William has taken exception to the current state of science and its ‘overreach’.
He claims, “IMO, all that is left of materialism/physicalism/naturalism is really nothing more than a hidden (even subconscious) anti-theistic agenda.”
This is a thread for William to guide us in a detailed exploration of the alternatives, their mechanisms, how we might test them and how we might benefit from them.
From wiki:
It doesn’t appear to me that the two are “the same thing”.
Side note: it doesn’t appear that my views are all that idiosyncratic after all. It seems I’m a philosophical pragmatist.
Agreed.
There is confusion between the working assumptions to do science and the philosophical conclusion that physicalism is true based on the success of science operating under such assumptions. In other words, there is a confusion between methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism.
There is also no recognition of the need to distinguish between successful, true theories of science and the epistemic status of unobservables in such theories. Whether science can make justifiable claims for belief in the unobservables of its theories is a different question from the role of methodological naturalism in science.
A restricted form of pansychism is a prediction of a mathematical theory of consciousness developed by the neuroscientist Giulio Tononi. There is a great discussion of this theory at Scott Aaronson’s blog where Tonini himself, David Chalmers, and Christof Koch make extensive comments.
BruceS said:
There is no such confusion on my part. I fully understand the supposed difference between “methodological” and “metaphysical” naturalism, but that is a distinction drawn in the same manner that atheists like to draw about the term “atheism” – that it means “lack of belief in god”. It may be technically true, but people that “lack belief” in god wouldn’t bother running around ridiculing the idea and attacking theists.
A methodology based on naturalism necessarily means that one’s research heuristic is applied as if naturalism was true. But, what does “naturalism” mean, outside of a vague cultural consensus about some supposed demarcation between “supernatural” and “natural”? “Naturalism” carries with it too much culturally biased baggage to be an acceptable, fundamental aspect of scientific research.
Also, applying that term in the scientific method cannot help but promote the idea that “naturalism” = “reality”, especially for those not equipped philosophically to separate the two.
Methodological Pragmatism demotes (as it should be demoted) science from something that fosters the inclination to view science as “arbiter of reality”, to an inclination to see science simply as a means to develop useful tools. This would be the path, IMO, to eliminating the tension between science and spirituality/religion.
There is only a “war” between science and religion, IMO, because anti-theists/anti-spiritualists have wrongly claimed “science” to be something other than (and more than) what it actually is. The term “naturalism” is the semantic device they utilize to wrongly promote their metaphysics as if science “agrees” with them or supports their worldview.
Speaking of godless Newtons, the original Newton never got a professorship, because he didn’t believe in the trinity.
Newton was Expelled.
That aspect of his theology seems rational to a lot of modern thinkers, but he had a lot of beliefs we would find strange.
He compartmentalized his science.
British fossils?
Since most scientists don’t study philosophy and don’t care a fig for isms, I would say most are pragmatists.
I’m still waiting for some of the countless examples where atheistic ideology has impeded science.
Petrushka said:
The problem with “most scientists” not studying philosophy and not caring “a fig for isms” is that they will then likely lack the critical thinking skills necessary to realize the distinction between pragmatism and naturalism, or that their methodology is being orchestarted by a metaphysic they don’t even realize is coloring their research.
IMO, “not giving a fig about isms” = blind belief that one’s own ism, which they don’t even recognize as an ism, is true.
William has become the Gary Gaulin of Philosophy.
THIS.
Alan, Oleg’s comment seemed a good fit for this thread:
“olegt says:
March 27, 2011 at 10:43 pm
It’s getting late. Tomorrow I will be packing groceries and Nick will be taking a remedial course in logic, while the broad-minded scientists of [insert your favorite flavor of creationism] will be toiling in their labs and putting the rest of us to shame. It’s a perfect world!”
Bottom line: IDists would like to redefine science because ID isn’t science and they’d like it to be. If they could create a positive case for ID, it wouldn’t be an issue.
You could cut through all this bullshit simply by listing a few of the countless examples where atheistic materialism has impeded science.
Or better yet, where the rejection of materialism has led to an important discovery.
The fact is, William, that theory of gravity from Newton to Einstein, is a demonstration that science is not mired in some stultifying vision of material reality, but is free to form models that fit the data, regardless of where the data leads.
Compare this to the response of people who have tried for over a century to find evidence for ESP, Psi, ghosts, faith healing, and such. Have they modified their models in response to data?
William’s emperor has no clothes.
Peirce’s pragmaticism was developed to explain how science works.
Of course science is pretty much methodological pragmatism (or to use Peirce’s later term, pragmaticism), since pragmatism is basically how science actually operates (if hardly William’s solipsistic version). Some people have a problem with pragmatism as science, since it isn’t always obvious how mathematics (or even some theory) is “pragmatic” (eventually, yes, but mathematics isn’t particularly about usefulness and pragmatics), but pragmatists generally work it into their explanations of science, so that in the end it’s about how science does work.
It’s wearying to hear one basic philosophy of science trumpeted as if it were somehow new or opposed to how science typically operates. But ID does little other than to stumble about, never quite getting either science or philosophy right, yet trying to use the latter to tar the former. If about all that your whole program encompasses is a dislike for what “pragmatism” actually produces, though, that’s the word/philosophy/science game that you play. It signifies nothing.
Glen Davidson
In the sense of protecting them from the tests that falsify them, yes, they have.
In any other sense, no, they haven’t.
Glen Davidson
Petrushka said:
No, it’s not. Certainly, scientists are individually free to pursue whatever they wish (even if at the risk of being called pseudo-scientists), science itself not “free to form models that fit the data, regardless of where the data leads”; it is constrained formally by naturalism, whatever that happens to mean at the time and in the culture that kind of science is being practiced.
That models are eventually accepted into the cultural mainstream even though they defied the cultural “naturalism” norm, and that “naturalism”- expected models are eventually discarded, demonstrates that in the end, pragmatism wins out over metaphysical a prioris anyway.
IOW, it doesn’t matter if “the big bang” theory is roundly derided as creationist nonsense at the time because of an a priori commitment to naturalism; it doesn’t matter if Newton is accused of imbuing his theory with occult forces because of the definition of natural philosophy at the time; it doesn’t matter if non-local, instantaneous transfer of information is considered to be “mysticism” at the time; it doesn’t matter if Galileo is accused of heresy at the time; metaphysical commitments, whether naturalist or religious, eventually (at least in all demonstrable cases) give way to pragmatism.
But, then, who knows what kinds of things are not ever even investigated because of the cultural a prioris about what we should expect, and not expect, to find? The metaphysical a prioris baked into our scientific culture are pointed out on virtually a daily basis by Cornelius Hunter on his blog.
IOW, the case you make is for pragmatism, not naturalism. You just make the mistake of assuming an equivalence between “naturalism” and “pragmatism”.
The link Alan posted to Tom Gilson’s blog points to a discussion of the issue of whether using “naturalism” in the name is a bad idea. Any one person’s preferred name, the commonly accepted definition of the name as used in the philosophical literature, and changing that common usage are all separate issues from the most important point: Physicalism is a philosophical theory, not a scientific conclusion or prerequisite.
The discussion about what science tells us about metaphysics has a long history. This discussion is separate from the discussion of what science needs to assume in order to be successful in generating explanations and predictions that more than one person has reason to find acceptable. It is also separate from whether one can believe a (ETA: substance) dualistic version of ghosts exist and still be consistent with what current science tells us (one cannot, due to causal closure and conservation laws).
Unlike ghosts, consciousness exists. How consciousness can be reconciled with current physics is an open question. I think it is a question best addressed within science and that we are a long way from being able to conclude what science operating under methodological naturalism can and cannot explain about consciousness. The metaphysical attempts to answer the question are fun intellectual exercises, but none of them have even convinced the majority of philosophers, let alone working scientists.
Yes, it’s true that science is pragmatic and always has been. Newton pretty much perfected mathematical model building and popoularized scorn for “hypotheses.” What you would call ideological commitment to materialism.
Give me some counterexamples where ideological commitment has actually impeded science.
You have provided some examples of critics of new theories, but you have not provided any examples where critics actually impeded science or model building.
BruceS said:
How do you know ghosts don’t exist?
Causal closure is nothing but a bald metaphysical assumption, and natural laws are not prescriptive. There is nothing in “current science”, other than metaphysics, that would prevent dualist entities and any material effects thereof from being consonant with what science actually “tells us” sans metaphysical bias.
Petrushka said:
No. It’s what I would call a commitment to what is empirically demonstrable in spite of the cultural norms of either religion or naturalism of his day.
The trouble with William’s attempt to fight “methodological naturalism” is that he’s using ID’s strawman version, not the rather fluid and, I dare say, fairly meaningless “naturalism” that scientists actually use. Basically, scientists are pragmatic about what is “natural,” that is, if they can study it the phenomenon is (hypothetically, at least) “natural.”
Primarily, “naturalism” is invoked to say that science isn’t going to bother attacking, let alone using, fictions that have little or no evidence in the “natural,” or observable, world. Don’t trouble me with some fictive “Designer” of the “natural laws.” Believe in it if you wish, but we’re dealing with evidence. If it weren’t a rather hideous sounding term, I might consider labeling science as “methodological evidentialism,” or really just “evidentialism.”
ID has a problem with the rather unfortunate term “methodological naturalism” mainly because it doesn’t credit fictive entities. Science realizes that doing so would corrupt any honest discovery process, and, not generally being very sophisticated about philosophy, uses traditional terminology by saying that it is committed to “methodological naturalism” (really, a position not much discussed in philosophy, since “natural” can only be meaningfully understood according to other terms and concepts).
The basic fact is that science says it’s not going to take evidence-poor assertions seriously, and ID finds this to be distressing. Everything else is just flotsam and jetsam (with even a bit of ligan) obscuring this crucial difference of approach to the evidence.
Glen Davidson
William, please tell us about the existence of ghosts. Something other than, “you can’t prove that ghosts don’t exist.”
Or cite an example where commitment to atheistic materialism has impeded science.
Petrushka:
http://blog.vixra.org/2010/03/23/crackpots-who-were-right-4-ignaz-semmelweis/
http://blog.vixra.org/2010/06/17/%E2%80%9Ccrackpots%E2%80%9D-who-were-right-12-georg-ohm/
http://blog.vixra.org/category/crackpots-who-were-right/
http://blog.vixra.org/2010/04/01/%E2%80%9Ccrackpots%E2%80%9D-who-were-right-5-svante-arrhenius/
I’m afraid that William’s examples have little or nothing to do with “naturalism” or any other notion about how science operates. The “Ohm” anecdote even points in the opposite direction, against German idealism in favor of English empiricism (I believe the latter, not the former, were more inclined to viewing science as “naturalism”), which, by the way, was the tradition in which Darwin worked. German idealism did seem to facilitate some of the quantum thought of Planck and later physicists however, even if the Copenhagen interpretation seems to be another example of neo-Kantian/idealism overreach.
The other examples illustrate pretty much standard problems of acceptance of newer ideas that has existed, and almost certainly will continue to exist, in human endeavors such as science. It would be amazing that these well-known failures of human scientists would be used as examples of how “naturalism” has hurt science, except that we have long seen ID use any failure of human scientists as some sort of excuse to distrust science’s evidence and reasoning in origins science.
Glen Davidson
Petrushka: Those examples are supportive the points I have actually been making, not your specific characterization. Naturalism is not just “atheism/materialism”, nor is the point I’m making only about that; it is about how science can be impeded by naturalist narratives (such as, the indivisible atom) and demands/expectations (identifying the cause, providing a narrative-paradigm friendly theory) beyond simple, pragmatic empirical demonstration.
IOW, there are many cases where “methodological naturalism” has created narratives, which then generate worldview expectations and demands, that are entirely irrelevant to the empirical facts. In one case, it would require an understanding of quantum physics to explain the empirical success of the experiments, but because the scientist could not explain the empirical success in terms of theory, his scientific progress was impeded.
The paradigms, which are naturalist narratives, can leave good science behind for decades if not longer. Several of the examples at that blog show that science that has been ridiculed and dismissed because it could provide no theory or cause that fit the current naturalist narrative (like personal hygiene to prevent the spread of disease), only to be found to be true later after the narrative has been sufficiently changed.
And – that is the problem with any “ism” narrative-bound methodology; it’s not good enough to simply have empirical success; one must provide a narrative-friendly explanation or else the science is impeded – as these examples and others at that site clearly demonstrate.
Methodological Pragmatism, on the other hand, implies no metaphysical narrative or even a need for an explanation or theory in the face of experimental results. IF washing hands and equipment factually results in significantly less deaths, calling it a superstition because there is no known causal connection is simply a case of a naturalistic narrative not only impeding scientific progress. but also costing the lives of many people.
William, no one denies that there have been episodes in science when new theories have been temporarily rejected. Criticism of Ohm may have hurt him, but he was justified pretty quickly. How do you suppose his work became mainstream if no one worked to prove or disprove it? Everyone just magically changed their mind?
Evolution being the prime example of an idea rejected for ideological reasons. Going on 150 years, as opposed to 20 years.
Evidence that older people have more trouble than younger people understanding new concepts. That’s a failing of human beings in general, not evidence for ideology. It is perhaps relevant that Quantum theory was developed primarily by young people. In fact, most new physical theories are developed by younger people.
The episode with Goddard says something about journalists, but nothing at all about science. Newton had elucidated action/reaction centuries before. Besides, Goddard’s ideas were falling on London a decade or so later.
But while you have given a few examples of academic jealousy and the intransigence of older men, you have not given a single example of atheism or materialism as ideologies impeding science.
And ID as an ideology has not contributed a single new or useful idea in 211 years. Not one. Nothing. Nada. ID stands exactly where in did when Paley published his Natural theology.
Have you read it? There’s not a single idea expounded by Behe or Dembsky or Axe or Hunter that isn’t better presented by Paley.
ID has been intellectually sterile for over 200 years. No improvements, no theories, no models, nothing.
Feel free to supply specifics.
It’s absolutely untrue that the US rejected Goddard’s work. To use a newspaper, even if it’s the Gray Lady, to pretend otherwise is ludicrous, since American scientists knew and appreciated Newton’s second law of motion. I even have a couple of bound collections of Scientific American from Goddard’s time that report quite positively on Goddard’s experiments, and in a question-and-answer forum it is explained how rockets work in space.
The US didn’t fund Goddard’s work, or did so only anemicly, as it didn’t see much value in it (plus, FDR cut military total spending). For that matter, it didn’t do Nazi Germany much good–even though they pushed it before fully flouting the Versailles Treaty because that treaty didn’t cover rockets–since their V2s were very costly and the average strike only killed a couple of people or so. Even after the war the US didn’t bother much with rockets until rather late, thinking that bombers (which were extremely useful in WWII) were the better choice for delivering nuclear devices, and the USSR managed to get ahead for a while.
So that example totally fails. US physicists weren’t stupid, and knew that rockets could work in space (even if it would take immense work to do so), but the US didn’t see the value of rockets. It was the correct judgment during WWII, but not by the late 1950s.
Glen Davidson
from: http://amasci.com/weird/vindac.html#j1
From: http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/11-01-26/#feature
So in your opinion, ghosts are a bit like germs? They are being ignored and denied because of ideology?
One thing stands out in all your examples, William. The people who turned out to be right had evidence. They had, or developed, methods for acquiring experimental evidence.
Show us your evidence for ghosts, William. Pretend you are the oppressed Ohm. Show us your math. Show us your experiments, your observations.
Do you see a pattern in this?
petrushka said:
What do you think “impede” means? It doesn’t mean “stop”.
Petrushka said:
I have given multiple examples that support the actual point I’m arguing and have made well beyond the point of my own satisfaction. That they do not satisfy you or anyone else here is certainly not unexpected.
All your examples, Wialliam, have one thing in common. Can you guess what it is?
The people who turned out to be right had evidence. And despite resistance, evidence accumulated. Despite resistance, people worked on the problems and tested the unpopular theories.
Where is the impediment? Show me an example where the scientific community failed to work on the problem. It may sound callous, but all your examples are of short duration. Nothing like the 150 years of evolution denial, still going on.
Why isn’t one of your examples of the ideological opposition to evolution?
When someone says, “Ghost do not exist”, (like BruceS did) that is a positive assertion. It is their job to support that assertion. It’s not my job to prove the opposite.
When I say, I experienced what, by any reasonable definition, would be called a “ghost”,” what am I asserting? That ghosts exist? No, not really. I’m asserting that I experienced what, by common definition, would be called a “ghost”. Have I asserted that the existence of ghosts can be scientifically proven to exist?
Depends on what you mean by “science”. By the modern, western, ideologically-commited definition, certainly not, because ghosts are considered to be supernatural and thus outside of the realm of scientific scrutiny or proof.
But, all of this is an argument I’ve already made on this site. Suffice it to say now, refer back to my first post in this thread:
So, don’t forget, I’m a philosophical pragmatist; I don’t claim my views, models or beliefs have anything to do with “reality” – they only help me to successfully navigate my own experience. IOW, they work for me. They don’t even require a coherent metaphysical narrative.
I said physicalism is not science but metaphysical. But that does NOT mean I don’t think it is true.
Take causal closure in the metaphysical sense to mean that the only causes that act in the physical world are physical: I don’t think this is a “bald” assumption. I think it is the rational metaphysical conclusion of the success of science and the nature of its laws, where science itself operates under MN.
I believe most philosophers agree with this line of reasoning. Almost all the ones that don’t appeal to consciousness, not ghosts, as counter-arguments to physicalism. I know your epistemic standards are different from mine and so that argument won’t impress you.
William, you are not impeded from believing in ghosts or faith healing or anything else.
You are not impeded from acquiring evidence and publishing it, as Ohm did.
I merely point out that in 211 years since Natural Theology, not a single new idea or bit of supporting evidence has been provided by Paleyists.
It is not because science is ideological. Science no longer gives a damn about billiard ball particles or strict determinism or action at a distance.
What science cares about is relationships between phenomena. Evidence, math, predictive models. No one really gives a damn what the underlying reality IS. Just whether models can be made that accommodate the data.
Humans are limited in their ability to invent and to comprehend complex models. This is exacerbated by the need for several years of graduate level math just to manipulate the models. So new models will meet resistance. It is not ideological resistance. It is human frailty.
But if a new idea is accompanied by evidence, math and a successful model, it will win. Your argument from ideology is bullshit.
I would not go that far. Certainly philosophers who are scientific realists care about reality and claim that science can be used to make claims about that reality.
I also believe that most scientists are that type of realist, partly because it seems to me to lead to a more meaningful life doing science. Saying “I do science to know what is” seems to me to be much better than “I do science so I can predict future experiments”. I don’t have any evidence for that. But, as I’ve said before, I have trouble believing that paleontologists think dinosaurs are just a way of predicting where they will find new fossils.
However, I do agree that scientific realism is a philosophical claim and not a prerequisite for doing successful science.
Also note that physicalism is not the same thing as scientific realism: it is a much looser claim that is consistent with scientific instrumentalism of the type I understand you to espouse. All that is needed is for physicalism is supervenience on some physical reality, not necessarily the one described by the terms of our best physics.
It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that scientific realism is characterized differently by every author who discusses it, and this presents a challenge to anyone hoping to learn what it is.
link
I think most people are realists to the extent that they think they are modelling something real. But I think any successful innovator must suspect that reality is deeper than the model. Models all the way down, so to speak.
That’s my personal imagining. Models all the way down. I suspect there is no limit to divisibility of reality. Just lumps in the data.
So I have no problem thinking things are real. People are real, planets are real. Atoms are real.
But they are not and never will be complete descriptions or perfect models of reality. There will always be deeper levels.
Yes, there is a blob of related beliefs grouped under scientific realism. It is a different blob than the anti-realists.. Not exactly sure where the pragmatists go. Whatever works for them on the day they are asked, perhaps?
This quote from the first para of your link:
Epistemic attitude to the unobservables is generally taken to be a key way to distinguish realism from anti-realism.
Sure models all the way down is what science is.
But reality is not a model.
Are the terms of the best physics model what reality is? That is the issue as I understand it.
Here’s another quote:
Only a philosopher could have written that!
What is reality?
It’s easiest being a pragmatist, assuming one knows what that entails. 🙂
Regardless of one’s position on realism, the terms like scientism and evolutionism are caricatures and straw men.
Individual scientists are always limited and flawed. That includes the Newtons and Einsteins. The institution of science is entirely pragmatic and cares not for philosophical issues. The net effect of all the work done by all the scientists is guided by an invisible hand. Results.
All this talk about MN and not a peep from Keith.
I gotta think that is the calm before the storm.
It must be a little disheartening, trying to defend a dualist paradigm. I guess it makes some folks a little defensive.
If it’s models all the way down, it hardly matters. You keep digging, but you will never reach the bottom. To be effective, you merely need to believe that there will be an island of stability in the data at the next lower level.
And they can be verified. Repeatability rules!
Repeatability goes without saying. The net effect is guided by results and repeatability.
And relevance. Results, repeatability and relevance.
Do you need to come in again? 🙂
Aside from those, what has science done for us?