Thanks for keeping the site warm for me 🙂
Gotta lot of threads to catch up on, by the looks of things.
Still a bit gobsmacked by the number of Christians on Uncommon Descent who seem to think that William Lane Craig’s apologia for the divine command to genocide has any merit, and it’s left me somewhat sick of heart, but reassuring that Timaeus, and some others also find it abhorrent.
The idea that any action is good if you think that God commanded it seems to me so self-evidently dangerous that I simply cannot imagine how anyone can entertain it for a moment. And that’s only one of the problems with it.
For those out of the loop, the hoohah started here:
Why I refuse to debate with William Lane Craig
I think Dawkins’ excuse rings hollow, myself, but his link to Craig’s essay on the genocide of the Canaanites made my blood run cold.
Patric said:
If that is all “behaving morally” means, then if my ideal is “to exterminate Jews from the face of the earth”, and II align my actions with that ideal, then those actions are by definition moral.
Also, it depends on what you mean by “compulsion”; if we wish to remain a healthy weight and fitness, and enjoy the benefits of that, then we are “compulsed” to eat a proper diet and exercise accordingly. That is true of any goal we have; we are compulsed by necessary ramifications to behavior to do some things, and avoid others, in order to acquire the goal, whether that goal is presumed to be objective or subjective.
You make it difficult to follow Elizabeth’s edict of assuming good faith on the part of other participants.
I said “however that is defined”, to clearly distinguish that I was discussing the reasons for behavior rather than a particular standard of morality. Invoking Godwin’s Law in response is simply an attempt to poison the well rather than address the issue.
I believe the word you are looking for is “compelled”, not “compulsed”.
You are making a category error by comparing morality to diet. Our bodies respond in predictable ways to diet and exercise, or the lack thereof, for objective physical reasons, whether any other other people know what you’re doing or not. Violating a moral code has no such consequences in the absence of other observers.
To return to your statement that “without [necessary consequences], morality is just rhetorical sophistry. There’s no reason for me to act morally if I think some other option would suit my goals better in any given situation.”, you have not made the case that morality requires “necessary consequences”, only that it is possible to act immorally without negative consequences. That’s not a surprise.
So, is “exterminating the Jews” not a valid good to pursue? If not, why not?
I would be making a category error if what I meant by “necessary consequences” was not precisely that violating the proper moral code has such consequences in the absence of other observers (as does conforming to the proper moral code). You are again simply assuming your consequent – that there are no such consequences absent any other observer. That’s an essential part of my argument and what is under debate: without such consequences (as appropriately illustrated by my diet analogy), then the concept of morality is nothing but rhetoric and sophistry.
If there are no necessary consequences, by definition it is possible to act immorally without negative consequence. Otherwise, there would necessarily be negative consequences. My point is that a meaningful morality requires necessary consequences, because without them then it is possible to act immorally without negative consequence, and it is also possible to behave morally without positive consequence.
I would agree in one sense that morality is irrelevant to decisions that have no consequences, or inconsequential consequences as it were. Choosing between strawberry or raspberry icecream has no consequences that could hurt or harm anyone, so it isn’t a moral decision.
Choosing between locally grown or air-freighted strawberries, however, might be an ethical decision, and while the locally grown strawberries might be more expensive (which, bizarrely, they sometimes are) there are adverse consequences to other people in selecting the cheaper air-freighted ones, as it creates a market for an environmentall damaging product.
So that decision is a moral decision.
But I don’t think that is what you mean – or is it? I
No, I mean necessary negative and positive consequences to the person making the moral choice. Sorry for not making that clear.
If it is possible to make an immoral choice an it not have a negative consequence for the person making the choice (and similar for positive consequences for moral choices), and in fact it is possible for negative consequences for moral behavior, and positive consequences for immoral behavior, then arguing about morality as if it matters is a rather absurd proposition.
Why should I behave morally if (1) it’s all subjective, and / or (2) there are no necessary, congruent personal consequences (good or bad) for my behavior? I mean, if I can commit genocide and get away with it and enrich my own position because of it, why not?
It’s OK, I think you were clear, I just wanted to check! I thought we might have a brief moment of agreement there!
I don’t see why at all. At the core of morality lie the consequences of our decisions. That’s why our decision-making has a moral dimension – because our actions have consequences. Sure they may have consequences for us, but if a doctor saves the life of a dying road accident victim, despite the risk of being sued later, and is, in fact, sued later, the fact that she experiences “negative” consequences of her actions does not make it an immoral act. Quite the reverse. And if another person steals from the collection plate, and a second person thanks them for donating, mistaking the action, then it doesn’t make the act
moral. What makes an act moral or immoral are the consequences for other people, surely?
Reward and punishment might be useful incentives for people to behave in a way that benefits, and does not hurt, others, but its scarcely the root of morality. Indeed, you could say it undermines it. Which is the better deed, a caring act done for money, or a caring act done for love?
1) I think this one is a tautology. Morality is about what we “ought” to do, right? So “why should we behave morally?” is tantamount to saying “why ought we to act in one way when we’d rather act in another?” And the answer, clearly, is that we have non-proximal goals. These include goals that concern ourselves, but more distally (“I ought not to have a second biscuit, because I’ll get fat”) and those that concern others (“I ought not to have a second beer, because I’ve got to drive home”) . So you could also ask the question: “why are we cursed with oughts at all?” And again, I’d say, because we are social animals with Theory of Mind capacity.
2). Because we care about others, and because we have reified the maxim “treat others as you would be treated” as something we call Good, and aspire to. Also we want to avoid punishment and disapproval, and we enjoy approval and reward, but if that’s all that is driving us, we wouldn’t be inclined to describe our decisions as “moral” merely “expedient”.
I love this poem by Stevie Smith (apologies if I’ve posted it before):
I set it to music once:
The singer is Emily van Evera.
You are again ignoring my point in favor of attempting to poison the well with Nazi imagery. This repeated behavior suggests to me that your intention in posting here is not to arrive at a mutual understanding with your interlocutors but simply to stir the pot in order to get people to respond to you.
On the off chance that is not the case, I’ll try to explain what I find flawed in your position.
If I understand you correctly, you are saying that immoral actions, in your view, have direct, objective consequences similar to the consequences of eating an unhealthy diet. Is that an accurate statement?
If so, are these consequences only within the mind of the person performing the immoral actions or are they imposed by an outside authority? That is, are you arguing that a moral code will include the concept of guilt for violating that code or are you claiming that there exist one or more intelligent actors who will punish transgressions of that moral code, even if that transgression is never detected by other people?
So if my goal is genocide of the jews because I think it is the best thing for me, my loved ones, and on balance the rest of humanity, behaving in a way that brings that about is moral, because I am choosing one behavior over another in service of a greater good?
Well, you’d be using the Golden Rule as a principle, I guess, it’s just that you’d be defining “others” in a way that doesn’t make a lot of sense.
But I’m not really sure of your point – I’m not claiming, and I don’t think any of us atheists are claiming – that there is a bombproof way of figuring out what we “ought” to do. But that doesn’t stop us trying. And what puzzles us, I think, is why you think that before we start we are required to think there is some “objective” set of “oughts” out there, given that you don’t think there’s any surefire way of figuring out what they are.
Or do you?
They have unavoidable consequences. I don’t know what you mean by “direct”. If you mean “immediate”, such consequences might not be immediately noticeable, just as the eventual negative effects of a poor diet might not be immediately noticeable.
They are effects inexorably caused by one’s moral or immoral intentions, just as the effects of a poor diet and exercise regimen are inexorable.
I’m really confused, William, I have to say.
Is it your position that we need to posit a God who will mete out our desserts after our death in order to give us any incentive to behave well?
Or is it just that we have to posit an ideal standard of goodness in order to have any reason to figure out what is good?
Or both? Or neither?
Dear Liz,
I’ll limit my comments here to you, since you have Christ-like heart, which you apparently absorbed by osmosis. This was immediately recognizable and obvious to me. In many ways you exemplify good Christian character more than I do. My excuse is that I had to recover from four decades of being an obnoxious militant atheist like Dawkins. Recovering from this curse has been no simple task, and is ongoing.
I found the whole concept of infinity fascinating
Actual infinity is mathematically absurd. Check out Hilbert’s hotel. It seems to me that “eternity” must be a realm of more dimensions of space and time. I’m agnostic about string theory, but I find its mathematical foundation concerning multi-dimensionality to be somewhat convincing.
Listening to your lovely playing I’m wondering why you didn’t continue to perform?
Earning a living as a classical concert pianist is very difficult, and I have no patience for teaching. Teaching students who are not disciplined or motivated is pure torture.
the whole point, as it were, of God, was that no matter how brief and tiny our lives, each of us mattered
But Liz, if God does not exist, and we are just the product of random mutations and natural selection that did not have us in mind (which I find evidentially and mathematically completely indefensible and hopelessly illogical), then each of us, and no one, ultimately matters at all!
But I’m intrigued to know what you made of Michael Denton’s second book. It seems Denton convinced you, but failed to convince himself. Why do you think this is?
Excellent question! I read Nature’s Destiny with much intrigue. In this book Denton expands the fine-tuning argument to include not only the laws of physics but the properties of water, the carbon atom, etc.
Denton calls himself a “vitalist.” I’m not quite sure what this means. I presume it means something like deism, or some kind of grand cosmological front-loading.
In any event Liz, I find conversation with you to be most stimulating and thought-provoking.
I hope I have convinced you that it is possible to be rational, intelligent, inquisitive, and well-educated, and still be a Christian theist. We are not all knuckle-dragging troglodytes who want to destroy science and impose a theocracy!
Although you were replying to Elizabeth, I’m going to comment on what you wrote.
Infinity may be absurd from a common sense viewpoint. But it isn’t mathematically absurd.
There may be no external agent to which we matter. But we can still matter to ourselves (to each other, to relatives, etc).
A vitalist believes there is a “vital spirit” (elan vital, vital force) to be found in living things, and presumably without a materialist explanation.
I’d like to address this one – probably a bit different than what William would answer.
You know Elizabeth, you always seem to be able to ask some very good questions, which if answered well, I think could clarify some of your understanding and/or misunderstanding of how theists view morality and its basis. Here’s my attempt:
Theists contend that there could be no logical sense of what is morally good without the existence of that which exhibits moral perfection. There are of course more in-depth directions that this premise could go.
Theists do not contend; however, that not believing in the existence of that which exhibits moral perfection precludes one to be immoral.
That which exhibits moral perfection (God) could (and in the view of most theists, does) impart a sense of that which is morally good through logical reason, of which He is the author. Logical reason is not a domain that is common only to those who believe in God; since belief in God does not affect His existence or non-existence – in fact, belief about anything does not affect it’s existence or non-existence. Belief does not make Him so. What makes Him so Is Him being, which is separate from our belief about Him.
So no, we don’t need to posit God to have an idea of what is morally good. God (or a standard of moral perfection) must exist, however for moral goodness to have any meaning and as I already stressed, but stress again, it has no connection to our belief about God. And what is morally good is then a separate issue from whatever consequences there might be for not being so, or for not doing what is morally good; although there could still be such consequences and benefits for doing what is morally good. Those consequences and/or benefits are to some extent not exclusive to those who believe in God, but are somewhat a part of what naturally transpires in a world (or universe) where reason reigns.
As far as incentives to behave well, that becomes another matter, and I believe it is left to the individual to work that out. There certainly are incentives, but it is reasonable to posit that there are some who for one reason or another, are unaware of what those incentives are. I think though, that most people understand that there are benefits to doing what is morally good, and consequences for doing what is morally evil. That is an understanding that seems to develop with experience, and I believe that it is the benefits and consequences, which ultimately motivate us to do what is good as opposed to what is evil. We do evil because often we are confused about the consequences, or because quite often we perceive that there are immediate benefits, while ignoring the long-term consequences. And with doing good, there are often no immediate benefits, but immediate consequences, but there are ultimately long-term benefits. Doing what is morally good then focuses on the long-term benefits and not the immediate consequences or benefits.
When I talk about benefits I don’t necessarily mean personal benefits. So selfishness in doing good may not be a factor. It could be doing good because of the long-term benefits to someone I love, or even to someone or a group of someones that I don’t know, which might not have any long-term benefits to me – at least that I can perceive. Ultimately, whether I seek to do good for my own benefit or the benefit of others, there are long-term benefits for me as well as for others. That is what theists believe are the logical outcomes of doing what is exemplified by that which is (He who is) morally and perfectly good, whether one believes in Him or not.
Ultimately though, I don’t think that morally good acts are what God is concerned with so much as the attitude of the heart in doing morally good acts. So if I’m doing what is morally good not necessarily because I want to do them, but because I seek the long-term benefits, then that could be perceived as an illegitimate reason for doing good, but nonetheless still a good act. On the other hand, if I do a morally good act simply because I want to do so, then that is far better than merely doing so due to the long-term benefit(s). Keep in mind that to a morally perfect being, there are no benefits to doing good. There is nothing to be gained. A morally perfect being does good not out of a perceived benefit, but out of His character. It stands to reason then that God would prefer us to desire to do what is good rather than to seek some kind of reward for doing so. But I don’t believe that any of us does that perfectly in the practice of doing good. If we did we would be that morally perfect being.
William J Murray,
Can you give an example of anyone who does not base their moral conclusions on feelings? Because I don’t think that’s possible. Also, do you have any evidence that more is needed than feelings and practicality? If so, feel free to present it. So far though all you’ve done is assert such.
Subjective “feelings” and subjective assessments of what one thinks is “practical” as the basis for morality can be used to justify anything – including gassing jews, torturing heretics and throwing imperfect infants off a cliff.
I’m not sure what you mean about “evidence” that more is needed – this isn’t a debate about what is factually existent, but rather about what is logically necessary for a logically coherent, consistent, and sufficiently warranted moral system.
My position is that unless there are necessary consequences to immoral behavior, there is no reason to even call such behavior immoral; if there were no negative, necessary consequences to a diet that consisted only of junk food, there’d be no reason to call the food junk in the first place, or to believe we should avoid such a diet.
Of course there must be a standard of good to figure out what is good; conversely, there doesn’t need to be a standard of good if we’re just going to arbitrarily pick what “good” is.
William J Murray,
Your assertion does not rebut the explanation. You insist that without some external supervening agent, all processes are just mechanical, but that just demonstrates my point that you are actual ignorant of biology/neurology since you don’t explain why your claim is valid. As such, your claim (along with Craig’s) remains dismissed by the scientific and academic communities. Unless you can provide some actual substantiation for your claim, not many folk are going to find it credible.
I have no idea what you are talking about here. Perhaps you should supply a quote of what I responded with and what I responded to?
If you are referring to the immediately precdeing posts of mine and yours, I haven’t claimed that morality is factually not based on feelings and a sense of practicality; my argument is logical; that IF morality is based on subjective feelings and a subjective sense of practicality (or, indeed, any commodity posited as intrinsically subjective), THEN one’s basis for morality can be used to justify virtually anything, AND SO one cannot condemn any act as intrinsically or self-evidently immoral, including genocide, AND such acts would be moral for those who committed them if they felt it was the right thing to do and found it practical in some way to do so.
If you are fine with the basis of your morality being able to logically justify virtually **anything**, including genocide, torturing infants for pleasure and beating up little old ladies for their social security money, then you and I don’t have any ground to argue about, because I’m not making a case of fact, but rather I’m examining the logical premises, inferences and conclusions of competing moral systems.
I do believe that the desire for the extermination of the Jews did indeed have rather negative consequences. Just depends on how you look at it. Indeed, pretty much any thought of harm against another group has very real negative consequences for the initiator. The person may well get away with harming the objective individual, property, or group, but it’s rather funny how the underlying reasons for engaging in such behavior eventually catch up with such individuals.
Sorry about not quoting earlier; I’m learning the mechanics of Lizzie’s site. 🙂
In any event, yes, this initial premise of yours is true:
However, this conclusion doesn’t follow:
It does not follow for the simple reason that subjectivity does not relegate strong feelings as irrelevant. I can still quite readily condemn anyone based on my subjective feelings. And anyone (and everyone) is free to either agree with my perspective or not. The point is though, subjectivity does not take away my ability to judge others based upon my feelings or upon practical measures.
Now, whether the acts I’m condemning are moral to those folks committing them is of course irrelevant to me. And since there is no Great Divine Supervening Agent (as far as I can tell at any rate) ultimately only those behaviors that are protected are going to be continued.
But the subjectivity of one’s perspective on the “rightness” or “wrongness” of given behaviors does have any impact on the validity of that determination. The drug cartel leadership in Mexico has no doubts that their business ventures (including the murders of ATF and other “law” enforcement personnel who are “immorally” attacking and hindering their “just” business). They are welcome to believe such of course – it’s their subjective perspective. Doesn’t mean I or others have to agree. And if enough folks don’t agree, guess what? The consequences of their actions can become rather negative.
Ultimately it all comes down to how one’s behavior affects others. You can believe what you are doing is “moral”, but if everyone disagrees with you and finally pummels you out of existence, it really doesn’t much matter what you believed.
This statement of yours from above implies that your (and other) moral frameworks are not based on feelings:
I’d like a concrete example of a moral conviction that isn’t based on feelings. For example, the moral conviction “murder is wrong” is most definitely based on feelings, along with having a practical consideration component. And in case you don’t understand the feeling aspect of “murder is wrong”, it comes from the horrifying effect that murder has upon witnesses, particularly associates of someone murdered. In fact all the commandments in the bible are based to some extent on feelings. I’d just like to see a substantiation of some moral conviction out there that isn’t based on feelings at all.
I didn’t say or imply that subjectivity regulated feelings to irrelevance; in fact, if one is going to base their morality on subjective feellings, those subjective feelings become exceedingly relevant in determining one’s moral system
What I said was that the subjective nature of feelings, when used as the basis for one’s moral systems, allows for virtually anything to be authorized (by one’s feelings) as moral.
Feelings become less relevant in determining a proper moral system when that system is based on the assumption of an objective standard.
I didn’t say you couldn’t condemn them based on your subjective feelings; I said: “one cannot condemn any act as intrinsically or self-evidently immoral”
You are free to subjectively judge anyone based on whatever subjective criteria you wish. No one has said or argued otherwise.
You are begging the question here. Why does “it all come down” to that? Why should I equate morality with how any of my actions affect others, if I base my morality on my feelings? What if I feel that I should base my morality on what seems to be immediately beneficial to me?
So it seems to me that you are implying here that “what is moral” is not ultimately defined by feelings and practicality, but rather upon consensus and might. If that is true, then by what principle can (and should) anyone challenge the consensus morality, or the morality of the mighty?
Either feelings authorize behavior as valid, or they do not, whether or not the might of consensus beats you up for your actions or not. If it is rather the might of the consensus that functionally (practically) determins “what is moral”, then obviously hiding Jews from the Nazis in your attic is rendered immoral because you know that if the mighty found you out, they’d shoot you – or worse.
However, if one feels that suspected witches should be burned at the stake because they consider it more practical to get rid of suspected witches than have to endure their presence, and the consensus of the mighty in power entirely agree with your view, then it is factually moral (for those people, at that time) to burn suspected witches at the stake.
Similarly, if one feels and considers it practical and those in consensus power agree, then it is by definition moral (for them, at that time, in that place) to do whatever is so authorized – throw imperfect infants off the cliff (sparta), drown infant girls (china), torture heretics (middle-ages Europe), massacre dissidents (China, Pol Pot, Stalin), commit genocide, gas Jews, mutilate little girls’ or boy’s sexual equipment (Islam, Christianity), sterilize undesirables (eugenics programs), force native American children into missionary schools, etc. Correct?
If you agree, we have no argument, and because if you agree, your moral perspective (at least what has so far been examined) is logically sound.
That is not responsive to my question. Are the effects you are asserting exist solely within the mind of the person performing the immoral actions or are those effects imposed by an outside authority?
My moral framework isn’t based on feelings; it is based on the assumption that an objective good exists, because without such a standard, then one can rationally justifify virtually anything as “moral”. That’s not a moral system I can live with, whether it is true or not.
Once again, you are mistaking a logical argument for an argument about what is factually existent. Whether or not I can give you an example of a moral conviction that you would agree is not based on feelings is entirely irrelevant to the debate at hand.
The debate examines both premises seperately: (1) That morality is based on feelings, and (2) that morality is based on an objective standard (what is objectively good). The debate isn’t going to end up revealing which is factually true, but rather what the logical ramifications of each premise would be if the premises are true.
If you find the logical ramifications of your moral premise {feelings as basis for morality) acceptable, we have nothing further to debate.
Because your question presents a false dichotomy that is loaded with idiosyncratic, ideological assumption that does not correspond to my position or stated argument.
And with this I agree. However, that doesn’t mean that all people have to agree that since anything can be moral from someone’s POV, that we all have to agree that everything is moral. We can still quite easily act on our own moral codes and for those of us who actually have moral codes that are the same, we can set up societies to protect our particular subjective viewpoint.
Which is a great way of saying that some people think their subjectivity is based on objectivity and thus hold others’ overt subjective perspectives as (pick a term – “inferior”, “irrelevant”, “non-existent”, “immoral”, etc) and thus dismiss them, but since other folks don’t see the objective basis they are free to dismiss those other people’s claims. Viola! That’s actually the reality we have in this world!
Which is true, but from a moral subjectivity perspective – so what? No moral relativist thinks there is such a thing as an intrinsic or self-evident morally “right” or “wrong” act, so I don’t see how this is even relevant.
Great! So we’re in agreement then.
First things first – in what way is my statement circular (i.e., begging the question)? I’m just curious why you are claiming such.
As to your questions, I never said anything about what someone should do; I’m pointing out that all morality boils down to how behaviors affect others. Simple statistics supports this conclusion – moral perspectives that affect others negatively tend not to be supported by others and ultimately lead to more negative affects for the holder than those moral perspectives that affect others positively.
Thus, you are welcome to hold a moral perspective that anything that immediately benefits you is “right”, but if your perspective negatively impacts others, ultimately it will not be supported by others and will eventually lead to a negative consequence for you.
No, that is not what I indicated. “What is moral” is completely up to the individual. What is supported is what the majority protects. The majority may well protect “morally wrong” behaviors from some peoples’ feelings and perspectives. Of course, people will challenge the consensus morality based upon their personal moral disagreements. If they don’t have the might to either convince the majority or overthrow it, they won’t instill their moral code as protected, but that won’t stop those folks with differing morals from trying.
Take abortion as an example – currently the majority supports the morality of abortion and protects the right of those people who find abortion morally acceptable and practical to have access to the service. There are still folks who find abortion morally wrong and who continue to fight against the current majority. Is abortion objectively morally wrong? According to those who believe that it is, it is. According to those who believe otherwise, it’s not. Might doesn’t make abortion right; it merely enforces the perspective of those who feel abortion is right.
See above. I certainly don’t believe that might makes right; might merely determines who’s perspective is protected and enforced.
Well, it’s “factually moral” from the perspective of the witch burners. I would daresay that from the accused witches’ perspective (along with other neutral parties), such burnings were anything but moral. But then, that’s the point.
The consensus power has nothing to do with the view of morality. Those against such acts obviously have an alternative morality that is just as existent and real as those in the consensus who happen to have the might to enforce their particular morality. So no, that is not an accurate interpretation of what I am describing.
I don’t completely agree. I will say that clearly the acts you described occurred because the majority supported them as morally proper and had the might to protect such actions from those who disagreed with them. I do not agree that the minority’s view was therefore somehow non-existent. It still existed and was the minority’s moral outlook.
I think at this point, I have to call your hand! 🙂
Describe the “objective good” that you have already found.
Your claim is that it exists and that you had determined a way to find it.
Lay it out and then we can argue if all the points in your moral code make sense.
I have never claimed that an objective good exists, nor have I ever claimed to have determined a way to “find it”, whatever that means.
Robin: I think that besides minor things that could easily be fleshed out and mutually understood in an agreeable sense, we don’t really have a conflict of logic about any significant point worth debating.
It is refreshing to find a moral subjectivist that owns up to all of the important logical ramifications of thier position. It is my experience that most attempt to dodge the consequential bullet that renders gendocide as being as moral an option as any other depending on individual feelings.
Please identify the false dichotomy you claim I am presenting. What alternative is there to internally vs. externally generated effects?
More generally, in the interest of getting you to clearly state what it is you mean, what exactly are the effects to which you refer?
You claimed that our morality is defined by “assuming” an “objective good” exists.
If you ground your morality on the premise that an objective good exists, but don’t actually believe it does, why should anyone?
Waaiii…whaaaa???
That’s it? Where’s the first pounding? Where’s the denial? Where’s the repeated insistence of how wrong I am? Where’s the appeal to authority? What’s with the politeness and respect?!?! Where’s the fun in THAT!?!?
I..I…I’m…I’m sorry…I’m just not used to this. I’ll have to rethink my argument and try again. Clearly I mispoke…errr…mistyped.
😛
Thanks William. It’s been an enjoyable discussion. I’d still like to pursue some of the finer points at some point, but I think you are right in that they are minor disagreements on an otherwise larger agreement.
What do you mean by “mind”? In my view, my mind is part of (or an aspect of) a larger, universal mind (in the same way my physical body is a part of a larger physical world), so the concept of something “existing soley in the mind of the person performing the immoral action” is a non-sequitur generated by imposing your idiosyncratic ideoogical framework upon my statements.
What occurs “in my mind” also occurs within the framework of universal mind, just as what occurs “in my body” also occurs within the framework of the physical universe.
What does “imposed by an outside authority” mean in this context? Is gravity an “outside authority” when it comes to imposing the necesary consequences of behavior? I guess in a depersonalized, mechanistic sense it is such an ‘authority” that is “imposing” the consequences of behavior.
In that sense, because of the nature of what god is, and without arbitrary decisions, commands, or choices, god (as analogous to gravity) inexorably metes out the consequences of our moral and immoral behavior.
If gravity can be said to “punish” those who jump off a cliff, the one can say that god “punishes” those who commit immoral acts.
What I don’t understand, then, is why exactly the same “moral ramifications” apply to William’s position. As Eric Holloway said at UD:
You rationally justify one thesitic premise over another the same way you justify any premise over any other: whether or not the premise provides sufficient warrant for, and leads to a rationally consistent and coherent worldview and provides sufficient warrant for the various aspects of that worldview.
OK, then how do theism and atheism differ in that regard then?
Oddly enough, I agree with this. But what tdoes it have to do with theism?
Yes indeed. Which is why empathy is so fundamental to our concept of morality. Still not seeing why you have to posit a god to make it work.
Well, no. Or only by stretching the term so that it doesn’t mean what you need it to mean, I think!
Well that really doesn’t work, IMO, William. For a start, in traditional Christian theology, there’s a safety net anyway. For another, it’s just an assertion – what evidence is there for some kind of cosmic balance that must be rebalanced? And even if there was, why would you call it good? What is “good” about punishment, unless it deters or prevents evil? Especially if you waive it anyway, for some folks?
I don’t understand your question.
Why would you insert “traditional Christian theology” into the debate? What does it have to do with anything?
It’s not an assertion at all. I am not asserting that it is a fact that immoral behavior has inexorably consequences; I’m arguing that unless we assume immoral (and moral) behavior has necessary consequences, there’s no reason to call any behavior “immoral” in the first place, and there’s no reason to to adhere to moral rules in the second place.
I have not made an any assertion that remotely corresponds to this supposed paraphrasing that could possibly require me to provide such evidence.
I can only conclude that you either do not actually read what I write, you do not understand it, or you are confusing me with someone else. I’m not a christian, Elizabeth. There is no “forgiveness” of immoral behavior in my worldview, because the consequences of immoral behavior are as necessary as the consequences of behavior in a gravity field, not because god arbitrarily chooses it to be so, but because it is a necessary ramification of the nature of god and what existence is and what good is.
You’re not talking to a Christian, or soemone that has a remotely christian perspective. Please stop trying to interpret what I say through the lens of what you expect a Christian to say and mean. It might facilitate our capacity to communicate.
Yes, I noted that you’d said you are not a Christian. That wasn’t why I mentioned Christianity, although I should have made it clear I wasn’t ascribing Christianity to you.
But Christianity is a form of theism, and clearly it’s a form that doesn’t work for your argument (if punishment can be arbitrarily set aside).
So would you refine your position as: in order for there to be morality (or for morality to mean anything) we must posit a God who will reward and punish us in the next life for our good deeds and misdeeds in this?
In which case, would you exclude Christianity?
In which case, how do you decide with God does the trick?
I don’t think either of us consider it meaningful to say that gravity “rewards” or “punishes” anyone. And there is no “delay” for the ramifications of moral and immoral behavior.
Let me try to communicate via analogy. I am a sentient entity comprised of billions of cells. I am not specifically aware of any particular cell, but because of the nature of my being, my automatic systems react to the activities of any particular cell immediately and in corresponding nature to whatever the cell is doing. I cannot help but be who and what I am; even my arbitrary decisions are ultimately limited by the nature of my being.
Individual cells in my body have a core representation of the greater me – their DNA, or in the mind context, basic existential comprension (self, other, intent), logic, math, and self-evidently true moral statements. We can liken this to “self-evident truths” we hold in our mind, core reflections of “what god is”, even if the totality of “what god is” cannot be appreciated by looking at the physical/mental DNA.
Still, the same things that are essential to what god is, are essential to what each individual cell and mind is.
Fulfilling the function of our aspect of god (our final cause) is what “good” is, not because god decrees it, but because it is what god is, and by our core essence, what we are – what our purpose is.
IF a cell in your body becomes faulty and not only refuses to carry out its purpose, but begins to actively work against its purpose, what do we call that cell? Cancer? Disease? What does the body automatically do when any cell embarks on this kind of behavior? What do you think the ramifications would be?
The cell is eventually destroyed, what is usable broken down and reused (digested or assimilated), and the rest is either isolated away from the rest of the body, or excreted.
Not because the sentient body wants any of that to happen; but because it must happen in order for god to exist and for the sake of all the other cells.
OK, well that’s interesting, because now your theism looks little different from mine! Except that instead of calling my [] “God”, I call it “good” (as my son said to his confirmation teacher, who asked him if he really believed in God: “as long as it’s spelled with two o’s”)
It’s a useful postulate. But it has no verifiable (I’m trying to steer away from the word “objective” here) existence. It’s a model, a normative model, rather than a predictive one, in other words. But useful.
Are you claiming any more for your God than I claim for my “good”?
I’m interested in a constructive conversation where all participants are making an honest effort to communicate as clearly as possible, not in cajoling someone into dropping a series of vague hints about their views while obfuscating via idiosyncratic use of language.
If you come up with some objective, empirical evidence for your “universal mind” and decide you would like to discuss it constructively, do let me know.
Ah, that means I didn’t understand your comment 🙂 Let me read it again.
William J Murray,
I don’t see why anybody would go down the road you have taken since even you can’t say that you have found anything.
You speak as if there’s a discovery to be made but even you haven’t actually found anything you are claiming “objectively” exists.
If anybody could have discovered something using your worldview it would have been you.
I don’t see why anyone would adopt a form of a worldview that even the author cannot show provided any results.
It’s necessarily sentient (in order to hold purpose in its mind), deliberate (although not in all respects, as some things are automatic due to its nature), and capable of directing its intentions and causing events. It is first/lsufficient cause and source of good, existence, logic, and intention.
As far as having verifiable existence, that depends on one’s criteria for verification. If something logically must exist, IMO that’s a pretty decent start.
I’m not trying to get anyone to adopt my worldview, nor do I advocate that anyone else go down this road. I’m making logical arguments based on premises, and that’s all I’m doing here.
It occurs to me that arguments like this themselves militate against morality having what we usually think of as an objective existence. What is objective is something that is assumed to be observable by anyone who cares to look and is observed by all those who actually look. It does not depend on an observer for its existence. We all observe – or feel – what we call gravity, even if we still don’t have a good explanation of what it actually is. People who jump out of aircraft still fall to the ground whether they believe it is going to happen or not.
The same can’t be said of morality. We can’t see, hear, touch, taste or smell it. We can’t observe it, even with our most powerful instruments, in fact, as this discussion bears out, we have a hard time even agreeing on what it is. Now, there is nothing wrong in arguing that there are objective moral standards and that their objectivity is somehow founded on the existence of a deity. But that usage of ‘objective’ differs from the common understanding and whoever uses the less common definition has a responsibility to make it clear what they are doing to avoid any confusion.