Atheism, Truth, Morals

Imagine my surprise when I heard that atheism was based on a search for truth. We all know that’s false.

Let’s examine a couple recent examples.

Patrick claimed that I did not provide any links.

Moderation Issues (3)

You’ll note the complete absence of any links…

I provided links. Patrick lied.

KN claimed that Immanuel Kant was an atheist philosopher.

Slavery in the Bible

KN lied,

Patrick demands morals of others while denying that there are any objective moral obligations.

Why do atheists care about what is true and what is immoral?

Why do atheists attack the object of their ignorance?

622 thoughts on “Atheism, Truth, Morals

  1. William J. Murray: That, coupled with my own experiences and other evidence, leads me to think that what they call “alien abductions” actually occur. It’s not something I spend any time thinking about, though.

    We’ve already been through the ‘evidence’ you claim demonstrates PSI is worth considering. I can only imagine it’s on par with that bunch of trash.

  2. Well, it’s been fun William, but I am boarding a plane for a five hour flight. Maybe after I land I will explain how my subjective morality has concluded that when a moderator claims that he encourages dissenting views and then silently bans those who do, it is wrong. Subjectively, of course.

  3. Acartia: Maybe after I land I will explain how my subjective morality has concluded that when a moderator claims that he encourages dissenting views and then silently bans those who do, it is wrong. Subjectively, of course.

    Exactly. If I did not like they way things were done here I would simply not comment. To do otherwise condones (FMM, are you watching) that behaviour.

    William benefits from his collaboration with Barry and the way Barry runs UD. William deletes comments, just as Barry does. William benefits when people are banned silently. He does not have to take responsibility but benefits anyway. Less comments to delete!

    So yes, the moral superiority stinks. And apparently William is the only one who cannot smell it.

  4. Omagain asks:

    When one is making a logical argument and a cornerstone of that argument has been shown to be incorrect, what is the moral thing to do William?

    Ironically, this is asked immediately after OMagain insists he behave as if morality is subjective.

    If morality is subjective, OMagain, the moral thing to do (assuming your premise) is anything I feel like doing, and your question wouldn’t be asked in the first place with the implied expectation that both our moral views should refer to an objective, binding standard. See how that works?

    It’s easy to say you are a moral subjectivist, but every act and every comment you write demonstrates otherwise.

  5. Acartia:
    Well, it’s been fun William, but I am boarding a plane for a five hour flight. Maybe after I land I will explain how my subjective morality has concluded that when a moderator claims that he encourages dissenting views and then silently bans those who do, it is wrong. Subjectively, of course.

    If morality is subjective, then such a moderator is only “wrong” (morally speaking) if he personally feels like he is wrong. Your feelings have no bearing on his wrongness because your personal feelings would ony determine what is right or wrong for you.

    See, that’s the nature of morality if it is indeed subjective in nature. Your opinion on the rightness or wrongness of anyone else’s behavior is entirely irrelevant wrt whether or not their behavior is actually immoral. The “actualness” that one’s behavior is moral or immoral, under moral subjectivism, is entirely determined by that particular individual’s feelings.

    Under moral subjectivism, if such a moderator feels they are behaving morally, then they are, period. Your feelings have no say in the matter of the moral actuality of his behavior. Thus, calling the behavior of other people “immoral” because you don’t like their behavior is, under moral subjectivism, a hypocritical venture. Under moral subjectivism, the only thing that can make a person’s behavior immoral is how they personally feel about it.

    Just because a thing would be immoral for you to do it doesn’t make it immoral for anyone else to do it; that’s then nature of subjectivism. You may not like what others do, but that doesn’t make what they do immoral.

    So, moral subjectivists do not have a logical right to moral outrage (unless they are outraged by their own immoral behavior). They don’t have a logical right to even imply that someone else is behaving immorally. They have no logical right to moral judgements on others whatsoever.

    Which is why it is impossible for non-sociopaths to actually behave like moral subjectivists.

  6. William J. Murray: Well, that’s a nice self-serving narrative, but I don’t think that’s why you guys don’t ban. IMO, you don’t ban here simply because being banned is the reason this site was formed and populated.It’d be pretty difficult to start banning people here AND maintain a self-righteous moral outrage over UD banning people.So, you guys are kind of emotionally committed to not banning people.Your sense of superiority over Mr. A kind of depends on not banning people, dontchathink?

    Not at all. Understanding science, not saying one thing to the rubes bit holding different opinions privately, actually understanding ID are a few of the many ways we’re superior.

  7. If Bob thinks that vanilla is the best flavor of ice cream, and he pukes at the thought of butterscotch, then for him, vanilla IS the “right” flavor, and butterscotch IS the wrong flavor.

    If Sally personally feels exactly the opposite, does she have rational grounds to say that Bob is eating the wrong flavor of ice cream? To condemn his eating of vanilla ice cream? If Sally is rational, she realizes that her personal predilection or preference does not transfer over to Bob and that he is entitled to his own subjective preferences. There is no objective standard which would give Sally the rational footing by which to either meaningfully criticize Bob’s vanilla-eating habits or to intervene in his eating habits.

    IOW, if Sally is rational, she realizes that just because she hates vanilla ice cream, that doesn’t mean Bob hates it or should hate it, and she realizes she has no rational reason to criticize Bob for his personal, subjective preferences. There is certainly no rational reason to be outraged over Bob’s eating habits or to expect everyone to think butterscotch is the best flavor of ice cream, no matter how much she loves butterscotch or how much she hates vanilla.

    We only expect Sally to intervene when Bob eats vanilla if Sally has become unhinged. If Sally were to go up to bob and berate him for eating vanilla, we’d say she’s the one in the wrong and that she is acting irrationally.

    Self-described “moral subjectivists” want to have their cake and eat it, too. They want morality to be subjective in nature, yet they also want it to justify their interventionist behavior, outrage and judgements, so they have to insist that while it is subjective in nature it is also entirely unlike all other things in the category of “subjective feelings and preferences”. So different, in fact, that it makes them act in ways that would be considered unhinged if one were acting on any other subjective feeling or preference. They act as if their subjective view is binding on everyone else, and they act as if others should be behaving as if they also preferred butterscotch and hated vanilla.

    So, berating me or Mr. A for supposed moral failures is, under logically-consistent moral subjectivism, irrational. It would be exactly like berating me or Mr. A for eating a flavor of ice cream you personally find disgusting, and expecting us to feel bad for eating our favorite flavor of ice cream because you personally hate it, and expecting (or wanting) us to, at some point, “admit’ that our favorite flavor of ice cream is, indeed, butterscotch – instead of vanilla.

    It’s not just irrational, it’s blatantly self-contradicting and hypocritical.

    Not that there’s anything wrong with that …..

    (cue Seinfeld theme)

  8. Ice cream! 4 sided triangles! Torturing babies! House! I’ll take the cuddly toy, thanks.

  9. Sally, Bob, Jane and Greg are playing Rubber Bridge, are the Rubber Bridge rules objective?

  10. William J. Murray: Ironically, this is asked immediately after OMagain insists he behave as if morality is subjective.

    Ironically you did not answer the question asked.

  11. William J. Murray: If morality is subjective, OMagain, the moral thing to do (assuming your premise) is anything I feel like doing, and your question wouldn’t be asked in the first place with the implied expectation that both our moral views should refer to an objective, binding standard. See how that works?

    When I ask you what the moral thing to do, after noting that all our morals are subjective, I expect you to be able to answer from your personal moral point of view. And I understand our views on what is moral may differ.

    Nothing implies we are both referring to the same standard. Your answer simply illustrates your moral character. Nothing more, nothing less. I can ask such questions without relying on or inferring an external objective morality.

    William J. Murray: It’s easy to say you are a moral subjectivist, but every act and every comment you write demonstrates otherwise.

    That is your claim. I am explaining to you why you are wrong.

    So, let me re-rephease the question in such a way you may find yourself able to answer it:

    William, when one is making a logical argument and a cornerstone of that argument has been shown to be incorrect, what is the moral thing to do according to your personal moral viewpoint?

    If you continue to insist that I am using objective morality by asking you moral questions I can only conclude your morals are inferior to mine, as judged by my own personal moral standards!

  12. William J. Murray: Your feelings have no bearing on his wrongness because your personal feelings would ony determine what is right or wrong for you.

    See, that’s the nature of morality if it is indeed subjective in nature

    That’s right! And as we are all social creatures who need to get along over time we’ve found a way to do that! That is all there is! Nothing more, nothing less. Those whose subjective morals deviate from the group norms are dealt with according to the norms that have developed over time to deal with such divergence. We have prisons!

    That you mistake this for something else it is not is your problem.

  13. William J. Murray: It would be exactly like berating me or Mr. A for eating a flavor of ice cream you personally find disgusting, and expecting us to feel bad for eating our favorite flavor of ice cream because you personally hate it, and expecting (or wanting) us to, at some point, “admit’ that our favorite flavor of ice cream is, indeed, butterscotch – instead of vanilla.

    Eat fish on Fridays do you William?

  14. William J. Murray: We only expect Sally to intervene when Bob eats vanilla if Sally has become unhinged. If Sally were to go up to bob and berate him for eating vanilla, we’d say she’s the one in the wrong and that she is acting irrationally.

    In your example, what is the objectively correct flavour of ice cream?

  15. William J. Murray: If morality is subjective, OMagain, the moral thing to do (assuming your premise) is anything I feel like doing, and your question wouldn’t be asked in the first place with the implied expectation that both our moral views should refer to an objective, binding standard.

    The magic word is ‘implied’. You are guilty of what you accuse others of. Given everything I have said I implied no such thing, and you know it.

    There is no right. There is no wrong. Those are just labels we assign to things given our current context in society. Given the consensus morality present at TSZ you are acting immorally right now. Given the consensus morality present at UD, you are not.

    See how that works? Black is white, white is black. You are both wrong and right simultaneously.

    But the problem you have, it seems to me, is that you crave the moral approval of this group over the approval you already have at UD. Deny it if you like, but I know better (just like you know better despite when I say the opposite).

  16. So, when you answer the question I will tell you if I think that is indeed the moral thing to do. You will presumably answer the question with what you think the moral thing to do is.

    So, once more:

    When one is making a logical argument and a cornerstone of that argument has been shown to be incorrect, what is the moral thing to do William?

    The moral thing according to you William. No objective morality implied or needed. Clear?

  17. Nothing implies we are both referring to the same standard.

    Sure it does, or you’d realize how inane your question is and wouldn’t have asked it because it would make no difference whatsoever no matter how I answered it. It’s like asking me, “what flavor of ice cream do you prefer”, as if any answer mattered significantly to any serious debate. You might as well be asking me what my favorite color or movie is. Oh! See! His favorite flavor is vanilla! HIssssss!!! Booooo!! (cue irrational moral judgement).

    Your answer simply illustrates your moral character.

    If we are assuming moral subjectivism, then my answer is: “Anything I feel like doing at the time.” My moral character, under moral subjectivism, could only be ascertained by asking me how often I act in line with my particular moral preferences; it cannot be logically ascertained by asking me what my moral preferences are.

    Since I always do what I prefer (one way or another) to do at the time, under the premise of moral subjectivism, I am morally perfect. Under the premise of moral objectivism, however, I’m far from it because I often do things I prefer to do even though I know I shouldn’t.

  18. dazz:
    Sally, Bob, Jane and Greg are playing Rubber Bridge, are the Rubber Bridge rules objective?

    What do you think yourself, dazz? So many people here are very sure that this or that is or is not objective. I’m not convinced everyone means the same thing by that term.

    ETA: I take it you mean a rubber of contract bridge?

  19. When one is making a logical argument and a cornerstone of that argument has been shown to be incorrect, what is the moral thing to do William?

    You might believe you are showing me something; what you believe you are showing me may not be what I see. Since I operate under the assumption of moral objectivism, if I realize I have made a logical error (or any error) in an argument, the moral thing to do is admit it, even if I prefer not to. If I was operating under moral subjectivism (which I did for many years), the moral thing to do is equivalent to whatever I prefer to do at the time.

    I actually behave differently depending on what beliefs I hold. I acted very differently when a was an atheist/materialist because, you know, I actually thought through the logical ramifications of atheism and materialism and acted accordingly.

    Not like some milquetoast faux wanna-be atheist/materialists who go around preaching and condemning, full of meaningless moral superiority and outrage about this or that, all the while still tiptoeing around harming others as if there was some horrible consequence inevitably waiting for them, acting as if anyone should give a crap about “the best interests of society” or playing nice in a world full of ripe fruit and sheep.

    I will now use my mind powers t make you act as if acausal free will and objective morality exists!

    Boom! (mic drop)

  20. dazz:
    Sally, Bob, Jane and Greg are playing Rubber Bridge, are the Rubber Bridge rules objective?

    They’re flexible and can be stretched.

  21. William J. Murray: Sure it does, or you’d realize how inane your question is and wouldn’t have asked it because it would make no difference whatsoever no matter how I answered it.

    I insist there is no shared moral standard that can be objectively pointed to other then the standards that evolution and society has imbued us with. Those we share, we cannot help but do so. There is nothing else.

    And no, it makes no difference whatsoever how you answer it to the universe at large. But it makes a difference here to this group of people you seem keen to interact with. And when that group of people judges you, as has happened, you have to accept that judgement.

    William J. Murray: It’s like asking me, “what flavor of ice cream do you prefer”, as if any answer mattered significantly to any serious debate.

    If that’s your excuse for not explaining why you think according to whatever moral standard you hew to why you should continue to use arguments that have been shown to be incorrect, so be it. I will use my personal non-objective morals to determine my feelings on that.

    William J. Murray: ” My moral character, under moral subjectivism, could only be ascertained by asking me how often I act in line with my particular moral preferences; it cannot be logically ascertained by asking me what my moral preferences are.

    If so say so. But you are not getting it are you? Nobody is judging you by some objective moral standards, they are judging you by their own moral standards. And sure, theirs are as relevant as yours are (i.e not at all) but nonetheless you stand judged.

    William J. Murray: Since I always do what I prefer (one way or another) to do at the time, under the premise of moral subjectivism, I am morally perfect.

    Exactly so.

    William J. Murray: Under the premise of moral objectivism, however, I’m far from it because I often do things I prefer to do even though I know I shouldn’t.

    And how do you know you shouldn’t? No doubt you refer to societal norms and they way you were brought up. How else do you ‘know’ what is right and wrong?

    So to repeat, no it does not matter ultimately how you answer the question. But in the short term you are judged nonetheless.

    So answer the question!

  22. William J. Murray: Not like some milquetoast faux wanna-be atheist/materialists who go around preaching and condemning, full of meaningless moral superiority and outrage about this or that, all the while still tiptoeing around harming others as if there was some horrible consequence inevitably waiting for them, acting as if anyone should give a crap about “the best interests of society” or playing nice in a world full of ripe fruit and sheep.

    That’s some highly developed moral sense you’ve got there. The world will be better off without you. Do you want to put some names on those labels? Presumably you are talking about me?

    William J. Murray: or playing nice in a world full of ripe fruit and sheep.

    Your psychopathy is showing. Might want to reconsider that.

  23. OMagain: Then why don’t you admit it?

    Because you have yet to demonstrate that you are a logically-consistent moral subjectivist; you continue to demonstrate the contrary.

    If an argument I make has in it the claim that you are not a bird, and you claim that you are, even if you believe you are doesn’t mean you have shown the logic in my argument to be false.

    You might honestly believe you are a rationally-consistent moral subjectivist. The kind of statements you make here and how you phrase them demonstrate otherwise. Repeatedly.

  24. walto: What do you think yourself, dazz? So many people here are very sure that this or that is or is not objective. I’m not convinced everyone means the same thing by that term.

    ETA: I take it you mean a rubber of contract bridge?

    I can’t even play Bridge LOL, just thought it would be a good analogy so googled it.
    Anyway, I agree the issue here is what we mean by objective. Bridge rules are objective in the sense that they apply to all the players. Moral rules do too: they’re supposed to apply to everyone (or a sub-set of people). But of course what rules should apply to whom is subjective. In my opinion it’s idiotic to pretend that acknowledging our moral subjectivity means that one needs to accept that moral rules only apply to oneself like WLM claims. It’s a big fat non-sequitur.

    I also find it ironic that he uses this example where eating certain things based on taste preferences can’t be considered immoral, while many religions forbid eating pork for example, simply based on dogma. It illustrates the religious irrationality of renouncing one’s moral judgement in favor of some make believe god-given “objective” rules. The irony again, is that it’s precisely when one surrenders his moral judgement that anything goes, and there’s ample evidence that religion makes people do the weirdest things

  25. In practice, how does one distinguish between objective morality and subjective morality?

  26. William J. Murray: Because you have yet to demonstrate that you are a logically-consistent moral subjectivist; you continue to demonstrate the contrary.

    Demonstrated to your satisfaction, you mean. And yet according to your previously expressed views I am a robot with no free will. As such, how can I possibly demonstrate such? Next time you are in your unconstrained free-will-decision world could you have a word and see if you can throw a bit of free will my way? Then perhaps I could break out of the box I am in and demonstrate to your satisfaction whatever it is you need to be demonstrated before you will admit you are in error!

  27. OMagain said:

    And when that group of people judges you, as has happened, you have to accept that judgement.

    What does “you have to accept that judgement” mean? I have to accept that they don’t prefer the same things I do? Uhhhh. …. okay.

  28. Woodbine: In practice, how does one distinguish between objective morality and subjective morality?

    When William passes judgment he is using objective morality, when everyone else is passing judgement they are also using objective morality regardless of what they might actually themselves be saying.

    Simple really.

  29. William J. Murray: What “you have to accept that judgement” mean? I have to accept that they don’t prefer the same things I do?

    No, you have to accept their judgment of you. And you seem to care about that…

  30. William J. Murray: I have to accept that they don’t prefer the same things I do?

    Sure, some people prefer to represent the people’s options they are interacting with honestly and some don’t think that matters. I get that, I really do. Some people prefer to think they know what someone else is saying better then the person saying it does. I understand that, I’ve met many people like that. Some people just prefer to deal with others on a level of shared understanding rather than one person knowing better than the other what they are thinking.

    I get that. I really do. Is it attractive as a personality trait? Not at all.

  31. OMagain: Demonstrated to your satisfaction, you mean. And yet according to your previously expressed views I am a robot with no free will. As such, how can I possibly demonstrate such? Next time you are in your unconstrained free-will-decision world could you have a word and see if you can throw a bit of free will my way? Then perhaps I could break out of the box I am in and demonstrate to your satisfaction whatever it is you need to be demonstrated before you will admit you are in error!

    I might have said you could be, or probably were, a biological automaton without free will. I really don’t care either way. It’s still morally incumbent upon me to treat you as if you have free will.

    If there is no objective morality with inescapable consequences, there is no rational reason for me to admit an error unless I just happened to feel like it – which, in my case, would be if it was somehow of benefit to me to do so.

  32. OMagain said:

    No, you have to accept their judgment of you. And you seem to care about that…

    Yeah. That’s what it seems like.

    I care what what my wife thinks about me. I care far less what my children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren think of me. I really don’t care what anyone here thinks about me. Do you care what I think about you?

  33. Woodbine said:

    In practice, how does one distinguish between objective morality and subjective morality?

    Under the assumption that morality is objective in nature, I think that question would be “how does one determine correct morality form incorrect morality.” Is that what you’re asking me?

  34. William J. Murray:
    Woodbine said:

    Under the assumption that morality is objective in nature, I think that question would be “how does one determine correct morality form incorrect morality.”Is that what you’re asking me?

    Is “incorrect” morality not objective?

  35. OMagain said:

    When William passes judgment he is using objective morality, when everyone else is passing judgement they are also using objective morality regardless of what they might actually themselves be saying.

    I have no reason to pass judgement on others under the assumption that what I am considering is a personal preference. To each their own. There is no logical reason to “pass judgement” (in any sense worth arguing about) on another’s morality if moral subjectivism is true.

    So, if you are engaged in a serious debate about what is right and wrong and are passing judgement on others’ behavior in a serious way (not in the “oh, her lipstick shade is utterly wrong” kind of way), the “passing judgement” itself in such a way is directly implicating objective morality.

    In a discussion where people were actually, logically consistent with moral subjectivism, moral behaviors would be regarded categorically the same as other subjective preferences and feelings. They certainly wouldn’t rise to the level of serious debate, outrage, judgement, or any expectation that anyone else should accept anyone else’s personal moral views or behave accordingly.

    We would consider utterly facile and dim-witted anyone who insisted that everyone in the group should prefer the same flavor of ice cream and we would recoil from the idea of seriously ridiculing someone for their personal preferences. We would consider people unhinged if they went on a rant or tirade against some flavors or shades or accents as something that should be outlawed or universally avoided.

    If moral subjectivism is true, you’re going on and on about shades of lipstick, OMagain. Nothing more, categorically speaking. You’re acting as if it is really important what shade of lipstick someone else prefers to wear. Your acting as if any individual should “accept the judgement” of some group that dislikes that person’s choice of lipstick.

    Jesus. How can you not see that? It’s ridiculous.

    Oh, right. Biological automaton. You’re not programmed that way.

  36. dazz: Is “incorrect” morality not objective?

    Under the assumption of objective morality, choices/behaviors can be objectively moral, objectively immoral, or objectively neutral.

  37. William J. Murray: Under the assumption of objective morality, choices/behaviors can be objectively moral, objectively immoral, or objectively neutral.

    So objectively immoral rules need supernatural grounding too?

  38. William J. Murray: Under the assumption that morality is objective in nature, I think that question would be “how does one determine correct morality form incorrect morality.” Is that what you’re asking me?

    No (although it’s a good question).

    Suppose you (or anyone) offer as an example of an objective moral truth – ‘X is wrong.’

    How do I (or anyone) determine the truth of its objective nature.

    What test can I perform to establish whether ‘X is wrong‘ is an objective moral statement as opposed to a subjective man-made one?

  39. William J. Murray: How can you not see that? It’s ridiculous.

    self-delusion perhaps?

    People will believe all sorts of silly things when the alternative is unthinkable for them.

    peace

  40. William J. Murray: If there is no objective morality with inescapable consequences, there is no rational reason for me to admit an error unless I just happened to feel like it – which, in my case, would be if it was somehow of benefit to me to do so.

    I think what’s interesting about what William says here is it’s a demonstration of what happens when you get to the far ends of the bell curve in ‘me’ cultures.

    Disconnecting from the group identity to such an extreme is probably not unique to Williams culture or demographic. The ‘task based’ mentality is present in the USA much more than in other western countries. Trust based relationships are at the other end of that scale. And so the first problem is making William see that my view has value to him, regardless of if I am right or wrong.

    I guess when the task is ‘only admit an error when it is somehow of benefit to me’ things get warped quickly.

  41. Woodbine: How do I (or anyone) determine the truth of its objective nature.

    You already know my answer…..revelation
    I’ll eagerly await William’s

    peace

  42. William J. Murray: Jesus. How can you not see that? It’s ridiculous.

    I can see it. It is ridiculous.

    However what is even more ridiculous is inventing things like all the things you have invented to cover that gaping hole you are terrified of. Your thoughts are not profound nor do they have eternal meaning. It’s all lipstick colors, all the way down. And that’s all there is.

    William J. Murray: Oh, right. Biological automaton. You’re not programmed that way.

    You say that as if you are somehow not the product of millions of years of evolution where a drive to self preservation to reproduce was at the heart of everything.

    You have deluded yourself into thinking there is some profound plan for you and your actions. There is not. There is only what we have here and now. And it’s just lipstick on an uncaring universe, lipstick that will fade away like the last photograph of somebody nobody living knows the name of.

  43. fifthmonarchyman: People will believe all sorts of silly things when the alternative is unthinkable for them.

    What is the alternative? What do you think about Williams beliefs about aliens, ghosts, babies kidnapped by aliens, a free will zone where causality does not apply so decisions can be made that are ‘free’? William also believes that Uri Geller can bend spoons and there is something spooky going on with the ‘chair lift illusion’.

    Who has the silly beliefs? Me who says that what we have observed so far seems to be it, or you and William with your ghosts and aliens and holy spirits?

    Go on, tell me.

  44. fifthmonarchyman: People will believe all sorts of silly things when the alternative is unthinkable for them.

    Could you tell me in your own words what I believe and what is silly about it?

  45. William J. Murray: You’re acting as if it is really important what shade of lipstick someone else prefers to wear. Your acting as if any individual should “accept the judgement” of some group that dislikes that person’s choice of lipstick.

    No I’m not! I’m chatting on a message board!

    The way you win arguments, if you realize it or not, it to recast them in your own straw man and then you defeat that! I’m not ‘insisting’ you have to accept the judgment of the group, I’m saying that it has been given and like it or not, there it is, accept it or not, there it is. Recast that however you will.

    William J. Murray: So, if you are engaged in a serious debate about what is right and wrong and are passing judgement on others’ behavior in a serious way (not in the “oh, her lipstick shade is utterly wrong” kind of way), the “passing judgement” itself in such a way is directly implicating objective morality.

    You see. By the mere fact of engaging in a ‘serious debate’ I’ve already agreed to your premises. You’ve already won. By definition. And this is what people don’t like about your ‘style’ William. Your ‘logic’ is not logic at all. It’s a bastardisation of logic to your own ends.

    William J. MurrayWe would consider utterly facile and dim-witted anyone who insisted that everyone in the group should prefer the same flavor of ice cream and we would recoil from the idea of seriously ridiculing someone for their personal preferences.

    Again, you construct a facile situation and then defeat the argument I’ve not made.

    A better example would be if we were working together and I was senior to you. Then I could insist that my personal preference as to how a particular piece of work was performed was the way it was going to be. And that would be that. And the, by your standards I would be considered dim-witted and utterly facile. Again, argument by definition.

    William J. Murray: We would consider people unhinged if they went on a rant or tirade against some flavors or shades or accents as something that should be outlawed or universally avoided.

    And here you demonstrate that you are not a student of world history. You probably don’t even have a passport. Have you ever left the united states?

    If those people who are ranting happen to be running the country, you might consider them unhinged but you’d also go and get them their favour ice cream flavour if you knew what was good for you.

  46. Kantian Naturalist: Bullshit. Bullshit and poppycock.

    There’s never even the semblance of argument for any of these extravagant claims. It’s always the same old story: these are “necessary presuppositions”, and their necessity is always supposed to be “self-evident” except to those moral degenerates who deny them.

    It’s a very neat and tidy little scheme for deciding who is going to be allowed to play in the sandbox of reasonable discourse. It’s utterly self-serving, bullying, and despicable.

    For the record, I think that all of WJM’s claims are false: norms do not depend on purposes; purposes do not depend on an external purposive-giver; objective morality does not depend on an external purposive-giver; and responsiveness to norms does not require counter-causal or libertarian freedom.

    Rather, as quite a few philosophers have argued, purposiveness or goal-having is a constitutive property of living things because they need to maintain both organizational closure and thermodynamic openness with their surroundings. Teleological normativity does not require positing an intelligent designer or creator of any kind. (Side-note: it is precisely on this point that Aristotle disagrees with Plato. There is nothing in the Aristotelian metaphysics that corresponds to the Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus. The Unmoved Mover is not a designer.)

    To be sure, there are interesting questions here about the evolution of morality in primates and hominids, about the emergence of discursive normativity from teleological normativity, about how to naturalize reason, and about how to recognize that “the neurobiology of self-control” (as Pat Churchland calls it) does everything that ‘free will’ was supposed to do.

    And there also interesting conceptual questions, such as in what sense is morality objective? (I myself think of ‘objective’ as what Sellars calls ‘an accordion word’ — it’s meaning is stretched and bent to fit into different positions, and thereby much philosophical music is made.)There are perfectly good senses of ‘objective’ in which morality is not objective, and also perfectly good senses of ‘objective’ in which morality is objective.

    But there’s no reason to believe that our self-conception as rational animals, governed by objective moral and epistemic norms, requires anything like classical theism or any variant.

    My 2c.

Leave a Reply