In a post at Uncommon Descent, Denyse O’Leary selectively quotes John Maynard Keynes:
Whatever his merits or failings as an economist (the world is pretty divided on that), John Maynard Keynes got ID basically right in his Treatise on Probability (1921):
The discussion of final causes and of the argument from design has suffered confusion from its supposed connection with theology. But the logical problem is plain and can be determined upon formal and abstract considerations. The argument is in all cases simply this—an event has occurred and has been observed which would be very improbable à priori if we did not know that it had actually happened; on the other hand, the event is of such a character that it might have been not unreasonably predicted if we had assumed the existence of a conscious agent whose motives are of a certain kind and whose powers are sufficient.(p. 340)
So the obvious question he asks is, what does the evidence suggest?
That would make Keynes way smarter than many Catholic philosophers who can exquisitely explain who the universe shows no evidence of design, through dozens of casuistries, though then it is unclear what the Catechism of the Catholic Church is even about.
In the comments, kairosfocus is equally enthusiastic:
JMK is way smarter than most of his detractors, too. He really changed the world.
(I wonder whether the homophobic kairosfocus realizes that Keynes was described by his lover Lytton Strachey as “a liberal and a sodomite, an atheist and a statistician.”)
Had Denyse resisted the quotemining impulse, she would have included these words of Keynes instead of cutting the quotation short:
Thus we cannot measure the probability of the conscious agent’s existence after the event, unless we can measure its probability before the event. And it is our ignorance of this, as a rule, that we are endeavouring to remedy. The argument tells us that the existence of the hypothetical agent is more likely after the event than before it; but, as in the case of the general inductive problem dealt with in Part III., unless there is an appreciable probability first, there cannot be an appreciable probability afterwards. No conclusion, therefore, which is worth having, can be based on the argument from design alone; like induction, this type of argument can only strengthen the probability of conclusions, for which there is something to be said on other grounds. We cannot say, for example, that the human eye is due to design more probably than not, unless we have some reason, apart from the nature of its construction, for suspecting conscious workmanship.
And no, Denyse, putting a question mark at the end of your post title (“Economist John Maynard Keynes understood ID?”) does not excuse your dishonesty.