Dogmatism vs Skepticism

Lately I’ve been reading Outline of Pyrrhonism by Sextus Empiricus. Sextus collects the arguments for Skepticism as practiced by ancient Greek and Roman philosophers. Since the notion of “skepticism” seems to play some small role here, I thought it would be fun to take a look at what Sextus means by it.

Sextus situates skepticism as the only reasonable response to “dogmatism”. The dogmatists he has in mind are Platonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism (“the Peripatetics”).

He observes, firstly, that the dogmatists all contradict one another — if Stoicism is right, then Epicureanism must be false; if Epicureanism is right, then Aristotelianism must be wrong, etc. What are we to do when dogmatism contradicts dogmatism?

Sextus then observes that none of these positions is “self-evident”, because all of them requires “going beyond the appearances” by making claims about what is “nonevident”. In order to do make claims about what is nonevident, the dogmatist must always either make a circular argument that assumes what they purport to establish or commit themselves to an infinite regress. On this basis he concludes that it is not reasonable to make claims about reality one way or the other. Instead the Skeptic endeavors to live only according to the appearances, and be guided only by what is immediately evident to the senses.

A nice corollary of Sextus’s arguments is that one cannot be a naturalist and a skeptic, since the naturalist does make positive claims about the nature of reality. Naturalism and theism effectively cancel each other out.

The dialectic between dogmatism and skepticism stretches out across the whole history of philosophy. The re-discovery of Stoicism and Epicureanism during the Renaissance re-activated the ancient quarrels between competing dogmatisms (though with a different political dimension, since by this time Aristotelianism had become, thanks to Aquinas and subsequent theologians, the official doctrine of the Catholic Church, which its entrenched power structure).  So the quarrel between competing dogmatisms had a political dimension that it seemed to have lacked in antiquity. The revival of Skepticism, most notably (to my mind) with Montaigne, then leads to renewed efforts to establish dogmatism by refuting Skepticism. (This did not prevent some philosophers from attempting to integrate Christianity and skepticism, as Pierre Gassendi did.)

Descartes was, as we know, the most famous (or infamous) of attempts to refute skepticism. But as was pointed out even then, Descartes’ arguments do not avoid circularity. (I believe it was Antonin Artaud who first made this point in first, in his Objections to the Meditations. Descartes’ Reply is, to put it mildly, not convincing.)

The inconsistencies within Cartesian dogmatism led to multiple and contradicting attempts to repair it: Spinoza, Leibniz, Malebranche, and Berkeley being the attempts that have since made it into the Canon (largely because they were all men). At the same time, Pierre Bayle is collecting the new Skepticism into what amounted to a new version of Outlines of Pyrrhonism for the modern era. Following on the heels of all of them, it fell to Hume in his Treatise on Human Nature to demolish all permutations of modern dogmatism by destroying their basis in Cartesianism.

Since then, the dialectic runs back and forth between competing dogmatisms and between dogmatism and skepticism. Kant was perhaps the first philosopher to even attempt a genuine via media between dogmatism and skepticism, but the fatal problems with Kant’s solution are well-known to most casual students of philosophy.

To this day it remains unclear whether there is a via media between dogmatism and skepticism. Some philosophers, including myself, think that the historical arc of pragmatism that runs from Hegel through Peirce and Dewey to Sellars should be understood as precisely an alternative to both dogmatism and skepticism. Others, of course, are not convinced. And so we have the persistence of both multiple forms of dogmatism — naturalism and theism alike — as well as new forms of skepticism.

Can a naturalist be a skeptic? Is skepticism more reasonable than any competing dogmatism? Is skepticism a viable philosophy as a way of life? Is pragmatism a dialectically stable alternative to dogmatism and to skepticism, or must it collapse into one or the other?

443 thoughts on “Dogmatism vs Skepticism

  1. quote:

    In order to do make claims about what is nonevident, the dogmatist must always either make a circular argument that assumes what they purport to establish or commit themselves to an infinite regress.

    end quote:

    Since this claim is itself “nonevident” does that mean that the skeptic is also a dogmatist?

    😉

    peace

  2. I love these sort of broad historical overviews you do of a certain idea in philosophy. Thanks!

  3. Is there a who cares ism?

    I don’t meant that there’s no point in thinking. I mean that the way to bet is that such problems are not going to be solved, and unless it is our professional life, we needn’t trouble ourselves with it, except as entertainment.

  4. fifthmonarchyman: Since this claim is itself “nonevident” does that mean that the skeptic is also a dogmatist?

    Ooh, nice try! But I think the answer is “no,” at least by Sextus’s own lights.

    The dogmatist is (according to Sextus) someone who makes claims about what is real and what is not. To do so, he must propose a criterion for determining what is real and what is not. But then the question can always be raised, “what justifies the criterion?”

    If the criterion is justified by another criterion, then the skeptical question can be raised again, and so there is a regress.

    If the criterion is justified by what is established by the criterion, then argument is circular.

    For example — as Descartes shows — one cannot establish the reliability of the senses by means of the senses. Once the question has been posed, “by what criterion can we establish the reliability of the senses?”, it is clear that the answer “the senses” will not the work, since then it would be circular.

    Descartes famously tried to argue that the intellect can vindicate itself, whereas the senses cannot vindicate themselves. The flaws in that method have been known since Artaud’s criticisms of Descartes, and they came to a head in Hume’s skepticism about reason.

    Whether or not Humean skepticism about reason can be avoided has been a central issue in philosophy ever since.

    The reason why Sextus avoids this whole problem is that, by resolving to live only according to the appearances, he does not make any claims at all about reality, and hence does not need any criterion with which to establish such claims.

  5. fifthmonarchyman: In order to do make claims about what is nonevident, the dogmatist must always either make a circular argument that assumes what they purport to establish or commit themselves to an infinite regress.

    Heh. Oh man. Finding you having written that, has that strange quality of irony one might also experience when reading stories of bomb-makers blowing up from making their own bombs.

    In fact, I think I have a picture for this exact situation. As if it was made just for the situation that one would find you, having wrote that.

  6. Kantian Naturalist: he does not make any claims at all about reality,

    Sure he does,

    He claims that it is true that the dogmatist is making claims about reality but does not offer any criterion to establish this claim

    peace

  7. fifthmonarchyman: Is that a claim about what is real?

    No, it’s a definition. Darth Vader isn’t real, yet there is some definition one could make of what Darth Vader is.

  8. fifthmonarchyman: Sure he does,

    He claims that it is true that the dogmatist is making claims about reality

    No, that is how he defines a dogmatist. Whether there are such persons in reality is immaterial with respect to the mere act of making such a definition.

  9. Kantian Naturalist: If the criterion is justified by what is established by the criterion, then argument is circular.

    exactly, Skeptics are just as vulnerable to this trap as everyone else. The problem is that they are often unable to see it.

    what’s needed is a bit of self reflection

    peace

  10. Rumraket: No, that is how he defines a dogmatist.

    Exactly it’s a presupposition.
    A premise that is simply assumed with out evidence.

    peace

  11. Rumraket: Whether there are such persons in reality is immaterial with respect to the mere act of making such a definition.

    His entire approach is based on the assumption that he is doing what the “dogmatist” does not do.

    That is simply not the case. He is on exactly the same ground as the dogmatist.

    There is only way to avoid the infinite regress and skepticism or dogmatism is not it

    Peace

  12. fifthmonarchyman: He claims that it is true that the dogmatist is making claims about reality but does not offer any criterion to establish this claim

    The skeptic is using the very claims that the dogmatist is making, though. The point here is that the skeptic doesn’t have to make any claims about reality in order to use the dogmatist’s own claims against her. All the skeptic has to do is take up the very claims that the dogmatist is making and show that those claims cannot be grounded in a way that avoids both circularity and a regress.

  13. Mung:
    Man, this Sextus guy appears to have been against everything and everyone.

    Sextus Empiricus: Against the Professors

    Yes, that’s part of what makes him so much fun!

    Does empiricism get it’s name from him, or did he take on that name?

    Apparently he was called that because he belonged to the Empirical school of ancient Roman medicine. I believe that empeiria, the root word here, means something like “learning from trial and error”, as distinct from making deductions from first principles.

  14. KN,

    Can a naturalist be a skeptic?

    Yes, and I am both, in the sense that I am a naturalist, but not a dogmatic one; my naturalism is contingent on the veridicality of my senses.

    If my senses aren’t veridical, then all bets are off. If they’re veridical, then I am a (provisional) naturalist based on what they tell me.

  15. So it would be incorrect to call keiths an empiricist in that sense, since he never seems to learn from his errors.

  16. Evidence that there is a God. I was composing a post about keiths while at the same time he was composing a post, and he happened to hit the post comment button just before I did just so that my post appeared right after his, lol.

  17. Kantian Naturalist: The point here is that the skeptic doesn’t have to make any claims about reality in order to use the dogmatist’s own claims against her.

    Of course he does. For starters
    1) He has to claim that he can know what the skeptic is claiming. This is a claim about reality.
    2) he has to claim that he knows what circular reasoning is and know that it is bad
    3) he has claim to know that his response to her claims is valid and logical

    etc etc etc

    Kantian Naturalist: All the skeptic has to do is take up the very claims that the dogmatist is making and show that those claims cannot be grounded in a way that avoids both circularity and a regress.

    how can he do this with out making a claim about reality namely he is able to show that the dogmatist’s claims cannot be grounded in a way that avoids both circularity and a regress?

    peace

  18. keiths: If my senses aren’t veridical, then all bets are off.

    There is a claim about reality right there.
    you dogmatist 😉

    peace

  19. fifthmonarchyman: Of course he does. For starters
    1) He has to claim that he can know what the skeptic is claiming. This is a claim about reality.
    2) he has to claim that he knows what circular reasoning is and know that it is bad
    3) he has claim to know that his response to her claims is valid and logical

    etc etc etc

    how can he do this with out making a claim about reality namely that the dogmatist’s claims cannot be grounded in a way that avoids both circularity and a regress?

    Simply, because there’s a logical difference between claims about reality and claims about claims. It’s just the difference between an object-language and a metalanguage.

    Sextus is arguing in the metalanguage that no object-language claims can do what the dogmatist wants them to do: correspond to objective reality.

  20. keiths:

    If my senses aren’t veridical, then all bets are off.

    fifth:

    There is a claim about reality right there.
    you dogmatist 😉

    That’s a logical truth, not an empirical claim. Think, fifth.

  21. keiths: That’s a logical truth, not an empirical claim.

    I did not say it was an empirical claim. I said it was a claim about reality. Think keiths

  22. Kantian Naturalist: Sextus is arguing in the metalanguage that no object-language claims can do what the dogmatist wants them to do: correspond to objective reality.

    Right therefore he is arguing that the metalanguage is relevant to how things actually are.

    That is a claim

    peace

  23. Kantian Naturalist: Sextus is arguing in the metalanguage that no object-language claims can do what the dogmatist wants them to do: correspond to objective reality.

    Well then, why didn’t he just say so!

    I’m a bit miffed that this doesn’t seem to be available for Kindle.

  24. fifthmonarchyman: Right therefore he is arguing that the metalanguage is relevant to how things actually are.

    That is a claim

    That would work if all claims are claims about reality, or if it is not possible to make any claims at all without also making claims about reality.

    Sextus’ method is to take the claims of the dogmatic metaphysicians at face value, and to show that they fail by their own lights.

    This is because any comprehensive metaphysics needs to not only make claims about reality, but also to justify those claims, to show why those claims are the correct ones to make.

    Sextus’ point is that any standard of philosophical correctness must fail by its own lights, since it cannot help but resort to either circularity or a regress in order to established as a standard.

    He’s not assuming any standpoint on reality independent of what he takes the dogmatists to be asserting. If he did that, then he certainly would be a dogmatist. Rather, he’s taking the claims of the dogmatists and showing that none of those claims can do the work that the dogmatists want them to do.

    In short, he’s showing that there’s no such thing as objective knowledge.

    To emphasize a point I made above: I’m not a Skeptic in Sextus’ sense. I just find his criticism of dogmatic metaphysics to be extraordinarily powerful and sophisticated. And I think that refuting skepticism (as Descartes tried to do) is much harder than it looks.

  25. Mung:
    Evidence that there is a God. I was composing a post about keiths while at the same time he was composing a post, and he happened to hit the post comment button just before I did just so that my post appeared right after his, lol.

    “Composing a post” = Composting ????

  26. Mung: Well then, why didn’t he just say so!

    I’m a bit miffed that this doesn’t seem to be available for Kindle.

    There does seem to be this for Kindle.

    I’m not sure, but I think that the book called “Pyrrhonic Sketches” is the same as Outline of Pyrrhonism. The Greek title is “Pyrrhōneioi hypotypōseis”.

  27. Kantian Naturalist: That would work if all claims are claims about reality, or if it is not possible to make any claims at all without also making claims about reality.

    no it only requires that claims about reality are claims about reality.

    Kantian Naturalist: Sextus’ method is to take the claims of the dogmatic metaphysicians at face value, and to show that they fail by their own lights.

    How can he show this? Only by assuming that certain things are true. Things like the law of non-contradiction and that rationality is possible

    He does not explain why these things are or on what basis he is able to trust their validity. If he did he would run into the same circularity or regress that he is challenging in others

    Kantian Naturalist: This is because any comprehensive metaphysics needs to not only make claims about reality, but also to justify those claims

    Is this a claim about reality? You know the answer don’t you

    Kantian Naturalist: In short, he’s showing that there’s no such thing as objective knowledge.

    Again this is a claim about reality. So he is in exactly the same spot as the dogmatist

    Kantian Naturalist: To emphasize a point I made above: I’m not a Skeptic in Sextus’ sense.

    OK but you are in the same predicament that he is in. There is only one way out

    peace

  28. fifthmonarchyman,

    For one thing, the law of non-contradiction is up for grabs here, and it’s important to see why.

    The argument for the law of non-contradiction in Aristotle’s Metaphysics is difficult to parse out. As best I can tell (and some schiolar of ancient Greek philosophy agree with me on this point) the argument works by actually assumes the ontology that Aristotle is articulating there. And that’s because, when you drill down to the most basic level of explication, Aristotle is assuming that there are determinate objects with determinate properties. Only with that assumption in place does the argument for the law of non-contradiction actually go through.

    This is a subtle point, but an extremely important one: is logic independent of metaphysics?

    There are (I’ve said this before, but it bears repeating, apparently) alternative logics which do not uphold the law of non-contradiction. For a brief exposition, see “The logic of Buddhist philosophy“.

    But to the extent that Sextus is assuming the law of non-contradiction, he’s only doing so because his dogmatist opponents are doing so. He is using de dicto, not de re — that is, allowing his opponents to make the claims that he then undermines, without making claims of his own. The claim that we can’t have knowledge of objective reality follows from his analysis of the impossibility of avoiding both circularity and the regress for any claim that a dogmatist wants to make about objective reality. That’s why it’s not a first-order claim about the world, but a second-order claim about claims about the world.

  29. I assume this is apparent to almost everyone here, but to make it explicit: just as it is circular to appeal to the senses in order to establish that the senses are reliable, so too it is circular to appeal to revelation in order to establish that revelation is reliable.

    🙂

  30. KN,

    And I think that refuting skepticism (as Descartes tried to do) is much harder than it looks.

    You and walto have had some recent experience with that. 🙂

  31. KN,

    I assume this is apparent to almost everyone here,

    With the emphasis on almost. 🙂

    …but to make it explicit: just as it is circular to appeal to the senses in order to establish that the senses are reliable, so too it is circular to appeal to revelation in order to establish that revelation is reliable.

    Cue the Godbot.

  32. keiths:
    KN,

    You and walto have had some recent experience with that.

    The difference between me and Walto is that I think that there are threads running from Hegel and Peirce that can used to establish a genuine alternative to both dogmatism and skepticism. Walto is much more of a Kantian than I am: he just thinks that there are necessary structures to human self-consciousness which make it impossible to sustain skepticism. I’m much more persuaded that Hegel shows us just why we cannot be content with Kant’s residual dogmatism about reason itself.

  33. KN,

    I was referring to the prolonged difficulties both of you had in trying to respond to my Cartesian skepticism.

  34. Kantian Naturalist: Only with that assumption in place does the argument for the law of non-contradiction actually go through.

    Is that statement and it’s negation both true at the same time and in the same respect?

    Kantian Naturalist: But to the extent that Sextus is assuming the law of non-contradiction, he’s only doing so because his dogmatist opponents are doing so.

    He is claiming that his opponents are doing this.
    That is a claim about reality. Just like the ones he is challenging.

    Kantian Naturalist: The claim that we can’t have knowledge of objective reality follows from his analysis of the impossibility of avoiding both circularity and the regress for any claim that a dogmatist wants to make about objective reality.

    He is claiming that his analysis is reliable. That is a claim about reality. Just like the ones he is challenging

    Kantian Naturalist: That’s why it’s not a first-order claim about the world, but a second-order claim about claims about the world.

    Again You are assuming that there is a difference between a first order claim and a second order claim. Just like the ones he is challenging

    peace

    Kantian Naturalist: There are (I’ve said this before, but it bears repeating, apparently) alternative logics which do not uphold the law of non-contradiction.

    Is that statement and it’s negation both true at the same time and in the same respect?

  35. What are we to do when dogmatism contradicts dogmatism?

    We have to pick one but then not be dogmatic about it. 🙂

    Just because different religions [or philosophies] may conflict with one another it doesn’t follow that they are all false. The question that interests me is whether it can be shown that at least one must be true.

    On this basis he concludes that it is not reasonable to make claims about reality one way or the other. Instead the Skeptic endeavors to live only according to the appearances, and be guided only by what is immediately evident to the senses.

    Does he think then that we cannot say that the appearances are all we can say is real or that we cannot even say that the appearances are real. Because the latter would seem to me to be yet another case of saying one thing but then living as if it is false.

    That there only appears to be a cliff, but I’m sure not going to put that to the test! Or would he say that really is a cliff and if I jump off it I really will fall until I hit bottom? Are we certain he wasn’t a sophist? 😉

    Instead the Skeptic endeavors to live only according to the appearances, and be guided only by what is immediately evident to the senses.

    Why? To what end does the Skeptic adopt this stance?

    A nice corollary of Sextus’s arguments is that one cannot be a naturalist and a skeptic, since the naturalist does make positive claims about the nature of reality.

    Yes. Let’s not lose track of this one.

Leave a Reply