Bad Materialism

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In various threads there have been various discussions about what materialism is, and isn’t, and various definitions have been proposed and cited.  In this thread I want to ask a different question, addressed specifically to those who regard “materialism” as a bad thing.  William, for instance, has said that “materialism” was “disproven” in the 18th century, yet laments

the spread of an 18th century myth in our public school system and in our culture at large.

So here is my question: if you are against something called “materialism” and see it as a bad thing (for whatever reason), what is your definition of the “materialism” you are against?

467 thoughts on “Bad Materialism”

  1. Neil Rickert: If you would spend more time laughing and less time posting insults, we would all be better off.

    If Gregory actually posted something of substance rather than doing an ELIZA version of Triumph The Insult Dog, we might have to read his posts.

  3. walto: If those mental events are items that are actually in the world and are not identical to brain states, then either there are problems with the causal closure of the physical world or there is some kind of parallelism (or occasionalism) going on.

    Firstly, I think there are pretty serious problems with identity to begin with. For one thing, if identity is a necessary relation, then we have all the problems that Kripke and Chalmers have brought to our attention in recent years — briefly, if mental states are identical with brain states, then (with a whole bunch of other prima facie reasonable assumptions) zombies should be inconceivable, and yet they certainly seem to be conceivable. So there’s that whole wasp’s nest of issues, which I personally would like to avoid as much as possible.

    Secondly, we could relax on the identity requirement and just say that a tokening of mental state M has a tokening of some brain state B as a necessary condition. That’s probably fine, but then we should ask, necessary or necessary and sufficient? On this point I would say that a tokening of some mental state M has, among its necessary conditions, some fantastically complex relation between different parts of the brain, and the brain and the body, and the brain-body and the physical as well as social environments, where the social environment is going to have to include culture and language. (I am resolutely agnostic as to whether those individually necessary conditions are jointly sufficient.)

  4. I agree with you that zombies are conceivable, but I don’t think anything follows from that myself. I don’t see either that impossibility entails inconceivability or that conceivability entails possibility.

  5. walto,

    But in philosophy, everybody is an expert. Modal logic in a day.

    It still stings after more than a year, eh, walto?

  6. keiths:
    walto,

    It still stings after more than a year, eh, walto?

    I have a cousin who made the unfortunate decision to renovate adjoining cottages with his girl-friend. They separated and now live in the adjoining properties. She, he tells me, has total recall of all his past misdemeanours and regularly reminds him when they meet. She also hopes, notwithstanding, that they can remain friends.

  7. I would like a word that draws a distinction between conceivable and possible. Perhaps possible is that word.

  8. walto: I agree with you that zombies are conceivable, but I don’t think anything follows from that myself. I don’t see either that impossibility entails inconceivability or that conceivability entails possibility.

    I find these issues far too esoteric for me to follow happily. But I will point out a very cool article I found recently, “The Medieval Origins of Conceivability Arguments” (pre-publication draft here):

    The central recommendation of this article is that philosophers trained in the analytic tradition ought to add the sensibilities and skills of the historian to their methodological toolkit. The value of an historical approach to strictly philosophical matters is illustrated by a case study focussing on the medieval origin of conceivability arguments and contemporary views of modality. It is shown that common metaphilosophical views about the nature of the philosophical enterprise as well as certain inference patterns found in thinkers from Descartes to Chalmers have their origin in the theological concerns of the Scholastics. Since these assumptions and inference patterns are difficult to motivate when shorn of their original theological context, the upshot is that much post-Cartesian philosophy is cast in an altogether unfamiliar, and probably unwelcome, light. The methodological point, however, is that this philosophical gain is born of acquaintance with the history of ideas.

    Specifically, Boulter argues that the inference pattern from conceivability to possibility only makes sense in a theological context, where the central concern lies in how accurately we can conceptualize the limits of divine power. Accordingly, Boulter is highly skeptical of the assumption that the inference from conceivability to possibility makes sense independent of that context. If he’s right, then a lot of analytic metaphysics rests on a mistake.

  9. If you give me your attention, I will tell you what I am:
    I’m a genuine philanthropist; All other kinds are sham.
    Each little fault of temper and each social defect
    In my erring fellow-creatures, I endeavour to correct.
    To all their little weaknesses I open people’s eyes;
    And little plans to snub the self-sufficient I devise;
    I love my fellow creatures; I do all the good I can
    Yet ev’rybody says I’m such a disagreeable man!
    And I can’t think why!

  10. petrushka: I would like a word that draws a distinction between conceivable and possible. Perhaps possible is that word.

    I would guess that most analytic philosophers would say that conceivability is a question of epistemology, and possibility is a question of metaphysics.

  12. That means nothing to me. I’m simply not deep enough.

    Perpetual motion is conceivable but not possible. Zombies are conceivable but not possible.

    The realm of the impossible is bounded by a semi-permeable membrane. Things occasional cross the barrier.

  14. petrushka:
    That means nothing to me. I’m simply not deep enough.

    Perpetual motion is conceivable but not possible. Zombies are conceivable but not possible.

    The realm of the impossible is bounded by a semi-permeable membrane. Things occasional cross the barrier.

    Perpetual motion is PHYSICALLY impossible, not metaphysically impossible. Zombies are claimed to be the latter.

    I’m not sure that case can be convincingly made, though. KN says the premises are all prima facie reasonable, but I think there’s an implied essentialism there that you might be able to dump. That is, even if X is necessarily Y (is Y in every possible world), that item has only its essential properties in every world. The mental dimension might not be essential to the brain state. In other words, even if the identity between the states isn’t contingent, maybe the physical or mental properties (or both) are. Maybe some are essential and some aren’t.

    These are (kind of wacky) metaphysical claims, so who the hell knows (I mean, other than keiths). It’s not at all clear what (if any) sort of evidence might be useful in determining answers to those kinds of questions. And it doesn’t much matter–at least not as much as where to have lunch.

  15. I don’t see the point of metaphysics, at least for people who wear long pants or people from Australia.

    Saying something is metaphysically possible is like saying it is possible to write a comic book. In the case of zombies, it’s pretty much coextensive.

    One might describe IBM’s Deep Blue as an attempt to create a metaphysical zombie. A device that can converse like a human without having self awareness.

    One could scale up Deep Blue to planet size, and it would not pass for human.

  18. Alan Fox,

    I have a cousin who made the unfortunate decision to renovate adjoining cottages with his girl-friend. They separated and now live in the adjoining properties. She, he tells me, has total recall of all his past misdemeanours and regularly reminds him when they meet. She also hopes, notwithstanding, that they can remain friends.

    I once dated a girl who’s memory was so good that she could remember things that never actually happened.

  19. walto:

    I don’t see either that impossibility entails inconceivability or that conceivability entails possibility.

    I agree.

    I don’t think we’ll be able to answer the “are p-zombies metaphysically possible?” question at least until we have a workable theory of subjective consciousness, and maybe not even then.

  20. petrushka,

    Does it bother anyone that we need petaflops to emulate protein folding?

    Why should that bother us? Nature is under no obligation to be simple in every respect.

  21. petrushka,

    I don’t see the point of metaphysics, at least for people who wear long pants or people from Australia.

    Neil is from Australia, and he probably wears long pants, and he does see a point to metaphysics. He leans Platonist regarding mathematics, if I recall correctly, and that is a metaphysical position.

  23. walto,

    And please note all that by “actual evidence” above keiths means items to which keiths agrees (or finds it in his interest here to pretend to).

    Present whatever “evidence” you like. Readers can judge for themselves.

    If you have a case, make it. If all you offer is innuendo, I will continue to point that out.

  24. keiths: don’t think we’ll be able to answer the “are p-zombies metaphysically possible?” question at least until we have a workable theory of subjective consciousness, and maybe not even then.

    That seems right — if there can even be a workable theory of subjective consciousness at all. Earlier today I had a rare episode of ‘spontaneous mindfulness’ — hard to describe, but sometimes I have these weird experiences in which I fall into an iterated regress of “I am conscious that I am conscious that I am conscious . . . . “. It often happens when I slow down enough from doing stuff that I can actually notice that there is awareness.

    In such experiences, the thought that there could be a theory of consciousness — that my own first-person, subjective consciousness of the world could be integrated into a third-person, objective description about the world — strikes me as quite absurd. The explanatory gap is real, and the hard problem is insoluble.

  25. petrushka: Does it bother anyone that we need petaflops to emulate protein folding?

    You can take it as evidence that nature is not a computer (or we are not brains in a vat with a computer generated virtual world presented to us).

  26. KN,

    Earlier today I had a rare episode of ‘spontaneous mindfulness’ — hard to describe, but sometimes I have these weird experiences in which I fall into an iterated regress of “I am conscious that I am conscious that I am conscious . . . . “. It often happens when I slow down enough from doing stuff that I can actually notice that there is awareness.

    Awareness of awareness.

    In such experiences, the thought that there could be a theory of consciousness — that my own first-person, subjective consciousness of the world could be integrated into a third-person, objective description about the world — strikes me as quite absurd.

    Me, too — but the thought that there isn’t a third-person explanation strikes me as even more absurd. I go with the less absurd of two seeming absurdities.

    I would love to see a solution to the hard problem.

  28. keiths: Neil is from Australia, and he probably wears long pants, and he does see a point to metaphysics.

    No, I don’t. It should be junked.

    He leans Platonist regarding mathematics, if I recall correctly, and that is a metaphysical position.

    Actually, I’m a fictionalist.

  29. keiths:.

    If all you offer is innuendo, I will continue to point that out.

    That is a very valuable service for which I’m sure all here are grateful.A statue in your honor is definitely called for. And maybe a medal of some kind too. I’m thinking it could say ‘Believe it or not, he just always knows’ on it.

    May I just reiterate (from here, sandbox or guano) how much I look forward to the theory of subjective consciousness ‘we’ (I.e. You) are developing. No doubt ‘we’ all do. Should be a hoot!

  30. Neil,

    You can take it as evidence that nature is not a computer

    Or that if it is, it must be either extremely fast or highly parallel.

  31. Kantian Naturalist: In such experiences, the thought that there could be a theory of consciousness — that my own first-person, subjective consciousness of the world could be integrated into a third-person, objective description about the world — strikes me as quite absurd.

    There isn’t going to be that kind of theory of consciousness.

  33. walto: Another expert checks in.You and Mung should maybe make a dance team–Cross-armed opposites!

    No thanks. keiths is hygiene challenged and has two left feet. Far left.

    Plus, I make a lousy dance partner myself.

    keiths and I together? People would keel over.

  35. Oh, Mung. You know that without people like ‘keiths’, your pet ideology IDism would be nowhere. You thrive on their resistance to your quasi-creationist paradigm. You provoke to dance with people like him, even if you say you can’t do it. That’s what the DI does. We know the PR lies the IDM tells to itself in its culture war aspirations. This is not a secret anymore. The Wedge Strategy showed this clearly. Do you deny this or wish to distance yourself from it?

  36. You’re right, Gregory. They’re just being modest.

    I do think though, that mung would have to be prepared to let keiths lead. Otherwise it’d be no go.

  38. “mung would have to be prepared to let keiths lead”

    In the Usa, keiths & atheism are currently leading, i.e. on the offensive. The DI and folks like Mung are merely reactionary. IDism itself is entirely backward-looking. There’s nothing forward-looking about it.

  39. Yes. I read recently somewhere (here maybe?) of a study according to which, at current trends, atheism will be the (large) majority doctrine by 2050. As you will predict, I would welcome that result, though it’s extremely unlikely I’ll be around to enjoy it.

    (I’ll be in heaven!)

  40. Gregory:

    Oh, Mung. You know that without people like ‘keiths’, your pet ideology IDism would be nowhere. You thrive on their resistance to your quasi-creationist paradigm. You provoke to dance with people like him, even if you say you can’t do it.

    It’s more like a wrestling match, with Mung getting pinned over and over.

  41. Kantian Naturalist:
    Put crudely: if our basic cognitive capacities were not already in direct contact with reality in some way or other, no augmentation of those capacities by mathematics or technology could make them so.

    Careful. You might become an Aristotelian! And then you’d have to change your name. 🙂

    So, zombies.

    How is it that we can say what a zombie is but also say that zombies do not exist?

    Are we agreeing with Aquinas on the real distinction between esse and essence?

  42. keiths: It’s more like a wrestling match, with Mung getting pinned over and over.

    With the right kind of lubricants you’d not see me complaining!

  43. Mung:
    So, zombies.

    How is it that we can say what a zombie is but also say that zombies do not exist?

    If we couldn’t say what a zombie is, how would we be able to say that they don’t exist?

  44. Mung: Careful. You might become an Aristotelian! And then you’d have to change your name.

    Oh, I’m very much a neo-Aristotelian in many respects, and I think I’ve been consistently forthright about that in all the conversations I’ve been part of, here and at Uncommon Descent.

  46. Kantian Naturalist: Oh, I’m very much a neo-Aristotelian in many respects, and I think I’ve been consistently forthright about that in all the conversations I’ve been part of, here and at Uncommon Descent.

    I did notice your reference to Cartwright. Would that be Nancy Cartwright?

  47. Mung: I did notice your reference to Cartwright. Would that be Nancy Cartwright?

    I can’t speak for KN, but I do see her as one of the better philosophers of science.

  48. walto: If we couldn’t say what a zombie is, how would we be able to say that they don’t exist?

    How can we know what a zombie is unless we embrace empiricism?

  49. Kantian Naturalist: … the thought that there could be a theory of consciousness — that my own first-person, subjective consciousness of the world could be integrated into a third-person, objective description about the world — strikes me as quite absurd.

    Cartesian Baconism!

  50. Mung: How can we know what a zombie is unless we embrace empiricism?

    An empiricist might claim that we couldn’t know what ANYTHING is unless empiricism were true, but I don’t get the zombie connection you’re making here.

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