This was originally intended as a brief reply to the comment by William J Murray but it sort of grew into something a little longer so I thought, since everyone else is doing it, I’d put it up here.
William J Murray:
I think that any fair reading of UD will show that the vast majority of pro-ID posters there, and certainly the moderators and subject contributors, are not “anti-science” at all, nor “sneer” at science; rather, they have what is IMO a legitimate concern over the anti-religious, anti-theist, pro-materialist agenda that many of those currently in positions of power in the institutions of science blatantly demonstrate.
I would agree that not all contributors to UD are anti-science but there is, nonetheless, a prominent strand of such thinking there. Many of the original posts mock the speculative excesses of evolutionary psyschology, for example, or seem to gloat over instances of where science has apparently got it wrong. Those occasions where the author of such comments has got it wrong themselves pass largely unremarked. The overall impression is of an anti-science advocacy site.
I will grant that there are a few contributors to UD who are critical of the perceived atheist/materialist stance of many scientists in public fora as improper because it associates science with atheism. They hold, as I do, that the most science can say on such questions is that, following Laplace, it has found no need for such hypotheses thus far. While it may be true that a majority of scientists hold atheistic views it is misleading to suggest that they are endorsed by science as a whole.
That said, my impression of UD is that the majority of contributors are critical of science because they believe it is hostile and threat to their religion. They feel that science is perceived as a source of knowledge that is more reliable and authoritative than that offered by the various faiths which is thereby undermined. One slightly amusing response is the attempt to cast science as just another religion. Those who do so seem to be oblivious to the contradiction: on the one hand, religion is presented as a way of knowing that is fully the equal of science, on the other hand, the authority of science is supposed to be undermined by calling it just another religion, implying that religion is a lesser form of knowledge and science is to be dragged down to that level. Unfortunately, much as they would like to, they can’t have it both ways
There is without doubt a very vocal group of scientists and advocates of science who believe that it does make religious beliefs untenable They highlight the harm that has been done – and is still being done – in the name of the various faiths as evidence that we would all be better off without it. My own view is that this is reactionary and most prominent in the United States. It is a response to the extreme hostility felt by many Americans towards any form of non-belief and the excessive influence of such religious beliefs on the society and politics of that country.
My own view is that it is true that, over the millennia, a great deal of blood has been spilled in the name of various religions. It is also true that huge numbers have been killed in the name of the various political ideologies, which were in some cases atheistic, that gained power in the twentieth century. I would argue that it is further true that trying to compare body counts is a pointless distraction. The real lesson to be taken is the dangers of absolutist thinking.
In spite of the posturing and boastfulness of some, we are mostly well aware of our own weakness and vulnerability. Instinctively, we crave the kind of reliable knowledge about the world in which we find ourselves that will give us a good handle on it and increase our chances of survival. We are all too easily seduced by anyone or any belief system which appears to offer such certainty, especially in times of heightened insecurity. The danger is that, once convinced of the absolute truth of such beliefs, there are some who will have no doubt that they are fully justified in doing almost anything to defend and promote such them. Thus we have the spectacle of William Lane Craig apparently feeling compelled to defend and justify the massacring of children, even though I have no doubt it is something he would never do himself, because it is something reported in his Bible as being required of believers and approved by his God.
Thus we come back to Oliver Cromwell’s impassioned plea, used as the motto for this blog:
I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken.
That may be your “whole point”, but it isn’t mine. Of course, everything we experience and process in life is done so from a subjective point of view. Did you think I was arguing otherwise?
The question isn’t if we experience and process everything subjectively (of course we do); the question is whether or not, like gravity and entropy and the empire state building, we hold what morality refers to – the good – as an objectively existent phenomena. That doesn’t mean that it is, or that it can be proven that it is. It’s a question of logical premises and sufficient warrant for establishing the coherence and consistency of our views.
If one holds that there is no “objective good” that morality refers to, then it is my argument that one cannot also hold there are self-evidently true, universal moral statements. Only if there is a necessary, objective “good” can it be true that such statements actually exist (meaning, refer to something fundamentally true), and an objective good can only exist if there is a god.
Thus, if one wishes to hold the belief that there are self-evidently true, universally applicable (whether anyone particular person agrees or not) moral statements, they cannot be an atheist and have a logically consistent worldview.
Once again – this isn’t an argument about physical or existential fact; it’s a logical argument that examines the rational conclusions of a couple of premises and a statement we wish to arrive at. Nothing more.
I agree 100% with the above statement, however, it also shows the flaw in your reasoning.
Let’s change the statement to reflect a different premise.
My statement is as valid as yours.
It is also as just as useless to base a worldview on.
Both of our statements simply reflect our wishes, not reason.
Okay, as you point out above, we are in agreement on this point.
This, to me, is the crux of the problem. I do not see how the existence of a god establishes the existence of an objective good and morality. How are the moral prescriptions of a deity not just another subjective viewpoint?
This.
Either the Godhead can make choices, in which case she just decided to instigate genocide (I’m referring of course to the much discussed Biblical narrative) instead of, say, applying some miraculous non-violent brain washing intervention to erase the ‘sinful’ thoughts and practices of the alleged perpetrators; or she can not.
If she can, and chooses genocide, and that makes it moral – great, genocide has now become morally acceptable because of a subjective decision. Makes this whole discussion moot, doesn’t it?
If she can’t choose, she isn’t much of a Godhead at all, really, and there must be something even more fundamental that decides that genocide is in this case the inevitable option. If this is so fundamental that it even trumps the Godhead’s abilities, I posit that William Murray’s self-evident truth that genocide is immoral, is plainly wrong.
This is of course just Eutrypho’s dilemma, which no theist has yet been able to satisfactory resolve in my opinion. Reason for that is that there are some pretty fundamental incoherencies in the concept of an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God and the realities of this Universe.
fG
If “what is good” is a necessary commodity of the deity, and thus of whatever it directly creates.
Once again, if “what is good’ is a necessary (not arbitrary) aspect of god, then “what is good” is necessary, not arbitrary – even for god. IOW, god doesn’t get to arbitrarily decide what is good or not good.
WJM: “we hold what morality refers to – the good – as an objectively existent phenomena. That doesn’t mean that it is, or that it can be proven that it is. It’s a question of logical premises and sufficient warrant for establishing the coherence and consistency of our views.”
You keep stating that the claim ‘x is true’ in the face of your stated inability to ever confirm whether x actually may be true or not a ‘coherent and consistent worldview’. I disagree with you that assuming you can know something that you have already concluded you cannot know (IOW: pretense) is a coherent worldview.
WJM: “Once again, if “what is good’ is a necessary (not arbitrary) aspect of god, then “what is good” is necessary, not arbitrary – even for god. IOW, god doesn’t get to arbitrarily decide what is good or not good.”
You are confounding arbitrary with subjective. We as humans don’t get to arbitrarily choose our moral feelings either. Moral feelings are a human trait, just like hunger is. Traits are shaped by many influences (often including culture and education). Human moral feelings are both variable and subjective, just like hunger is, but not arbitrary at all, just like hunger is not. They are non-arbitrary because they are shaped by shared biological and cultural necessities (i.e. they are necessary traits), and variable because of the many differences among individual biological and cultural histories. But they are subjective because they belong to us (as the sources of the perception).
Thus, the only difference between your god and us humans in this regard is that there is no inter-individual variation, since there is only one individual god. So, godly moral feelings in your scenario are non-variable because they are based on a sample size of one; they are non-arbitrary because they are a necessary trait of the respective god; and they are subjective because they belong to this god.
I haven’t stated any claims. I’ve stated propositions, premises and inferences.
I didn’t say, or concede, or postulate that “moralty” was, or refers to, “feelings”.
You are apparently failing to understand both the nature and substance of the argument at hand.
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Here are some of your claims from one single post:
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Those sound like claims.
To borrow your own favorite objection: rhetoric is not a rebuttal.
But if you insist:
You keep stating that the PROPOSITION ‘x is true’, in the face of your stated inability to ever find out whether x actually may be true or not, is a ‘coherent and consistent worldview’. I disagree with you that assuming you can know something that you have already concluded you cannot know (IOW: pretense) is a coherent worldview.
On the contrary, I think you are failing to understand the relevance of the argument I just brought to the table. I never said that you say, or concede, or postulate that morality refers to feelings. I observe, along with most fellow humans in history who have studied morality, that moral behavior is governed by moral feelings, i.e. the intuitive discernment of “right” and “wrong”, informed and modified by our environment. We wouldn’t even have a concept of morality to discuss if we didn’t have moral feelings to base the question upon what morality is. And those moral feelings, which are the foundation of our moral judgments and behaviors, are subjective and variable, but not arbitrary.
WJM: even if you disagree that human moral behavior is based on moral feelings (in which case I would really like to hear what you think this sense of right and wrong I feel is, if it’s not a feeling), you still haven’t addressed the crucial point: your conflation of subjectivity and arbitrariness.
Which is why you keep misunderstanding my arguments. That is my belief about the nature of god, which I believe exists.
They are not claims that such a god actually exists or actually has those commodities. I am not attempting to make a case that such a god actually exists, or actually has those commodities.
No, I do not. My argument begins with “IF proposition X is true, THEN ..”
First, I’m not tendering an argument about what morality factually refers to. Second, I’ve already covered the “feelings” theory of morality, which renders it subjective, and so if morality is based on feelings, there are no self-evidently true, universal moral statements.
Once again: this is an if .. then logical argument. I’m not attempting to make claims of fact or prove what morality factually refers to, or prove if there is a god. I’m not asserting any facts about these concepts.
Elizabeth and I have agreed that there are self-evidently true moral statements which apply to all humans at all times in all culures regardless of if they personally agree to them or not, such as it is always wrong to torture infants for fun.
If you do not agree that such statements exist, we have nothing to argue about, because that is the proposition the debate is about. It is not a claim of fact, nor is the argument an attempted proof of fact. What the argument is about is what worldview premise offers sufficient, necessary justification (warrant) for the expectation that such statements exist. IOW, we examine atheistic worldviews logically, and theistic worldviews logically, to see if ether or both can rationally produce such moral statements.
If morality refers to subjective, individual feelings, then as long as an individual “feels” it is okay to torture infants for fun, then by definition (individual feelings) it would be moral, and so the idea of a self-evidently, universally true moral statement fails. It is my argument that the only way that a self-evidently true, universal moral statement can exist is if god exists (because “what is good” must refer to a purpose, and for humans to have a universal purpose, they must have been created by an entity with a purpose in mind) and if “what is good” (which morality refers to) is a necessary commodity of god (not arbitrary). That would mean that everything god deliberately and directly creates would be for the good purpose which is an existential aspect of god’s being.
None of those are claims of fact, but rather are propositions, premises, inferences and logical conclusions. Nothing more. It’s only an examination of the rational consistency of Elizabeth’s worldview and beliefs, where IMO she has two irreconcilable views – atheism, and that self-evidently true, universal moral statements exist.
That’s because I haven’t conflated anything. If god is making arbitrary moral rules, then there is no such thing as a self-evidently, universal true moral statements, because god can simply command the contrary and it is moral by rule. If morality is subjective, then again no self-evidently true moral statements exist, because morality can mean anything the indivdiual “feels”.
For it to be true that self-evidently, universal moral statements to exist (logically speaking), there must exist a very specific worldview premise. There must be a god, and “what is good” must be an intrinsic (necessary) aspect of the nature of that god, unchangeable even by that god.
If moral statements are subjective, or arbitrary, they are not self-evident and universal.
Of course you did. Answering a question concerning subjectivity with an statement concerning arbitrariness is conflating the two concepts. Unless this statement of yours: “if ‘what is good’ is a necessary (not arbitrary) aspect of god, then ‘what is good’ is necessary, not arbitrary – even for god. IOW, god doesn’t get to arbitrarily decide what is good or not good.” was not supposed to be relevant to the question: “I do not see how the existence of a god establishes the existence of an objective good and morality. How are the moral prescriptions of a deity not just another subjective viewpoint?”
That’s exactly your problem: something being an intrinsic aspect of the nature of that god makes this trait non-arbitrary, but it does not make it non-subjective. The morality of this god is subjective for the same reason that any human’s morality is subjective: it belongs to this god, just like any human’s morality is subjective because it belongs to this particular human.
Hence, per your own criteria, your god’s moral statements are not self-evident and universal.
I am sorry, but you are starting to descend into self-contradiction and absurdity; you said this: “we hold what morality refers to – the good – as an objectively existent phenomena.”
(Definition *to hold*: to assert or affirm, especially formally)
That IS a proposition, assumption, assertion, or whatever you want to specifically call it, but it is most definitely not a conditional IF, THEN statement!
Of course you are, when you say that you hold what morality refers to as an objectively existent phenomenon!
Is this supposed to be an answer to my questions whether you disagree that human moral behavior is based on moral feelings, and if yes, what you think this sense of right and wrong I feel is, if it’s not a feeling?
Once again: “we hold what morality refers to – the good – as an objectively existent phenomena.” is NOT an IF, THEN logical argument. It’s a claim or proposition or assertion what morality actually refers to.
My POINT here is that your entire proposition/premise/worldview/belief is incoherent, on several levels:
1) It is based on the assumption that you can know something that you have already concluded you cannot know.
2) You have failed to establish that the morality of your god is non-subjective, which is your stated prerequisite for your premise (that self-evident moral statements exist).
Madbat089:
I’m not making assertions or claims of fact. I really don’t know how to be more plain and direct than that. Your interpretations otherwise are incorrect, and your arguments derived from that interpretation are of no interest to me.
As I have pointed out many times in this thread and in others, morality is taken as a subjective description of what humans “ought” to do in relationship to some goal or purpose. We can either hold that purpose to be subjective (whatever individual purpose a person has at the time) or objective (an existential, necessary good). It is only in the case of the latter that universal, self-evidently true moral statements could exist.
However, your argument is (apparently) that self-evidently true, universal moral statements do not exist under any worldview, which would mean that Elizabeth holds irreconcilably irrational beliefs – atheism, and that universal,self-evidently true moral statements exist.
Here’s the point about what an “objective good” means, in contrast to a subjective good, which morality (as a set of oughts) refers to. (Once again, this is part of a hypothetical argument, not a claim of fact). Humans can pick any assortment of purposes, such as, say, baking a chocolate cake. Their capacity to select any purpose they want to pursue is what is subjective; the “chocolate cake”, however, is an objectively existent purpose (even though it has been subjectively chosen by an individual).
Morality for that purpose, then, would be how to best bake a chocolate cake. If they throw some metal shavings and seawater into a mixing bowl, then even if they believe they are fulfilling oughts that will acquire their goal (what would be called “good behavior”), they are certainly not, in an objective consideration of their goal and what it takes to get there, “doing good”.
Madbat, this is where you are failing to understand the nature of the argument I’ve presented. You apparently take “morality” as set of feelings about how one should behave according to those feelings, without any consideration for a purpose. IOW, if you feel bad about some behavior, you avoid it, without considering any larger goal. This removes moral behavior from any objective considerations whatsoever.
If morality is just a set of feelings one has, then yes, it is entirely subjective and yes, there are no universal, self-evidently true moral statements. If, however, we take morality as a set of behaviors that are committed to in order to acquire a goal or fulfill a purpose that is posited as being describable in objective terms, then one has a moral system that is arguable outside of their “feelings” – meaning, they might have a rationally arguable moral system.
The problem, however, lies in how one chooses the purpose or goal that they are attempting to fulfill. One might choose pragmatism, but how do they choose what to them are practical goals worthy of pursuing? One might choose a system that generates the most benefit for the most people, but how then should one define “benefit”? On a larger scale, how does one choose what purpose to pursue in the first place?
We can see that even if one’s morality describes an objectively-describable goal (say, feeding the hungry, aiding the sick), choosing any such goal still comes down to subjective feelings that are not claimed or held to be anything more than that. IOW, the reason that one chooses to feed the hungry is because they feel like they should, and there is no warrant for that choice offered other than subjective feelings.
The only way that objectively true moral statements exist (which would provide a basis to expect to find universal, self-evidently true moral statements) is if they refer to an objectively existent purpose for existence, whether or not we know what that purpose is. The only way a purpose exists is that it lies in the mind of a sentient agency. The only way something that lies in the mind of an agency can objectively apply to all minds is if mind is a universally existent commodity, objectively existent in its own right.
In the same way that whatever produces the effects we call gravity exists everywhere in the universe and is part of the fabric of existence itself (as is entropy and time), the purpose for existence must lie in a universal mind of which all of our so-called individual minds must be a part of, just as all of our physical bodies are part of the physical universe and obey the rules of gravity, time, and entropy.
If “the good”, or “the purpose of existence” is a necessary (not arbitrary) commodity that is an intrinsic aspect of universal mind, just as gravity is a necessary (not arbitrary), intrinsice commodity of universal physics, then whatever humans otherwise choose to pursue as their goal, even if the are unaware of or ignore the universal purpose, humans still have a universal purpose. One can choose to ignore that purpose, just as one can choose to ignore gravity as they go through life, but such willful ignorance is going to cost them because, like gravity, there are necessary consequences to ignoring objectively existent commodities.
It is only IF some aspects of universal mind (God) are objective commodities (purpose) that are shared by all minds (just as there are some fundamentally physics commodities that all physical bodies share) THAT there can be universal, self-evidently true moral statements.
There is no other condition of existence (that is my hypothetical argument) that can warrant such an expectation. If there is no god, or no universal mind of which the purpose of existence is a universal commodity for all beings with minds (whether they are aware of it or not), then there cannot be any universal, self-evidently true moral statements.
So, it is the conclusion of my hypothetical logical argument that atheism and the belief that universal, self-evidently true moral statements exist are irreconcilable beliefs, and so Elizabeth’s belief system is irrational on those grounds.
IF you are an atheist, and IF you don’t believe that universal, self-evidently true moral statements exist (such as: it is always wrong, in any conditions, to torture infants for personal pleasure), then those two beliefs are entirely consistent, logically speaking.
William J Murray,
You have a major logic problem pointed out by madbat089 that you don’t seem to be able to address.
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How do you reach out from within your subjective mind and come to a conclusion you believe has been reached by another subjective mind, in this case your god’s?
How do you know god’s intended purpose without directly talking to him?
If god did talk to you, why is he obligated to tell you the truth?
Everything you have said so far, presumes that you know the workings of god’s mind, and further, that it works just like yours.
I have offered no such conclusion.
I don’t claim to know it, and “what the purpose is” is entirely irrelevenat to the dabate. We can call the purpose “X”, and the self-evidently true moral statement “Y” for the purposes of the debate, because what they might actually state is entirely irrelevent to discerning the existential conditions that must exist in order for them to exist **at all**.
You’re arguing about “how can we discern true moral statements”; I’m arguing about which worldview can hypothetically produce any universal, self-evidently true moral statements whatsoever.
No, it doesn’t. It only presumes (which is the hypothetical proposition in question) that universal, self-evidently true moral statements exist, and then extrapolates backwards from that assumed, hypothetical proposition the existential premises that must exist if that proposition is true.
It is not an argument that the proposition is in fact true, or even that any particular statement is in fact a self-evidently true moral statement, but only an argument about what would have to be true IF the proposition was true (that some – whatever they may be – unversal, self-evidently true moral statements exist).
However, it appears that you and Madbat are immune to understanding that this is a purely hypothetical, logical argument that extends solely from the proposition and is not attempting whatsoever to “prove” the proposition, or even discern which moral statements are true. No “knowledge” of any of the particulars is necessary whatsoever, even if such knowledge was available.
Unless there exists a worldview that itself is self-evidently true, no worldview can produce self-evidently true moral statements.
You simply can’t get to those unless you first buy into the particular worldview that produces them. Since that process of buy-in is in itself subjective, self-evidently true moral statements will be forever out of reach.
It is all subjective, as we have said all along. Which is emphatically not the same as arbitrary.
fG
I agree that IF it is all subjective, it is THEN all subjective. There really is no reason to keep reiterating this, as it a valid tautology. Asserting that it IS subjective adds nothing to the debate.
The argument at hand extends from the assumptional premise that it is not “all subjective”, because if it were, then we could not say that something is wrong for an individual to do (for them, even if no one else knows) regardless of what they believe or feel about it, and that we can expect that such statements exist.
Whether or not the worldview must also be “self-evident” adds nothing to the debate about whether or not an atheistic worldview (whether self-evident or not) can support (provide sufficient warrant for) the expectation that such statements exist.
Why is anybody still attempting to unravel WJM’s obfuscatory verbiage? He’s already acknowledged that he doesn’t give a flying fuck about whether or not his ‘worldview’ actually has anything to do with Reality, and his nominal position of I just want it to be rationally justified is fatally undermined by the logical fallacies on which his argumentation depends. Is there anything at all in WJM’s verbiage which is worth addressing, once you clear away the bullshit, smoke, and mirrors?
Offering a hypothetical argument about something is not the same thing as not caring about whether the thing being discussed is true or not.
The argument that god exists, or that one’s moral worldview matters when it comes to consequences (personal , social and/or necessary), or that some worldviews are more justified via evidence and logic are just entirely different arguments that I don’t wish to get sidetracked into here.
This argument is about a specific hypothetical proposition.
That can only be correct if you made a mistake when you said:
“we hold what morality refers to – the good – as an objectively existent phenomena”
So, to answer this question once and for all: DO you or do you NOT hold what morality refers to as an objectively existent phenomenon?
that’s not what subjective means; it would be what arbitrary means;
that’s not what objective means;
Under your ramifications of “self-evidence”, yes.
No. It means that you hold irreconcilably irrational beliefs. As we have discussed before, Elizabeth means something very different than you do when she refers to self-evident statements.
No. “Subjective” and “objective” are not meaningful attributes of capacities.
This sentence has no discernible meaning to me. Purposes are not objective, and chocolate cakes are not purposes.
None of this bizarre scenario of yours has anything to do with morality, fulfilling objective oughts or good behavior. If I have decided that I want to make what I think of as a good chocolate cake, there are suitable and unsuitable methods of attaining that goal. There are no objective, universal, necessary chocolate cakes or methods; there are only certain combinations of certain ingredients that a certain group of humans have agreed on calling “chocolate cake”, and there are certain procedures and ingredients that have been observed to result more successfully in the creation of the agreed upon “chocolate cake” than others.
No, I do not. I have no idea where you get “without any consideration for a purpose from”. I never said that, and quite certainly do not hold that.
Quite the contrary.
Except that purposes are not objective. Purposes only exist as motivations of individuals or groups of individuals. Thus, what you describe here is not a rational system at all.
No. The warrant offered beyond the subjective feeling that something is good is usually the long-term benefits, weighed against the costs (and no, I don’t just mean economic benefits and costs here; I mean benefits and costs on any and all levels that weigh into the level that the decision is made on – personal, communal, legal, global, etc.)
No. That is simply wrong. Something lying in the mind of a sentient agency is PER DEFINITION SUBJECTIVE. It CANNOT be objective, per definition of these two words!!!
“Mind” is the name for the aspect of individual, conscious organisms that reasons, thinks, feels, wills, perceives, judges etc. Universal mind is thus a contradictory concept.
And how could it be possible for me to have a purpose in my mind, and for me to not know that purpose?
Your main mistake here is to call “it is always wrong, in any conditions, to torture infants for personal pleasure” a self-evident statement.
William J Murray,
Wow. This is getting tiring. I am not immune at all to understanding that the discussion you are having with Elizabeth is about a hypothetical argument. I am not Elizabeth. I am not having that discussion with you. In fact, I stopped commenting on the thread on which you are having said hypothetical argument. I am commenting on statements and arguments you have made on THIS thread. You have made the statement that you hold that what morality refers to – the good – as an objectively existent phenomenon. THAT is what I am discussing.
I said: “The morality of this god is subjective for the same reason that any human’s morality is subjective: it belongs to this god, just like any human’s morality is subjective because it belongs to this particular human.”
You answered the following:
That obviously is not an answer to my objection at all, because your “existential, necessary” good is an aspect of your god, and thus subjective.
You also have not addressed the point that your worldview premise, whether discussed for hypothetical or practical purposes, is not coherent at all because it is based on the assumption that you can know something that you have already concluded you cannot know.
My beating heart is an aspect of me. We hold it to be objectively existent, even if we cannot see it. We hold it to be an objectively existent commodity for all humans. Because it is an aspect of me personally doesn’t make it subjective.
We either hold things to be objectively existent, or subjective. It is part of my hypothetical argument (to warrant the category of moral statement proposed) that our minds are part of universal mind (god’s mind), in which some things, like universal purpose, are objectively existent, like the beating hearts all living humans have, or like gravity that all human bodies experience. Because a human subjectively experiences a thing doesn’t make the thing itself a subjective commodity.
Asserting that mind, and purpose, are subjective is irrelevant to the debate because this is not a debate about “what is”, but rather what “must be” in order for there to exist universal, self-evidently true moral statements.
What would those be?
No, you and I agreed that she probably means something different – but she hasn’t made her case one way or another here. However, she said that self-evidently true statements exist that apply to all humans whether they agree or not, regardless of conditions. Whatever specifically she means by “self-evidently true”, that description (which she agreed to) is untenable under atheism.
Where is the definition that says this?
The same way it is possible to have a functioning liver in your body and not know it. The same way it is possible to have all sorts of dysfunctional mental traits and not know it. The same way it is possible to have self-defeating behavioral patterns and not know it. The same way it is possible to be hallucinating and not know it. The same way it is possible to have repressed memories and not know it. The same way it is possible to have all sorts of subconscious aspects to your mind and not know it.
I agree that IF mind and purposes are inherently subjective, THEN there can exist no universal, self-evidently true moral statements … which is why I have argued that the only way such statements can exist is if mind and purpose exist (to some degree) as objective commodities.
I can sense and measure my heartbeat. According to the shared observation of humans that means that there is a heart in my body. Thus, a heart in my body is objectively existent in the sense that we call observations that are repeatable between independent subjective observers, can be observed by all those who actually look, and can be agreed upon by these observers “objective”.
A heart is not a commodity, it is an organ; and I don’t “hold it to be objectively existent”; I observe a number of symptoms, and I conclude that I have a heart, according to agreed upon convention.
Of course it does. The only reason we call anything “objectively existent” is because it falls into the category of observations that are repeatable between independent subjective observers, can be observed by all those who actually look, and can be agreed upon by these observers, i.e., because in these cases the subjective observations of human observers agree with one another. But they are still just a collection of subjective observations.
Don’t you realize the absurdity of arguing that *x cannot be true* is irrelevant, when your argument revolves around the assumption *x must be true*????
And I didn’t just *assert* that mind and purpose are subjective, I clearly deduced the relationship from what mind, purpose and subjectivity refer to in our language.
Ah yes, I thought so: subconscious aspects, repressed memories, and hallucinations. That’s exactly what a purpose IS NOT. A purpose is a conscious, intentional, desired result. If something is the result of unconscious impulses, we don’t call it purposeful.
From Dictionary.com:
– existing in the mind; belonging to the thinking subject rather than to the object of thought ( opposed to objective).
– Philosophy . relating to or of the nature of an object as it is known in the mind as distinct from a thing in itself.
– relating to properties or specific conditions of the mind as distinguished from general or universal experience.
From Oxford Dictionary:
– dependent on the mind or on an individual’s perception for its existence.
Your irrational worldview premise:
1) It is based on the assumption that you can know something that you have already concluded you cannot know.
2) You have failed to establish that the morality of your god is non-subjective, which is your stated prerequisite for your premise (that self-evident moral statements exist).
Yes, and because she hasn’t made her case one way or the other, and I am not Elizabeth, I am not going to argue with you what you think or I think Elizabeth thinks or means. That’s idle speculation and does not influence my investigation into whether the premise for YOUR discernment of morality is tenable, rational and has any relevance to the real world.
You said ” I’m arguing about which worldview can hypothetically produce any universal, self-evidently true moral statements whatsoever. ”
I am saying “None”, for the reasons I laid out above. Worldviews are intrinsically non-universal nor self-evident. That is what the word ‘Worldview’ *means*. Ergo, they are logically incapable of producing any universal, self-evidently true moral statements whatsoever.
Now perhaps you mis-stated what you meant. Perhaps you meant to say, which ‘reality’ can produce such statements. That would be a different discussion, but also a totally academic one because nobody can identify the underlying reality without looking through the lense of one’s worldview. In other words, that discussion is about as useful as the argument of angels dancing on the head of a pin.
The original question was if some worldviews have more warrant than others in claiming universal self-evident moral truths, right? You claim that theism has more warrant than atheism. I maintain that none of them are, even in principle, able to demonstrate that such truths exist and therefore none of them has more warrant than any other.
fG
From Wikipedia (mind):
Obviously, your dictionary.com definitions notwithstanding, there is a long, rich history of philosophical debate about whether or not the “mind” is itself an independent, objectively-existent “substance”, and whether or not it is the foundation of what we call “reality”. Referring to a dictionary definition of “subjective” as if it has the final say on what “mind” and “purpose” are in actuality is called definitional fiat, and doesn’t change the fact that IF we hold (meaning, assume or premise) that Y is true, then the dictionary must be wrong (to some degree) about what mind (and by inclusive extension, purpose) are in its definition of the term “subjective”.
I haven’t said that any can demonstrate that such truths exist, only that one provides sufficient warrant.
What is that?
I haven’t attempted to establish any such thing; I’ve concluded that for Y to be true (that universal, self-evidently true moral statements exist) X (that universal mind and existential purpose must be objectively existent, necessary (not arbitrary) commodities) must also be true. Y may not be true; I haven’t tried to “establish” Y or X as true. The premise for the argument is that Y is true, and for Y to be true, X must also be true.
If I create a robot for the purpose of opening doors for people, that is its purpose whether it knows it or not.
Where Y = the premise that “universal, self-evidently true moral statements exist” and X = “objectively existent, universal, existential, necessary purpose in an objectively existent, universal mind”:
My argument is that IF Y is true, THEN X must also be true
.Your argument that Y is not true is irrelevant to the argument, because my argument (which is a hypothetical) begins with the premise that Y is true. Your argument that X is “actually” not true is again irrelevant, because whether or not X is “actually” true is irrelevant to the argument – unless you can show how X can be false and Y still true.
The argument is entirely about what hypothetical conditions would be required for Y to be true, not about whether or not Y or any of those hypothetical conditions are actually true.
Ignoring a long history of philosophical debate and opinion in the process. You do realize that many people, using “our language”, hold that mind and many commodities held in the mind are objectively existent phenomena? You don’t get to sweep way thousands of years of philsophical debate and disagreement by referring to dictionary.com as the final philosophical arbiter of what mind and purpose are.
A worldview is a description of what one thinks “reality” is, and how it behaves. So, when I say that I am investigating which worldview provides warrant for belief Y, I am investigating which description of what reality is and how it behaves provides warrant for belief Y.
You separation of “worldview” from what can only be a description of “what reality is” only confounds communication. Descriptions of “what reality is and how it behaves” (a worldview) could produce warrant for the expectation that self-evidently, universally applicable moral statements exist, even though the worldview itself (the description of reality) might not be self-evident or universally held.
Obviously, descriptions of “what reality is an how it behaves” presumes that the description of reality is universally applicable regardless of if any individual accepts it or not. Such descriptions of reality usually begin with self-evidently true statements that are held as being self-evidently true whether or not any particular indvidual agrees – statements such as “I exist” and the fundamental principles of logic.
IOW, under my hypothetical, compatible worldview, one can recognize that an act is universally and self-evidently wrong, even though they cannot provide sufficient worldview warrant for why it is wrong.
Why would you think that our purpose would be “objectively existent” instead of being “personal and subjective”?
If our purpose in life is as unique as we are, there is no point in having an “objectively existent purpose” since that would defeat the point of being unique.
What makes you think god has a common purpose for us when he clearly made us so different?
Again, you argument assumes that god intended A.
If god thinks differently than you do, all your arguments fall apart.
In terms of they hypothetical argument, to satisfy the prerequisites (provide sufficient warrrant, or grounding) for the premise.
Irrelevant to the hypothetical debate at hand. The premise of this hypothetical argument is that universally applicable, self-evidently true moral statements exist. It has nothing to do with whether or not humans are unique in any particular way.
This isn’t an argument about fact, but rather a hypothetical argument about what conditions are necessary in order for the premise to be true.
My hypothetical argument only assumes the premise, and attempts to find what worldview commodities are required in order for the premise to be true.
Again, irrelevant to the argument about what worldview commodities must exist in order for the premise to be true. This is not an argument that the premise is in fact true, or that any of the commodities proposed that would provide warrant for the premise are true or factually existent.
William J Murray,
……………………………
It is not irrelevant at all, it is instead a crucial requirement for your position.
If “universally applicable , self-evidently true moral statements exist”, there is no evidence that they apply to us.
They may only apply to god.
The only evidence you have that they apply to us is “your belief” that that was god’s intention.
If god’s worldview is different than yours, then all your arguments are baseless.
Evidence is required in an argument about facts. This is not an argument about facts. This is a logical argument about hypothetical commodities.
Statements I have made during the course of this argument have repeatedly characterized this hypothetical argument as being about moral statements that universally apply to all humans whether they agree to them or not. “Applying to humans” is part of the premise.
I have offered no evidence of anything whatsoever. This is not an evidence-based argument. It begins with an assumed premise and then describes what existential conditions are necessary if the premise is true.
This isn’t an argument about “what is”. Do you not understand the difference between a purely hypothetical argument, and an evidence-based argument?
There may be an infinite number of potential conditions that, if true, it would mean that my premise is not true. That is entirely irrelevant; the argument isn’t “what existential conditions would make the premise not-true”; we’ve already established whole categories of conditions that, if true, would render the premise false.
The argument is: what existential conditions are required if the premise is true. IF god had a purpose that didn’t apply to humans, then obviously the premise would fail, meaning that in order to make the premise true (that universally applicable (to humans), self-evidently true moral statements exist), the purpose of god (necessary, not arbitrary) must apply to humans.
All arguments, hypothetical or not, must be consistent, or “coherent”.
Any premise *you* introduce is fair game for your debating opponents to question.
You have provided no logic construct that warrants the relationship between X and Y in your quote above.
If you want to use logic as a tool to prove something, you have to check the consistency of your assertions and conclusions, ******* within the scope ******** of the reality of your problem.
Time and again, when pressed, you have abandoned the coherency of your logic and simply asserted preferred inputs.
You should be able to back up what you introduce.
Elizabeth and I agreed to the premise, which led to the debate. If you do not agree to the premise, we have nothing to debate here.
As it stands, I’m satisfied with the current state of the debate. It is clear that in order for self-evidently true, universally applicable (to all humans, regardless of conditions) moral statements to be possible, there must be a god as universal, objectively-existent mind that holds a necessary (not arbitrary) purpose for the existence of the humans it has created, and that humans share that aspect of universal mind in their mind.
Otherwise, such moral statements would not be possible.
Please read the above carefully.
The speaker, in this case you, has just informed me what god thinks.
Suppose, god had a different thought than you did.
What does that do to your argument?
Regardless of the scope, god must agree with **you**, in order for your argument to carry the day.
Your whole argument that only theism can provide a coherent worldview, hinges on the fact that god thinks like you, since if he doesn’t, there may be no common reason for the existence of humanity.
Show me the LOGICAL construct that justifies your claim.