Barry finally gets it?

Barry Arrington was astonished to find that Larry Moran agreed with him that it would be possible for some future biologist to detect design in a Venter-designed genome.

He was further astonished to find that REC, a commenter at UD, agreed with Larry Moran.

Barry expresses his epiphany in a UD post REC Becomes a Design Proponent.

Has Barry finally realised that those of us who oppose the ideas of Intelligent Design proponents do not dispute that it is possible, in principle, to make a reasonable inference of design?  That rather our opposition is based on the evidence and argument advanced, not on some principled (or unprincipled!) objection to the entire project?

Sadly, it seems not.  Because Barry then gives some examples of his continued lack of appreciation of this point.  Here they are:

For example, consider this typical objection:  “All scientific claims must employ methodological naturalism, and you violate the principle of methodological naturalism when you make a design inference in biology.”

If that objection is valid (it is not, but set that aside for now), it is just as valid against REC’s and Dr. Moran’s design inferences as it is against any other design inference.

Yes, indeed, Barry.  It is not a valid objection, and if it were, it would be as valid against REC’s and Dr. Moran’s as against ID.  There is nothing wrong with making a design inference in principle. We do it all the time, as IDists like to point out.  And there’s nothing wrong with making it in biology, at least in principle.  There is certainly nothing that violates the “principle of methodological naturalism when you make a design inference in biology”.  I wonder where Barry found that quotation?

The point sailed right over REC’s head.  He responded that the objections were not valid as to his design inference, because his design inference (opposed to ID’s design inferences) was “valid and well evidenced.”

I doubt it sailed over REC’s head.  I expect it was the very point he was making – that there  is no reason in principle why one cannot make a valid design inference in biology, but whether the inference is valid or not would depend on the specifics of the evidence and argument.

But that is exactly what ID proponents have been saying for decades REC!  We have been saying all along that the various “typical objections” are invalid if the evidence leads to a design inference.

REC, the only difference between you and us is that you are persuaded by the evidence in a particular case and not in our case.  But you are missing the point.  If what is important is the EVIDENCE, then th “typical objections” lose all force all the time.

Barry, consider the possibility that you have been misreading the “typical objections” the entire time.  That the yards of text that are spilled daily at UD railing against Lewontin and us benighted “materialists” are entirely irrelevant.   The objection to ID by people like me (and Moran, and REC, and any other ID opponent I’ve come across, including Richard Dawkins in fact) is not that it is impossible that terrestrial life was designed by an intelligent agent, nor that it would be necessarily impossible to discover that it was, nor even, I suggest, impossible to infer a designer even if we had no clue as to who the designer might be (although that might make it trickier).  The objection is that the arguments advanced by ID proponents are fallacious.  They don’t work.  Some are circular, some are based on bad math, and some are based on a misunderstanding of biochemistry and biology.  They are not bad because they are design inferences, they are bad because they are bad design inferences.

In other words, the objection “all scientific claims must employ methodological naturalism” is invalid in principle, not in application, if it is even possible to make a valid design inference based on the EVIDENCE.

And here is where Barry steps on the rake again. Of course all scientific claims must employ methodological naturalism. It’s the only methodology we have in science – it is another way of saying that scientific claims must be falsifiable.  That doesn’t mean we can’t infer design. Design is a perfectly natural phenomenon.  If Barry means that we can only infer natural, not supernatural, design, he is absolutely correct, but that is simply because a supernatural design hypothesis is unfalsifiable. The reason Lewontin was correct is not that science is terrified of letting the supernatural in the door of science lest we have to face our worst nightmares, but that if you accept the supernatural as a valid hypothesis, you throw falsifiability out of the window.

You agree with us that it is the EVIDENCE that is important, and objections thrown up for the purpose of ruling that evidence out of court before it is even considered are invalid.

Yes, it is the EVIDENCE that is important,  But on the other side of the EVIDENCE coin are the predictions we derive from the theory that we are testing against that EVIDENCE. If there are no predictions – and a theory that can predict anything predicts nothing – then we have no way of evaluating whether our EVIDENCE supports our theory.  In fact, the word EVIDENCE only makes sense in relation to a theory. I’m no lawyer (heh) but doesn’t there have to be a charge before there is a trial?

Of course, by the same token, nobody can claim that ID is false – it may well be true that life was designed by a supernatural designer, whether at the origin-of-life stage as some claim, or at key stages, such as the Cambrian “Explosion” (scare quotes deliberate), as others claim; or for certain features too hard to leave to evolution such as the E.coli flagellae that enhance their ability to maim and kill our children. Or even to design a universe so fine-tuned that it contains the laws and materials necessary for life to emerge without further interference.   Science cannot falsify any of that – nor, for that matter the theory that it was all created ex nihilo Last Thursday.

That’s why nothing in evolutionary biology is a threat to belief in God or gods, and why the paranoia surrounding “methodological naturalism” is so completely misplaced.

What is a threat to us all, though, I suggest, is bad science masquerading as science, and that is my objection to ID.  Not the “broader” project itself as stated in the UD FAQ:

In a broader sense, Intelligent Design is simply the science of design detection — how to recognize patterns arranged by an intelligent cause for a purpose. Design detection is used in a number of scientific fields, including anthropology, forensic sciences that seek to explain the cause of events such as a death or fire, cryptanalysis and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI). An inference that certain biological information may be the product of an intelligent cause can be tested or evaluated in the same manner as scientists daily test for design in other sciences.

but its fallacious (in my view) conclusion that:

…that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause rather than an undirected process such as natural selection.

Fallacious not because I assume that the “intelligent cause” is supernatural, but because the math and biochemistry simply do not support that inference.  Even if it’s true.

1,072 thoughts on “Barry finally gets it?

  1. OMagain: How do you?

    revelation
    your turn

    OMagain: What attributes that HAL displays does the universe also display?

    Since HAL is part of the universe there are no attributes that HAL displays that the universe does not also display by definition.

    That is unless you want to claim that HAL is not part of the universe, of course that brings us back to the natural verses supernatural question again.

    peace

  2. OMagain: Are rocks self-aware fifth? Do rocks dream?

    According to my worldview no. Lots of folks disagree with me.
    How would you convince them they are wrong?

    peace

  3. OMagain: Chuckle. Like the “evidence” you provide by quoting the bible? What was your evidence that each species is an archetype held in the mind of god again?

    You know that Tu quoque is an informal logical fallacy don’t you?

    peace

  4. fifthmonarchyman,

    Me: Whether those results are ‘good’ or ‘important’ is a matter of judgement.

    fmm: exactly. It’s not an empirical question.

    So bloody what? The empirical approach has proved useful. What the hell else is it supposed to do? (Yes, I know, descent into profanity again, yadda yadda. But you offer tedious non-points as if it were Manna from Heaven).

  5. Allan Miller: Ah, maybe that’s where I was going wrong. ‘Empirical’ does not perhaps mean the same to me as to fmm.

    Yes, I’d say that is the problem here.

    Allan Miller: Hard to see how one (if one is a scientist) can be either a rationalist or an empiricist.

    Yes, I’d say that you are right.

    (Sorry for a late response — I was travelling yesterday, with a delayed flight messing up plans).

  6. Allan Miller: So bloody what? The empirical approach has proved useful. What the hell else is it supposed to do?

    Nothing as far as I can tell.
    I think this is a case of you not being able to take yes for an answer.

    This rabbit trail happened because keiths incorrectly claimed that he decided empirically that

    quote:

    Good scientists and skeptics understand that such questions need to be decided empirically, not by definitional fiat.

    end quote:

    I was only pointing out that “goodness” is not a question that can be solved by empirical investigation. It’s a value judgement
    I made that point long ago.

    There is no need to belabor it. It’s obvious.

    Apparently you agree with me. let’s just leave it at that and move on.

    peace

  7. The terms “rationalism” and “empiricism” are actually really sloppy terms to be using, especially when applied to the history of philosophy.

    But generally speaking, it seems that Kant was right about this much: there are conceptual frameworks that have their own constitutive rules, where those rules are a priori relative to that framework, and there are changes in our sensory awareness as a result of how reality affects us. Though Kant’s own synthesis of rationalism and empiricism is woefully inadequate, it is (I would say) a big step in the right direction.

  8. fifth:

    I was only pointing out that “goodness” is not a question that can be solved by empirical investigation. It’s a value judgement

    Damn, fifth, you are slow on the uptake.

    I addressed that already:

    “Good scientists”, in this context, refers to those who are good at science. It’s not a moral judgment.

    Hume’s is-ought distinction is irrelevant here except for demonstrating your confusion.

  9. fifthmonarchyman,

    Nothing as far as I can tell.
    I think this is a case of you not being able to take yes for an answer.

    So why are you continuing to pursue it?

    This rabbit trail happened because keiths claimed that he decided empirically that

    quote:

    Good scientists and skeptics understand that such questions need to be decided empirically, not by definitional fiat.

    end quote:

    You are quote mining.

    Full quote:

    There’s nothing logically impossible about a real supernatural entity. Good scientists and skeptics understand that such questions need to be decided empirically, not by definitional fiat. Further, they recognize that scientific conclusions are provisional and may be overturned by future discoveries. Thus, they are open to looking at new evidence and arguments.

    fmm: I was only pointing out that “goodness” is not a question that can be solved by empirical investigation. It’s a value judgement
    I made that point long ago.

    That was your take-home from the quote? That it’s making a point about ‘goodness’? Yeesh. Yeah, I can see why you’d want that to span several pages of the thread.

    There is no need to belabor it. It’s obvious.

    Apparently you agree with me.

    No, I don’t agree with you – I don’t see it as an argument about ‘goodness’ at all, but about the rational justification for the empirical approach. Nonetheless, good scientists (competent ones, not morally ‘good’ ones) are indeed following a grand old empirical tradition of empirical investigation, which has been shown to work empirically. Crap ones, not so much. Are you trying to dismiss this as a tautology, a la ‘survival of the fittest’?

    let’s just leave it at that and move on.

    Ready when you are.

  10. keiths: “Good scientists”, in this context, refers to those who are good at science. It’s not a moral judgment.

    again geeze

    “good at science” is a moral judgement. You are presupposing that “good” means something like “efficient” or “trustworthy” but you have no empirical evidence that this is the case.

    If you disagree please present empirical evidence to support the claim that good scientists judge things empirically. Be specific slow down and think about this

    peace

  11. Allan Miller: Nonetheless, good scientists (competent ones, not morally ‘good’ ones) are indeed following a grand old empirical tradition of empirical investigation

    you too, really? This is not that difficult

    You are equating “competent” with something like “empirically based” or “respected” you have no empirical justification for doing so.

    If you disagree please provide empirical evidence for your claim.

    peace

  12. The epistemic goodness of empirical inquiry is justified by the history of science itself, which is also an empirical inquiry (as all history is).

  13. Kantian Naturalist: The epistemic goodness of empirical inquiry is justified by the history of science itself,

    Please provide specific empirical evidence for this. Assertion is not argument

    peace

  14. Let me try and help you all

    Suppose I said that good/competent scientists decided matters by whim and scientists who used empirical investigation were “crap”

    How would you use empirical evidence to prove me wrong? Be specific.

    Keep in mind I’m not looking for definitional arguments but empirical evidence.

    peace

  15. fifthmonarchyman: You are equating “competent” with something like “empirically based” or “respected” you have no empirical justification for doing so.

    In science, “competent” means does not look stupid in 50 years.

  16. Kantian Naturalist: Are you asking for a crash-course in the history of science?

    Nope, I’m asking for specific empirical evidence supporting the claim that good/competent scientists rely on empirical evidence.

    Sort of like the empirical evidence you would provide to support the claim that cigarette use is correlated with increased cancer risk.

    peace

  17. fifthmonarchyman: Nope, I’m asking for specific empirical evidence supporting the claim that good/competent scientists rely on empirical evidence.

    Well, would discussing Galileo’s discovery of the laws of motion satisfy you? Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood? Lavoisier’s discovery of oxygen? The Michelson-Morley experiment that disproved the existence of ether?

  18. petrushka: In science, “competent” means does not look stupid in 50 years.

    I have no problem with that definition as long as we understand It is a definition rather than empirical evidence.

    peace

  19. One good contra-example would be worthy of a discussion.

    I hgave numerous times asked ID advocates for an example of ID inspired research, or an example of an ID paradigm that worked out.

  20. Kantian Naturalist: Well, would discussing Galileo’s discovery of the laws of motion satisfy you?

    not unless you have empirical evidence that Galileo was a good/competent scientist

    Kantian Naturalist: Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood?

    not unless you provided empirical evidence that Harvey was a good scientist

    Kantian Naturalist: Lavoisier’s discovery of oxygen?

    not unless you provide empirical evidence that Lavoisier was a good scientist

    etc etc

    You are conflating “productive” or “famous” with “good/competent”. You have no empirical justification for doing so.

    If you disagree please provide the empirical evidence

    peace.

  21. fifth:

    “good at science” is a moral judgement. You are presupposing that “good” means something like “efficient” or “trustworthy” but you have no empirical evidence that this is the case.

    fifth,

    Often I despair of explaining even the simplest of concepts to you.

    If I describe someone as “good at torture”, I am not expressing moral approval of their activities. To describe someone as “good at torture” simply means that they are competent at torture, just as describing someone as “good at comforting” means they are competent at comforting people.

    Isn’t this obvious, even to you?

    P.S. Speaking of competence – if the Christian God exists, why doesn’t he yank you out of the game and substitute someone who can present an argument without face-planting every two steps?

  22. keiths: To describe someone as “good at torture” simply means that they are competent at torture

    My argument is not about moral goodness. It’s about empirical verses definitional

    In this case you need to define what you mean by “competent”. This is a value judgement not an empirical question.

    You define competent to mean X. You don’t empirically determine that competent means X

    This is not hard. Take your time and think about it.

    peace

  23. fifth:

    My argument is not about moral goodness.

    fifth, a couple hours earlier:

    “good at science” is a moral judgement.

    Another face-plant.

  24. keiths: To describe someone as “good at torture” simply means that they are competent at torture

    Lets try it this way suppose I said this

    “Good/competent scientists and skeptics understand that such questions need to be decided by psychic reading”

    You ask me how I determined this and I say

    “by psychic reading”

    What would you say?

    peace

  25. fifth,

    I’m not a big fan of slapstick. You’re going to have to do your face-plant performance for someone else.

  26. keiths: My argument is not about moral goodness.

    fifth, a couple hours earlier:

    “good at science” is a moral judgement.

    So

    These two statements are not in any way contradictory.

    IMO “good at science” is a moral judgement so is “competent at science”.

    You are describing what you deem to valuable to a particular enterprise. What aught to be.

    That is not what my argument is about however. My argument is about how you assign that value, How you make that judgement (moral or not).

    It is not through empirical evidence.

  27. It’s not part of my view that criteria, norms, standards, and even definitions play no role in scientific inquiry — far from it! I’ve long defended the idea that criteria, norms, and standards have to be instituted in order for there to be successful empirical inquiry. That seems obvious enough to hardly need stating, but there it is anyway.

    The converse point is that criteria, norms, and standards are also themselves revised over the history of empirical inquiry. What we understand to be “good science” changes over time. Aristotle was one of the best, if not the best, natural scientists of classical Greece. But we can also recognize that he made many methodological errors, as well as substantive ones.

    Darwin thought of himself as a mediocre scientist because he didn’t follow a strictly inductive method, as Bacon and Mill insisted one should. We can recognize that Darwin was in fact an excellent scientist, because he did implicitly follow a hypothetico-deductive method as made explicit by later philosophers like Whewell and Peirce.

    But if what you want are criteria, norms, and standards of thought and conduct that are universally and necessarily binding on all rational agents, at all times and places, then there is no such thing.

  28. Kantian Naturalist: It’s not part of my view that criteria, norms, standards, and even definitions play no role in scientific inquiry — far from it!

    So we are in agreement welcome to the dark side

    Kantian Naturalist: What we understand to be “good science” changes over time.

    What causes our understanding to change?

    Kantian Naturalist: But if what you want are criteria, norms, and standards of thought and conduct that are universally and necessarily binding on all rational agents, at all times and places, then there is no such thing.

    Don’t worry that is not what I want 😉

    peace

  29. OK, lessee now. It is my contention that good mechanics adopt processes that lead to better results in the fixing-of-cars game. Crap ones, not so much. This has been an empirical process of discovery.

    fifthmonarchyman:

    “Please provide empirical evidence of this moral judgement. Please be specific. peace.”

    Everyone else: “Wha?”

  30. Kantian Naturalist: The best books in philosophy of science I’ve read within the last year are Rouse’s How Scientific Practices Matter and Horst’s Beyond Reduction. (Rouse and Horst are good friends and colleagues, though Rouse is a metaphysical naturalist and Horst is a Christian.)

    Going back a bit to my grad school education, I can happily recommend Kitcher (Science, Truth, and Democracy), Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie), Dupre (The Disorder of Things), Longino (Science as Social Knowledge), Hacking (Representing and Intervening), Feyerabend (Against Method), van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance) and of course Kuhn.

    Bloody hell, KN! I’m well into my sixth decade. But info appreciated!

  31. keiths: “Just let me indulge my prejudices. Someone else will fix it.”

    You appear determined to oppose a position I do not hold.

  32. 5MM: It’s a great point you’re making, it’ just lost on these guys.

    KN said:

    What we understand to be “good science” changes over time.

    5MM asked “what changes it”, but I’d also like to know: who is “we”?

  33. Alan Fox: Bloody hell, KN! I’m well into my sixth decade.

    Perhaps this suggestion might be more appropriate then:
    Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction
    Joking aside, it’s actually a good summary of key issues.

    The overviews by Alex Rosenburg, Ladyman, and Godfrey-Smith all cover the same ground at greater length. They are available online (news groups is where I found them).

    KN’s books are, I believe, defending specific points of view rather than giving an overview of the issues in philosophy of science and the various approaches to them.

  34. William J. Murray: 5MM asked “what changes it”, but I’d also like to know: who is “we”?

    excellent!!!!

    William J. Murray: 5MM: It’s a great point you’re making, it’ just lost on these guys.

    I never cease to be amazed how smart folks can miss something so simple that is right in front of their eyes. It’s like they are blindfolded or something.

    When I encounter stuff like this it drives home the notion that we should never count on our own fallible intellect when the chips are down.

    What a poverty it would be if that was all we had to rely on.

    peace

  35. fifthmonarchyman,

    When I encounter stuff like this it drives home the notion that we should never count on our own fallible intellect when the chips are down.

    That’s right! You should kid yourself that truths are revealed to you, or ‘choose your beliefs’, or maybe both. That’s the way to go! Certainly makes your reasoning unassailable, since you don’t use it as such.

  36. Allan Miller: It is my contention that good mechanics adopt processes that lead to better results in the fixing-of-cars game.

    again, read slowly please

    Good and better are both value judgements. You have simply declared the kind of mechanic and process that you prefer.

    You did not do this based on empirical evidence but on your own personal preferences. Oscar the grouch from Sesame Street would probably disagree with you. How would you convince him he is wrong?

    peace

  37. William J. Murray,

    Over at UD, you said this:

    “Darwinism has never been about the evidence. It has always been about the atheist/materialist narrative.”

    Is there, even hypothetically, any possible empirical evidence that would dissuade you from this position?

  38. fifthmonarchyman,

    again, read slowly please

    Do you find such smarminess helps your case much?

    Good and better are both value judgements. You have simply declared the kind of mechanic and process that you prefer.

    Haha. Good one. You think it mere preference to cite as a ‘good mechanic’ one who actually manages to fix cars? Weird. Nonetheless, that is the point. It is an empirical consideration. The fixing of cars is an empirical test of a mechanic’s ability (eta: and the processes they follow).

    You did not do this based on empirical evidence but on your own personal preferences. Oscar the grouch from Sesame Street would probably disagree with you. How would you convince him he is wrong?

    You are calling in muppets as witnesses for your case? How appropriate.

    peace

    When terminating a post that contains the kind of oleaginous insults that you employ, that tic rings particularly hollow. My favourite was having it follow “Do you kiss Darwin with that mouth?”

  39. fifthmonarchyman: When I encounter stuff like this it drives home the notion that we should never count on our own fallible intellect when the chips are down.

    No ,we should count on revelation from a presupposed entity derived from our fallible intellect.

  40. Allan Miller: The fixing of cars is an empirical test of a mechanic’s ability.

    agreed,
    However the standard by which you judge is not established empirically but definitionaly based on your own preference.

    Allan Miller: When terminating a post that contains the kind of oleaginous insults that you employ, that tic rings particularly hollow.

    I honestly don’t want to come off as insulting. I am just truly baffled at your apparent inability to get this. It’s not difficult.

    peace

  41. One thing that seems to be conflated in WJM and fmm’s minds is the distinction between a general approach – the adoption of empirical approaches because they work, which is itself empirical – and any specific currently accepted paradigm using those methods (among others), which is more fluid.

    As a paradigm in itself (of sorts), the adoption of empirical approaches is likely to change much more slowly, if at all, than any particular currently accepted paradigm built using them (inter alia), due to the much broader sphere of successful adoption.

    The theists round about seem stuck, yet again, in the idea that there is AN answer, out there beyond human brains, and our own judgement is cursed by relativism. Who’s the best mechanic? Why, Sam Sparks of Dodgeball Falls, Illinois. God says, and his opinions are what the rest of us call facts.

  42. newton: No ,we should really on revelation from a presupposed entity derived from our fallible intellect.

    That merely assumes that the Christian God does not actually exist. You make that assumption based only on your fallible intellect.

    If it is unwise to assume an entity derived from our fallible intellect how is it wise to use that same intellect to assume that an entity independent of us does not exist?

    peace

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