Presuppositions of Science

Given recent posts here at TSZ challenging the validity of presuppositions and self-evident truths I thought the following list might be worthy of debate.

Presuppositions of Science

1. The existence of a theory-independent, external world
2. The orderly nature of the external world
3. The knowability of the external world
4. The existence of truth
5. The laws of logic
6. The reliability of our cognitive and sensory faculties to serve as truth gatherers and as a source of justified true beliefs in our intellectual environment
7. The adequacy of language to describe the world
8. The existence of values used in science
9. The uniformity of nature and induction
10. The existence of numbers

When critics object to the Logos as a presupposition and offer instead 10 other presuppositions, Ockham’s Razor flies out the window.

788 thoughts on “Presuppositions of Science

  1. petrushka,

    It failed to refute any absolute statement of solidity, but it confirms that any statement of the illusory nature of solidity will be ignored in everyday life. The experience of solidity is not an illusion.

    The experience is real, but the solidity may not be. That’s Berkeley’s point, and Johnson’s ‘refutation’ failed to touch it.

  2. Elizabeth: I think there is a “true” story “out there” about how things work, and why certain things happen when other things happen etc.

    Yes, as I said before, I think we have to start with a concept of truth before we can move on to concepts of probability.

  3. petrushka: It failed to refute any absolute statement of solidity, but it confirms that any statement of the illusory nature of solidity will be ignored in everyday life. The experience of solidity is not an illusion.

    That’s partly right. Keiths is right that Dr. Johnson’s kick doesn’t refute Berkeley, and it’s not entirely clear what would refute Berkeley. But it’s also true that Berkeley’s metaphysics doesn’t seem to make a difference to experience. I believe it was Hume who said, “Berkeley failed to persuade anyone that his position was irrefutable.”

    However, we can make explicit a problem with Berkeley’s idealism. At the very heart of his metaphysics is the claim that all of one’s experiences of the world beyond one’s own mind are produced by the contact of one’s own mind with the Mind of God. This does not actually explain anything. To use C. I. Lewis’ phrase from his criticism of idealism, “it substitutes adoration of a mystery for explanation of a fact.”

  4. walto: Yes, as I said before, I think we have to start with a concept of truth before we can move on to concepts of probability.

    But does the concept of truth need to be an epistemic ideal or goal? Or would a strictly semantic concept of truth be sufficient?

  5. Kantian Naturalist:

    I do think that empirical knowledge cannot yield absolute truth, but that is because I do not think there is any such thing as absolute truth — certainly not in empirical domains, but also not in logic or in mathematics.

    If one were to insist that knowledge of any kind requires the possibility of absolute truth, then I suppose I’d say that by that standard, no one can know anything at all. (That is, actually, the point of Agrippa’s Trilemma — it’s an argument for skepticism, or the view that no one can know anything.)

    But I see no reason to accept that standard, for reasons previously given.

    I just realized that this remark from earlier is mistaken — the Trilemma isn’t motivated by a demand for absolute truth but by a demand for absolute justification.

    The Trilemma is supposed to show that knowledge is impossible because any attempt at absolute justification will fall on one of the three horns of the Trilemma. That’s why the Trilemma can be avoided by adopting a context-sensitive account of justification as a historically evolving, culturally mediated social practice.

    Though it is common to see “pragmatic” used here as a term to distance one’s position from “philosophy”, in fact the arguments for pragmatism (as developed by Hegel, Peirce, Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, Rorty, etc.) are sophisticated treatments of the deepest issues in “traditional” philosophy (both the battle between rationalism and empiricism and the battle between physicalism, dualism, and idealism).

  6. Patrick: . . . you have just granted that science can’t get you to truth.

    I don’t see that Reciprocating Bill said any such thing.

    quote:

    Science has no foundation, or means to “truth,”analogous to the foundations you claim for your Christianity.

    end quote:
    Reciprocating Bill

    peace

  7. fifthmonarchyman: So you would agree that you can’t find truth by means of empirical investigation?

    Quite the opposite. It is only through the combination of scientific theory, empirical investigation and engineering efforts that, for example, knowledge of the world of the kind that enabled us to place Curiosity on Mars can be secured.

  8. Kantian Naturalist: That’s why the Trilemma can be avoided by adopting a context-sensitive account of justification as a historically evolving, culturally mediated social practice.

    I think that’s right…but I’m glad it doesn’t say “only by adopting….”

  9. Patrick: The Logos became flesh

    Prove it.

    As a presupposition it does not require proof as revealed truth the proof is in the revealing

    quote:
    these things God has revealed to us through the Spirit. For the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. For who knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might understand the things freely given us by God.
    (1Co 2:10-12)
    end quote:

    peace

  10. KN,

    But it’s also true that Berkeley’s metaphysics doesn’t seem to make a difference to experience.

    Sure, but I’m not aware that Berkeley ever argued otherwise. Are you?

    I believe it was Hume who said, “Berkeley failed to persuade anyone that his position was irrefutable.”

    To me it’s the first fact — that Berkeley’s metaphysics makes no difference to experience — that explains why idealism is in fact irrefutable. I wrote in the earlier thread:

    I prefer realism because I think it is a simpler theory that explains our observations just as well as idealism, while being more intuitive. I don’t think idealism has been refuted, however.

  11. Reciprocating Bill: Quite the opposite. It is only through the combination of scientific theory, empirical investigation and engineering efforts that, for example, knowledge of the world of the kind that enabled us to place Curiosity on Mars can be secured.

    What criteria did you use to determine that what enabled us to place Curiosity on Mars was actually knowledge?

    Was the proposition that empirical verification leads to knowledge empirically verified?

    IOW How do you know stuff in your worldview?

    peace

  12. fifthmonarchyman: That you put knowledge in scare quotes is interesting.

    The scare quotes indicate that what you claim is knowledge, isn’t.

    walto defines knowledge as justified true belief and you have just granted that science can’t get you to truth.

    What I said is that science can’t get us to “truth” analogous to that which you claim for Christianity, i.e. truth with an unassailable foundation. (Neither can Christianity, as it’s claim to do so is circular.)

    It can get us to truth that enables the placement of Curiosity on Mars.

  13. walto: I think that’s right…but I’m glad it doesn’t say “only by adopting….”

    Actually, I’m enough of a quasi-Hegelian that I want to endorse the stronger claim as well — but perhaps it would be antithetical to my pragmatic fallibilism for me to do so!

  14. fifthmonarchyman: What criteria did you use to determine that what enabled us to place Curiosity on Mars was actually knowledge?

    Curiosity actually landed on Mars.

  15. Reciprocating Bill: It can get us to truth that enables the placement of Curiosity on Mars.

    So in your world view truth equals “helps us do stuff”

    OK

    How exactly does the proposition truth is what “helps us do stuff” help you do stuff?

    peace

  16. fifthmonarchyman: How exactly does the proposition truth is what “helps us do stuff” help you do stuff?

    Not much. As I said, the sciences generate knowledge of the world just fine, thank you, without having to address sophistries like this, which are themselves are not within the purview of science.

  17. fifthmonarchyman: Are you just saying it helps you do stuff to believe Curiosity actually landed on Mars?

    No, I am saying that the fact that Curiosity actually landed on Mars confirmed that the description of the world that enabled us to place it there was sufficiently accurate for that purpose, and warrants being regarded as knowledge.

    ETA: “Sufficiently…for that purpose.”

  18. keiths:
    KN,

    Sure, but I’m not aware that Berkeley ever argued otherwise.Are you?

    To me it’s the first fact — that Berkeley’s metaphysics makes no difference to experience — that explains why idealism is in fact irrefutable. I wrote in the earlier thread:

    I agree with you. There’s no way to demonstrate the falsity of idealism.

  19. fifthmonarchyman: How do you know??

    Are you just saying it helps you do stuff to believe Curiosity actually landed on Mars?

    Peace

    Yeah, like landing (with signals indicating as much), pictures consistent with knowledge of Mars gained in various other ways, and the sort of analyses that are consistent with expectations of Martian geologic evolution.

    Funny how veridical findings bolster the “beliefs” of those who deal consistently with the scientific world. Your position allows you to cling to unsupported claims while attempting to dump upon successful enterprises for collecting knowledge that have nothing to do with your “truth.”

    Glen Davidson

  20. fifthmonarchyman: As a presupposition it does not require proof as revealed truth the proof is in the revealing

    Actually it is a presumed revealed truth based on presuppositions so therefore it does not require proof. We have yet to determine any actual revealing has occurred beyond the presupposition that it is possible that a presupposition is capable of it.

    Just curious, is it possible to be mistaken about revelation? If so how does one differentiate between true and false revelation? For instance is your belief in a mortal soul a revealed truth?

  21. walto,

    I agree with you. There’s no way to demonstrate the falsity of idealism.

    Or if there were, it would falsify realism too, and we would all poof into nonexistence. 🙂

  22. fifthmonarchyman: Cool,
    So you would agree that you can’t find truth by means of empirical investigation?

    We can reach conclusions that we can state, with a reasonable degree of confidence, as “probably mostly true” statements. But not absolute truth, no. We approach truth asymptotically in science, and it always comes with caveats and confidence estimates.

  23. Reciprocating Bill: Not much.

    So you are saying that your chosen criteria for knowledge is not true? Or are you just saying you don’t particularly care about anything that does not help you do stuff?

    If it’s the former why do you believe something that is false?
    If it’s the later why should I care?

    peace

  24. Reciprocating Bill: Not much. As I said, the sciences generate knowledge of the world just fine, thank you, without having to address sophistries like this, which are themselves are not within the purview of science.

    I think we can do a little bit better than this, though, by reflecting on the historical failure of foundationalist justifications.

    Peirce does this in “The Fixation of Belief“. He points out four different methods whereby one may arrive at settled beliefs sufficiently stable to guide action: the method of tenacity, the method of authority, the a priori method, and the method of science. Of the last he says:

    To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency — by something upon which our thinking has no effect. Some mystics imagine that they have such a method in a private inspiration from on high. But that is only a form of the method of tenacity, in which the conception of truth as something public is not yet developed. Our external permanency would not be external, in our sense, if it was restricted in its influence to one individual. It must be something which affects, or might affect, every man. And, though these affections are necessarily as various as are individual conditions, yet the method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion.

    and

    It may be asked how I know that there are any Reals. If this hypothesis is the sole support of my method of inquiry, my method of inquiry must not be used to support my hypothesis. The reply is this: 1. If investigation cannot be regarded as proving that there are Real things, it at least does not lead to a contrary conclusion; but the method and the conception on which it is based remain ever in harmony. No doubts of the method, therefore, necessarily arise from its practice, as is the case with all the others. 2. The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions. But here already is a vague concession that there is some one thing which a proposition should represent. Nobody, therefore, can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. The hypothesis, therefore, is one which every mind admits. So that the social impulse does not cause men to doubt it. 3. Everybody uses the scientific method about a great many things, and only ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it. 4. Experience of the method has not led us to doubt it, but, on the contrary, scientific investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion. These afford the explanation of my not doubting the method or the hypothesis which it supposes; and not having any doubt, nor believing that anybody else whom I could influence has, it would be the merest babble for me to say more about it. If there be anybody with a living doubt upon the subject, let him consider it.

    In other words:

    1. The method of science is dialectically stable in a way the other methods are not;
    2. The method of science is a historical accomplishment;
    3. The vindication of the method of science consists in contrasting it with other methods;
    4. The history of the methods of inquiry is itself the justification for the epistemic superiority of the method of science over other methods.

  25. Elizabeth: We can reach conclusions that we can state, with a reasonable degree of confidence, as “probably mostly true” statements. But not absolute truth, no. We approach truth asymptotically in science, and it always comes with caveats and confidence estimates.

    I’m not asking about “absolute” truth whatever that means
    I’m asking about any truth.

    How can something be true and false at the same time in the same respect?

    If you are just saying we don’t know the whole story yet I’d agree. Revelation is an ongoing process

    Do you agree that truth is necessary for knowledge

    peace

  26. fifthmonarchyman: I’m not asking about “absolute” truth whatever that means
    I’m asking about any truth.

    How can something be true and false at the same time in the same respect?

    It could have a probability of being true, and a probability of being false.

    If you are just saying we don’t know the whole story yet I’d agree. Revelation is an ongoing process

    Do you agree that truth is necessary for knowledge

    Well, you aren’t telling me what you mean by “truth”. I think it’s possible to “know” something only partially, or probabilistically. But you seem to be using “truth” in some different sense from the one that is applicable to statements or conclusions.

    For instance you haven’t yet (I don’t think, unless I’ve missed it) told me what you mean by “Jesus is Truth”.

    I understand “Jesus said some things that are true”. But what do you mean by “Jesus is truth”?

  27. fifthmonarchyman,

    Science has no foundation, or means to “truth,”analogous to the foundations you claim for your Christianity.

    If you had read to the end of Reciprocating Bill’s comment, you would see that he identified how science can “get you to truth” (to use your term), just not the putative “truth” you claim for your religious beliefs. Your paraphrasing was inaccurate and misleading.

  28. fifthmonarchyman: So you are saying that your chosen criteria for knowledge is not true?

    No, I’m saying that your question is an empty sophistry.

    The model that enabled the placement of Curiosity on Mars certainly included mathematically expressed descriptions of the world such that a given force applied to a vehicle of a particular mass at a particular time on a particular course would result in that vehicle’s approach to Mars at a particular time at a particular velocity and course some months later – with great precision. To that extent the model was shown to be accurate (by it’s success), considering it knowledge, and true, is warranted.

    Do you disagree?

  29. Kantian Naturalist: I think we can do a little bit better than this, though, by reflecting on the historical failure of foundationalist justifications.

    It’s important to know that I am not exposing foundationalism here. I am exposing Christian theism. It is much closer the the Foundherentism that walto referred to.

    Christian theism is a unique system all it’s own. In my opinion every other system falls short for one reason or the other.

    peace

  30. fifthmonarchyman,

    The Logos became flesh

    Prove it.

    As a presupposition it does not require proof as revealed truth the proof is in the revealing

    There is no difference in practice between what you are calling a presupposition and what is normally considered assuming your conclusion.

    If you can’t provide evidence to support your claim, do the honest thing and admit it.

  31. fifthmonarchyman: Revelation is an ongoing process

    No it’s not.

    Fer instance. At some point in the future death will be largely optional. Aging will be “solved”. This is because our understanding of biology is an ongoing process and at some point will result in biology being amenable to manipulation in similar ways we currently apply in computer code. For some extant organisms aging already seems to be something they simply don’t do. But as time progresses our understanding increases and this results in new possibilities that arise directly from that knowledge.

    In what sense is “Revelation” also an ongoing process? In 100 years time will you have finally determined which creation story out of the two offered at the start of the Bible is the actual one? Will the big debate over “Gate, Rope, Animal” finally be resolved unambiguously?

    To you, personally, revelation might be an ongoing thing. But you are not building anything for the future, no shoulders for those who follow to stand on. No higher ground for others to start from.

    If it’s an ongoing process, name something was previously not known then demonstrate how it became known through revelation.

  32. Reciprocating Bill: To that extent the model was shown to be accurate (by it’s success)

    So success is the criteria by which you judge the accuracy models. fine

    How did you decide that success was the best criteria for judging model’s accuracy?

    peace

  33. Kantian Naturalist: But it’s also true that Berkeley’s metaphysics doesn’t seem to make a difference to experience.

    On my view of experience, it does.

    Berkeley’s thesis depends on experience being passively received. However, on my view, we actively generate our own experience via our interactions. And that seems to make Berkeley’s thesis implausible.

  34. fifthmonarchyman: What criteria did you use to determine that what enabled us to place Curiosity on Mars was actually knowledge?

    On my view of knowledge (as abilities), that’s pretty much self-evident.

    I reject the idea that you can be knowledgable, yet be a hopelessly incompetent buffoon who just happens to have a large repetoire of sentences that he can express.

  35. OMagain: If it’s an ongoing process, name something was previously not known then demonstrate how it became known through revelation.

    In my worldview everything that is known is known by revelation.
    If I know anything now that I did not know earlier it is because God had revealed it to me

    OMagain: Fer instance. At some point in the future death will be largely optional. Aging will be “solved”.

    Wow that is quite a belief you have . Prove it.

    Do you have objective empirical evidence that aging will be “solved” instead of just prolonged?

    peace

  36. Neil Rickert: I reject the idea that you can be knowledgable, yet be a hopelessly incompetent buffoon who just happens to have a large repetoire of sentences that he can express.

    What criteria did you use to reject that idea? Did it have to do with “abilities”

    peace

  37. fifthmonarchyman,

    How did you decide that success was the best criteria for judging model’s accuracy?

    I’m sure you’re all excited that you’re going to spring some kind of deep, Aha! conclusion that somehow makes your refusal to support your own position intellectually equivalent to Reciprocating Bill’s and others clear statements of their own views, but your behavior today is hard to distinguish from garden variety trolling.

    If you’ve got a point to make, make it. These silly games do not reflect well on your integrity or your personality.

  38. fifthmonarchyman: So success is the criteria by which you judge the accuracy models. fine

    My question to you was, “To that extent the model [that permitted the placement of Curiosity on Mars] was shown to be accurate (by it’s success), considering it knowledge, and true, is warranted.

    Do you disagree?”

  39. Patrick: If you’ve got a point to make, make it.

    I have no point I’m just asking questions.

    My presuppositions are constantly attacked here I just want to know on what basis you have for making the attack.

    That process has been like trying to nail jello to a wall.

    peace

  40. Reciprocating Bill: My question to you was, “To that extent the model [that permitted the placement of Curiosity on Mars] was shown to be accurate (by it’s success), considering it knowledge, and true, is warranted.

    Do you disagree?

    Yes I do disagree

    If truth does not exist then knowledge is impossible. Knowledge is justified true belief

    Success is not a criteria for knowledge truth is. However and you have yet to say how you get to truth in your worldview.

    That is why I asked you what criteria you used to determine that success equals accuracy,

    peace

  41. BruceS: Hence one can say that doing science is compatible with there being no need for a concept of truth.

    As opposed, say, to doing not science?

  42. fifthmonarchyman: I have no point I’m just asking questions.

    My presuppositions are constantly attacked here I just want to know on what basis you have for making the attack.

    Its inanity and (apparent) lack of intelligent comprehension of the replies you get.

    That process has been like trying to nail jello to a wall.

    So not only don’t you make sense, you don’t even understand sense.

    Glen Davidson

  43. BruceS: ETA: 5 on the adequacy of language is clearly false as written. For science is continually inventing and refining the languages it uses: mathematics, mechanisms, simulations, diagrams, and so on.

    I’m a bit confused as to how pointing out the adequacy of language to describe the world is supposed to demonstrate that language is inadequate to describe the world. Must be something lost in translation.

    Are you advocating a return to early geometry where pictures sufficed to demonstrate self-evident truths?

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