I am currently working my way through the book A Natural History of Natural Theology: The Cognitive Science of Theology and Philosophy of Religion.
There is already a thread here dedicated to the book, but I decided to separate the thesis of the book from the actual natural theological arguments themselves. The evidence that the premises upon which these natural theological arguments rest are natural and intuitive are the subject of that thread.
In this thread I’d like to explore how the cosmological argument for the existence of God is presented in the book and provide a place where these cosmological arguments can be examined and criticized.
: Chapter 5
: The Cosmological Argument and Intuitions about Causality and Agency
The cosmological argument infers the existence of God from the existence of the universe. It has been developed in various traditions of natural theology (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Hinduism). Early examples include the Kalam (Islamic theological) cosmological argument, formulated by among others Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and al-Ghazali, the second and third of Thomas Aquinas’s five ways, Duns Scotus’s argument from contingency, and cosmological arguments based on the principle of sufficient reason by Gottfried Leibniz and Samuel Clarke.
Cosmological arguments can be usefully categorized in three classes. The first, exemplified by Thomas Aquinas’s second and third way relies on the observation that causes stand in relation to their effects as chains; as an infinite regress of causes is deemed impossible, this leads to the inference of an uncaused cause, that is, something that has itself as a sufficient cause. Aquinas’s second way is the argument from first cause: as things cannot cause themselves, and as an infinite regress of causes is impossible, there must be a first cause that is itself uncaused. His third way observes that all natural things are contingent; in other words, they may as well not have existed. If everything were contingent, then even now nothing would exist, since things that do not exist only come into existence through things that already exist. Therefore, there must be something that exists of necessity, that is, it is impossible for this being not to exist. The second class, the Leibnizian cosmological argument, says that the totality of the world is a contingent being that requires a sufficient explanation for its existence. The third class, exemplified by the Kalam cosmological argument, contends that all objects that have a temporal beginning must have a cause. Since the universe has a temporal beginning, it must have a transcendant cause. We will focus on this category.
1. I question whether the cosmological argument infers the existence of God. Modern arguments for the existence of God may be inferential but the classical argument was offered as a demonstration.
2. I would suggest that the claim that in Aquinas causes stand in relation to their effects as chains is a later interpretation influenced by Hume.
3. I question their understanding of and presentation of Aquinas’s second way.
4. I question their understanding of and presentation of Aquinas’s third way.
5. How does the argument of Leibniz differ from the arguments of is predecessors and what was the origin of the principle of sufficient reason.
6. Why focus on the one version of the cosmological argument that depends on a temporal beginning of the universe?
If you’re a shark, at this point there is plenty of blood in the water!
Afiak, none of this has anything to do with the fine tuning argument. But don’t let that stop you.
Discuss.
Or it so happens that arguments – argument for or against anything – fail to convey the full import of the issue. We can have two Marys (as in Mary’s room thought experiment) arguing over what colour is like, and the “better argument” may win, but no argument and no reasoning conveys the experience of colour to either of the Marys.
Similarly, any concept of God, no matter how well reasoned out, remains unconvincing without the corresponding experience of the full import of what God is about. On classical theism, God is existence itself, spiritual light and wisdom, the deepest essence of everything, and there are arguments to show why this makes sense, but all this remains only a word salad for anyone who cares more about smaller things.
Just like repeated criminals return to crime no matter how often you lock them up. Crime is simply more “real” and feels more “free” to them than any other kind of life, no matter how well you intellectually explain to the criminal that it’s “better for everyone” to be without crime. Intellectual arguments have no force for those who only acknowledge brute force and spiritual instruction has no effect on those who have no spiritual tendency.
The argument may make perfect sense, but try to explain it to your dog. Conversely, when it cannot be explained to your dog, does it mean it’s worthless?
I generally agree with your attitude on this matter, Erik. In my book on religious experience I spent some time criticizing C.S. Lewis not only for his (crappy) arguments, but for his apparent position that there’d be any importance to them, even if they WERE halfway decent.
Yes, I also think that there is a limit to what argument can accomplish.
But I also suspect that Aquinas was more sensitive to the limits of argument than commonly thought. Previously, Keiths worries about a fallacious move in the argument:
I think that what keiths sees here as a fallacious argument is actually something quite different and more subtle. When Aquinas says
we should notice the ‘caesura’ or ‘pause’ here between what is rationally demonstrated on the basis of reason alone (that there is a first cause) and what is commonly (universally?) accepted as being true (that God is the first cause).
In other words, what’s not that the argument is missing any premises; it’s that there’s a caesura between the argument and the affirmation of faith. The conclusion of the argument is not “therefore, God exists”; the conclusion of the argument is, “therefore, there must be a first cause”. The statement, “which everyone understands to be God” is not part of the argument itself, strictly speaking.
And one might well wonder whether someone who has never had an experience of God — has never had an experience of “vertical transcendence” — would be disposed to agree that God is the first cause, even if she accepts the validity of the argument that there must indeed be a first cause.
KN,
No, Aquinas intended his Five Ways to prove the existence of God, not merely of a “first cause” or “necessary being”.
The title of that section of the Summa Theologica is “Does God Exist?”, and Aquinas introduces the Five Ways thus:
The difficulty lies in the premise that everything must be caused.
How rational is it to assert that everything has a cause except for my invisible sky fairy?
Since the argument requires there to be at least one uncaused cause, you have pretty much eviscerated causation. Better to assume that causation is not what we intuitively think it is.
Which argument has that premise?
2nd Way:
That’s another way of saying that every event has an (efficient) cause.
Thank you.
And keiths, not finding “therefore God exists” in the argument goes looking for it in the title, or the preface, or wherever…
Mung,
In the text:
Not only does Aquinas explicitly state that he was arguing for the existence of God — so did you, Mung.
Can you defend Aquinas’s second and third way arguments, or do you concede that they fail?
waldo, let’s try this from the end of the argument and trace the logic backwards from there:
“Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.”
So he is not talking just any cause, he is talking of efficient causation. So when he talks about a series of causes, he’s talking about efficient causes.
“Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause.”
Again, he’s is talking about things that have an efficient case. He is not saying that everything has an efficient cause.
” Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect.”
Talking about whatever has an efficient cause. Not a claim that everything has a cause.
“Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity…”
Talking about things that have an efficient cause. This is not an assertion that everything has a cause.
“There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself…”
No efficient case can cause itself. This is not a claim that everything has a cause.
And now to for the beginning of the argument.
“The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.”
Now where does he ever have as a premise that everything must have a cause?
It just isn’t there.
You can, of course, deny the premise that there are efficient causes. If you like.
The problem with all these arguments is that once the premises are cleaned up sufficiently to show why they are rationally acceptable, the argument no longer works.
In the second way, the first premise can be taken as “every sensible, finite thing has a cause”. Why should we think this? Is an a priori principle? Is it analytic? If it is a priori, what is the basis of this premise?
Well, one might think that “every sensible, finite thing” is a constitutive principle of empirical inquiry, and one that is justified by the following line of thought:
And that is surely right. But notice, now, that our excellent track record of causal explanations of spatio-temporal phenomena gives us no reason at all for thinking that we could ever develop a causal explanation for the entire cosmos, the totality of all of time and space. We might simply have no idea how to talk about causal processes that aren’t spatio-temporal.
The very concept of non-spatio-temporal causal processes could involve, for all we know, a very subtle category error. (Kant thought so. Sure, Kant was wrong about a lot of stuff, but he was no dummy. If Kant thought there was a problem here, it’s worth slowing down to think about it.)
Defend them from what? That you don’t like the arguments isn’t something I feel any need to offer a defense against.
What do the arguments have as a conclusion that you disagree with? From what I’ve seen so far you don’t even know what the conclusion of either argument is, and you’ve made no effort to show how from the premises of the arguments the conclusion does not logically follow. Get to it. Please.
The one that includes thr assertion that thngs cannot cause themselves.
Why else would a first cause be necessary?
The alternatives include the possibilities that things are uncaused, or that our understanding of causation is deficient.
Mung,
If you could defend those arguments — the ones you presented as arguments for the existence of God — then you would.
You can’t.
He does not say things cannot cause themselves. What he says is that an efficient cause cannot be its own efficient cause.
Go back and read the argument, please.
In addition to denying any efficient causes you could argue that some efficient causes are themselves uncaused. But all his argument requires is that there be efficient causes. Nowhere in it does the claim exist that everything has a cause.
I can’t imagine why though you would think science could be successful if what you say is true.
keiths, I’ll respond to you tomorrow.
Wait, are you saying that all Aquinas is saying is that every event that is the efficient effect of something has an efficient cause? That’s a tautology, no?
Give the guy some credit! He’s saying that every thing/event has an efficient cause, that there are no uncaused things in our experience. That’s a premise that is (a) intuitively plausible, and (b) not just a tautology.
I mean, crimity–the guy was a good philosopher, not a shallow philosophist like…well…I don’t like to say. 🙁
Another double post.
Mung,
Good! Go do your research, NewMung!
It doesn’t matter how plausible it is. It’s not a premise of his argument, and you don’t get to make it a premise of his argument just because it suits you to do so.
“In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.”
You can. of course, deny:
1.) that our senses are involved at all.
2.) that there are any efficient causes.
3.) that there is any order to them if they exist. (think Hume)
Science, however, would hardly be possible otherwise.
Aquinas does not say that everything has a cause.
Let me try another approach, since you seem to be a rather reasonable sort.
(Whatever it is that leads to the constant conjunction of your posts with another just like it, you might want to have that looked at. Unless there’s no cause for it.)
If everything requires a cause, then God, if God exists, requires a cause. But Aquinas does not say that God requires a cause. And he was a good philosopher.
But god does not require a cause.
Therefore, god does not exist.
hotshoe,
Define ‘exist’. 🙂
Mung, science is successful without being able to discern causes at the quantum level. Dare I suggest that causation is emergent?
Hi petrushka,
What would cause causation to emerge? 😉
As to your first comment, that science cannot discern the cause is not, afiak, a reason to deduce that no cause exists. And in fact you do avoid saying that events are uncaused at the quantum level You merely say that science can still proceed. That’s no doubt true, but unimpressive.
By the way, how is quantum computing coming along? Is that just a pipe dream?
Exactly right. As I said, our experience indicates to us that every event has a cause. It’s not a tautology, as you suggest, it’s either an induction a la Hume, or some kind of Kantian necessary intuition. Either way, though, it’s substantive.
So now we wonder, Hmmmm, if everything we ever see is caused, does the chain go back infinitely or is there a first cause. Aquinas says, we can’t go back infinitely. Et voila! First cause.
You want to resist the claim that God is subject to the same argument, and that, I think, is quite sensible. The way to do that, IMO, is just to insist on it. I.e., insist that the existence of current events requires that there be a first cause which is itself uncaused.
As I say, it’s all sensible, as well as at least partly suggested by our experience. But it’s not really a proof of anything.
walto, I deny your premise that our common sense experience tells us that every event has a cause. Can you tell me which of Aquinas’s premises you’re denying?
If not, on what basis do you deny his conclusion?
Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause
Or are you just saying that not everyone agrees this first efficient cause is called ‘God’?
It’s not my premise (although it seems reasonable to me), it’s Aquinas’s: He writes:
Can you tell me which of Aquinas’s premises you’re denying?
OK, here are the rest of them:
Ok, so the “to take away the cause is to take away the effect” is a repetition of the first premise, which I’ve already said seems reasonable–either as the result of induction or as some sort of the basis of human reasoning a la Kant.
But the business about the causal chain not being able to go back infinitely doesn’t do much for me. In fact there’s a little sleight of hand there with the use of “first” when he says “everybody knows there can’t be any intermediate causes unless there’s a first cause.” He’s trying to sneak in “Hey, we all know there are intermediate causes, but that means there must be a first cause.” That’s all just question-begging: if he has a real argument for why a causal chain can’t go back infinitely, he hasn’t given it, just tried a little trick based on the terms “intermediate” and “ultimate.”
What else? Y’all have already discussed the issue about “and this all men call God.” I guess I’m in the “Huh?” camp there. If some cosmologist proves beyond any reasonable doubt that the universe came into being with a Big Bang having nothing preceding it (not even time), would all say that s/he had proved the existence of God? That’s not obvious to me. I’d actually say that most people would not call that first cause “God.” That’s my take.
If not, on what basis do you deny his conclusion? Or are you just saying that not everyone agrees this first efficient cause is called ‘God’?
See above.
Well, keiths, I was hoping that by now you’d have posted some reason for me to actually need to defend Aquinas’s arguments. But you haven’t. Silly me.
And I don’t feel obligated in the least to defend an argument that Aquinas never made.
Interesting question, and I don’t have an answer. Perhaps decoherence?
I think it’s better to admit that causation is an unsolved problem — possibly an unsolvable problem — than to regurgitate bullshit and pretend to be profound.
I’ll be brief. A lot of readers don’t understand how the cosmological argument works. I’d recommend that they read the following two articles by Edward Feser:
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/07/so-you-think-you-understand.html
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/07/cosmological-argument-roundup.html
Feser also wrote a very good defense of Aquinas’ Five Ways in 2011 titled, “Existential Inertia and the Five Ways” (American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 237-267.
For my critique of that article, see the following post:
Bye!
[Fixed a broken link. So sue me. – Mung]
Sorry. The correct link to Feser’s second article is as follows:
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/07/cosmological-argument-roundup.html
No one should ever read that dirtwad Feser.
There are probably millions of people on our planet inherently worse than he, but none of them are such blog-prolific scum.
Mung,
Don’t worry about it. Nobody thought you’d be able to defend Aquinas in particular or your faith in general.
Vincent,
I followed your first Feser link, but none of his numbered points apply to my criticisms of the Second Way.
The one that comes closest is this:
Feser writes:
That’s all fine, but it isn’t part of the Second Way as stated by Aquinas. All Aquinas says is this:
Aquinas claims that the Five Ways are proofs:
As I remarked earlier:
The question applies to you as well, Vincent.
vjtorley, if you really took Feser seriously, you too would soon reject the IDist ideology that has come to define your communication at UD and lately at TSZ. If invited again, I’d drop a discursive bomb on the DI with you, given that you almost always properly capitalise “Intelligent Design” in contrast with the secret IDist policy of the DI.
But the DI is simply not ready (if you can trust me, since I’ve been there and seen their system & personnel behind the scenes) for that and you are far away in Japan teaching English (like Poulshock), rather than actually developing philosophy. And you have admittedly never published an article (or even tried?) in a serious (peer-reviewed/replied) journal, preferring instead low-grade UD blog. So, as for cosmogony, this just isn’t an area where you can be seen (outside of your fanatic IDist brethren) as credible, as ‘evangelical’ as you want to be.
Yes. You’re all for the “good faith” rule, when you’re not against it. And you’re all for addressing the post not the poster, except when you aren’t.
This is why you should lobby with all your strength against my being made any sort of moderator here at TSZ. I would hound you, just like you hounded Alan and Neil and probably innumerable others. They would probably sit idly by appreciating you getting a taste of your own medicine.
Your little foray here into pure ad hom sufficiently demonstrates that there’s nothing wrong with Aquinas’s arguments, at least nothing that you can manage to articulate.
But I’ll check back in a couple days. I do believe in miracles.
Mung,
No, I’m against both of those rules, Mung. Get your facts straight.
Regarding Aquinas’s Second and Third Ways, which you offered as arguments for God’s existence, my question remains unanswered:
Without that assumption they are no longer arguments for God’s existence, which would contradict your claim. So what justifies the assumption, Mung?
Gregory,
That’s skirting the line of doxxing. The location and employment of your interlocutors is not pertinent to the discussion.
Making up the rules as we go.
All one has to do is follow vjtorley’s provided link to his OP at UD and then click on his name there to be taken to his web site. AFIAK, VJT has never attempted to hide who he is or where he works, and in fact has made that information freely available on the internet.
So Elizabeth has all her “bulldogs” keeping a close eye on Gregory and they are doing a fine job! Meanwhile they ignore all the other ongoing infractions, true to form. Nice job Lizziedogs!
Protect the world from Gregory! Erm, I mean protect “The Skeptical Zone.” Yeah, they need protection from the likes of Gregory. Arf! Arf!
ETA: pertinent has nothing to do with it.
Mung,
Please read the rules linked at the top of the page, in particular the section beginning “ETA6”.
Lizzie has redacted personal information that is readily available at other sites a number of times. I suspect that she also considers Gregory’s comment approaching the line she has drawn. Hopefully she’ll chime in with a clarification.
Patrick, why don’t you post the relevant section you were invoking instead of sending me off on a wild goose chase?
As I quoted above:
This clearly does not apply either to VJT or to Gregory’s use of “vjtorley.” There is no outing nor attempt at outing going on here. You’re threatening Gregory with banning, right? Based on what, exactly?
Violation of the First Amendment?
Keep stretching Patrick. Maybe you can use the second amendment.
I know you are a busy person but some of us here would enjoy sparring with you if you ever find yourself with a free moment. It’s a shame Feser does not hold you in the same high regard that you hold him, judging by your past forays to his flame-pit of a blog. The best I can say of Feser is that he can only generate minority interest. He is certainly not worth reading for interest; though it is instructive as a warning to glance at some of his OPs in case Feser ever manages to generate more than a tiny minority influence.
Mung,
I was doing you the courtesy of assuming that you could read for comprehension. Mea culpa.
Gregory identified vjtorley’s location and type of employment, neither of which have been brought into the discussion by vjtorley himself in that thread or on this site. Following Lizzie’s lead with respect to using kairosfocus’ real name, I pointed out that Gregory was getting close to the line.
Personal information like that is typically redacted. Only persistent refusal to abide by the no doxxing rule results in a ban.
For future reference, here is the rule on doxxing:
And here is part of the clarification Lizzie provided:
Gregory posted material that references the real life identity of vjtorley. While not specific, it does, as I said, skirt the line.
My hope is that he recognizes the principle behind the rule and chooses to refrain from posting personal information in the future.
Repeating my question to Mung:
Regarding Aquinas’s Second and Third Ways, which you offered as arguments for God’s existence, my question remains unanswered:
According to Feser, Aquinas does give an argument for identifying “the first cause” (the necessarily existing being that, being necessary, does not need any further cause for its existence) with the God of classical theism does not occur in the Five Ways per se, but elsewhere in the Thomistic corpus.
In other words, it doesn’t function as a mere assumption in the Thomistic story, but as a promissory note that gets redeemed at a different place in the account.
Those of us who think that there is clearly something right about the Cosmological Argument — there must be at least one necessary being — but who don’t see how the C.A. leads to the God of classical theism would therefore need to see where the rest of the argument is.
keiths:
There is no such assumption, therefore, there’s no need to justify it.
KN,
Call it a promissory note if you like, but I’d like to see one of the theists here redeem it.
I’ve seen some attempts elsewhere, but I’d like to know what the local theists find persuasive. How do they get from “there is a first cause” to “there is a God”? (Well, we know that fifthmonarchyman does so by simply defining God as anything that happens to be a first cause.) Likewise, how do they get from “there is a necessary being” to “the necessary being is God?”
Mung,
The Second and Third Ways can’t prove God’s existence unless you show that only God can be the first cause or the necessary being.
You presented them as arguments for God’s existence. How do you know that the first cause is God? How do you know that the necessary being is God?
If you can’t defend the arguments, then just say so instead of pretending that the criticism is invalid.