The “consensus” view among atheists seems to be that atheism is reasonable and that religious beliefs are not.
So why are atheists angry at God?
We can become incensed by objects and creatures both animate and inanimate. We can even, in a limited sense, be bothered by the fanciful characters in books and dreams. But creatures like unicorns that don’t exist ”that we truly believe not to exist” tend not to raise our ire. We certainly don’t blame the one-horned creatures for our problems.
The one social group that takes exception to this rule is atheists. They claim to believe that God does not exist and yet, according to empirical studies, tend to be the people most angry at him.
I’m trying to remember the last time I got angry at something which did not exist. It’s been a while since I last played World of Warcraft, but that might be a candidate.
But atheists angry at God? That’s absurd. Assertions that there are empirical studies to that effect? Simply ludicrous. By definition, atheism is a lack of belief in God or gods. It is simply a matter of logical impossibility that atheists should be angry at God.
If it turns out that I have a worldview and didn’t realize it, OK — that’s not a problem for me. I’ll have discovered something new about myself.
But here’s why I don’t think I have a worldview. I don’t think that I have a worldview because I don’t think anyone has a worldview. A worldview is just not a thing that anyone has.
Here’s what I mean by this: I think that our minds are somewhat “modular”, in that we have different representational resources dedicated to different domains of experience. We do have a capacity to integrate information across modules — what Karniloff-Smith calls “metarepresentational redescription” — but this is where our minds usually resort to metaphors. I think that strict consistency across all representational modules is very likely to be impossible, given the constraints of our cognitive system. So if a worldview is supposed to be some unifying, consistent conceptual framework that embraces all of one’s beliefs and attitudes, I don’t think that anyone has such a thing — I think that a worldview, in that sense, is contradicted by what we know about how minds represent the world.
Well, among other things, I’d say my scientific knowledge (I have a decent layperson’s understanding of hominid paleontology, cognitive neuroscience, and evolutionary theory), my religious sensibilities, and my aesthetic proclivities.
I read some of his posts that way. (I have not read them all – too Wordy). But he also keeps asking for presuppositions of non-theists, apparently rejecting any replies that there are none. Perhaps he thinks theists have epistemological presuppositions but don’t recognize them.
What could he think they are? Let me amuse myself by presuming to list the presumptions he might think non-theists are presuming to presume and which are subsumed in their epistemology.
1. The norms for rational argument. You and WJM have addressed this argument.
2. That sensations are a reliable, given basis for knowledge. This is the Myth of the Given which you’ve debunked at TSZ.
3. Science as a basis for epistemology without realizing that approach is circular. This would be Qune’s naturalized epistemology, ie use psychology to explain/justify knowledge and live with the possibly circular situation that we need an epistemology to do science. There are some counter arguments that such naturalists can try to avoid the prima facie circularity. But we can also avoid it by using philosophical arguments informed by science, rather than just science, in our epistemology
4. Transcendental arguments as presumptions. By a transcendental argument I mean:
What must be presupposed for inquiry, representation or cognition to be possible. Generically put, a transcendental argument goes like this: F is a pervasive feature of human experience. But unless G were necessarily the case, F would not even be possible. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that G.
I possibly got this from you somewhere. It even has the word “presuppose”! What more could you ask? But such arguments are not fixed presumptions; they are always open to revision as we learn more from science on the nature of our experience and how to revise concepts in the transcendental argument accordingly. This idea is similar to our exchange agreeing that constitutive explanations must be revisable in the light of changing causal/descriptive explanations.
5. That we cannot explain learning without presumptions/outside guidance. This may have been true about older learning algorithms, like connectionism which required training data from humans or GOFAI which required concepts hard-coded by humans. But new deep learning algorithms have shown how to avoid these presumptions.
tl;dr: We don’t need fixed presumptions in our epistemology. For example, we can argue for a modest foundationalism or a pragmatic coherentism, always recognizing that all beliefs are revisable, through philosophical and scientific inquiry (though not all at the same time), as you have attributed to Sellars.
None of that is quite right. I’m too lazy to go into it in detail again, so I’ll just say that I don’t believe that whether this or that proposition is logically possible can be determined from a worldview. Something is logically possible if it’s true in one or more possible worlds, otherwise not.
Something is epistemically possible (for me) if it’s consistent with everything I know. While you apparently take knowing something to require knowing that one knows it, I do not. So “there being no truth” is not epistemically possible for me if I actually know anything–which I do iff I have JTB for anything–and I say I do.
FWIW, I don’t think that’s a good explanation of the myth of the given. I take that myth to involve some certainty claim. Foundationalism need not require certainty of anything, I don’t think (that would also be my sense for reliabilism).
No, it is not a presupposition.
Yes, I make pragmatic judgments.
Yes, my ability to have knowledge depends on my making pragmatic judgments.
However, it does not depend on my presupposing that I make pragmatic judgments.
I’m afraid this analogy makes the entire position incoherent.
We do not, in fact, test axioms. Different sets of axioms are chosen, and once chosen, have different inferential consequences — different theorems can be proven. And this is the key point: nothing constrains the choice of axioms. In logic and mathematics we are constrained by nothing more than our ingenuity and creativity. As long as the system is internally consistent, one can choose or invent whatever axioms one likes. They are chosen, not tested.
(I think Neil Rickert will back me up on this, but I’ll also accept whatever criticisms and corrections he makes.)
We don’t even test axioms against reality. What we do is use different axioms to construct theories that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by different measurements. If one is a scientific realist — as I am — then one will say that we discovered that our universe is better described in non-Euclidean terms than in Euclidean terms, because if we assume that mass can distort space-time, some long-standing empirical anomalies can be resolved.
This does not mean that Euclidean geometry is false — it means only that Euclidean geometry is not as useful for physics as was previously assumed. (On the other hand, Newtonian mechanics is still perfectly useful for putting people into space and getting them safely back, even though we know it is, strictly speaking, false.)
Thus, we freely choose our logical and mathematical axioms, and our choice is constrained only our collective ingenuity And we never test our axioms directly against reality; rather, we construct a physical theory that stipulates how measurements will be brought into coherence with some set of geometric axioms by defining the hypotheses to be confirmed or disconfirmed. That’s why we regard Euclidean geometry as less useful for fundamental physics, though still perfectly useful for architecture.
If presuppositions were like axioms — or like scientific hypotheses — they could not function as presuppositions. The presuppositions are not freely chosen, because they are the criteria in terms of which any choice is intelligible as a choice, and they are untestable because they are the criteria according to which any test is evaluated.
And a broken record is still a broken record.
Oh please. It’s patently obvious that people who are not Christians die all the time for what they believe. [ETA: That means it should go without saying.] That you choose to take what I wrote and cast it the most absurd possible light is your choice.
I learned a long time ago that what people say about me says more about them than it ever does about me.
FMM is eager to consider all other ideas of how we can have knowledge, provided that they are mirror images of his own.*
Glen Davidson
*And how could they not be?
Yes, I agree.
I had a similar reaction to fifth’s post on this, but decided to let it pass.
It is reasonable to say that the axioms are a presupposition of Euclidean geometry as abstract mathematics. But they are not a presupposition for real life.
In real life, we use a portable measuring rod to measure distances and lengths. The axioms of Euclidean geometry are an idealization of that process of using a portable measuring rod. If we want to change to a non-Euclidean geometry for ordinary life, then first need to change how we measure distance. You cannot separate the geometry from the measuring, as the etymology of “geometry” ought to tell you.
When we get to astronomy and cosmology, what happens is that we really cannot use a portable measuring rod to find the distance to Andromeda. So we have to find a way to project our earth-bound measuring system to the cosmos as a whole. Newtonian physics and relativistic physics differ in how they do that projecting.
And, by the way, that’s what’s wrong with constructionism (or some versions of it). We construct our scientific theories, but we do not construct reality itself. What we construct affects how we conceptualize reality and how we talk about reality. But it is still the same reality.
I just want to pick up on this loose thread for a moment:
I wouldn’t deny or downplay the role of sensations in empirical knowledge, or that empirical knowledge is usually reliable knowledge of contingent-but-actual reality. The Sellarsian objection to empiricism has to do with the idea that merely having a sensation is both necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The reason for this is that knowledge is, ultimately, a kind of claim, and a claim is an inferentially articulated move in the game of giving and asking for reasons.
I would qualify the Sellarsian picture by distinguishing between the kind of knowledge that non-sapient animals have and the kind of knowledge that sapient animals have, and then stress that sensations are not sufficient for empirical knowledge of sapient animals. (Sensations are also not sufficient for empirical knowledge of non-sapient animals, but for different reasons.)
But just as merely having a sensation is insufficient for empirical knowledge, so too is merely “seeing” a logical truth insufficient for rational knowledge, for the same reason: in order to “see” a logical truth, a huge amount of logical know-how is already at work in the background. One can’t see a logical truth, grasp that it is true without any other knowledge at work, and then proceed from there — in the same precise way that one cannot have a sensation, in the absence of all knowing-how (such as knowing how to use a concept or knowing how to respond to environmental solicitations and affordances in appropriate ways), and then build up empirical knowledge from there.
As I see it, the Myth of the Given is, at bottom, a rejection of the very idea of presuppositions. For a presupposition to be a presupposition, it cannot rest on any other presuppositions. A presupposition is therefore itself presuppositionless. But presuppositionless knowledge is a chimera — a snare and delusion! — because knowing is a kind of asserting, and one must know how to assert in order to assert. Presuppositionless knowledge would be an assertion made by someone who doesn’t know to how assert, and that’s nonsense. And since presuppositions are presuppositionless knowledge, then they are nonsense as well.
What might there be, if not presuppositions? I think — perhaps unlike Sellars? — that there is what Searle calls “the Background”, or what Wittgenstein calls “certainty” (Sicherheit, in On Certainty). I just think that the error lies in conflating certainty and knowledge. As Wittgenstein puts it, it only makes sense to talk about knowledge when doubt also makes sense. If doubt is unintelligible, then so is knowledge. Hence Wittgenstein would insist that I do not know that I have (or am) a body, but that I am certain of it. And one’s certainties are typically implicit in the form of life that one has acquired.
However, I would — unlike Wittgenstein — also want to stress how the certainties of one time and place can be turned into doubt in shocking and fascinating ways. The function of world-transforming philosophers, artists, and spiritual leaders is to destroy old certainties — in order to make the way for new ones — which will be destroyed in turn, and so on ad infinitum.
OK, thanks for the input. Some good discussion here if you are interested, especially posts by AaronR and Fafner88 and photographer who I’m guessing are philosophy post-grads or were at one time.
Mung,
I think fifthmonarchyman is posting in good faith. I think he believes everything he is saying. I also think his position is intellectually dishonest.
I’m off to meditate the rest of the afternoon. Don’t take it personally if I don’t respond for a few hours.
What was it that Einstein said about insanity?
I don’t know, what was it and how does it apply here?
I agree.
But I don’t agree with that. To me, “dishonest” implies saying something contrary to what one believes.
I’d say that he is confused, though perhaps unaware of that confusion.
So, you don’t consider being a disenchanted atheist and ex-reform Jew counts as (having) a worldview? Some may call the embrace of philosophistry a kind of worldview also … or just an attitude of intentional superficiality and self-trickery. Others might just call it happy-go-lucky ‘Sellarsian’ naturalism.
Psalm 11:5, Psalm 36:2
One-trick Gregory, boring and superficial gadfly, strikes again. Pfft. Try harder, Gregory.
right, and you said that something can be consistent with everything you know and still be false.Therefore it is epistemically possible that truth does not exist in your worldview
peace
Given your worldview how do you know that it is good to make pragmatic judgements?
peace
I love that little book.
ETA: On Certainty
KN, you might enjoy:
How to Do Good & Avoid Evil: A Global Ethic from the Sources of Judaism
Core Ethic 1 : The value of the human: every human being must be treated humanely
Core Ethic 2 : The golden rule: do not do to another what you would not want to be done to you
Core Ethic 3 : Peace: commitment to a culture of nonviolence and reverence for all life
Core Ethic 4 : Justice: commitment to a culture of justice and a just economic order
Core Ethic 5 : Truth and tolerance: commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life in truthfulness
Core Ethic 6 : Equal rights: commitment to a culture of equal rights and a partnership between men and women
fifthmonarchyman,
That depends on the meaning of “good”. And I don’t think there’s a definitive answer to that.
Never said they were. It’s analogy
exactly, Geometry is a package deal you can’t separate one one aspect from the others
I’m asking how you “measure distance” and how you know it is the correct way. What makes your “geometry” the correct one and not mine.
peace
So you choose pragmatism even though you can’t say it’s a good thing? OK
Why exactly do you choose it?
peace
I actually don’t say that “it is the correct way”. It is a way that works well, and that is in wide use. Using it is a matter of social norms, rather than of correctness. There are no criteria by which we can judge it correct.
It isn’t really a choice. It is all that we have.
Pragmatism seems to be the only internal basis for making judgments. Using truth requires an external standard. But we cannot access external standards until we have some knowledge of the external world. So the starting point has to be judgments made on a internal basis.
I would disagree.
Instead of believing certain things because “it helps us to manage” one could believe things because it gives glory to God.
Now I realize that you would not find that prospect to be appealing but it is an option.
Lets face it Neil we just look at the world from different perspectives. You start with you I endeavor to start with God.
I know you find that to be foolish but trust me from my perspective your choice is equally goofy. What I find especially naive is the idea that your starting point is the only possible one.
peace
If revelation is the way we know things knowelege of the external world is equally ultimate and basic to knowelege of the internal.
Notice how you assume that Christianity is false before you even begin to reason
peace
Can you recognize that’s your assumption?
Glen Davidson
But, according to my criticisms raised above, it’s an analogy that can’t work.
Mung,
Mung, thank you for the book suggestion!
It not an assumption on my part it is an observation based on the plain evidence of Neil’s post
Neil Rickert explicitly said that we “must” begin with internal knowelege. That is a full out rejection of the idea of revelation.
Christianity is a revealed religion so a rejection of revelation is a rejection of Christianity.
If I’m incorrect please enlighten me.
peace
How so? I happen to agree with your post as far as it goes.
Apparently you still think I’m making claims. I never said your choice of presuppositions is wrong just different than mine.
Now I am interested to know if your presuppositions are as “useful as was previously assumed” but that is for a different time
Again this might be the case for your presuppositions but my presuppositions are also revealed truth
the Logos became flesh,
Till you get this you will not understand what is being said.
peace
Rejection of revelation doesn’t logically follow from starting with internal knowledge.
You don’t really do logic, though.
Glen Davidson
walto, to fifth:
fifth:
Yes, it was. You even quoted him in your response:
If you can’t even tell the truth about something that happened five comments earlier, what hope is there that you’ll be able to examine your beliefs objectively?
LoL!
the irony
Double post.
Think of the newborn infant. It cannot believe things at all, because it does not have the knowledge that is prerequisite to belief. It can only make decisions based on internal criteria, and probably not consciously. It cannot know anything about “glory to God”. So it makes decisions the only way possible.
I’m puzzled that you seem to be trying so hard to justify what you say are your presuppositions. But if they are presuppositions, why would you be concerned with justifying them?
Where am I making that assumption?
Or are you just making stuff up?
Only if I don’t actually know anything at all can there be both no truth and consistency with what I know. If I do know something, there is truth. So consistency with what I know would require that there be truth.
It’s my position that I know things, just as it’s your position that you know things. I guess you could say that it’s epistemically possible for me that it’s logically possible that it’s epistemically for me possible that there’s no such thing as truth. (And this is the case even though it seems to me that (i) it’s logically necessary that there are truths and that (ii) it’s epistemically impossible for me that there is no such thing as truth.) That’s at a level of abstraction that’s difficult for me, though, so I wouldn’t swear to any of that.
The important point is that however that stuff works out–and maybe one of the programmers or mathematician/logician types here would do a better job of sussing this out than I can–it’s quite clear to me that there’s no way in which your presuppositions can really put you in any better epistemic situation than my presuppositions leave me, no matter what sort of incarnative revelations or gospelly truths you think you’re starting off with (via presupposition or otherwise).
The human condition is what it is–whether one believes in God or not. You need God to actually exist to get you out of that: belief in God is insufficient, because (sadly) transcendental arguments are fantasies.
Making stuff up is the time-honored christian way.
Don’t take it personally. 🙂
fifth,
Tell that to Descartes (after you’re done fighting the Bible, of course).
P.S. It’s “knowledge”, not “knowelege”. You’ve been making that mistake throughout the thread.
Then maybe what you are calling “revelation” is what I am taking to be an indicator used for pragmatic judgment.
I guess that explains why you were unable to provide a satisfactory answer to my question of how you distinguish between revelation and indigestion. It’s looking as if you don’t distinguish between them.
Yes, I’m well aware of that. It seems to be the basic method for theology.
fifth’s argument is in disarray.
He claims that knowledge is impossible unless Christianity is true, but his comments reveal that it is absolute certainty he thinks is impossible, not knowledge. (I agree, of course, but the problem applies to both Christians and non-Christians — even if Christianity is true).
He needs to come up with a better argument against the possibility of knowledge in a non-Christian framework.
Meanwhile, his argument for the necessity of Christianity is comical. We can only get knowledge through revelation, he says, and revelation is impossible without the Incarnation.
Why? Because it’s “logically impossible” for spiritual beings to communicate across the “infinite ontological gap” with physical beings. Incarnation bridges the gap.
I raised the obvious question: If communication is logically impossible across the gap, then how is incarnation possible?
fifth’s answer (I kid you not): It’s magic, just like the magic that allows us to wiggle our fingers.
So the one kind of magic — a spiritual being incarnating across the “infinite ontological gap” — is possible, while the other kind of magic — a spiritual being communicating across the gap — is impossible. Why? fifth has no idea. He just believes it.
What a mess. But it’s kind of a beautiful mess, because it reveals to anyone reading this thread that fifth’s Christianity is a goofy mishmash of arbitrary and unsupported beliefs.
It serves that purpose admirably.
hotshoe_,
Yup, I’m a one-trick pony. Just like in Berlin’s classic “The Hedgehog and the Fox”. I’m a hedgehog, unlike Tolstoy. (KN, however, seems more like a disenchanted philosophistic Tolstoy.)
And do you know what, 11-time gold medal winner Usain Bolt is also a hedgehog. And in the past few days he’s just ‘crushed’ the USA’s best sprinters at the IAAF world championships in Beijing.
We strong and fast! 🙂 No (coldshoe) gramma empty armchair internet foulmouthed despair changes that. Amen.
quote:
and they said to him, “Do you hear what these are saying?” And Jesus said to them, “Yes; have you never read, “‘Out of the mouth of infants and nursing babies you have prepared praise’?”
(Mat 21:16)
end quote:
peace
Once again I’m not making claims and I’m not justifying anything. I’m merely sharing my presuppositions.
peace
right, If Christianity is false we can know nothing at all. That has been my point all along. You acknowledge this is a possibility in your worldview. It’s possible you know nothing at all
I have no problem with that view it seems consistent to me.
I just don’t find those particular presuppositions very appealing. To each his own
peace