Empirical Falsifiability

Edward Feser has a blog post up that is highly relevant to much of the debate that takes place here at The Skeptical Zone between theists and non-theists.

A note on falsification

Lazy shouts of “unfalisfiability!” against theological claims just ignore all this complexity — the distinctions that have to be drawn between empirical claims on the one hand and claims of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics on the other; between extremely general empirical claims and more specific ones; between philosophy of nature (which studies the philosophical presuppositions of natural science) and natural science itself; and between the testing of a thesis and the testing of the auxiliary assumptions we generally take for granted but conjoin with the thesis when drawing predictions from it.

So, falsificationism is a rather feeble instrument to wield against theology. And in fact, atheist philosophers have known this for decades, even if New Atheist combox commandos are still catching up.

484 thoughts on “Empirical Falsifiability

  1. As Popper himself emphasized, it is simply an error to suppose that all rationally justifiable claims have to be empirically falsifiable. Popper intended falsificationism merely as a theory about what makes a claim scientific, and not every rationally acceptable claim is or ought to be a scientific claim. Hence not every rationally acceptable claim is or ought to be empirically falsifiable.

  2. Personally, I am not a fan of falsificationism. I think Popper got that wrong.

    I don’t use that in arguing with theists or creationists. And I do think that it is often used in dubious ways.

  3. I think the issue involves whether creationism wants to be a theology or a science. If it says, “OK, I admit it, I’m not a scientific program at all,” then it can certainly retort that its metaphysical opponents it have the same lack of falsifiability. The thing is, there’s this repeated claim to being a scientific position. Those require empirical backing.

  4. http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/The_Dragon_in_My_Garage

    If you can’t come up with way in which it could be practically demonstrated that you are wrong, then your claim is indistinguishable form being practically impossible to demonstrate being true. And therefore it should not be believed to be true until this happens.

    There’s a god!
    Where?
    Everywhere!
    Why can’t I see it?
    It doesn’t emit light!
    Why can’t I weigh it or feel it?
    It doesn’t have mass or a physical body!
    Then how do I know it’s really there?
    It will speak to you!
    But I hear nothing?
    It’s your own fault!

    BULLSHIT.

    “When inventing a god, the most important thing is to claim it is invisible, inaudible and imperceptible in every way. Otherwise, people will become skeptical when it appears to no one, is silent and does nothing.” – Anonymous

  5. Neil Rickert:
    Personally, I am not a fan of falsificationism.I think Popper got that wrong.
    I don’t use that in arguing with theists or creationists.And I do think that it is often used in dubious ways.

    Claims about reality seem to imply some regularity that could be tested, or some history that may have left footprints.

  6. Some claims seem to be supported by consilience rather than by escaping falsification.

    The problem with falsification is that large theories, such as evolution or bang or solar system formation, is that they are coarse grained. People fill in the details with inferences that get falsified, but which are not critical to the big picture.

  7. petrushka: Claims about reality seem to imply some regularity that could be tested, or some history that may have left footprints.

    Not all claims are claims against reality.

    I’ve always taken falsifiability to be applied to scientific theories, rather than claims. And experience shows that theories are not easily rejected.

    The major issue is that we adopt scientific theories on a pragmatic basis, rather than as a true/false matter. And falsification is based on the assumption that it’s a true/false issue.

    And, of course, that’s where there’s a problem with creationism. For the creationist, the most important pragmatic criterion is consistency with his theology. So creationists and scientists talk past one another.

  8. petrushka: Claims about reality seem to imply some regularity that could be tested, or some history that may have left footprints.

    Exact same can be said about appearances – they imply some regularity that could be tested or some history that may have left footprints. You can regularly observe that when you put a whole-wall mirror in a room, the room will appear twice bigger, except that in reality it’s not.

  9. Erik: You can regularly observe that when you put a whole-wall mirror in a room, the room will appear twice bigger, except that in reality it’s not.

    Fails consilience.

  10. With ID the problem is that it pretends to be making claims about life and its details, but the moment you bring up evolutionary limitations found throughout life (“bad design” in some cases) the matter is immediately labeled by them as “theological.” They say that you’re assuming something about the Designer, which just happens to be an unknown designer (the inscrutable God, in other words). That’s ridiculous, of course, because we’re doing what science should do, assuming for the sake of hypothesis designers like humans (the only significant examples of designers), who really don’t design things like life. But of course their Designer is in fact God and shouldn’t be (they say) subjected to the same tests of design that actually designed tools and objects would be. ID is just about Design, they claim. But if it were science it would be about reasonable limits that designers actually have versus the limits known regarding evolutionary processes.

    The claims are about science and scientific evidence, yet the prevention of good meaningful falsification of their design claims is in essence theological, that the designer is not like us and cannot be subjected to meaningful tests (no, that life is functionally complex is not a meaningful test). I think that most of them really don’t know better, since they typically don’t understand science while they do know religion. But that ID really is religious apologetics is ingrained in the fact that although they happily analogize to human designs, they’ll never actually test their claims by looking for human design traits, such as rational leaps and extrinsic purpose.

    As for what Feser wrote, I find this questionable:

    Claims of mathematics and logic are like this too. We can analyze and argue about them philosophically, but they are not plausibly subject to empirical refutation, specifically.

    Practical mathematics and logic are indeed subject to refutation. If the Pythagorean Theorem didn’t hold in surveying (where the curvature of the earth doesn’t meaningfully interfere, anyway), it would be rapidly discarded by surveyors and architects. Logic likewise, either it works in computers, or it doesn’t, and if it doesn’t it’s not going to be used for long. There are mathematics and logics that aren’t empirically tested, being theoretic and unrelated to “real world” situations, but these are understood as really not being matters of science or of existence.

    And that’s really the problem that Feser has. Sure, you can have a theology involving “substrates” and what-not that really tells you nothing about the world, or a God who is good without, you know, doing anything that good humans would do (feed a hungry child if possible, etc.), but most people really aren’t all that interested in those sorts of claims. If you claim that a good God exists, why isn’t God subject to normal empirical tests that existential claims normally entail, and especially if God is good, why can’t we see that?

    In other words, is theology really about anything other than special pleading? If it is, can’t we expect some real-world consequences?

    Glen Davidson

  11. Design as an alternative to evolution always seems to be based on an analogy with human design, until you point out that humans don’t produce designs like biological systems.

    The same thing happens in theodicy. God is the good shepherd, except when he kills everyone for petty reasons. He is merciful and forgiving, except when He is vengeful and indifferent.

  12. It is rather interesting that Popper is one of the few philosophers of science that scientists actually admire and respect. Among philosophers, Popper’s project suffers from too many well-known defects.

    Feser neglects to mention that Popper insisted on falsification as a demarcation criterion between science and “pseudoscience.” The idea of such a demarcation has fallen on hard times since Laudan’s criticism of that idea.

    But it was central to Popper that we can distinguish between empirical claims that are genuinely scientific and those that aren’t, but which still robe themselves in the mantle of scientific authority. (Marxism and psychoanalysis were the main pseudosciences he was concerned with, both of which functioned in Popper’s time and place as basically “secular religions”.)

    Feser also neglects to mention that Popper’s emphasis on falsifiability derives from his concern with Hume’s problem of induction. Popper’s idea was to evade Humean worries about induction by making science purely deductive. On Popper’s model, one has a hypothesis — a “conjecture” — that can come from anywhere. It doesn’t matter how the conjecture is generated. Then one formulates an observation that is strictly entailed by the hypothesis. And then one looks to see if the observation is actual. If the observation doesn’t obtain, then (by modus tollens) the hypothesis must be false.

    The problem with pseudosciences, Popper thinks, is that one can always invent some spurious reason as to why the theory should be retained even though its predictions were refuted. Marx claims that the socialist revolution would begin in industrial countries and spread across international borders. But Marxists can invent all sorts of hypotheses about why that didn’t happen. Likewise psychoanalysts can always invent all sort of spurious ad hoc hypotheses about why their favored claims never pan out.

    And while theology and metaphysics are not pseudosciences, creationism definitely is. Intelligent design is not a pseudoscience because it doesn’t make any predictions in the first place, hence it doesn’t make predictions that are dogmatically clung to in the face of recalcitrant evidence, as creationism does.

  13. I think specific claims need to be testable. If they can’t be tested, they have no truth value. But scientific theories, being broadly general explanations of large sets of observations, are not testable in this way — that is, the test of a theory is whether it is USEFUL, whether it can make helpful predictions or lead research in fruitful directions.

    As I understand it, scientists regard all theories as hostage to tomorrow’s discoveries, and subject to modification or extension endlessly. They are inherently incapable of being perfected. Yet they inform all scientific understanding and direct all scientific progress.

    Theology is famously a subject without an object. It’s not a general understanding drawn from a large number of verified observations, it is a collection of more or less consistent fabrications, based on nothing beyond the will to believe. Theological disputes cannot be resolved by isolating conflicting testable claims — they are “resolved” by either force or schisms. Reality cannot be used to arbitrate among fictions at any level.

  14. Historical sciences (cosmology, geology, archeology, biology) can be refuted or corrected by science, but cannot be tested or replicated. To some extent they make predictions about what things are possible or impossible to find, and what things are likely to be found.

  15. petrushka:
    Historical sciences (cosmology, geology, archeology, biology) can be refuted or corrected by science, but cannot be tested or replicated. To some extent they make predictions about what things are possible or impossible to find, and what things are likely to be found.

    But even where direct testing or replication is not possible, scientists in these fields don’t arrive at their hypotheses by declaration and acclamation. Disputes CAN be resolved.

  16. Kantian Naturalist:
    It is rather interesting that Popper is one of the few philosophers of science that scientists actually admire and respect. Among philosophers, Popper’s project suffers from too many well-known defects…

    And while theology and metaphysics are not pseudosciences, creationism definitely is. Intelligent design is not a pseudoscience because it doesn’t make any predictions in the first place, hence it doesn’t make predictions that are dogmatically clung to in the face of recalcitrant evidence, as creationism does.

    regarding your contention that : It is rather interesting that Popper is one of the few philosophers of science that scientists actually admire and respect.

    Hmmm… I think you are greatly mistaken there!

    Larry Moran, John Harshman, Joe Felsenstein and great many others on the sandwalk.blogspot site would surely disagree! I direct your attention to:

    http://sandwalk.blogspot.ca/2015/01/the-nature-of-science-nos.html

    I am almost certain that you are misunderstanding Popper.

    Popper was most emphatic in his contradiction of Positivism’s Verificationism (a version of which I am convinced Larry Moran & John Harshman and other scientists still embrace despite their emphatic protests to the contrary).

    I think Joe Felsenstein’s criticism of Popper was off-mark. I would be delighted if Joe would weigh in and correct me. The “stochastic outcome of random processes “ in Biology is in principle no less amenable to Popperian analysis than the “stochastic outcome of random processes“ of Quantum Theory & Nuclear Physics of which Popper was very much aware. At least that is how I remember my upper level philosophy courses decades back.

    Popper maintained that that non-falsifiability may demark the boundary between scientific and non-scientific but that non-scientific statements CAN still be “meaningful”. A more modern version of Popper’s thesis was called NOMA by Stephen Jay Gould.

    In other words, there are really two demarcation lines:

    Between Science and Non Science as well as between meaningful and nonmeaningful.

    Questions regarding human purposes, meanings, and values can be meaningful without resorting to “the scientific method” or some version of empirical analysis.

    I may be guilty of over-simplifying Popper here – but I see Intelligent Design as an example of non-meaningul nonscience, whereas a Buddhist response to human suffering could constitute an example of meaningful non-science.
    Intelligent Design is by definition pseudo-science. It makes an unfalsifiable claim there is a “Designer” and ranks right up there with Johannes Kepler’s initial invocation of angels pushing planets along their elliptical orbits. It amuses me to contemplate that Kepler reconsidered and retracted his silliness in the early 1600’s yet today we witness modern incarnations of similar silliness still persisting.

    As a random act of mischief, I cite the highest religious authority, the Vatican
    http://io9.gizmodo.com/does-the-new-pope-believe-in-evolution-453874239

    http://io9.gizmodo.com/pope-rails-against-intelligent-design-says-god-isnt-a-1652162938

    Where is mregnor when you need him?
    😉

  17. TomMueller: I am almost certain that you are misunderstanding Popper.

    Popper was most emphatic in his contradiction of Positivism’s Verificationism (a version of which I am convinced Larry Moran & John Harshman and other scientists still embrace despite their emphatic protests to the contrary).

    The verificationism of positivism, the verificationism that is widely criticized, was a theory of meaning.

    I’m not sure what you are arguing here. Many scientists do embrace Popper’s falsificationism. You can find it mentioned in online forums, in research papers. That Larry Moran does not embrace it does not show that it isn’t widely accepted by scientists.

  18. Neil Rickert: The verificationism of positivism, the verificationism that is widely criticized, was a theory of meaning.

    I’m not sure what you are arguing here.Many scientists do embrace Popper’s falsificationism.You can find it mentioned in online forums, in research papers.That Larry Moran does not embrace it does not show that it isn’t widely accepted by scientists.

    Hi Neil

    I do not think we are disagreeing, although I really would like to hear what Joe Felsenstein would say on the matter.

    The “problem” with Popper is that Gould’s NOMA now makes perfectly good sense… Which some scientists (prone to atheistic evangelism) cannot abide.

  19. TomMueller: The “problem” with Popper is that Gould’s NOMA now makes perfectly good sense… Which many scientists cannot abide.

    Sigh. Yes, Gould’s NOMA makes perfectly good sense, abstractly considered. The problem is, ALL Western (Abrahamic) religions not only step over the line and make scientific (and falsifiable) statements, but in fact DEPEND on these statements in ways fundamental to the core of the religion. Christians hold that Christ really DID exist, and that he really DID rise from the dead. These are, in principle, scientific claims. This holds true to the degree that if ALL intrinsicially scientific claims were removed, there would be basically nothing left of any of these religions.

    As I read it, scientists have no trouble with religions making all variety of untestable assertions. If you wish to believe that invisible fairies make the flowers bloom, no problem. If you wish to claim there was a global flood in historical times, or that some man walked on water and poofed up miracles, you have violated NOMA – you have overlapped the magisteria beyond redemption.

  20. Goulds NOMA is a nice idea, it’s just false in practice too often. They overlap and religion takes a beating every time it happens. That’s why things like the Discovery Institute even exists.

  21. TomMueller: The “problem” with Popper is that Gould’s NOMA now makes perfectly good sense… Which some scientists (prone to atheistic evangelism) cannot abide.

    I never had a problem with NOMA. But I think we are agreeing.

  22. Flint: The problem is, ALL Western (Abrahamic) religions not only step over the line and make scientific (and falsifiable) statements, but in fact DEPEND on these statements in ways fundamental to the core of the religion.

    I don’t think that is true.

    Some, perhaps many religious people step over the line. But that’s not the same as saying that a religion steps over the line.

  23. Neil Rickert: I don’t think that is true.

    Some, perhaps many religious people step over the line.But that’s not the same as saying that a religion steps over the line.

    I explained. Christians, to BE Christians, MUST believe that Christ was raised from the dead. This isn’t philosophy, this is a statement of scientific fact.

  24. Kantian Naturalist:
    TomMueller,

    I’m afraid I don’t see where I’m misunderstanding Popper.

    Perhaps we are talking at cross-purposes;

    You said: Popper insisted on falsification as a demarcation criterion between science and “pseudoscience”.

    If I remember correctly, Popper insisted on a demarcation between Science and Nonscience

    It is possible for certain categories of nonscientific statements to be meaningful. Such is not the same for pseudoscientific statements; according to Popper that is.

  25. Kantian Naturalist,

    And while theology and metaphysics are not pseudosciences, creationism definitely is. Intelligent design is not a pseudoscience because it doesn’t make any predictions in the first place, hence it doesn’t make predictions that are dogmatically clung to in the face of recalcitrant evidence, as creationism does.

    I think you are correct here in theory but not in practice. If you ask Steven Meyer what is the theory of intelligent design he will say that he uses the inference argument that Darwin used. Intelligence is the best inference to explain information (sequences) inside DNA. If it stops there then you have something that is limited but you can have an interesting debate. The problem is he does not stop there and thats where the problems start. He then goes on to say in his debate with Dr Krause that ID can make predictions. His prediction that he claims was made is for a high level of function inside the genome. If he is right or wrong here is not the issue. Is there a method that he used for this prediction i.e. is there a mathematical model. I agree that ID in its purest form is based on empirical science the challenge is keeping it there. Both sides are guilty of pulling ID out its evidentiary zone as opponents do when they ask who is the designer.

  26. Flint: I explained. Christians, to BE Christians, MUST believe that Christ was raised from the dead. This isn’t philosophy, this is a statement of scientific fact.

    There’s a scientific account of the requirements to be a Christian?

  27. TomMueller,

    Ah, ok! Now I understand what you were getting at, and yes, you are correct — Popper uses falsification as fundamentally a demarcation between science and nonscience. However, he is therefore also able to use it to define pseudoscience. So we are both right, but you are more right than I am. (How often does anyone on the Internet say that!)

    I appreciate your emphasis on the difference between falsificationism and verificationism. The latter, in the hands of the positivists, had the disastrous effect of conflating knowledge and meaning, which resulted in the view that metaphysics is meaningless. Popper, more prudently, only wanted to clarify the criterion of scientific explanation per se.

    Admittedly, I’ve not read much Popper. I’m reading the SEP entry on him right now and learning a lot!

  28. Neil Rickert: There’s a scientific account of the requirements to be a Christian?

    Yes, there is. I should think this would be obvious. The irreducible core of the Christian faith is that Jesus performed miracles and rose from the dead. Conversely, if you think Jesus was an ordinary man, not related to any gods, who died normally but who used parables to preach moral rectitude, you aren’t a Christian. You could be Jewish, since Jews regard Jesus as Just Another Prophet.

  29. colewd:
    I think you are correct here in theory but not in practice.If you ask Steven Meyer what is the theory of intelligent design he will say that he uses the inference argument that Darwin used.Intelligence is the best inference to explain information (sequences) inside DNA.

    Which hopefully we understand is nonsense. You might as well claim that intelligence (rather than gravity) is the best inference to explain watersheds.

    If it stops there then you have something that is limited but you can have an interesting debate.

    Not really, unless the debate is over whether the notion of “intelligence” has any meaning at all.

    The problem is he does not stop there and thats where the problems start.He then goes on to say in his debate with Dr Krause that ID can make predictions.His prediction that he claims was made is for a high level of function inside the genome.If he is right or wrong here is not the issue.Is there a method that he used for this prediction i.e. is there a mathematical model.

    The method he used for this prediction is purely theological — that he does not believe his god would fill the genome with junk. This is a “prediction” of his god’s behavior, which of course presumes (1) that his god exists; (2) that his god designs genomes; and (3) that Meyer has a hotline to his god’s actions and intentions unavailable to others.

    I agree that ID in its purest form is based on empirical science the challenge is keeping it there. Both sides are guilty of pulling ID out its evidentiary zone as opponents do when they ask who is the designer.

    No, ID in its purest form isn’t empirical, because it makes no observations. It only attempts to force scientific observations into a theological mold whether they fit or not. ID is PURE RELIGION.

  30. Flint: Yes, there is. I should think this would be obvious. The irreducible core of the Christian faith is that Jesus performed miracles and rose from the dead. Conversely, if you think Jesus was an ordinary man, not related to any gods, who died normally but who used parables to preach moral rectitude, you aren’t a Christian. You could be Jewish, since Jews regard Jesus as Just Another Prophet.

    hmmm that would mean one of the greatest biblical scholars and admired Christians of the 20th Century, Albert Schweitzer, according to your tautologous Nicene Creed definition; was in fact not a Christian and will end up burning in Hell, presumably together with Mohandas Gandhi and Siddhārtha Gautama Buddha.

    hmmm again! To you a patient Albert Schweitzer (more patient than I in fact) may reply: Matthew 7:21

    Please do not bother replying – I have heard it already all before.

  31. Flint, quoting colewd: His prediction that he claims was made is for a high level of function inside the genome.

    related to Flint’s objection #3: it’s not an entailment…

    Separately, I am not sure I agree with Neil re scientists’ fondness for Popper’s falsificationism. I’ve often seen Popper used as a quick and easy way to guillotine a conversation about a really stupid idea (SWIDT), but conversations about what is actually science include stuff like consilience and fecundity. YMMV

  32. TomMueller:Pease do not bother replying – I have heard it already all before.

    And having appealed to an authority you don’t understand, to address an issue you don’t understand, you have slammed your mind shut. How very religious of you.

  33. Kantian Naturalist:
    TomMueller,

    Ah, ok! Now I understand what you were getting at, and yes, you are correct — Popper uses falsification as fundamentally a demarcation between science and nonscience. However, he is therefore also able to use it to define pseudoscience. So we are both right, but you are more right than I am. (How often does anyone on the Internet say that!)

    I appreciate your emphasis on the difference between falsificationism and verificationism. The latter, in the hands of the positivists, had the disastrous effect of conflating knowledge and meaning, which resulted in the view that metaphysics is meaningless. Popper, more prudently, only wanted to clarify the criterion of scientific explanation per se.

    Admittedly, I’ve not read much Popper. I’m reading the SEP entry on him right now and learning a lot!

    Hey me too – I am still in the earliest stages of learning mode!

    It has been decades since I enjoyed the delight of sitting in upper level philosophy courses. I have forgotten far more than I can remember!

    If you are a fan of Kant (as your name suggests) – I highly recommend this site by one of my former profs who had an enormous impact on my thinking:

    http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/texts

    regarding: I appreciate your emphasis on the difference between falsificationism and verificationism…

    A very important distinction lost on far too many including Coyne and a host of others… I have discovered that debating their kind is no less frustrating than an exchange of ideas with born-again Christian evangelists. There really is no exchange of ideas with dogmatists bent on proselytization.

    best

  34. Flint: The irreducible core of the Christian faith is that Jesus performed miracles and rose from the dead.

    That’s not a scientific account. That’s your personal account.

    I know some people who call themselves Christians, but who would not fit your “irreducible core.”

  35. DNA_Jock: related to Flint’s objection #3: it’s not an entailment…

    Not sure here what you mean by “it”. There is no particular reason why plenty of junk should or should not be present, and there are organisms at both extremes.

    Separately, I am not sure I agree with Neil re scientists’ fondness for Popper’s falsificationism. I’ve often seen Popper used as a quick and easy way to guillotine a conversation about a really stupid idea (SWIDT), but conversations about what is actually science include stuff like consilience and fecundity. YMMV

    I think I agree, the boundaries of “science”, in general, are very hard to demarcate. But your point about consilience is perhaps subtle – you could almost say that if it’s not possible in principle for experts to agree, it’s probably not science.

    I think it’s important to distinguish between specific testable claims, and general explanations covering a large set of related observations. Even if we DID find a fossil rabbit in the Cambrian, we’d most likely extend our theory to account for this, since all other consistent (and consiliant) observations would STILL need to be covered by any alternate theory.

  36. Neil Rickert: That’s not a scientific account.That’s your personal account.

    I know some people who call themselves Christians, but who would not fit your “irreducible core.”

    And so your argument is that religion is so hopelessly vague, fuzzy, and indeterminate that just about anything could be a religion?

    Just out of curiosity, do your “Christians” who deny the divinity of Christ, make ANY testable claims? Do they ever cross the line into the land where observations are possible?

  37. colewd: If you ask Steven Meyer what is the theory of intelligent design he will say that he uses the inference argument that Darwin used. Intelligence is the best inference to explain information (sequences) inside DNA.

    I am underwhelmed.

    I don’t much like “inference to the best explanation” (or abduction).

    When I see someone saying that the scientist reached his conclusion via abduction, I interpret that as “it’s seems like pretty good conclusion, but I don’t know how the scientist came up with it.”

    When I see somebody saying that he is making an inference to the best explanation, I conclude that he is bullshitting me (and perhaps himself).

    As used by ID proponents, abduction seems to be “jump to the conclusion that I want (often for religious reasons), and declare that to be a inference.

  38. DNA_Jock: related to Flint’s objection #3: it’s not an entailment…

    I’ve often seen Popper used as a quick and easy way to guillotine a conversation about a really stupid idea (SWIDT), but conversations about what is actually science include stuff like consilience and fecundity. YMMV

    Karl Popper is no different than Carl von Clausewitz …

    … quoted second-hand far more often than actually read. Misquoted really.

    I remain convinced the majority of the scientific community who quote him actually misinterpret Popper along lines Popper himself would take great exception to.

    Of course, there are others who in a state of great self-denial simultaneously dismiss Popper while embracing some version of Verificationism. They readily admit the former while denying the later.

    I can only imagine Karl Popper would be most amused.

  39. TomMueller:A very important distinction lost on far too many including Coyne and a host of others…I have discovered that debating their kind is no less frustrating than an exchange of ideas with born-again Christian evangelists.There really is no exchange of ideas with dogmatists bent on proselytization.

    Preach it, brother. In my world, “Pease do not bother replying – I have heard it already all before” doesn’t quite cut it as “an exchange of ideas”, reflecting as it does as rigid a dogmatism as anyone could dream of erecting.

  40. Neil Rickert:As used by ID proponents, abduction seems to be “jump to the conclusion that I want (often for religious reasons), and declare that to be a inference.”

    As that cartoon put it, the religious method is “here are the conclusions. Let’s see if we can misrepresent any facts to support them.”

  41. DNA_Jock: I’ve often seen Popper used as a quick and easy way to guillotine a conversation about a really stupid idea (SWIDT), but conversations about what is actually science include stuff like consilience and fecundity.

    I’ll agree that is how it is mostly used. I doubt that scientists use it much (or at all) in their own scientific research programs. They use it mainly in argumentation.

  42. Flint,

    Quick Question:

    re: Flint’s dogma The irreducible core of the Christian faith is that Jesus performed miracles and rose from the dead.

    According to your own post: none of that is matter of debate or open to discussion?

    Pray tell… how could any exchange of ideas be then conceivably possible?

    You want an exchange of ideas? I have read your books. Now how about you reading a couple of books that do not coincide with your Weltbild and then continuing the exchange of ideas:

    https://www.amazon.ca/gp/product/B00DB39V2Q/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?ie=UTF8&btkr=1

    https://www.amazon.ca/gp/product/B003WEA97K/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?ie=UTF8&btkr=1

    both are great reads.

    You’re welcome

  43. Flint,

    Sorry, I was unclear. The unentailed “It” is Meyer’s prediction of high levels of function in the genome. All these ID predictions are either post-dictions, or they come with a built-in “Or not” caveat…

  44. TomMueller,

    Yes, I’m a fan of Bennett as well. I recommend his site to my students and I also benefited enormously from his Learning From Six Philosophers. I am actually not familiar with Bennett’s work on Kant. I learned Kant from Henry Allison and those influenced by him.

    Though in all honesty my views are really post-Kantian rather than Kantian — much closer to Hegel, Nietzsche, Dewey, Cassirer, C. I. Lewis, Sellars etc. than to what Kant himself actually thought. But they all begin with criticisms of Kant!

  45. Neil Rickert,

    As used by ID folks, that seems like an apt criticism of abduction. But let it be recalled that Peirce (who coined the term “abduction”) did not think that the abductive leap was the whole of science. It was the beginning of scientific theorizing. Peirce (much like Popper) always insisted that the hypothesis generated by the abductive leap had to be tested.

    My whole epistemological* objection to ID has been that they make the leap and then call it a day — as if simply making the design inference were sufficient for science, and never mind the testing of that inference.

    * which is not to say that I don’t also object to ID on cultural-political grounds, etc.

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