[Vincent Torley has posted this at Uncommon Descent. As many people who might like to respond, not the least among them Dr. Liddle herslf, are unable to do so directly, I reproduce it here. The rest of this post is written by Vincent Torley]
Over at The Skeptical Zone, Dr. Elizabeth Liddle has written a thought-provoking post, which poses an interesting ethical conundrum about the morality of creating sentient beings.
Dr. Liddle’s post was titled, Getting some stuff off my chest…., and its tone was remarkably conciliatory, as the following extracts reveal:
I don’t think that science has disproven, nor even suggests, that it is unlikely that an Intelligent Designer was responsible for the world, and intended it to come into existence.
I don’t think that science has, nor even can, prove that divine and/or miraculous intervention is impossible.
I think the world has properties that make it perfectly possible for an Intelligent Deity to “reach in” and tweak things to her liking – and that even if it didn’t, it would still be perfectly possible, given Omnipotence, just as a computer programmer can reach in and tweak the Matrix.
I don’t think that science falsifies the idea of an omnipotent, omniscient deity – at all.
Apparently, Dr. Liddle’s main reason for disbelieving in an “external disembodied intelligent and volitional deity” is a philosophical rather than a scientific one: she is “no longer persuaded that either intelligence or volition are possible in the absence of a material substrate.” Fair enough; but Dr. Liddle should tell us what she means by the word “material.” Does she mean: (a) composed of visible and/or tangible “stuff”; (b) having some (non-zero) quantity of mass-energy; (c) spatially extended, and inside our universe; (d) spatially extended, and inside some universe; (e) composed of parts; (f) behaving in accordance with the laws of Nature; or (g) behaving in accordance with some invariant set of mathematical laws? What is Dr. Liddle’s definition of “matter,” and why does Dr. Liddle believe that an intelligent being has to conform to that definition?
But the most interesting part of her post came in two paragraphs where she made it clear that while she regarded the notion of an omnipotent, omniscient deity as quite compatible with science, it was ludicrous to suggest that this deity might also be omnibenevolent:
I do think that the world is such that IF there is an omnipotent, omniscient deity, EITHER that deity does not have human welfare as a high priority OR she has very different ideas about what constitutes human welfare from the ones that most people hold (and as are exemplified, for example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), OR she has deliberately chosen to let the laws of her created world play out according to her ordained rules, regardless of the effects of those laws on the welfare of human beings, perhaps trusting that we would value a comprehensible world more than one with major causal glitches. In my case, her trust was well-placed…
I don’t think that it follows that, were we to find incontrovertible evidence of a Intelligent Creator (for instance, an unambiguous message in English configured in a nebula in some remote region of space, or on the DNA of an ant encased in amber millions of years ago) that that would mandate us in any way to worship that designer. On the basis of her human rights record I’d be more inclined to summon her to The Hague.
This is a little inconsistent. On the one hand, Dr. Liddle declares that she values “a comprehensible world” with no “causal glitches”; but at the same time, Dr. Liddle wishes that the Intelligent Creator, if she exists, would do more to promote human rights and alleviate suffering.
At any rate, here is the question I would like to ask Dr. Liddle. Suppose you were the Intelligent Creator of a world containing life. Suppose also that you have decided that your world should contain no “causal glitches” whatsoever: miraculous interventions are out of the question. Suppose, finally, that the laws of your world happen to dictate that any sentient beings in it will suffer and die, and suppose, also, that death in your world is absolutely final, with no hereafter. That goes for sapient beings as well: in your world, you only get one innings.
The life-forms that currently exist in your world include not only micro-organisms, but also complex animals, rather like our insects, which are capable of a rich variety of behavioral feats, but lack any kind of phenomenal consciousness: they react to environmental stimuli in a very sophisticated manner, but for them, there is no subjective feeling of “what it is like” to experience those stimuli. So far, everything is unfolding in accordance with your pre-ordained program.
Here’s my question for Dr. Liddle, and for skeptical readers. Given the above constraints, would you regard it as immoral to be the author of a program that eventually resulted in the appearance of:
(a) sentient beings capable of feeling pain, but with no self-awareness whatsoever;
(b) sentient beings with some rudimentary self-awareness;
(c) sapient beings capable of reasoning and language, as well as a rich sense of self-awareness?
Putting it another way, would it be better for an Intelligent Creator not to create a world of sentient (and/or self-aware and/or sapient) beings, than to create a world in which sentient / self-aware / sapient beings existed, but where all of these beings would undergo suffering (and where some of them would undergo a considerable degree of suffering), caused by the inexorable operation of the laws of Nature in that world? Or putting it as baldly as possible: if you were the Creator, would you deny us all the gift of existence, on the grounds that it would be immoral to create beings like us?
If your answer is that it would be immoral to create beings like us, then I would ask you to set out, as clearly as possible, the ethical principle which would be violated by the creation of beings like us.
And if it’s not the existence of suffering per se that you object to, but the degree of suffering, where do you draw the line, and why?
Over to you, Dr. Liddle…
[ETA correction to blockquotes – AF]
I believe in god to secure a happier life.
The hope for happiness only works to your “advantage” if it is properly motivated and acted upon. Simply hoping for the sake of reward or preservation is an empty gesture – hence Pascal’s wager is a fool’s insurance policy, or if you prefer, a losing
lottery ticket.
I think Murray is helped in a Twelve Step way. Apparently he needs faith to stabilize his life. I’m not going to make fun of that.
But I will point out that not everyone needs imaginary sky friends. It’s just a fact that people are not all the same.
That’s interesting.
I have never said that I find atheism satisfying and enjoyable, nor do I. I think it’s boring, really, and hardly anything for which I would hope.
I find dealing the world as it appears to be (with as little prejudgment as possible), rather than as I wish it would be, to be what is satisfying–in its way.
You did indeed object to dealing with the world/God, etc., in a minimally biased fashion, holding up your relativism as superior.
Glen Davidson
I’d call that the difference between adopting a normative model (your “choose”) and a predictive model (your “decide”).
Except that William chooses because it will improve his life. Or perhaps, having chosen, he notes it has improved his life, and he chooses to maintain the choice.
I fail to see any important difference. In both senses of the bifurcation, on goes one way or the other because one predicts an outcome and prefers it.
Slightly off topic, but Robert Frost is widely quote-mined on the topic of choosing. He is being snarky.
If “faith” is not the kind of entity that evolves, then neither is it the kind of entity that can be disrespected.
People who whine about disrespect to “faith” could benefit from a day in the stocks getting rotten vegetables thrown at them, and gaining a much-needed perspective on actual disrespect.
I’ve got a much more pertinent quote for you:
— Andy Rooney, The Free Lance-Star, Feb 3, 1987
No, pointing out that you are apparently seriously proposing an argument that is isomorphic to Pascal’s Wager is shorthand to reference all of the refutations of that argument, including some that were immediately identified by his friends when he first articulated it.
That’s not what I asked for. I asked for objective, empirical evidence for the existence of a deity, of at least the quality one would require to trade a stock.
Not to those of us who value rationality, intellectual integrity and honesty.
Do you or do you not have objective, empirical evidence for the existence of a deity?
Longer explanation wrt Pascal’s Wager:
From the point of being a hardcore materialist/atheist, I realized I wanted to believe in god – more than that, to keep from being a bad person and to enjoy life, I needed to believe in a good and loving god.
Also, I realized that believing in any god that would punish or condemn me – or anyone – for making mistakes or because of a technicality – wasn’t a god that was going to help me be a good person or enjoy life. Who can help but despise such a god, even if it existed? Like Liz, how can you love or “worship” a god with such pitiful traits? How could belief in such a sorry creator help me be good or enjoy life?
The thought of such a god would just make me less happy and less good. It would make me miserable.
Therefore, OMagain, if god is the sort that punishes anyone for making up their own concept of god and using it to be a better person and enjoy life more because the available concepts don’t help, then that god isn’t worth caring about. You say that if you were god you’d punish me more; if I were god, I’d appreciate the effort someone like me went to in order to avoid being a bad person and hurting others. I woudn’t give a crap about something so vain as whether or not that person worshipped me in particular, as long as he was able to be a good person and enjoy my creation.
So: if the god that actually exists is intolerant of my inventing a concept of god that allows me to be good and enjoy creation, that isn’t a god I care about pleasing or “worshipping” in the first place.
I may not be able to cover every bet, but I can cover all the bets I care to cover (wrt an actual god and an actual afterlife) and it doesn’t cost me anything but some “mental gymnastics”. The bet doesn’t cost anything, and the risk is at least no greater than any other bet, including atheism. Additionally, the effect of placing the bet (not winning it after death, but just placing it) grants me real, tangible benefit while I’m alive – even if they are placebo effects, they are still real.
Again,only a fool doesn’t place that bet, because I can only lose the bet if circumstances turn out in such a way (a despicable god and afterlife) that I would have thrown my winnings away anyway, or wish I hadn’t won, being unable to endure such a god or afterlife anyway.
Let’s call that “William’s Wager”. You are of course free not to believe in god if you wish, but if one wishes to believe in god, there are certainly concepts of god worth believing in – even if you have to make one up. There is no additional downside to my bet (besides that which exists with any bet), it costs nothing, and I benefit in a practical way during my life.
What you originally wrote was:
If you cannot keep your chooses and decides straight, how are we expected to?
🙂
Now you are saying
Awesome! Speaking personally, my choice of favorite ice cream flavor depends on sensory evidence. When tasting a new ice cream, I have not made a prior choice about whether it will become my new favorite or not. When I have chosen a new favorite (e.g. lemon gelato, while visiting Tiberius’s villa) the choice was informed by the evidence.
So your original statement was, as I suspected, completely wrong.
Thank you for the clarification.
And this is your version of “not making fun of that”?
Is it?
Would you have the enfeebled, unable to speak their minds, inherit the Earth?
Do you applaud the sentiment of Matthew 5:28? Better to be an inhibited cripple?
You approve of this (unachievable) denigration of the body?
Don’t resist evil people?
Should we become like children?
Truth should be hidden from the wise and learned?
Christ’s rejection of the world and everything in it is a good example?
It is good to regard ourselves as sick?
Biblical literalism.
Do you think it’s true that a god exists? And if so, is that because you have evidence supporting his/her existence? I’m not asking about your chosen “beliefs” here, but about what you think is objectively true when you turn off the mental gymnastics.
How do you interpret those sayings?
I would say that your examples are somewhat unrepresentative of the big picture.
The life and sayings are not a historical record of one person, so there are lots of weird and inconsistent bits.
What is the big picture?
I’m well aware it is weird and inconsistent.
WJM,
You are on the path to faith, but mistakenly believe to have arrived. Faith can be comforting, but it is not a means to an end. Faith requires us to sacrifice ourselves for the love of God, to understand God on God’s terms, and to suffer. I urge you to spend some time reflecting on the words of Pope Benedict XVI:
You seem to be doing apologetics in reverse. Picking the worst or most impractical parts to disprove the story. Since I don’t worry about the historical accuracy, I look at the best parts. In general, that parts disregarded by churchgoers.
Don’t make a public display of praying, don’t be greedy, do unto others, etc.
As metaphors. As painting a colorful picture with words.
You said that Jesus presented an ethical model to follow. Not that *some* of what Jesus said constituted an ethical model to follow.
The three things you mention are a tiny part of the attributed sayings.
Jesus preaches poverty and inaction. He tells people not to plan ahead. He reinforces the doctrine of sin, the perverse idea that people are naturally sick.
He cures some people but not others. To what end?
He says nothing to condemn slavery when the centurion tells him of his sick slave.
He tells a man not to bury his father.
He tells his disciples to preach only to the Israelites.
He says to his preachers that they should not provide for themselves or carry money, but expect others to provide.
He sets families against each other.
He is anything but ecumenial. “You are either for me or against me”.
He condemns an entire generation (Matthew 12:43-45).
To follow him you must surrender all right to self determination.
He inverts life and death so that the meaning of both is negated.
He issues false promises.
Perhaps worst of all, he turns everything into pure metaphor. No food but spiritual food. No milk but spiritual milk. No seeds but spiritual seeds. No body but a metaphorical body. No kingdom, only the promise of a kingdom. All riches are just tokens in his parables. The land and the plants are but metaphors of faith. Fisherman don’t catch fish, but the ineffable: souls.
There has never been a more insubstantial speaker.
Firstly, every metaphor also has a literal meaning. Everyone is responsible for the literal interpretation of the metaphors they use. Those who are not aware of that are poor speakers.
Secondly, you didn’t answer the question.
This question really stumped me for a long time. I just don’t think in these kinds of terms. I think in terms of models that are either useful or not useful, logically consistent or not, and is reconcilable with my actual experience or not – not in terms of whether or not what the model refers to is “true”.
My view of a scientific theory, is that the theory is neither true nor false. Rather, the theory define methodology and defines data obtained by that methodology.
Is that how you are viewing your theism? If it is, then perhaps that helps make sense of some of what you have been posting.
Vincent,
According to most Christians, they don’t turn away. However, I don’t think there’s agreement regarding whether that’s because they are free to turn away, but choose not to, or whether they aren’t free to begin with.
Let’s go with “not free”, arguendo, since that is your position.
You wrote:
If libertarian freedom is a good thing, befitting a rational creature, then why does God deny it to believers in heaven?
Why is that incoherent? Suppose Tom Cruise wishes he were taller. Would you argue, “Well, if you were taller, you wouldn’t be Tom Cruise anymore; therefore you’re wishing yourself out of existence”?
I assume you agree that God isn’t obligated to the trillions of people he doesn’t create. That leaves the ones he does create, whoever they may be. Each of them will be sinned against if born into a world full of imperfect people. Therefore, each of them would be better off if everyone else were perfect. God can bring this about, but fails to do so. (Or, more likely, he isn’t an omniGod. Or, more likely still, he doesn’t exist.)
Also note that your logic leads to a moral absurdity. Suppose God created someone who by her very nature was constantly in agony, from birth to death. By your logic, God would be blameless for deliberately creating her. After all, if he had he created her differently, to spare her from suffering, she would have been someone else. And as you put it, “God cannot be held responsible to an individual X for an evil that God could have prevented only by preventing the existence of X.”
To the people (and other sentient creatures) who suffer because of the evil God permits.
William : I just don’t think in these kinds of terms. I think in terms of models that are either useful or not useful, logically consistent or not, and is reconcilable with my actual experience or not – not in terms of whether or not what the model refers to is “true”.
Sounds very practical ,sort of a religion without the demand that one believes it to be true. I am still bit unclear what is the choice and what is the decision.Your description seems to indicate you are deciding the most useful model of assumption. Your wager as well seems to be a decision,nothing to lose.
What is the Uncaused choice?
keiths : . (6) your argument against God’s goodness assumes that God is responsible for any evil which He could have prevented. But I would answer, “Responsible to whom?”
To the people (and other sentient creatures) who suffer because of the evil God permits.
Only if we hold God to the same standards as we do humans. God is in the enviable position of getting all the credit for the good things and none of the blame for the bad.
William J. Murray,
Well, you have simply described the way most scientists approach ‘truth’ in their fields. It applies equally to the daily life of many, scientist and non-scientist. We evaluate the information coming in, form mental models of an assumed reality, revise them if we recognise inconsistency.
It just so happens that atheists, by the process you describe, find logical inconsistencies in the spritual stories they are told, or struggle to reconcile them to their actual experience. IDists, meanwhile (to take an example of a particular kind of theist) find instead logical inconsistencies within evolutionary theory, and the data instead bespeaks to them of direct evidence of that which they seek. Or maybe that evidence leads them to do some seeking; whatever. Still, from the inside, all I feel I do is examine propositions and argue on their merits. I would struggle to incorporate the “would it be useful for my well-being to consider this true?” filter, so I don’t. It might be rational, but it is illogical, Captain.
All well and good; let’s shake hands and be on our way.
And yet … you repeatedly show contempt for the intellectual world of the atheist. They possess ideological blinders; they willfully deny ‘the obvious’; they are hypocrites or self-deceivers.
I find you to be somewhat inconsistent.
No, but that’s hardly the point is it? When that evil god is punishing you, if you care about that god or not is beside the point!
I’d rank you lower (higher temperatures) then the atheists who avoided being a bad person and did not hurt people anyway.
That you have to pretend to believe in a god to not hurt people speaks volumes about you.
And I ask again, if there is a god then when you die and are asked “Why did you believe in me” what will you say?
The thing about people like you is that you have to worry about what they would do should they stop believing. If the only thing stopping you from being “bad” is your belief in god then…..
And of course it prevents you from being a bad person, and allows you to do good. Some of us don’t need such lies to be good people you know….
All gods are invented William, some are just invented by other people is all. As far as I can tell Liz’s “sorry creator” is far preferable to your anodyne creation. At least it does something and has a position. Terrible and vengeful is preferable to “Williams god that does not punish but does not seem to do anything else either”.
And I ask again, if there is a god then when you die and are asked “Why did you believe in me” what will you say?
I absolutely agree with William here. I think the test of a model is whether it is useful, not whether it is true. All models are false.
However, I’d say, as I suggested earlier, that there are (at least) two kinds of models, or two criteria of “usefulness” perhaps. One is whether it predicts data. Scientific models fall into this category, and we tend to assume that the better a model predicts data the closer it is to “the truth” which I would phrase as “some underlying reality that we can’t access directly but which appears to have regularities that we can discern”.
However, other models – models of morality, for instance, or theological models – are “normative” – they don’t do any predicting, but they do affect the way we perceive things or behave.
I think confusing the two is potentially a problem. More often the problem is that people mistake theological models for scientific ones – and evaluated on their predictive power, they are poor. But they can still as William suggests, be extremely useful on other criteria.
The trap William seems to be falling into is the opposite – but perhaps he isn’t falling in, we are simply assuming he must be – of thinking that because normative models are useful, their particular kind of usefulness namely, e,g, improving William’s quality of life, is the same kind of usefulness as a scientific model.
Which is obviously false. Scientific models are terrible for improving the quality of life, as people who stupidly blame Darwin’s theory for the Holocaust demonstrate. A scientific model by definition is evaluated on its ability to predict data, nothing else. How it changes behaviour is irrelevant to its quality as model.
But theological models can be rather good, which is why I hold on to a vestige of mine.
Again, I’m entirely with William on this.
I think this is, from a utilitarian perspective, indistinguishable from the idealized Jesus or idealized parent or older sibling. I did a rather poor job of making a case for this, but I agree that having an idealized figure as an ethical model is useful. It helps if one doesn’t have to distort reality too far.
ETA:
I think we may have a hard wired faculty for building ethical models, not unlike the hard wired faculty for learning language. As a cat and dog owner, I’d argue that this is not unique to humans.
I think you just explained religion. Simply that, but taken too far.
Sorta, I think. The model has to be in agreement with data (experience) inasmuch as it doesn’t contradict any data, and then organizes that data into a useful arrangement, otherwise there’s no reason to care about the model. This is why my model of god has changed over the years – new data, refinements due to understanding and taking into account both logical criticisms of the model and logical arguments for additional features or considerations; then checking to see if the new version of the model is more useful than the previous version.
Demonstrating that the model is “true” is beyond the scope of the model’s purpose; all that matters is that it works for me.
What is your yardstick for how useful your yardstick is?
How happy you feel? How happy those around you feel? Something else?
What “new data” have you received over the years about god?
Seems to me it’s been a long long time since humanity had an update from the old man in the sky…
Regarding the explanation of relogion, I’d note that Buddhism apparently involves an idealized ethical figure who is not a deity. Perhaps the cultural or psychological divide lies in needing or not needing a deity.
There a number of churches that stress ethics without requiring belief in a specific deity.
ETA: getting back to the topic, this relates to the question of God’s morality. The central desire for some of us is a role model. This is commonly expressed as WWJD.
The Abrahamic God seems to be out of step with society. More attuned to tribalism than to a universal, compassionate ethic.
OMagain,
“Hi. This is God here. Talking to me used to be a simple affair.
Moses only had to see a burning bush … and he’d pull up a chair.”
Prefab Sprout – One of the Broken.
Uncaused cause, or the demiurge as the creative nature of god.
Would this be the god that may or may not actually exist? Then how can you speak about it out of one side of your mouth as if it does, and from the other that it does not matter that it exists or not?
I don’t think “happiness” really covers it adequately, which why I use the terms “enjoy life” and “good person”. So, “a good person who enjoys life” is the character description I have chosen for my “be-ing” – for the past couple of decades, anyway. My yardstick, then, is how much I am enjoying life, and whether or not I consider myself a good (enough) person.
I’ve decided to add the (enough) because I’m not really trying to be a paragon of virtue. Trying to be too good becomes problematic for me.
How happy and safe and satisfied the people I care about appear to be is an essential part of my sense of goodness and enjoyment. I should say that “enjoying life” is a broad category full of various individual and idiosyncratic elements. Also, my sense of “being a good person” is better described as doing what my conscience says, and not so much what my sense of compassion or empathy say. I have found compassion and empathy to be, for me, not good primary considerations in serving both of my goals – enjoying life and being a good (enough) person.
I’m describing and explaining my model. I’m not making claims about reality.
Models that don’t describe reality aren’t useful.
One wonders, then, about all the things humans have usefully done or produced while laboring under models that we, at a later date, have determined or currently believe were not true.
Oh, they can be very useful.
Can you be a little more specific, WJM, and name some specific models?
Let me start. Newtonian mechanics is a great example. It’s clearly a useful model as it describes the dynamics of objects on the human scale with great precision. It turned out to be wrong on the microscopic scale, so it wasn’t completely true. Scientists had to invent an entirely new theory of quantum mechanics. But classical mechanics has not been discarded. It is very much in use because it describes a certain corner of our physical reality very well.
My point is that a model need not be “true” as in “absolutely correct.” If it provides a good description of reality in some limit, it’s a useful model.
That’s why I use the term “normative models” – models that don’t describe how things are, but how they might be. Those models can sometimes bring about the reality they describe, by virtue of someone holding them.
For example, take a wayward teenager who is untrustworthy about coming home by curfew, and constantly in trouble because of it. So someone says: OK, I’m actually going to relax this whole curfew thing, because I’m going to trust you to come home at a time you think sensible.
Sometimes presenting that model – of a trustworthy person – to someone for whom that model is a bad fit, helps bring about a reality in which the model is a good fit.
There’s a difference between “describing reality” and “being true”. A model can describe reality quite well – have good predictive power – but not be true. It can be simply incomplete, or it can be wrong – not turn out to predict some additional phenomenon that it should predict. Phlogiston is the text-book example (it was not a bad idea, and led to a better one, and did describe reality quite well, but unfortunately not enough of it, and the tweaks to it in order to make it fit some phenomena – e.g. sometimes having negative weight – hopelessly messy).