fact constant, so unlike you, they wouldn’t expect to get different values for different conglomerations…

    Why do you expect each of those ‘conglomerations’ to produce a unique value under naturalism?

    Origenes:

    Because I assume there to be a relationship between cause and effect.

    “A relationship between cause and effect” does not imply that different conglomerations must produce different values. Do you seriously think that if naturalism is true, we should measure a different value for the density of lead if we use a one-pound sample versus a ten-pound sample?

  5. Looks like Origenes has given up on defending his thesis.

    It’s just as well. Things were going pretty badly for him.

  6. keiths

    Keiths: “A relationship between cause and effect” does not imply that different conglomerations must produce different values.

    Well, assuming that those conglomerations are the cause of values, then that is exactly what is implied.

    Keiths:Do you seriously think that if naturalism is true, we should measure a different value for the density of lead if we use a one-pound sample versus a ten-pound sample?

    Assuming that the size of a leaden object has no impact on its density, you are not discussing the cause of lead density. So it is a bad comparison.
    To remind you, we were discussing the alleged physical causes of laws and fundamental constants. My simple claim is that if a physical object X causes a certain gravitational value, then I expect a physical object Y (when X is not Y) to cause another gravitational value.
    This must be true unless a gravitational value is caused by something which is equally present in object X and Y.

  7. keiths:

    “A relationship between cause and effect” does not imply that different conglomerations must produce different values.

    Origenes:

    Well, assuming that those conglomerations are the cause of values, then that is exactly what is implied.

    Why make that silly assumption? Your bowling ball is not the cause of the universal gravitational constant.

    keiths:

    Do you seriously think that if naturalism is true, we should measure a different value for the density of lead if we use a one-pound sample versus a ten-pound sample?

    Origenes:

    Assuming that the size of a leaden object has no impact on its density, you are not discussing the cause of lead density. So it is a bad comparison.

    Guess what? The size or nature of a ‘conglomeration’ has no impact on the gravitational constant, which after all is a constant, meaning that it is a constant — it does not vary. It’s a constant, in other words.

    You are assuming, for no discernible reason, that different ‘conglomerations’ of matter should produce different gravitational non-constants. Furthermore, you are assuming that the gravitational non-constant should vary linearly with the number of bosons:

    If 24 bosons -> C, then 10000 bosons -> 10000/24 x C

    These assumptions are, to put it gently, completely wrong.

    My simple claim is that if a physical object X causes a certain gravitational value, then I expect a physical object Y (when X is not Y) to cause another gravitational value.
    This must be true unless a gravitational value is caused by something which is equally present in object X and Y.

    Some questions for you (all assuming Newtonian mechanics):

    1. Have you ever taken a physics class?

    2. Do you know the difference between a gravitational force and the gravitational constant?

    3. Are you aware that gravitational forces can vary, but that the gravitational constant does not, because it is, in fact, a constant?

    4. Have you heard of a property called ‘mass’, and are you aware that two dissimilar objects can possess the same quantity of mass?

    5. Are you aware that an object placed in a gravitational field will experience a force that depends on its mass? That different masses will experience different gravitational forces, but that the gravitational constant nevertheless remains fixed?

  8. Why make that silly assumption? Your bowling ball is not the cause of the universal gravitational constant.

    Okay, I guess we are in agreement then: the universal gravitational constant has no bottom-up explanation from the level of physical objects. Thank you for supporting my argument.

    Guess what? The size or nature of a ‘conglomeration’ has no impact on the gravitational constant, which after all is a constant, meaning that it is a constant — it does not vary. It’s a constant, in other words.

    Okay, I guess we are in agreement then: the universal gravitational constant has no bottom-up explanation from the level of physical objects. Thank you for supporting my argument.

    You are assuming, for no discernible reason, that different ‘conglomerations’ of matter should produce different gravitational non-constants.

    I have been discussing the possibility of a bottom-up explanation of laws and fundamental constants from the level of physical objects. First I assume that conglomerations of matter produce laws and fundamental constants, and then I go on to show why this cannot work. Why is it that I have to explain my straightforward line of reasoning again and again?

    Furthermore, you are assuming that the gravitational non-constant should vary linearly with the number of bosons.

    Is just a simple example, which should be clear enough for any reasonable person. Don’t act like my argument depends on it. All I am saying is:

    If A is the cause of 23Y, and A is not B, then B must cause something else than 23Y.

    Or ‘different causes have different effects’.

  9. I’m not sure I understand the question “Where do the laws come from?” and “How do they cause things to happen?”

    For all I know, laws don’t have causal power, they are just descriptions of reality.

    As for “Where do the laws come from?”, well, I would say they come from us, and they are what they are based on how the universe works.

    Origenes, you seem to be pulling the good old “you need something else to explain why things are the way they are, something I call God and God stops the regress because I won’t allow questions about why God is the way He is”

    If that’s the case, you are just imagining a problem and then positing a solution that only pushes it one step further. Rejecting that the proposed explanation also requires explaining is just special pleading.

  10. Origenes,

    Origenes, your criticism of “materialism” rests on some serious errors.

    The most serious error is that you seem to have taken Rosenberg’s The Atheist’s Guide to Reality as authoritative about what materialism/naturalism/atheism really is. It seems not to have occurred to you that Rosenberg’s take is but one of many, and in no way authoritative for what other self-described naturalists think.

    As a corollary, the errors in that book — and there are many! — do not rebound onto atheism as a whole.

    In fact I consider Rosenberg’s view to be completely mistaken, not just in details but in basic conception. Yet I still think that naturalism is an intellectually defensible position. More specifically, I think that Rosenberg’s mistake is that he thinks he knows physics, and he actually doesn’t. His background is in population genetics, and that has ill-equipped him to delve into the metaphysical background of fundamental physics. A contrast of Rosenberg with Ladyman and Ross’s Every Thing Must Go indicates that Rosenberg’s work is a textbook-example of how not to go about metaphysical naturalism!

    And that’s even taking into account that Atheist’s Guide to Reality is intended as a popularization of established science and not an academic treatise.

    If you’re interested in a philosophical defense of naturalism that’s actually good, I recommend Dennett’s new From Bacteria to Bach and Back.

  11. dazz,

    I agree that Origines is assuming a very demanding metaphysical realism about laws of physics, and that seems out of step with what physicists are actually doing.

    However, I don’t think Origenes is wrong in appealing to the principle of sufficient reason here.

    For a long time I was less than enamored with the PSR. I thought (and some extent still do) that once you’ve accepted the PSR, proving that God (or something like God) exists is a relatively trivial exercise. But recently I’ve been writing about a somewhat obscure book in contemporary metaphysics, After Finitude by Quentin Meillassoux (review here). A central plank of Meillassoux’s account is his rejection of the principle of sufficient reason. In doing so, there are serious problems as to whether he can allow for any explanations at all in his ontology.

    For those of us who like explanations of phenomena, and think that science is in the explanation business, we’re going to need something like the principle of sufficient reason.

  12. Kantian Naturalist: once you’ve accepted the PSR, proving that God (or something like God) exists is a relatively trivial exercise

    Is this the argument that if every contingent entity must have an explanation by virtue of the PSR, and the set of all contingent entities is also contingent, then it also must have an explanation that is not contingent (but necessary instead)?

  13. dazz: Is this the argument that if every contingent entity must have an explanation by virtue of the PSR, and the set of all contingent entities is also contingent, then it also musthave an explanation that is not contingent (but necessary instead)?

    Pretty much, yes. The principle of sufficient reason says that there must be a reason for any fact, if the fact is a contingent fact. So if the existence of the physical universe is a contingent fact, then there must be a reason for it. And unless there’s an infinite regress of explanations, then there must be something that exists necessarily.

    But I myself cannot see any reason why that necessarily existing entity must be identified with the God of Abrahamic religions.

  14. Kantian Naturalist: Pretty much, yes. The principle of sufficient reason says that there must be a reason for any fact, if the fact is a contingent fact. So if the existence of the physical universe is a contingent fact, then there must be a reason for it. And unless there’s an infinite regress of explanations, then there must be something that exists necessarily.

    But I myself cannot see any reason why that necessarily existing entity must be identified with the God of Abrahamic religions.

    Thanks KN. I remember reading long ago at stanford.edu that the set of all contingent things must also be contingent, was it an answer to Russell’s attack on the CA? (the fallacy of composition thing). Can’t remember, will look it up now.

  15. dazz: Thanks KN. I remember reading long ago at stanford.edu that the set of all contingent things must also be contingent, was it an answer to Russell’s attack on the CA? (the fallacy of composition thing). Can’t remember, will look it up now.

    I think that there’s a worry to be had about whether there’s such a thing as “the largest set” or “the set of all possible things,” given Cantor’s work on transfinites. But I also think there are worries to be had about whether mathematics is a reliable guide to doing metaphysics!

  16. But meanwhile, and going back to origenes’ argument, why assume the laws of nature must be contingent? Couldn’t they “just be” as Paul Davies suggests? Are the laws of nature part of the universe or are they ontologically prior to it?

    OK, I know that’s not really origenes’ argument, but anyway

  17. Origenes,

    You’ve conspicuously avoided my questions. The first two, in particular, seem more and more relevant:

    Some questions for you (all assuming Newtonian mechanics):

    1. Have you ever taken a physics class?

    2. Do you know the difference between a gravitational force and the gravitational constant?

    3. Are you aware that gravitational forces can vary, but that the gravitational constant does not, because it is, in fact, a constant?

    4. Have you heard of a property called ‘mass’, and are you aware that two dissimilar objects can possess the same quantity of mass?

    5. Are you aware that an object placed in a gravitational field will experience a force that depends on its mass? That different masses will experience different gravitational forces, but that the gravitational constant nevertheless remains fixed?

  18. Origenes,

    If A is the cause of 23Y, and A is not B, then B must cause something else than 23Y.

    Or ‘different causes have different effects’.

    Seriously? You can’t conceive of two dissimilar causes having the same effect?

    A reductio of your argument:

    A kilogram of kumquats produces the same reading on a digital scale as a kilogram of kapok. Kumquats and kapok are dissimilar. Therefore naturalism is false.”

  19. Kantian Naturalist: I think that there’s a worry to be had about whether there’s such a thing as “the largest set” or “the set of all possible things,” given Cantor’s work on transfinites. But I also think there are worries to be had about whether mathematics is a reliable guide to doing metaphysics!

    I think mathematics is a reliable guide doing metaphysics, as long as one keeps paying attention to natures of things. Nominalists tend to treat every object under mathematical speculation as the same kind of object, but they are not.

    For example, problems pertaining to a “set of all contingent things” are problems pertaining to sets, not to contingent things. Sets may be contingent, but they are not things. An empty set is clearly not a thing or an object that you can take and put into another set the way some mathematicians would like to.

    Just like you cannot divide by zero, you also cannot take an empty set and do stuff with it. This is a lesson both in mathematics and in metaphysics.

  20. keiths: Seriously? You can’t conceive of two dissimilar causes having the same effect?

    Causality cannot be random. If it is, it’s not causality.

    keiths: A kilogram of kumquats produces the same reading on a digital scale as a kilogram of kapok. Kumquats and kapok are dissimilar. Therefore naturalism is false.”

    In the empirical world, there are multiple causes to any single effect. Saying that it’s a kumquat or a kapok that produces a reading on the scale is not an exhaustive description of the event. There may be a kilogram of kumquats (or kapoks as you wish), but unless someone puts them on the scale, there will be no reading on the scale.

    Multiple causes. The description must be exhaustive in order to be properly explanatory.

  21. Erik: Sets may be contingent, but they are not things. An empty set is clearly not a thing or an object that you can take and put into another set the way some mathematicians would like to.

    Just like you cannot divide by zero, you also cannot take an empty set and do stuff with it. This is a lesson both in mathematics and in metaphysics.

    I don’t think that’s right. You can’t weigh the empty set on a scale or use it in a marinade, but you can perform formal operations on sets, including the empty set. If there are sub-sets, then sets can contain sets. And so sets can contain the empty set as well. The whole point of Principia Mathematica is to show how to derive all of mathematics from set theory.

    Whether that has consequences for metaphysics is a different question!

  22. keiths, to Origenes:

    Seriously? You can’t conceive of two dissimilar causes having the same effect?

    Erik:

    Causality cannot be random. If it is, it’s not causality.

    Kumquats and kapok produce the same scale reading, therefore causality is random? Does Not Follow.

  23. Erik: Just like you cannot divide by zero, you also cannot take an empty set and do stuff with it. This is a lesson both in mathematics and in metaphysics.

    You can take an empty set and “do stuff” with it in mathematics, the same way you can take zero and do stuff with it

  24. Erik,

    In the empirical world, there are multiple causes to any single effect.


    So? That’s just as true for Origenes as it is for me, and it doesn’t change the fact that dissimilar causes can have the same effect — an identical scale reading, for instance.

  25. keiths: That’s just as true for Origenes as it is for me…

    Then you are overstating your disagreement with him.

    Your example with kumquats and kapoks has a description that exhaustively describes what achieves the effect: Put one kilogram (of anything) on the scale and it will produce the corresponding reading.

    It’s the kilogram doing the work, not kumquats and kapoks. Kilogram of anything. Kumquats and kapoks are irrelevant.

  26. dazz: You can take an empty set and “do stuff” with it in mathematics, the same way you can take zero and do stuff with it

    But you cannot divide by zero. Similarly, I’d say you cannot take a bunch of empty sets and form a set of empty sets. Unless you like exercises in nonsense.

    You can do stuff with zero, yes, but depends what stuff we are talking about specifically. You can’t do whatever you want with it. There are certain specific things that can be done with it as per its nature.

  27. Erik: Similarly, I’d say you cannot take a bunch of empty sets and form a set of empty sets. Unless you like exercises in nonsense.

    This isn’t that hard. The empty set is a set that contains no members. A set that contains the empty set has one member. A set that contains the set that contains the empty set has two members. That’s how you generate the natural numbers from sets. All you need is the empty set and an operation that allows you to define a set as containing a set. Apply that rule to the empty set and you get all the natural numbers. Then it’s just a question of using that to define your arithmetic.

    If you want to say that all of 20th-century mathematics is an exercise in nonsense, well, that’s your business, I guess. I’d urge you to reconsider, though.

  28. Erik,

    Then you are overstating your disagreement with him.

    No, the disagreement is as I stated. I say that dissimilar causes can share the same effect, and Origenes disagrees:

    If A is the cause of 23Y, and A is not B, then B must cause something else than 23Y.

    Or ‘different causes have different effects’.

    Erik:

    Your example with kumquats and kapoks has a description that exhaustively describes what achieves the effect: Put one kilogram (of anything) on the scale and it will produce the corresponding reading.

    No, my description is not exhaustive. I don’t describe how the scale, the kumquats, or the kapok came to be. I don’t mention the Big Bang or stellar nucleosynthesis. I don’t discuss what motivated me to put the kumquats and kapok on the scale in the first place.

    I don’t need to discuss those things because your claim is obviously false:

    The description must be exhaustive in order to be properly explanatory.

    Erik:

    It’s the kilogram doing the work, not kumquats and kapoks. Kilogram of anything.

    That’s the whole frikkin’ point. Dissimilar causes, same effect. Origenes is wrong.

    None of this is difficult, Erik. Slow down and think it through.

  29. keiths: That’s the whole frikkin’ point. Dissimilar causes, same effect. Origenes is wrong.

    It’s the kilogram producing the effect in your example, just one single cause. Your example works against you once you sort out what’s relevant in it. But you are not a man of relevance.

  30. Erik: But you cannot divide by zero. Similarly, I’d say you cannot take a bunch of empty sets and form a set of empty sets. Unless you like exercises in nonsense.

    I think you have just refuted arithmetic — or, at least, the foundational account of it. For that works by defining zero to be the empty set, and then doing what you would call “exercises in nonsense” to get to the other numbers.

  31. Erik,

    You’re making a fool of yourself on two fronts simultaneously. That’s impressive.

    What’s not impressive is your poor reasoning and lack of knowledge.

    A set containing only the empty set does indeed have one member, and that member is the empty set.

    It’s the kilogram producing the effect in your example, just one single cause.

    You just got through telling us that exhaustive causal descriptions are required. Make up your mind, Erik.

    Kapok and kumquats are dissimilar “conglomerations”, to use Origenes’ terminology, but they can produce identical scale readings. Origenes is wrong.

  32. Kantian Naturalist: A set that contains the set that contains the empty set has two members. That’s how you generate the natural numbers from sets.

    You don’t need specifically sets to generate numbers. You can abstract numbers from absolutely anything that has plurality. It’s abstraction, not generation.

  33. keiths: Kapok and kumquats are dissimilar “conglomerations”, to use Origenes’ terminology, but they can produce identical scale readings. Origenes is wrong.

    It never occurred to you that you can both be wrong?

    It’s not kapoks or kumquats that produce scale readings, but their weight. Kilograms of anything.

  34. Neil Rickert: You seem to be claiming that 0 = 1.

    Elaborate.

    Neil Rickert: I think you have just refuted arithmetic — or, at least, the foundational account of it. For that works by defining zero to be the empty set, and then doing what you would call “exercises in nonsense” to get to the other numbers.

    You seem to be saying 0+0=1. Or is it 2?

  35. Erik: It’s not kapoks or kumquats that produce scale readings, but their weight. Kilograms of anything.

    Different “conglomerates of matter” produce the same reading…

  36. dazz: Different “conglomerates of matter” produce the same reading…

    False. Different readings if their weight differs. Same readings if they have the same weight. The weight matters. The fact that they are conglomerates (or not) or whatever specific substance doesn’t matter.

  37. Erik: False. Different readings if their weight differs. Same readings if they have the same weight. The weight matters. The fact that they are conglomerates or not or whatever specific substance doesn’t matter.

    The “conglomerations of matter” thing is part of origenes’ argument, not mine

  38. dazz: The “conglomerates of matter” thing is part of origenes’ argument, not mine

    His argument may be false, but so is your refutation.

  39. Erik: His argument may be false, but so is your refutation.

    It was keith’s refutation, but it looks like a good one to me: let me rephrase that:

    Different “conglomerations of matter” CAN produce the same reading…

  40. dazz: It was keith’s refutation, but it looks like a good one to me: let me rephrase that:

    Different “conglomerations of matter” CAN produce the same reading…

    Yes. And Origenes’ thesis was ‘different causes have different effects’. The issue here is what properly counts as cause.

    In keiths’ example, it’s not different conglomerations of matter that produce the reading, but the weight. Same weight, same reading. Keiths is not identifying the cause properly. He is attributing causality to that which is irrelevant in his example.

  41. Erik: Yes. And Origenes’ thesis was ‘different causes have different effects’.

    Always? If I start a fire in the forest, or a lightning does, the effect is the same for two different causes, isn’t it?

  42. dazz: Always? If I start a fire in the forest, or a lightning does, the effect is the same for two different causes, isn’t it?

    In both cases, fire burns the forest. Does it not?

    To make a proper example, we have to agree what’s relevant in the example and also what the example is relevant to. For now you are starting to sound like ID-ists. ID-ists also like to attribute ad hoc causes here and there when it suits them.

    You are overstating your disagreement with Origenes. I’m not denying the disagreement, but in its current form it’s more like talking past each other.

  43. Erik: Elaborate.

    In the foundations of arithmetic, it is usual to define 0 as the empty set and 1 as the set containing the empty set as its only element.

    Your response to KN in an earlier post seemed to be in conflict with this definition.

  44. Erik: In both cases, fire burns the forest. Does it not?

    To make a proper example, we have to agree what’s relevant in the example and also what the example is relevant to. For now you are starting to sound like ID-ists. ID-ists also like to attribute ad hoc causes here and there when it suits them.

    You are overstating your disagreement with Origenes. I’m not denying the disagreement, but in its current form it’s more like talking past each other.

    I don’t think it makes sense to ask for an explanation of natural laws. The laws are what they are because that’s how nature works, not the other way around. I guess I would say the laws are built “bottom-up” in a way. Laws don’t cause anything to behave according to them

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