I thought you all might be interested in a book we just released this week – Naturalism and Its Alternatives in Scientific Methodologies. It has been heading up the Amazon charts, and hit the #1 Hot New Release spot today on three lists – Scientific Research, Epistemology, and Psychology.
This book is based on the Alternatives to Methodological Naturalism conference earlier this year. Anyway, I hope some of you check it out and see what you think!
The only way that science can be metaphysically neutral is by abstaining from all metaphysical commitments. And the only way to do that, from what I understand, is by adopting some version of instrumentalism. (Perhaps Van Fraassen’s The Empiricist Stance would be the best work to look at here.) But one very serious problem with instrumentalism — an objection long familiar from Putnam — is that instrumentalism makes it impossible to understand scientific progress as a rational process. Or as Putnam famously put it, “scientific realism is the only view that makes scientific progress seem like something other than a miracle.”
In short, if we hope to understand scientific progress as a rational process, then we must be scientific realists. And that means that science cannot be metaphysically neutral.
But scientific progress is a miracle.
Robin,
Its the a prior assumption that we can eventually explain our universe from the evidence inside it. We will eventually fill the gaps with explanations derived inside the universe. Seems a little out there to me 🙂
None of that has anything to do with the proposed mechanisms, so your uneducated equivocation is duly noted. As for Tiktaalik there are tetrapod tracks in starta millions of years earlier. Whales? You don’t know what, if anything, can account for the anatomical and physiological differences observed between whales and land mammals.
The testing for ID has already been presented, Robin.
That would be begging the question unless you can show where this particular perspective is applied as either a basis of research or a basis of the teaching of science.
Here’s the thing you seem to be missing (or perhaps confusing): there’s a difference between what a scientist might believe personally and what he or she actually does scientifically. So where’s this prior assumption used as a basis of scientific practice? Anywhere? No? So unlike “God of the Gaps”, which is actually an approach to trying to use “God” as explanation in areas for which which have no explanation, this supposed “naturalism of the gaps” isn’t actually applied anywhere. So that would be the opposite then of “without resorting to fallacious reasoning”. Oh well…
Exactly! Scientists may personally believe in evolutionism but when it comes to scientifically testing its claims they fall short.
That is false. We make design inferences based on our knowledge of cause and effect relationships. OTOH all you and yours can do is hand out promissory notes- “we may not know how blind and mindless processes didit but give us a few thousand years and we may have something”
Do you think it’s better to make up stuff about things outside the universe and then “explain” the universe with that?
Actually, what I’d love for someone like Bill to explain is how science is suppose to operate with, nevermind use as a basis for explanation, something “outside the universe”, particularly in light of the fact that science is really only concerned with explaining and being able to predict how phenomenon occur within the universe.
I don’t see how this distinguishes creativity from things that can be mechanically produced. Turing proved that no algorithm can solve the halting problem, but it’s pretty clear that human creativity cannot solve it either. Note that “solving” the halting problem doesn’t just mean occasionally being able to point at some program and say “Aha! That program does/doesn’t halt!”, it means being able to take any program, look at it, and say (with 100% reliability) “it does/doesn’t halt.” It doesn’t take flashes of brilliance, it takes boring reliability.
And, frankly, humans pretty much suck at predicting what programs will do, even over short periods of time. Have you ever looked at some pile of uncommented spaghetti code and tried to figure out what on earth it does? Programmers even have trouble figuring out what their code is going to do as they write it, let alone trying to go back later and figure out code they didn’t write. That’s why we have things like debuggers, so you can let a computer figure out what the code does, and have it tell you (via letting you watch as it runs, so you can understand as well as the computer does).
But solving the halting problem requires going beyond that to understanding what the program will do over an unbounded period of time. Even if you fully understand the code, there’s no guarantee you or any other human will be able to predict its long-term behavior.
Take a simple example: a program that iterates over the even integers starting from 4. For each one, it checks to see if it can be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers; if it cannot, it prints the number and exits; if it can, it goes on to the next even integer. Does this program ever halt? I don’t know. You don’t know. Mathematicians have been trying to resolve this question for over two and a half centuries! (Hint: it’s equivalent to Goldbach’s conjecture.) It’s been shown (by exhaustive computer search) that it won’t halt before 4*10^18, and there are probabilistic arguments (based on the density of primes) that it’ll probably never halt, but nobody really knows for sure.
But it’s actually worse than that, because “solving” the halting problem doesn’t just mean that you must always be able to say whether a program halts or not, it also requires that your answers are never wrong. Humans make mistakes all the time, so that also rules us out for exceeding Turing’s limit on what computers can do.
Bump:
Thanks. Sal? Johnny? I’ll buy a copy if you have a good case.
You have to buy the book for that. 🙂
Robin,
I have had conversations where it is claimed that the person had faith science will eventually solve the problem. This claim was made by a scientist. This is naturalism of the gaps. Yes, I had heard this claim more then once.
God of the Gaps is considered fallacious reasoning. I think naturalism of the gaps is in the same boat. When there is a collection of evidence and not just pointing to a single gap, then you can make an inference.
If you take into consideration the number of gaps that have been filled by scientific research vs the number filled by religion, you’ll know which way to bet.
And yet no gaps have been filled in with blind and mindless processes.
Apparent to who? For the theists it’s very apparent undeniably so in fact.
The Atheist claims that god-like stuff is not apparent but they define god-like as being that which can’t be apparent. So there you go.
I think all of us “naturalism” skeptics would agree that it’s absurd but then again so is naturalism. In that case absurdity would be a feature and not a bug
peace
The issue is what can be discovered, and how.
We stick with empiricism (which is to what “naturalism” usually refers, in fact) because it can provide answers to humans. Sheer rationalism hasn’t worked, religion’s success is abysmal, revelation doesn’t work and is contradictory as well, while empiricism works.
The point is not that empiricism can find out everything. We certainly don’t know that it can. But what we can find out about “the world” appears to always involve empiricism, since we don’t know what there is except by looking at the evidence and matching up cause to effect.
Glen Davidson
You keep using that word (empiricism). I do not think it means what you think it means (HT TPB)
Humans can do that because they decide. They might be mistaken at times and they may be premature in their decision but they do decide.
Solving the halting problem does not require infallibility it requires decision making ability.
Decision-making is the cognitive process of identifying and choosing alternatives based on the values and preferences of the decision-Maker. It requires a mind.
So If I say that I know that it does not halt then there is no way you can say I’m wrong.
Is that correct?
Peace
You have, several times, said that I am an instrumentalist.
I do not have any problem understanding scientific progress. I do not see any need for it to require miracles.
This is surely wrong.
Firstly, the halting problem is only in issue with infinite mathematics. There is no halting problem for the finite state automaton. It is the infinite capacity of the Turing machine tape that allows the halting problem.
Secondly, there is a huge difference between “what can be produced by a particular machine” and “what can be produced by machines.” Just because something cannot be produced by a known machine, that does not exclude the possibility that someone might invent a new kind of machine to produce it.
Define miracle.
For me miracles are just highly unlikely events with theological implications.
Certain events in the history of the universe would be miracles in that sense by definition.
There is no way to get to where we are with out invoking miracle in that sense as far as I can tell. Except perhaps by appealing to an infinite unobservable multiverse where everything is equally likely to happen.
peace
Producing a machine that can solve the halting problem is an algorithmic process that may or may not halt at some indeterminate time in the future
ironic is it not? 😉
peace
Which is exactly what I addressed: people’s opinions about the efficacy of science, even in areas science has not yet addressed, are not the same as applying science (or “naturalism”) to some gap. So I don’t see “naturalism of the gaps” as a valid concept, let alone a problem.
God of the Gaps is considered fallacious because it relies on any combinationof special pleading, question begging, internal contradiction, reifying, or the fallacy of the general rule. Simply put, God of the Gaps is bad theology based on illogical premises. Whatever “naturalism of the gaps” might be, those same issues do not apply.
Exceeding Turning’s limit on what algorithms can do does require infallibility. If you can’t demonstrate that, you haven’t shown that humans exceed the capacity of computers.
How do you distinguish between that and what a computer heuristic can do? Other than by using different words for them? ‘Cause that sounds exactly like what a standard computer chess program does.
(This reminds me of Edsger Dijkstra’s comment, “The question of whether a computer can think is no more interesting than the question of whether a submarine can swim.”)
I can’t say that I know you’re wrong about whether it halts. I can say that you don’t have an adequate basis for your claim. (And therefore, for at least some definitions of “know”, I can say that you’re wrong about whether you know it.)
But can I use my creative powers as a human to “decide” that you’re wrong about whether it halts?
Computers are not persons so they can’t decide. They simply execute predetermined responses to stimuli based on the program they are running.
What would constitute an adequate basis for making such a claim? Be careful not to beg the question.
Or theoretical access to infallibility.
According to what criteria?
Again be careful not to question beg
peace
peace
You can do that but when you did you would have granted my point. 😉
peace
Did anyone mention that computers have now mastered poker?
I’d like to have fifth or Johnny name a specific task that cannot be done by computation.
deciding.
peace
Gordon Davisson,
I appreciate the thoughtful reply. However, if you look at my full paper from my previous book, Engineering and the Ultimate, I think I adequately responded. I agree that humans are not a full halting oracle. But that doesn’t mean that everything short of a full halting oracle is computable. What I show is that humans can produce axioms that allow us to convert non-algorithmic problems to algorithmic ones. These we produce at a semi-reliable pace, in a semi-reliable order, which is what leads to the many instances of simultaneous discovery in science. The oracle we likely have access to is an oracle more limited than the full halting problem, but beyond computability nonetheless.
Computers did not master poker.
A computer program was developed that performed satisfactorily on one particular style of poker in a very limited setting. It did this by behaving in a way (randomly) that humans do not behave.
peace
With that meaning of “miracle”, I see no need for miracles.
My earlier comment was about understanding progress in science. It was not about how the universe came to exist — or whatever else you have in mind there.
But that has nothing to do with anything.
Any machine that we can produce has some sort of finiteness restriction — otherwise we cannot produce it. And the halting problem does not apply to such finite systems.
So no highly unlikely event has ever occurred in your worldview?
IMO progress in science occurs in part by recognizing that unlikely events can and do happen. Think the big bang or the The endosymbiotic hypothesis for the origin of eukaryotic cells.
peace
Richardthughes,
It depends on how you define success. I would say that the most successful one, practically speaking, doesn’t quite know it yet – human computation and artificial artificial intelligence. They don’t speak of methodological dualism in those papers, but the concept is clearly there. Peter Thiel makes a similar case in his book “Zero to One”. Eric Holloway’s “Imagination Sampling” (in the book) has a lot of promise for generalizing this methodological dualism, but it is in the early stages so it is too soon to know if it will work out. I think “Imagination Sampling” probably has the biggest long-term payout of a single idea.
The one that has historically had the most success academically is methodological dualism in Austrian economics, starting with Ludwig von Mises and Praxeology. This has been taken forward by George Gilder in his book “Knowledge and Power” to show how it can be used to lay the groundwork for a better economy, and by “Zero to One” by Thiel to show how it can be used in microeconomics to build a better business.
Rakover’s methodological dualism in Psychology chapter is very interesting because he tries to lay out a framework and ground rules for combining explanations from different “worlds”. I think this has a lot of promise from a theoretic standpoint, but it is hard to see where the practical benefit will be.
Finally, Noel Rude points out that the shift in linguistics from a mechanistic point of view to a consciousness-focused point of view has been fundamental for the unification of the field. The syntactic constructions generally proved to be less-than-universal, while the teleological ones, those that are based on consciousness, lead to much more universals of language.
Anyway, hopefully that is enough to aid in your decision.
The process by which we produce a machine capable of solving the halting problem may or may not be infinite.
IOW it may or may not halt.
peace
Neil Rickert,
Kind of. The problem is that the problem is essentially exponential. So, while it is true that it is only 100% impossible on a machine with infinite tape, it is a practical impossibility even with very small machines. This criticism would be like saying we can’t use Calculus because we live in a quantum (i.e., no infinitesimals) universe. No, Calculus works just fine, because for all practical purposes, infinitesimals do work.
Except for the fact that there is an equivalency between all finitistic machines. This is the essence of the Church-Turing thesis. If you propose a machine beyond the Turing limit, you are essentially proposing a non-materialistic entity. It isn’t just like “if you have a PowerPC vs. an Intel”. Or even a quantum computer. You have to have a fundamentally different type of causative machinery in order to get beyond this boundary.
There is nothing that logically prohibits this sort of machine. But nothing remotely suggests that we can expect it.
peace
I’m not buying that, either.
Yes, there are problems that are too complex to solve with currently known methods.
Science works on the problems that scientists can solve, and it attempts to develop new methods that would allow solving additional problems.
There have been instances in the past, where problems were considered impossible to solve. Yet somebody later came up with a new way of looking at the problem, that made it very solvable.
I think some care is required here, before we try draw supposely definitive conclusions.
I’m not seeing the relevance.
My comment about no miracles had only to do with understanding how science makes progress. If different highly unlikely events had occurred in the past, the basic method by which science makes progress would be the same, even if the conclusions were different (because the world was different).
Whether you want to see miracles as involved in some past events is unrelated to the question of whether understanding science and progress in science depends on miracles.
Robin,
They apply to all special pleading that is a gap argument. If God is then natural philosophy is also.
Is archaeology the artisan of the gaps?
Is forensic science the criminal of the gaps?
Is SETI the ET of the gaps?
Received my copy today. But it’s obviously written by creationists, just look at the cover. And the pictures on the back of the authors? They are obvious creationists. And then you look at some of the reviewers. Vincent Torley? Really? Creationist.
Don’t know why anyone with their head buried in the sand of materialism like the resident “skeptics” here at TSZ would even want to crack the cover.
Nice job guys!
Neil Rickert,
Yes, exactly! This usually happens by removing unnecessary barriers. This is actually the take-home message I give in my Calculus class when talking about infinite series. I talk about how we are going to integrate functions that cannot be integrated. Then I show how, in the “these cannot be integrated”, there was an underlying truth attached to an assumption (finite series), that, if chipped away, allowed it to be solved. The limit was actually true (you can’t integrate these functions using finite numbers of elementary functions), but you could get around it by removing the assumption.
That is exactly what we are doing here. We are showing that you can get around the limitations of computation by inserting an entity that does not operate by computation (i.e., a human). By inserting the human into the loop, you get a plethora of engineering problems solved that were previously unsolvable because of theoretical limitations. It’s not that the theoretical limitations were strictly wrong, just as is the case in the fact that there are certain functions which you really can’t integrate. It’s that you can get around them easily by understanding what the limitations are and why they are there and what other alternatives there are (in this case, human computation, imagination sampling, etc.).
Mung whenever you get tired of tongue-kissing Joe maybe you can get around to explaining how to do science without relying 100% on materialism.
Tell us who will win the next lottery with a prize over 10 million dollars.
I’d love to do a series on how illogical/irrational atheists are, but then you’d have to pick some atheists and show how they are illogical/irrational, but then all the atheists here would just go straight to special pleading, “But I’m not like that moron.”
I really don’t want to derail this interesting thread so I think this will be my last comment on the subject of miracle and the scientific method.
I just want to point out that Boltzmann demonstrated that given our current understanding of physics it is highly unlikely that the universe outside my mind exists at all. So the scientific method presumes a highly unlikely event with theological significance (ie a miracle) has occurred.
peace
I appreciate how the attempt isn’t even made to supply an alternative to methodological naturalism for evolution, because the goal is to do so only for the various sciences. Nice touch that!
That’s not actually relevant.
Putnam’s realism is, roughly, that our current understanding of physics is approximately true. If anything, your argument is that Putnam’s realism requires miracles.
My own view is that our concept of “true” is far too limited to allow us to say that. All we can say, is that our current understanding of physics allows us to make pretty good predictions.
That we can make pretty good prediction about predictable things isn’t that great a nod towards our current understanding of physics. People have been doing that for millennia. Long before modern physics came on the scene. Hail physics!