A question has come up in another thread about the term “evidence”, and what qualifies (and does not qualify) as evidence. This particular debate has come about when Elizabeth said, in relation to an ongoing description of my model of “how things work” (free will/psychoplasm), said:
The problem it seems to me, with your model is that a) there is no evidence to support it whatsoever and b) we have a supported model that works pretty well.
I then challenged that assertion about the state of evidence with:
Can you support your assertion that “there is no evidence to support it whatsoever”?
She responded:
No, and I will qualify: I am aware of no evidence to support it, and I speak as one fairly well acquainted with the empirical literature.
Which I found odd, since I had given testimony (or, as Robin later said, “claimed”) that this model apparently worked well for me, others I know, and had in this thread and the Free Will thread pointed ouit various other similar doctrines that are chock full of such testimony (or “claims”). So, I asked:
So, my testimony, and that of others through various media, is not evidence?
Unfortunately, Elizabeth has yet to respond to that question. However, Robin contributed his/her answer:
No. Claims are never evidence of what is being claimed; they are solely evidence that someone made a claim. Why? Because anyone can make a mistake or even lie.
I think this deserves its own thread, for reasons I think will become clear. Before responding to Robin, though, I’d like for others to weigh in on the question of if testimony (not in the court sense, but in they typical “claim” sense), through various forms of media, is evidence.
I’m not saying it would be evidence, or even should be evidence to anyone else except the person experiencing the leprechaun. As I have said repeatedly, this is a model that posits that some actual, real phenomena are purely subjective-empirical, meaning only the subject (and perhaps a subgroup of people “like” the experiencer) can experience not only the phenomena, but the observation of the successful use of the information gleaned from the phenomena. If I could reliably provide evidence from the phenomena to any other person, it would be the same as the scientific model that works for all fully consensual-empirical phenomena.
The whole point of my model is to examine the usefulness potential of a proposed different category of phenomena that cannot be evidenced in the very way that you are asking me to explain how it would be evidenced to other people.
The usefulness is to the individual experiencer, not to other people.
BTW, just to be clear, there are two different things going on in this thread – first, I have a main argument about the nature of common evidence, even that which includes scientific-method evidence. That argument is about the hypocritical nature of the position that testimonial evidence isn’t evidence, which I think I’ve pretty well supported, since virtually all evidence we hold as valid about most things we consider true is ultimately based on testimonial evidence (even if such testimony purports to be about empirical research).
Because we trust the source of testimony to be truthful about the empirical nature of what it is testifying about, and because the message of that testimony comports with what we are willing to accept, we mentally consider that testimony to be empirical evidence – but it is not. It is testimony about empirical evidence, considered to be as good as actual empirical evidence (which one must experience themselves for it to be empirical).
The other sub-conversation going on is about my subjective-empirical model of reality (which includes the objective model as a subset of al “real” phenomena), and what the term “evidence” means outside of that subset we agree to call “objective” (more accurately, consensual-empirical). Phenomena that fall into the consensual-empirical category can be evidenced to virtually anyone else; phenomena that fall into the subjective-empirical category may or may not be capable of being evidenced to anyone else. That doesn’t necessarily mean it isn’t of practical use to the experiencer.
Two points on your most recent comment:
I would agree with what you are saying here. Personal reactions to art or “art” are an obvious example.
As I indicated in my Davis-Stravinsky example above, I think using the term “evidence” outside your consensual-empirical domain is inappropriate. Evidence is evident – apparent, clear – to outside observers. This sense of being able to be observed and objectively evaluated by others is integral to the word, at least in the ways in which it’s commonly used, not just in science but also in law. I don’t have evidence that Miles is a better musician than Stravinsky, I have a belief and I can make arguments in support of that belief (which might in turn be supported by evidence). That belief is real and is of practical benefit (e.g. in selecting similar kinds of music), as you say above, but there’s no evidence. Same thing with you and your leprechaun. If you want a word to describe what underpins a belief or other subjective phenomenon, I think you’d be best to look at other words than “evidence” if you’re to communicate clearly.
Actually, the clear communication of the concept I’m describing necessitates the use of the term “evidence” in the way that I used it, and that is the point you are missing. I’m not proposing a model about “tastes in music”, which is what you keep trying to insert. That you are resistant to the concept I am describing doesn’t mean I am applying inappropriate terms in the description.
Yes, you are trying to apply the term inappropriately. As Prof says, evidence is evident.
If you can’t point to a thing outside your subjective experience, to be examined by “outside” observers, then whatever you call it, it’s not evidence. You can’t simply redefine the word and claim that those of us who disagree with your redefinition are “missing the point”. You’re not Humpty Dumpty. (Or are you?)
Make up your own word for your subjective-model “evidence” or choose another word from the lexicon which does not conflict with established usage of the word evidence.
I have already agreed that, for those operating under the consensual-empiricism ideology of reality, nothing relating to any phenomena proposed to lie outside of that set can be/will be accepted as evidence. IOW, you define evidence only as that which supports your consensual-empiricism metaphysics.
Which is ultimately hypocritical (or would be, if you understood the logic), because you can never actually point to a thing “outside of your subjective experience”; you can only imagine/believe that you have.
Apparently, you’ve missed the entire point as well, but that’s hardly surprising.
Run along, little boy, go play in traffic.
I am quite willing to take the chance that I will instantaneously disappear when your brain gets wrecked by the car that hits you, if it turns out that I am not outside your subjective experience.
If it turns out that I survive your death and am outside your subjective experience, I will point to my survival as evidence that there are very likely, many other real things which are also outside my subjective experience.
Otherwise, it’s all just pointless solipsism, and I only believe in solipsism on alternate Tuesdays. Today is not your day. You’re not an interesting enough phantom of my imagination that you get to dictate what I believe.
Wow. First I need to get over the fact that WJM uses quantum physics and multiverse-theory to defend his worldview that A and non-A can be real at the same time. This is the same WJM who on UD threads happily chimes in on ridiculing people and applauding the banning of those same people who thought that quantum physics make questions of A and non-A rather complicated.
I must assume that you are dwelling in a very different worldview than the “everything is real, and quantum mechanics and the existence of spontaneously branching universes make this possible” view whenever you make comments like the following at UD (this is in Barry Arrington’s famous *we’ll kick you off UD if you don’t answer NO to the LNC question concerning Jupiter / the moon*):
I wonder whether the reason for you dropping that worldview when you are over at UD is that the UD referees would kick you off UD if they knew?
But on to the actual point:
The multi-verse scenario you described does not save you from having to abandon the LNC in order to save your “everything is real” worldview. On the contrary, under your worldview the branching versions in the multiverse are all real. That means that under this view the planet earth indeed is flat and not flat at the same time, in the same multiverse, thereby violating the LNC.
I have no idea what “what actually occurs” might mean under the worldview that everything that anyone can experience/imagine is real? If someone, anyone, says: “[Phenomenon X] occurs”, then, under your view, it actually does. Correct? Or am I still misunderstanding something?
You might want to re-read what Mr. Arrington’s actual challenge was:
Since “the same sense” is “in my personal, experiential reality, and those who share what can be shared of it with me”, no, Jupiter cannot both exist and not exist in that same sense at the same time.
No WJM, the “in my personal, experiential reality, and those who share what can be shared of it with me” doesn’t fly for my example (and many other examples like it). The flat-earthers I speak of do not claim that the earth is only flat in their personal, experiential reality, nor do the non-flat earthers I speak of. Both groups that I am addressing claim that the planet earth is flat / not flat in the repeatable, predictable, universally empirically accessible reality that the two groups share (If you don’t believe me, check out theflatearthsociety.org). Thus, if both these phenomena are taken to be real, the planet earth is flat and not flat at the same time, in the same multiverse, in the same sense, thereby violating the LNC.
And I would still appreciate an answer to this question:
But I”m not talking about them, and their view. I’m talking about me, and my view, and how it entirely comports with what Mr. Arrington actually said, which is the challenge you actually presented.
Obviously, you cannot be understanding my position if you think I mean that if someone imagines that the only thing anyone experiences is “blue”, that this is actually (meaning, the only thing anyone experiences, whether they are in that person’s experiential “reality” or not, is “blue) the case. What I have said is that it is possible that the appearance of one’s experience can support their views – IOW, they can believe that only Christians go to heaven, die, and then find themselves an exclusively Christian Heaven, even thoug there is another heaven, in another iteration of “reality”, that allows anyone in it.
Regardless of what, if anything, is going on outside of experience, it is my view that experience can accommodate virtually any view/belief.
But your view includes the view that everybody else’s views are just as real as yours. This means that if someone who is not you thinks that Jupiter does not exist / the earth is flat / the earth is not flat, then according to your view that everything is real that in your view Jupiter exists and does not exist, the earth is flat and is not flat, at the same time, in the same multiverse, in the same sense! That’s where the problem comes in, and that’s were your view does not comport at all with what Barry Arrington said.
So, you are saying that these are phenomena that are NOT real (in one case “everything is blue”, in the other case “there is only a Christian heaven” is NOT real, but just a personal belief)? You are saying that there ARE phenomena that people can experience and imagine that are NOT real? This seems to directly contradict your own earlier position. Interesting. So, what are the criteria then for what is real what is not?
You are bouncing back and forth from “real” as my model describes it, to “real” as your model describes it. My model doesn’t limit “what is real” to what is consensually empirical.
No, I am not using my definition of “real” at all. I was trying to use your definition. But I guess I don’t understand what you mean by “real” then. What do you mean by “real” if you don’t mean “actually the case”?
Unsurprisingly, no answer is forthcoming. I guess WJM has no idea what he actually mans by “real”. Too bad for the model he has put forth.
Evidence- evidence is what materialism doesn’t have