Barry finally gets it?

Barry Arrington was astonished to find that Larry Moran agreed with him that it would be possible for some future biologist to detect design in a Venter-designed genome.

He was further astonished to find that REC, a commenter at UD, agreed with Larry Moran.

Barry expresses his epiphany in a UD post REC Becomes a Design Proponent.

Has Barry finally realised that those of us who oppose the ideas of Intelligent Design proponents do not dispute that it is possible, in principle, to make a reasonable inference of design?  That rather our opposition is based on the evidence and argument advanced, not on some principled (or unprincipled!) objection to the entire project?

Sadly, it seems not.  Because Barry then gives some examples of his continued lack of appreciation of this point.  Here they are:

For example, consider this typical objection:  “All scientific claims must employ methodological naturalism, and you violate the principle of methodological naturalism when you make a design inference in biology.”

If that objection is valid (it is not, but set that aside for now), it is just as valid against REC’s and Dr. Moran’s design inferences as it is against any other design inference.

Yes, indeed, Barry.  It is not a valid objection, and if it were, it would be as valid against REC’s and Dr. Moran’s as against ID.  There is nothing wrong with making a design inference in principle. We do it all the time, as IDists like to point out.  And there’s nothing wrong with making it in biology, at least in principle.  There is certainly nothing that violates the “principle of methodological naturalism when you make a design inference in biology”.  I wonder where Barry found that quotation?

The point sailed right over REC’s head.  He responded that the objections were not valid as to his design inference, because his design inference (opposed to ID’s design inferences) was “valid and well evidenced.”

I doubt it sailed over REC’s head.  I expect it was the very point he was making – that there  is no reason in principle why one cannot make a valid design inference in biology, but whether the inference is valid or not would depend on the specifics of the evidence and argument.

But that is exactly what ID proponents have been saying for decades REC!  We have been saying all along that the various “typical objections” are invalid if the evidence leads to a design inference.

REC, the only difference between you and us is that you are persuaded by the evidence in a particular case and not in our case.  But you are missing the point.  If what is important is the EVIDENCE, then th “typical objections” lose all force all the time.

Barry, consider the possibility that you have been misreading the “typical objections” the entire time.  That the yards of text that are spilled daily at UD railing against Lewontin and us benighted “materialists” are entirely irrelevant.   The objection to ID by people like me (and Moran, and REC, and any other ID opponent I’ve come across, including Richard Dawkins in fact) is not that it is impossible that terrestrial life was designed by an intelligent agent, nor that it would be necessarily impossible to discover that it was, nor even, I suggest, impossible to infer a designer even if we had no clue as to who the designer might be (although that might make it trickier).  The objection is that the arguments advanced by ID proponents are fallacious.  They don’t work.  Some are circular, some are based on bad math, and some are based on a misunderstanding of biochemistry and biology.  They are not bad because they are design inferences, they are bad because they are bad design inferences.

In other words, the objection “all scientific claims must employ methodological naturalism” is invalid in principle, not in application, if it is even possible to make a valid design inference based on the EVIDENCE.

And here is where Barry steps on the rake again. Of course all scientific claims must employ methodological naturalism. It’s the only methodology we have in science – it is another way of saying that scientific claims must be falsifiable.  That doesn’t mean we can’t infer design. Design is a perfectly natural phenomenon.  If Barry means that we can only infer natural, not supernatural, design, he is absolutely correct, but that is simply because a supernatural design hypothesis is unfalsifiable. The reason Lewontin was correct is not that science is terrified of letting the supernatural in the door of science lest we have to face our worst nightmares, but that if you accept the supernatural as a valid hypothesis, you throw falsifiability out of the window.

You agree with us that it is the EVIDENCE that is important, and objections thrown up for the purpose of ruling that evidence out of court before it is even considered are invalid.

Yes, it is the EVIDENCE that is important,  But on the other side of the EVIDENCE coin are the predictions we derive from the theory that we are testing against that EVIDENCE. If there are no predictions – and a theory that can predict anything predicts nothing – then we have no way of evaluating whether our EVIDENCE supports our theory.  In fact, the word EVIDENCE only makes sense in relation to a theory. I’m no lawyer (heh) but doesn’t there have to be a charge before there is a trial?

Of course, by the same token, nobody can claim that ID is false – it may well be true that life was designed by a supernatural designer, whether at the origin-of-life stage as some claim, or at key stages, such as the Cambrian “Explosion” (scare quotes deliberate), as others claim; or for certain features too hard to leave to evolution such as the E.coli flagellae that enhance their ability to maim and kill our children. Or even to design a universe so fine-tuned that it contains the laws and materials necessary for life to emerge without further interference.   Science cannot falsify any of that – nor, for that matter the theory that it was all created ex nihilo Last Thursday.

That’s why nothing in evolutionary biology is a threat to belief in God or gods, and why the paranoia surrounding “methodological naturalism” is so completely misplaced.

What is a threat to us all, though, I suggest, is bad science masquerading as science, and that is my objection to ID.  Not the “broader” project itself as stated in the UD FAQ:

In a broader sense, Intelligent Design is simply the science of design detection — how to recognize patterns arranged by an intelligent cause for a purpose. Design detection is used in a number of scientific fields, including anthropology, forensic sciences that seek to explain the cause of events such as a death or fire, cryptanalysis and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI). An inference that certain biological information may be the product of an intelligent cause can be tested or evaluated in the same manner as scientists daily test for design in other sciences.

but its fallacious (in my view) conclusion that:

…that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause rather than an undirected process such as natural selection.

Fallacious not because I assume that the “intelligent cause” is supernatural, but because the math and biochemistry simply do not support that inference.  Even if it’s true.

1,072 thoughts on “Barry finally gets it?

  1. petrushka: My answer is the that the question will be moot by the time it appears to be answerable in the affirmative. An evolved mind will not be hyper-logical like Star Trek’s Data or HAL 9000.

    Why will the question be moot? Just because a computer is complex and hyper logical does not make it a person. It was not murder to unplug HAL.

    peace

  2. petrushka: I don’t see any controversy regarding animals.

    You don’t but others do. There is no empirical way to decide the question.

    That is the point

    peace

  3. fifthmonarchyman: Why will the question be moot? Just because a computer is complex and hyper logical does not make it a person. It was not murder to unplug HAL.
    peace

    That depends on how HAL evolved. If HAL is a version of IBM’s Deep Blue, then it is just a computer. If it is designed and programmed, it is a computer.

    If it evolves, it will be a mind.

  4. fifthmonarchyman: You don’t but others do. There is no empirical way to decide the question.
    That is the point
    peace

    There are lots of ways to decide the issue. Just no agreement on what they are.
    But if electronic brains evolve, it will be too late for humans to start worrying about whether they are minds.

  5. petrushka: That depends on how HAL evolved. If HAL is a version of IBM’s Deep Blue, then it is just a computer. If it is designed and programmed, it is a computer.

    If it evolves, it will be a mind.

    Yes 🙂

  6. fifthmonarchyman: Why will the question be moot? Just because a computer is complex and hyper logical does not make it a person. It was not murder to unplug HAL.

    peace

    Sez the person who – no doubt – thinks it’s murder to abort a mindless fetus.

    But stupidly thinks it’s NOT murder to destroy a self-aware emotional and rational being, just because it happens to be able to think based on silicon circuits instead of carbon-based ones.

    That’s a surprisingly bigoted idea.

    Why? Because HAL wasn’t endowed with a soul by your imaginary god?

  7. Or rather, it will have to evolve to HAVE a mind. It could evolve and not end up with a mind. I don’t think plants have minds.

    I think if it’s going to have a mind, it’s got to evolve, and it’s got to MOVE – navigate an environment in order to make use of resources and avoid hazards.

  8. petrushka: I would prefer to call man-made objects artifacts rather than non-natural.

    I consider humans and their artifacts to be part of nature.

    Unfortunately, there is the orthogonal distinction between natural and artificial in food and clothing. And real and imitation.

    So it would seem productive to ask how another person would like to label these distinction, rather than arguing about which set of terms is correct.

    Yes, well, I wasn’t feeling productively disposed and wanted to highlight the equivocation in the question.

  9. petrushka: There are lots of ways to decide the issue. Just no agreement on what they are.

    Lots of ways to decide but none of them are universally compelling.

    That is about the extent of it.

    peace

  10. fifthmonarchyman: Just because a computer is complex and hyper logical does not make it a person. It was not murder to unplug HAL.

    Would you like to play a game?

    I suggest there is no argument that you could make why it would be wrong to unplug you that also would not equally apply to HAL.

  11. hotshoe_: But stupidly thinks it’s NOT murder to destroy a self-aware emotional and rational being, just because it happens to be able to think based on silicon circuits instead of carbon-based ones.

    If Hal was emotional and self aware it would be murder to unplug him. That goes for all minds even the ones that think based on nothing materiel at all.

    The question is how do we determine if an entity is actually emotional and self aware rather that just appearing to be so?

    peace

  12. OMagain: I suggest there is no argument that you could make why it would be wrong to unplug you that also would not equally apply to HAL.

    I would agree, the same goes for the mind(s) behind behind the universe.

    There is no argument that will convince either way. Unless you are inclined to be convinced

    That is the point

    Peace

  13. Elizabeth: Or rather, it will have to evolve to HAVE a mind.

    The universe evolved to have a mind………..rather lots of them.

    Or at least it evolved to have my mind. There is no way to know for certain (sans revelation) that other minds exist.

    peace

  14. fifthmonarchyman,

    It sounds like you agree with me.

    You didn’t say anything to agree or disagree with. You asked a question, appearing to want to know how it could be determined empirically that empirical investigation was important to science. My answer is that this was determined empirically. If empirical investigation did no usefiul work, it would be dropped. So the use of empirical investigation has itself been an empirical investigation.

  15. fifthmonarchyman,

    There is no way to know for certain (sans revelation) that other minds exist.

    Why the bit in parenthesis? How can God’s mind reveal its existence to you, where other minds can’t? Is the certainty of revelation revealed?

  16. Allan, to fifth:

    If empirical investigation did no usefiul work, it would be dropped.

    Isn’t this obvious to you, fifth? Do you really think scientists have spent hundreds of years painstakingly gathering evidence simply because someone decreed that they should, by definitional fiat?

  17. Allan, to fifth:

    How can God’s mind reveal its existence to you, where other minds can’t? Is the certainty of revelation revealed?

    Fifth thinks so, though he’s never been able to justify his claim.

  18. fifthmonarchyman:
    These tests are of no help she could be a robot with a particularly good chat bot program with software that was designed to fool you.

    Ever hear of the Chinese room thought experiment?

    peace

    Those empirical observations would be of great help to a sane person.

    As you go about your life, do you worry whether the people you interact with are robots “with a particularly good chat bot program with software that was designed to fool you”? You are perfectly correct in citing that as a possibility, but do you take it seriously? If so, why? If not, why not?

    Yes, I’ve come to learn about the Chinese room thought experiment. Please explain what it has to do with whether Liz’s posts are made by a person.

  19. Allan Miller: If empirical investigation did no usefiul work, it would be dropped.

    I agree but that does not explain why it is “important” for “good” scientists to judge things empirically,

    Again “it works” is not equivalent to “it’s good” or “it’s important”. That is unless you declare it to be so by definition.

    Peace

  20. Pedant: You are perfectly correct in citing that as a possibility, but do you take it seriously? If so, why? If not, why not?

    We are hardwired to infer a mind when we observe certain phenomena. We don’t have to think about it it comes naturally. The problem comes when we try to justify that inference

    Pedant: Yes, I’ve come to learn about the Chinese room thought experiment. Please explain what it has to do with whether Liz’s posts are made by a person.

    Just as a Chinese room can mimic that it knows Chinese with out actually knowing anything at all EL could appear to be a conscious mind but instead be an elaborate mechanism that is simply following predetermined rules.

    peace

  21. keiths: Fifth thinks so, though he’s never been able to justify his claim.

    It’s not a claim it’s a presupposition. It’s definitional
    just as your idea that all good scientists judge things by empirical evidence is definitional.

    If you disagree please justify your claim with empirical evidence

    peace

  22. fifthmonarchyman: We are hardwired to infer a mind when we observe certain phenomena. We don’t have to think about it it comes naturally. The problem comes when we try to justify that inference.

    Evidence for the hardwiring?

    Why do you feel the need to justify the inference that the persons you interact with are persons, not robots?

    Just as a Chinese room can mimic that it knows Chinese with out actually knowing anything at all EL could appear to be a conscious mind but instead be an elaborate mechanism that is simply following predetermined rules.

    Could be, but lots of things could be. How reasonable is it to think it?

    Your world is really complicated.

    peace

  23. Pedant: Why do you feel the need to justify the inference that the persons you interact with are persons, not robots?

    I don’t feel that need. Nor do I feel the need to justify the inference that there is mind(s) behind the universe.

    It is your side that is demanding justification for the inference to other minds.

    Pedant: Could be, but lots of things could be. How reasonable is it to think it?

    not reasonable at all IMO. I’m perfectly content to go with the hardwired inference I’m just aware that hardwired inference is not the same thing as a compelling argument.

    Atheists demand a compelling argument before they will accept the universal hardwired inference that there is mind/intention behind the universe. I’m just pointing out that no such argument is available for any minds whatsoever

    Nor is such an argument necessary for a reasonable observer as you yourself just pointed out .

    peace

  24. fifthmonarchyman: The question is how do we determine if an entity is actually emotional and self aware rather that just appearing to be so?

    Duh. Clearly, you forgot to ask yourself that question before arbitrarily stating that it was okay to unplug HAL, killing him in the process.

    Not murder, because you – somehow – determined that it was an entity that was NOT “emotional and self aware” — otherwise, it should have been protected from being murdered.

    But how did YOU determine that??

    Hint: YOU didn’t. You just stupidly asserted it, so that you could justify unplugging-is-not-murder in that case.

    Cool motive, dude. Still murder.

  25. fifth,

    “Good scientists”, in this context, refers to those who are good at science. It’s not a moral judgment.

    Hume’s is-ought distinction is irrelevant here except for demonstrating your confusion.

  26. Alan,

    To repeat, I’m issuing no edicts…

    You’re declaring that “the natural” is “real”, “the supernatural” is “imaginary”, and that science deals with the real while the imaginary is relegated to philosophy and apologetics:

    I keep trying to suggest we move from “natural” to “real”. It’s then easy to see that all real phenomena are available to scientific scrutiny. The imaginary realm is open to philosophy and apologetics.

    That’s foolish, because it presupposes that there are no real supernatural entities. As I wrote earlier:

    There’s nothing logically impossible about a real supernatural entity. Good scientists and skeptics understand that such questions need to be decided empirically, not by definitional fiat. Further, they recognize that scientific conclusions are provisional and may be overturned by future discoveries. Thus, they are open to looking at new evidence and arguments.

    Alan:

    I’m suggesting there is a distinction between reality – whatever is amenable to study through observation, measurement and experiment – and imagination – whatever the human mind can come up with that does not or can’t be shown to impinge on reality.

    You are severely underestimating the power of science. Science isn’t restricted to hypotheses about entities that are already known to be real. Some of the most important hypotheses are about entities that aren’t known to be real at the time, such as phlogiston and neutrinos. It was science that told us that neutrinos are real while phlogiston isn’t.

    It would have been foolish to declare ahead of time that phlogiston and neutrinos weren’t real and were thus ineligible for scientific scrutiny.

    This is important, so let me emphasize it:
    Science can handle hypotheses involving entities whose existence has not yet been confirmed. If it couldn’t, how would we come to know that they do, or don’t, exist?

  27. Alan,

    Say the experiment result shows that people praying significantly improves the outcome of prayed-for people who are seriously ill. You’ve merely created or reified an unnecessary link in the causal chain.

    You don’t know ahead of time that it’s an unnecessary link, Alan. To do good science, it helps to isolate your prejudices from your scientific thinking.

    You have people praying and a coincidental effect that is statistically significant. Why insert the imaginary concept of “god” into the chain?

    You don’t know ahead of time that it’s imaginary. You may think it is — and I share that belief — but don’t let that corrupt your thinking. We might both be wrong about that. Best to look at the evidence — scientifically.

    What should we conclude if studies consistently demonstrated a measurable difference?

    That the hypothesis has not been falsified. Your long-term disdain for philosophy is unfortunate here, because an acquaintance with the philosophy of science would be helpful.

    Conversely why does the lack of a significant result rule out God as a “supernatural being”?

    It doesn’t. It simply falsifies the hypothesis (assuming the experiment was well-designed, of course).

  28. keiths: Says Mung, while failing (as usual) to offer a counterargument.

    I thought that was what it means to be a “skeptic” here at “The Skeptical Zone.”

    My bad.

    keiths, though, always provides a counter-argument.

  29. faded_Glory:

    Say I posit the existence of the causal agent ‘Froopz’ (leaving aside for now if he is ‘natural’ or ‘supernatural’). A characteristic of Froopz is that he makes the leaves turn brown in autumn.

    Now we observe that every autumn the leaves turn brown. Therefore I have scientifically proven the existence of Froopz?

    Of course not. The fact that a hypothesis survives a test doesn’t prove its truth.

  30. Mung:

    I really hate it when I am wrong.

    Yet you so often are. God must be playing some kind of cruel joke on you.

  31. keiths:

    How is it incoherent for a believer in Yahweh to regard him as separate from nature, which he created? Separating the creator from the created seems quite coherent to me.

    Lizzie:

    Fine.

    My point is simply that “methodological naturalism” is not a method that rules out, a priori, putative “supernatural” entities, however those are defined by the person usig the category.

    Yes it is, and obviously so — the name itself tells you!

    People like de Vries (who coined the term), Pennock, and Scott know what “naturalism” means, and they don’t suddenly invert its meaning when they prepend “methodological” to it. (And in Lewontin’s case, he knows what “materialism” means.)

    Let’s let them speak for themselves:

    Lewontin:

    We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism.

    [Emphasis added}

    de Vries:

    The natural sciences are limited by method to naturalistic foci. By method they must seek answers to their questions within nature, within the non-personal and contingent created order, and not anywhere else. Thus, the natural sciences are limited by what I call methodological naturalism.

    [Emphasis added]

    Pennock:

    Similarly, science does not have a special rule just to keep out divine interventions, but rather a general rule that it does not handle any supernatural agents or powers. That is what it means to hold methodological naturalism…

    [Emphasis added]

    Scott:

    Science is a way of knowing that attempts to explain the natural world using natural causes. It is agnostic toward the supernatural – it neither confirms nor rejects it.

    [Emphasis added]

    Just as for the word ‘supernatural’, your idiosyncratic definition of ‘methodological naturalism’ does not trump the accepted usage.

  32. Lizzie,

    If people are happy to posit a supernatural causal agent that behaves in a particular hypothesised manner, then that can be tested.

    Yes, which is why methodological naturalism is misguided. Supernatural hypotheses are fair game for science.

    However, if it tests positive, that still will not tell you that the agent was “supernatural”.

    Right. A test can’t tell you that your hypothesis is correct. At most it either falsifies or fails to falsify your hypothesis, and that remains true whether or not your hypothesis involves the supernatural.

  33. fifthmonarchyman,

    I agree but that does not explain why it is “important” for “good” scientists to judge things empirically,

    Again “it works” is not equivalent to “it’s good” or “it’s important”. That is unless you declare it to be so by definition.

    I really don’t know what you’re getting at. It’s been discovered empirically that empirical investigation is useful. As to your list of scare-quoted value judgements: meeting the vague criteria of some potentially open-ended value list is not what science is about. It’s about results. Whether those results are ‘good’ or ‘important’ is a matter of judgement. Some are, some aren’t, but the enterprise thrives on data. It has been discovered empirically that empirical approaches (among others) yield the results that science seeks. Science is a tool.

    It’s been discovered empirically that some fungi are fatal. It’s not been demonstrated empirically that it is ‘good’ or ‘important’ not to eat toxic fungi. It works, if staying alive matters to someone. And clearly it does, another empirical fact.

  34. fifthmonarchyman: I would agree, the same goes for the mind(s) behind behind the universe.

    You would agree, yet at the same time turning off HAL is not murder. So you are basically saying you can justify murder because of your religion, or something.

  35. keiths: Yes, which is why methodological naturalism is misguided. Supernatural hypotheses are fair game for science.

    keiths: where we are disagreeing is in what methodological naturalism is. I’m saying it’s a method. And that method can cope perfectly well with a “supernatural hypothesis” were “supernatural” is defined as “something that someone say is supernatural”.

    What matters is not what we CALL the hypothesised causal agent but whether we can make a predictive hypothesis about it.

    For some putative “supernatural” causes i.e. causes that people call “supernatural” e.g. ghosts, we can. For others, e.g. a god-that-can-do-anything we can’t.

    What matters is not whether people call it “supernatural” or not, but whether it makes predictions.

    And if people refuse to make predictions, and indeed scoff at those who “think they know what God would do”, then they can’t have their cake and eat it. Either they produce a predictive hypothesis about their Intelligent Designer, and it can be tested by methodological naturalistic methods without anyone worrying about Divine Feet, or they refuse to, in which case it’s not because methodlogical naturalism is “misguided” that it cannot deal with their hypothesis, it’s because the hypothesis isn’t predictive.

  36. keiths: Just as for the word ‘supernatural’, your idiosyncratic definition of ‘methodological naturalism’ does not trump the accepted usage.

    For the gazillionth time, I am not trying to define “supernatural”. People can define it how they want, as long as they make it clear what they mean. I don’t tend to use the word much because it seems pointless to me to carve off a set of effects ON the natural world, which must necessarily consists of forces that operate WITHIN the natural world and therefore be PART of it, but arbitrarily declare them to be “supernatural”, on the apparent grounds that they also have some unverifiable existence beyond it.

    My point is simply that what methodological cannot deal with is putative causal agents that have no constraints on their behaviour. Not because they are labeled “supernatural” but because methodological naturalism is rooted in prediction.

    Psi research is perfectly possible under methodological naturalism. So is research into hauntings and miraculous statues. But it can only be done if the hypothesis is predictive.

  37. keiths: Right. A test can’t tell you that your hypothesis is correct. At most it either falsifies or fails to falsify your hypothesis, and that remains true whether or not your hypothesis involves the supernatural.

    Exactly. Which means there is nothing “misguided” about it at all. It’s a perfectly good method. It just can’t tell you whether the causal agents it discovers are “spooky” or not.

    Frankly, magnetic and gravitational forces are spooky enough for anyone, and they are supposed to be Natural.

  38. Lizzie:

    where we are disagreeing is in what methodological naturalism is.

    Clearly! You are trying to redefine it, just as you tried to redefine ‘supernatural’, and your proposed redefinition is silly.

    You are actually arguing that de Vries, who coined the term, got the meaning wrong — and so did Pennock, Scott and practically everyone else who uses it. Why should your idiosyncratic definition trump the accepted usage? Why shouldn’t de Vries, who coined the term, have a say in its meaning?

    Worse still, you are trying to redefine ‘methodological naturalism’ so that it isn’t even a form of naturalism!

    Give up, Lizzie. The world is not going to redefine ‘methodological naturalism’ to suit your desires.

    The interesting question here is “Given the actual, accepted usage of the terms ‘supernatural’ and ‘methodological naturalism’, should science be bound by methodological naturalism or should it be able to tackle testable supernatural hypotheses?”

    The answer, clearly, is that it should not be bound by methodological naturalism.

  39. OMagain: You would agree, yet at the same time turning off HAL is not murder.

    Do you have an argument that will prove that HAL actually is a person and does not just appear to be such? The only persons we know of are carbon based humans. Why specifically should we extend the category?

    Once you have made the argument for HAL tell me why it would not also apply to Minds(s) behind the universe.

    peace

  40. OMagain: So you are basically saying you can justify murder because of your religion, or something.

    Nope I’m saying that the only way to know for sure that HAL (or any other entity) is a person is the have that fact revealed to me and It has not been.

    If you disagree please make your case

    peace

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