The Fallacy of the Stolen Concept was coined by Ayn Rand, to point out the absurdity of arguing against a position when the argument depends upon that position \u2013 setting up a kind of indirect (and hence not so obviously paradoxical) version of Epiminedes-style \u201cthis sentence is false\u201d. For example, to argue that all consciousness is really dreaming requires that there be some state one could recognise as \u2018waking\u2019, in order that dreaming could be distinct from it. One steals the concept of \u2018waking\u2019 (on whose existence \u2018dreaming\u2019 depends) in an attempt to argue there is no such thing.
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\nIt\u2019s rather a misnomer, as it conjures up an implication that there is some principle of concept \u2018ownership\u2019. And self-referentially, a common illustration of the fallacy is \u2018property is theft\u2019 \u2013 the supposed fallacy being that, as theft has no meaning without a concept of ownership, the statement is a paradox. (That slogan was never intended as a formal philosophical argument, of course, and a much less pretentious retort to such a definitional declaration could legitimately be \u201cno it isn\u2019t\u201d).<\/p>\n
We are, of course, familiar with the \u201cstolen concept\u201d; it is a regular slogan of William J Murray. However, I submit that his usage is frequently incorrect. Despite correcting others who fall into the \u2018ownership\u2019 trap, his usage all too frequently invites, or makes, that tumble. For WJM, \u201cI\u201d, \u201cmoral\u201d, \u201ctrue\u201d, \u201cright\u201d, when used by the \u201catheo-materialist\u201d, are stolen concepts. However, there is nothing fallacious about simple usage. Unless one is trying to deny the existence of one of these concepts using something which depends upon it \u2013 eg \u201cI do not exist\u201d, or \u201cThere are no true statements\u201d \u2013 then there is nothing fallacious going on. Murray\u2019s misuse relates to an apparent understanding of the stolen concept as a declaration that such concepts cannot be derived from<\/i> materialism. Which is not, I think, what Rand was saying \u2013 and, further, is incorrect. One does not need a supernatural entity before one can talk of what one \u2018ought\u2019 to do, or whether Truth etc exist. And the presence of such a supernatural entity offers no guarantees that they ground morality, or that they render anything True other than truth-propositions on the existence of supernatural entities.<\/p>\n
If an atheist were to argue that (for example) it was immoral to care about one’s actions, they would be committing the fallacy of the stolen concept. But to simply talk of \u2018morality\u2019 (merely: what one \u2018ought\u2019 to do), or \u2018moral duty\u2019, \u2018moral fibre\u2019, \u2018amorality\u2019, \u2018immorality\u2019 \u2013 no attempt is being made to disprove<\/i> the concept by its usage outside of religion. Even if it is definitionally the case that morality refers only to those oughts and ought-nots adjudicated by a spiritual arbiter, usage in another context (such as by someone who does not believe in said arbiter) is still not a stolen concept, sensu<\/i> Rand.<\/p>\n
An atheist can mean something by \u2018moral\u2019, and be in broad agreement with a theist about what it means, simply disagreeing about the source – human sensibility or divine decree. Ironically, Rand\u2019s own moral writing was grounded in the kind of thinking that Murray would dismiss as materialistic \u2018concept-stealing\u2019. That which is moral, for Rand, is that which a human should value in relation to his own survival. We only have values because we can be destroyed, and we\u2019d like to avoid that, ta very much. Theists extend that \u2013 as they have a sense in which we can be spiritually destroyed as well, after death, they care about morality because they care about preventing that spiritual<\/i> destruction. But to dress up the implicit egoism that remains, they invoke an entity that cares as much about objective \u2018values\u2019 as they do about what they fundamentally value \u2013 their permanent identity.<\/p>\n
FWIW, I disagree with Rand on morals. I think we possess an altruistic sense, that I am happy to term \u2018moral\u2019, which derives from our sociality as a species, and is sustained by both genetics and culture. It is not a matter of pure egoism, but the balance of the \u2018requirements of the self\u2019 and other constraints that arise from our desire to fit in with society. It is manifest by the sense of warmth we experience on witnessing or doing \u2018good\u2019, and an abhorrence for \u2018bad\u2019. Our morality articulates these shared sensations (shared by most, that is); religion packages them with additional carrots, sticks and reification. Society has proved a great survival feature of our species. We experience positive sensations on helping others, negative on hurting, because our ancestors who possessed these characteristics were more successful at procreating (thanks to sociality) than those who went it alone. As a sense, it is developed to a varying degree by society\u2019s present members. Some possess it not at all, others to a very high degree, just as with a sense of humour, or beauty.<\/p>\n
It is of course in the nature of things that religious and cultural norms can directly mould this individual sense \u2013 outrage against homosexuality, promiscuity, contraception or cussing, for example, appears viscerally felt, whereas those with (ironically) more personal freedom in such matters tend to be less prone to shock-horror at such things, while being at least as opposed to murder, torture and dishonesty.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The Fallacy of the Stolen Concept was coined by Ayn Rand, to point out the absurdity of arguing against a position when the argument depends upon that position \u2013 setting up a kind of indirect (and hence not so obviously … Continue reading