It is not all that infrequent here at TSZ that some opponent of theism or ID makes a statement that makes me scratch my head and wonder how it is possible that they could make such a statement. This OP explores a recent example.
Cartesian scepticism, more impressed with Descartes’ argument for scepticism than his own reply, holds that we do not have any knowledge of any empirical proposition about anything beyond the contents of our own minds. The reason, roughly put, is that there is a legitimate doubt about all such propositions because there is no way to justifiably deny that our senses are being stimulated by some cause (an evil spirit, for example) which is radically different from the objects which we normally think affect our senses.
– A Companion to Epistemology, p. 457
Imagine my surprise when I found keiths (a self-identified “Cartesian Skeptic”) appealing to the senses.
The big difference between moral and factual judgments is that the former funnel down to a single “point of failure” — the conscience — while the latter do not. That doesn’t mean that the latter can’t be wrong, of course, but it does raise the bar for error.
…
Of course, even if you do all the things I listed in order to confirm that your monitor is there, you still don’t know (without the asterisk) that it’s there. The Cartesian demon might be fooling you, or you might be an envatted brain.
But at least your judgment depends on multiple sensory channels rather than on a single faculty like the conscience.
Is keiths assuming there’s only one demon and that demon can only stimulate one of his senses at a time?
Of course, noting the inconsistency of keiths, I felt compelled to speak up.
…what makes you think that multiple sensory channels is better than one, or better than a conscience?
While we still await a response from keiths (who always defends his claims) a good buddy of keiths, Richardthughes, took up the challenge.
consilience (The same reason science is better than the bible)
Wikipedia article on Consilience
The principle is based on the unity of knowledge; measuring the same result by several different methods should lead to the same answer.
[Patrick, if you need help with those links let me know. Don’t just claim that they do not exist.]
For a “Cartesian Skeptic”, how is it that multiple sensory channels is better than “a single faculty like the conscience”?
How does “consilience” come to the rescue of the Cartesian Skeptic? Consilience is based upon the unity of knowledge, and it would seem to me that there must be something that bring about this unity. How is the “consilience” of the senses brought about? Perhaps Richardthughes is just confused. Maybe keiths will come to the rescue of his wingman.
Far be it from me to suggest that you’re equivocating*.
Do you believe that a virtual machine is not real on the basis that it’s a virtual machine or for some other reason?
Looks like walto already got there before me with is awesomeness* and his having never seen a virtual cow*. Good points all.
Have you attempted that math, Mung?
keiths:
walto:
I stipulated a brain-in-vat scenario, walto. The cow is virtual, not real.
I never saw a virtual cow
I never hope to see one
But I can tell you anyhow
I’d rather see than be one.
Apologies to Gelett Burgess.
I managed to graduate high school and be accepted into the Navy’s nuclear power program. No math needed. So no.
That’s a shame – short version you can get a high confidence from many positive signals (I got about 97.5% in the example). Thank you for your service. Were you reactor shielding?
Rich, to Mung:
High lead content in the brain.
Oh, BJ. Wrong again!
There is seeming to see (smell, etc) a real cow and being mistaken, but there are no ‘virtual cows’. If there were, we could count them. Is there a virtual cow every time someone thinks she’s seeing a cow, but is mistaken? Two every time somebody blinks? Can more than one person see the same virtual cow? If we lose attention do virtual cows fade away? Is it possible that they only SEEM to fade away but don’t really? When that happens, are there merely virtual virtual cows? How do we know? Can we only know* how many there are??
I tell you what, BJ. There simply ain’t no virtual cows (unless you count papier mache items), BIV or no BIV.
I’m imagining the smiles on the faces of the people out there who, unlike walto, are actually familiar with the concept of virtualization.
Keep it coming, walto. You’re the best!
P.S. What do the virtual cows eat? Virtual hay? Who virtually bales the virtual hay for the virtual cows? Virtual farmers? Who virtually provides virtual life insurance to the virtual farmers? Virtual insurance companies? And who virtually regulates the virtual insurance companies? Virtual waltos? This scheme obviously can’t work unless all those details are addressed.
Right, walto?
keiths,
Exactly right, Jamina. The concept of a “virtual cow” is ridiculous and has no identity criteria, just as it seems you are now admitting. It’s a joke idea for dimwits.
So stop massaging yourself and get thee to your psychopathic wrong-admission thread and start telling a few home truths. Just getting a decent start there could take you several months, so leave yourself plenty of time. The number of errors you have made on this site and have refused to admit is now approaching four digits.
PS: Just curious, Jasmina, are the people out there with “a concept of virtualization” as dimwitted about the idea as you are? Do they join you in first insisting (and I guess now denying without admitting it) that there are virtual cows?
The real view that Descartes actually held relies on a profoundly mistaken picture of our cognitive situation — at least, so it is argued by Kant et al. I can think that and also think that some of your arguments in defense of that view are, when I can make sense of them, trivial truths — in fact, they turn out to be tautologies.
Cartesian skepticism would have serious psychological and cultural effects if it were to be accepted as true, although the specific version you have propounded here has no entailments.
KN,
Cartesian skepticism doesn’t rest on an error. It’s correct, as you have acknowledged, and it cannot be refuted, as you have also acknowledged.
As for the “serious psychological and cultural effects” of Cartesian skepticism, you’re contradicting yourself again. Here’s what you wrote earlier:
Which is it? “Devoid of impact on how we live”, or “serious psychological and cultural effects”?
You’re throwing a lot of stuff — including contradictory stuff — against the wall, hoping to find something that will stick in support of the anti-skeptical position.
Instead of precommitting to an anti-skeptical position, why not choose your position based on a rational evaluation of the alternatives?
Again:
keiths,
At no point have you given any reason for us to think that the logical possibility that the senses are unreliable is itself a reason to believe that the senses are unreliable. It is logically possible that Donald Trump is a cyborg, but there is no reason to believe it.
It is true that I think that Cartesian skepticism cannot be ‘refuted’. But as I understand that ‘concession’, it is to say only that there is no deductively valid argument establishing that it is impossible that the senses are not reliable.
That’s not much of a concession, and I’m puzzled as to why you think it is so decisive.
As for the Sentinel Islander thought-experiment, I don’t see how it helps. All it does it embellish, in a nice and imaginative way, the conceivability that we are in an epistemic situation like the Sentinel Islander using the VR goggles. That doesn’t tell us what we want to know, which is a reason to believe that we actually are in that kind of situation.
KN,
For the umpteenth time:
The Cartesian skeptic does not assert that the senses are unreliable.
Here is my concise summary of Cartesian skepticism:
Do you see the difference? It’s crucial.
keiths,
Yes, you have claimed many times that we cannot know that the senses are reliable. Every time you have been pressed for a reason for this claim, you have presented us with infinitely many possibilities in which the senses are unreliable — evil geniuses, Sentinel Islanders, etc.
Yet here is the flaw in your entire argument: the fact that we can conceive of those possibilities would undermine the claim that we can know that the senses are reliable only if the claim that the senses are reliable were a necessary truth.
But it isn’t.
And therefore, none of the possibilities canvassed here can count as reasons for thinking that we cannot know that the senses are reliable.
The truth is that we can — and do — know that the senses are often reliable, and we also know the conditions under which they are usually reliable and the conditions under which they usually are not.
The fact that we can imagine all sorts of outlandish scenarios in which we are mistaken about those conditions in no way undermines the fact that normal, sane, mature adults can usually distinguish between when they are perceiving reliably and when they are not.
And it is because we can make precisely those distinctions that empirical knowledge, including science, consists of models that allow to navigate the world and intervene in it.
KN,
You appear to have shifted arguments again.
Before we move on to your new argument, do you understand why I say the following?
And do you see the difference between claiming that the senses are unreliable versus what I actually assert?
keiths,
I’m perfectly aware that you’re claiming that we cannot know whether or not the senses are reliable.
I think that’s bollocks.
And I’ve already given my argument as to why.
I await your response.
KN,
I’m talking about the fact that you keep forgetting what Cartesian skepticism is and end up arguing against a strawman.
Read this comment again and then tell me:
Do you understand why I say the following?
And do you see the difference between claiming that the senses are unreliable versus what I actually assert?
I want to know that you actually, finally understand what Cartesian skepticism is before I move on to your new argument.
So, which is it, Skeezix? Are there obviously virtual cows–that being something you KNOW (sans asterisk) as you originally asserted– or do we take your ridicule of the concept (one post later!) to be correct–meaning there are NO virtual cows (and you KNOW THAT instead)?
Either way, your contradiction is one more error to add to the multitude you’ve made just witin the last month, but have refused to admit.
But it could be that the one you pick to be true will also be wrong, which would give you a nice twofer. So, Skeezix, do you know that there are virtual cows or do you not? Do you know that there are no virtual cows?
walto,
Yes, there are virtual cows in the hypothetical simulation.
What I was mocking there was not the concept of a virtual cow, but rather your comical misunderstanding of it.
Do you seriously think we need virtual waltos to regulate the virtual insurance companies that provide the virtual life insurance to the virtual farmers who feed the virtual hay to the virtual cows?
You’ve obviously never drank virtual milk.
As I expected, you got your twofer there, Alana. There are no virtual cows for precisely the reasons that both you and I gave above and that you give a couple of more of here.
You can give no criteria of identity for virtual cows, thus you have no idea what the hell you’re talking about. Of course, that’s nothing new.
So now go and admit your two mistakes on your psychopath thread.
Chuckie KNOWS that he has, though!
No, I think that’s a ludicrous conception. Fortunately, it’s yours, not mine. See your quote above:
Just how many are there, Barb?
After all, how would the Cartesian skeptic know* that the senses are unreliable?
Have you answered yet how multiplying the number of senses is better than reducing the number of senses? Do you plan to?
How is it that I am able to buy virtual gold?
We can’t know that our senses are veridical.
Therefore, any knowledge claim based on the veridicality of our senses is illegitimate
Kindly provide a summary that isn’t a non-sequitur.
Magically, there are just enough, no more, no less.
There are no virtual cows, but there are virtual cows*.
Virtualization via the hypothetical!
How can I get in on the ground floor of your virtualization company keiths?
LoL. This thread just reminded me of a video game I played some time back.
Have you heard the phrase “virtual reality”, walto? Do you know what it means?
Can you explain to us why virtual cows can’t be part of a virtual reality? Please provide technical details. The VR industry will be hanging on your words.
Oy. Give it up Charlotte.
KN,
I’ll go ahead and address your new argument, but I’d appreciate it if you would answer the questions I pose in this comment. The discussion will go nowhere if you keep forgetting what Cartesian skepticism is.
KN:
It doesn’t take infinitely many. One is enough.
I’ve explained this before:
KN:
Huh? If “the senses are reliable” were a necessary truth, then it would be true! Nothing could undermine it in that case.
Slow down, KN. Take some time and think this through.
For what must be the fourth or fifth time, you are failing to distinguish two types of non-veridicality. Again:
Think of the Sentinel Islander. He’s perfectly sane, and his senses are functioning correctly. He isn’t dreaming or hallucinating, but he nevertheless reaches an erroneous conclusion about the reality of LaLa Land because the sensory information he is receiving through the VR headset is non-veridical.
He assumes that it’s veridical, and that leads to a false conclusion. Don’t repeat his mistake.
keiths,
Oy, Guido. I will give YOUR ‘argument’ instead, because it’s too stupid to respond to.
Uh, there’s no virtual uh insurance regulators, but I tell you there ARE virtual cows. They’re uh part of virtualizations. Everyone knows virtual insurance regulation never goes on in those, just virtual cud chewing! Those are uh also parts of virtualizations as all we um virtualization experts like me know.
I ask again, Guido, if there are virtual cows as you insist, HOW MANY ARE THERE? And why are there then no virtual farmers and virtual Dept of Agriculture employees doing virtual regulating as you claim does NOT occur? (I mean you did just ridicule that idea, remember, virtualization whiz?) Although, to be fair, you can’t KNOW you did so, because, on your silly view, you can’t know anything except stuff like virtual cows (which, incidentally, don’t exist).
walto,
Why, none, of course. Remember, you’ve told us that there can be no virtual cows in a virtual reality (though we’re still awaiting your explanation of the technical details). Let’s call that Walto’s Bovine Exclusion Principle, or WBEP.
I think you’re on to something. Do you think WBEP can be extended to other farm animals?
Nice dodge, Bullwinkle. Your posts may be stupid, but they do meet your prime directive of never admitting an error–even when you assert P and not-P in two successive posts.
Well done–keep deflecting!
It isn’t a dodge, walto.
I’m laughing at your assertion that there can be no virtual cows in a virtual reality. Where did you come up with that idea?
Out of curiosity, have you ever written a computer program?
Though both of your questions are dodges, I will mention that I wrote in Pl-1 probably before you were born. And your laughing* is just further evidence of your missing the point. No virtual regulation, no cow. No entity without identity.
Now, to the point. How many virtual cows in 15 (non-virtual) minutes with 6 mildly interested participants–one dozing in and out of sleep? Either answer the question or admit you can’t or shut the hell up. Your diversionary tactics are merely annoying, to me and likely everyone else here.
Also, while you’re at it, Bonzo, can you know that saying both P and not-P means that you’ve made a mistake, or only know* it?
[*The asterisk after “laughing” is intended to express my doubt. I think you are too busy doing your usual dodging in order to satisfy your prime directive.]
This thought-experiment doesn’t establish what you think it does. It establishes the bare logical possibility that we are in a situation analogous to that of the Sentinel Islander. But that logical possibility does not entail that we are not entitled to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical perception in our own case. Logical possibilities do not have the epistemic consequences that you believe they do.
And since we are entitled to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical perception in our case, we are entitled to assert that we know that our perceiving can be reliable under some conditions and also that we know what those conditions are and are able to determine when those conditions do and do not obtain.
I would like to add that some version of critical direct realism is the metaphysics of perception that we need to get scientific realism off the ground in philosophy of science. Cartesian skepticism yields at best a phenomenalism about perception and a concomitant instrumentalism in philosophy of science. One can’t be both a pheomenalist and a physicalist. Well, one can try — Quine certainly did — but it can’t work.
I don’t think Quine was ever a phenomenalist.
walto:
And never since? That might explain some things…
You seriously think that there can’t be a virtual cow in a virtual reality unless the VR includes virtual regulation??
That depends on the VR, obviously. If it’s a VR of a cattle ranch, then lots. If it’s a VR for nuclear reactor safety training, then probably none. It’s up to the programmer(s). Jesus, walto.
“HOW MANY ARE THERE?” he demanded. “Marigolds don’t exist. If they did, you would be able to tell me how many there are. Either answer the question or admit you can’t and shut the hell up!”
I think that virtual cows are possible — with or without virtual regulation 😉 — and have never argued otherwise. You mistook mockery for agreement.
KN,
Your response to this?
keiths:
KN:
We can’t distinguish between veridical perception and non-veridical perception of type 2:
If we are brains-in-vats, for example, and the sensory information we’re receiving is carefully and correctly coordinated in order to fool us into thinking that there is a cow in front of us, then how can we detect that?
I see no way to detect that, and you haven’t offered any.
No, because we can’t detect non-veridical perception of type 2. If you can’t detect it, you can’t distinguish it from veridical perception.
Regarding Cartesian skepticism versus physicalism, they’re compatible as long as you accept that physicalism, like science, is empirical. If the sensory information we’re receiving is non-veridical, then all bets are off. No empirical claims are safe in that case.
If we provisionally assume the general veridicality of sensory information — if we add the asterisk, in other words — then science can proceed, and physicalism can too.
No. YOU are mistaking mockery for agreement Joe. You actually don’t know what your view is. Sadly, you don’t even know*–because it is changing from post to post.
IT DOESN’T MATTER
I mean, unless one agrees with FMM, (and you occasionally), that certainty is required for knowledge. What KNN keeps trying and trying to explain to you is that if certainty is not required, these hypotheticals are not relevant.
That you can’t understand that simple fact is astonishing. FMM was closer.
walto,
How about answering this:
walto:
keiths: