Upright BiPed has been proposing what he has called a “semiotic” theory of Intelligent Design, for a while, which I have found confusing, to say the least. However, he is honing his case, and asks Nick Matzke…
…these three pertinent questions regarding the existence of information within a material universe:
- In this material universe, is it even conceivably possible to record transferable information without utilizing an arrangement of matter in order to represent that information? (by what other means could it be done?)
- If 1 is true, then is it even conceivably possible to transfer that information without a second arrangement of matter (a protocol) to establish the relationship between representation and what it represents? (how could such a relationship be established in any other way?)
- If 1 and 2 are true, then is it even conceivably possible to functionally transfer information without the irreducibly complex system of these two arrangements of matter (representations and protocols) in operation?
… which I think clarify things a little.
I think I can answer them, but would anyone else like to have a go? (I’m out all day today).
I thought observations were immaterial! The mind is not the brain and all that.
dtheobold,
A condensed version of the argument is available on this thread here:
Upright BiPed,
Well, that wasn’t so simple or concise, but can I assume that your point is this:
(1) Genomic DNA is a biological version of information.
(2) To explain genomic DNA we need a mechanism that can explain the information found in the genome.
?
Upright BiPed,
You are not using the term “transfer” then as it is used in “information” technology.
I can download a file and never use it, and therefore never create the “effect” of the “information” but in this case, a protocol was required for the transfer.
You’ve just said that I can create the object containing information with a template, and no protocol is required until I want to “use” the information.
You are also wrong about “translation”, which does not necessitate a protocol at all.
To listen to a vinyl record, a needle is physically moved.
There is no “protocol” as the receiver does not “interpret” the needle movement in an “information” related way, it is simply physically moved.
As far as a template duplication of “information”, no semiotic mechanism was used.
Upright BiPed,
Exactly!
You were claiming a contradiction was made by Reciprocating Bill but there was none.
If it rains,..the ground will be wet.
If the ground is wet, …it doesn’t mean that rain did it.
There was no contradiction.
Nothing you are saying here really relates very well to the argument I made. Which leads me to assume that you did not understand my argument.
But let me address the points you make here, and maybe that will help you understand my actual argument.
All physical laws in combination (and the stochasticities inherent in / related to them) are responsible, of course! Do you seriously suggest that the letter “a” could represent the “ahh” sound without the action of these physical laws (operating in sound waves, the application of ink on paper, human brains, etc.)?
No, of course not. A representation can be arbitrary in relation to any number of physical phenomena (like, e.g. the amplitude of the sound it represents). But that doesn’t mean it is arbitrary in relation to ALL phenomena. In fact, if it were arbitrary in relation to ALL physical phenomena, it would not be a representation in any meaningful sense of the word! And physical/material phenomena are, as far as I can tell, governed by physical law (and stochasticity). I.e. since a representation must be non-arbitrary in relation to at least some physical phenomena, it is non-arbitrary in relation to physical law governing these phenomena.
I see we’ve reached the point where the IDiot argument is in a smoking shambles, so the IDiot declares victory while scuttling for the door.
UB:
Again demonstrating that you don’t grasp the relationship of “entailment.” Entailment may be 100% reliable, yet by itself does not “confirm.”
A claim that 1) repeats your misapplication and misunderstanding of “entailment,” and 2) is wholly unsupported, with the exception of instances in which you have defined semiosis as “that which demonstrates the entailments of recorded information.”
In requesting your definition of “semiotic” I am requesting a description of what “semiotic” entails that “transfer of recorded information” does not entail. If nothing, why invoke it? If something, than what?
As I stated above, my position in this discussion is that your reasoning is fatally flawed. One doesn’t demonstrate flawed reasoning by means of empirical observations. So, no, my argument doesn’t represent the empirical methods I hold as scientific.
UB downstream:
Only if you assume the following conclusion: “the entailments in the presented argument arise only by means of a semiotic state or process.”
Of course, how complex systems exhibiting these relationships arose is the issue at hand. Contemporary biology holds that these systems arose across history as a result of non-semiotic processes, as there are no actors wielding signs and symbols behind that history. And, as before, that is simply to state a starting assumption. How those processes originated absent agents and actors then becomes an empirical question, not one that can be decided in an armchair shuffling dictionary definitions.
Your aim has been to establish that biology’s position must be mistaken, and that (although you remain coy about this) such actors must have been present. But you do so by going up the down staircase of entailment, and assuming your conclusions.
UBP:
I think I made it quite clear that you are mistaken in your belief that catalysis is not possible without protein. Clearly, I am not suggesting that the early products of the ribosome (which is itself catalytic RNA) were catalytic proteins mediating their own synthesis. Proteins have many functions, and I did give grounds for believing that protein catalysis is impossible without a ‘library’ of different acid types. But that is not the same as saying that catalysis, and hence life, is impossible. Until that threshold is reached, catalysis can only be the job of RNA, and any peptides produced would be non-catalytic – still functional, just not for catalytic function. Once catalytic peptide production becomes possible, there is good reason to consider that prior RNA-catalytic function has been replaced by the superior protein catalysts – including roles in the very system that produces those same peptides. This is a potential answer to any IC system – AC may not be able to arise directly, but can arise from AB -> ABC -> AC. Once B is lost, we cannot ‘prove’ it ever existed.
No, I really think you are just missing the point. That you should mention abiogenesis at all demonstrates that you are implacably determined to insist that protein synthesis, in the ribosomal manner, was present at the OoL: the First Cell was a protein factory. This is not advanced by any biochemist to my knowledge, but only by non-biochemists who have simply decided, without any obvious deep understanding of the many issues involved, that the system had no precursor.
It is not necessary that catalysis be carried out by proteins. This fact is most centrally borne out by the fact that the ribosome itself uses RNA catalysis, not protein catalysis. This is a fact that in itself requires explanation, and the RNA World hypothesis certainly provides one possible explanation of that fact.
Your argument does go away when there is a single acid, being attached by a ribosome to a peptide chain. So, to evade that possibility, you simply point to the undisputed fact that no known life forms have a tRNA library with a single member. Yet you have no biochemically-based argument for dismissal of consideration of precursor systems, only its inconvenience for your theory. “We (the non-biochemists) take the work that the biochemists have done to determine the code [the first step, incidentally, being to determine that polyuracil produced polyphenylalanine – I was making a reference to the history of biochemistry, not the history of life], and we close our ears to any and all further work that the biochemists have done. We have never seen a ribosome, would not know one end of a tRNA molecule from another, have no idea how things actually hang together or are related, but it all looks jolly complicated to us. Unless they can produce a working RNA-based life form, THEN evolve a functional ribosome-based peptide-synthetic machinery from it, THEN expand the initial limited code into its current state – that we INSIST is semiotic – then I’m afraid the biochemists have nothing further to say that may interest us. Good Day.”
By all means pose questions, and wholeheartedly disagree if you feel so moved, but don’t make the mistake of assuming that the ‘experts’ are up to something, or have not thought through the implications of their subject. I am, as I have said to many on your side, genuinely interested in locating ‘correct’ answers to these kinds of question – I have no preferred one. My ‘position’ is entirely neutral – my worldview would readily accommodate a 20-acid code in that shadowy First Cell, if such were satisfactorily demonstrated. But simply drawing a veil over the ‘event horizon’ that is LUCA is intellectually lazy IMO.
A ribosome is more than catalytic RNA. And if you want to say proteins can be synthesized without a ribosome, then it is up tp you to propose and test the alternative.
There have been claims of “natural” sound recordings. Can’t remember the details. There are also numerous instances of natural sound producers that have the same physical properties as phonographs and needles.
On a related tangent — has anyone read this?
Yes, I brought it up earlier and no one seems to care.
Joe G,
What do you think of their work? Do you think it supports Intelligent Design theory?
I think their work is interesting- it is what it is. And all work supports ID.
Joe G,
How can all work support ID?
And Baraminology!
Because we wouldn’t exist if not by design. Therefor our existence and everything we do, supports ID.
Not necessarilly.
Joe G,
With that I agree, but ID proponents such as like Stephen Meyer and William Dembsk believe that “Neo-Darwinian” theory is not compatible with Intelligent Design theory or their understanding of Christian theology, Thus I find odd for you to disagree with this common assumption on the part of ID theorists.
…and caek! Don’t forget the CSI in caek!
What is this alleged disagreement?
And another cheerleader chokes on cake. That reminds me:
Just when you thought it couldn’t get any better, I give you Thorton, the amazing EvoTard and its incredible math/ information formulation:
tardtard had sed:
I didn’t understand that as each nucleotide = 2 bits. 4 possible nucleotides = 2^2 = 2 bits. So, to me, a gene with 32 base pairs would have the information carrying capacity of 64 bits.
Back to tardtard. So I asked it about its math. tardtard responded with:
That is so wrong it is pathetic. tardtard is proud to be an ignorant piece of shit liar.
So according to thorton if I have 32 bits of information and someone gives me 32 more bits of information, I only have 6 bits of information.
Thanks for the continued entertainment thorton. Now I understand why you won’t support your position.
actually it reminds me:
Joe Gallien: One way of figuring out how much information it (an object) contains is to figure out how (the simplest way) to make it.
Then you write down the procedure without wasting words/ characters and count those bits.
That will give you an idea of the minimal information it contains.
I say that because all the information that goes into making something is therefor contained by it.
And if you already have the instructions and want to measure the information?
Again just count the bits in the instructions.
For example a cake would, at a minimum, contain all the information in the recipe.
I’m reminded of this one where Joe was making physical threats to people, and when asked where he could be found gave out the address of an empty parking lot.
Joe Gallien: “The same place I have lived for years.
If you want to visit me I can be found at 550 Main St in Keene, NH. Just ask for Joe G.”
Who would have though such an internet tough guy would turn out to be a fat, soft Fluffy bear?
SQUEEEEEEEEEEE!!
D1 – D3 are still quite negotiable. Someone just needs to come up with a better explanation for the centuries’ worth of positive evidence they have amassed.
D4 applies to all fields of science, not just evolutionary theory.
Is Dembski groveling already to please his new bosses at the Southern Evangelical Seminary?
The good people over at UD can explain this to you. This thread would be a good place to start: Bill Dembski asks, Is Darwinism theologically neutral – at BioLogos (= Christians for Darwin).
But why am I telling you this? Are you not a UD regular?
Joe:
Yes, but its proteins perform a structural, not a catalytic, role. That role is not optional in the modern system, but that is no reason to insist that it therefore non-optional in any equivalent system. Fully protein-free catalytic RNAs exist – for example the spliceosome.
Me personally? I would pass your concerns on to people who have the equipment, but I suspect they already know what they need to do.
Well, I did discuss it briefly, but it is strictly tangential to the genetic ‘code’/semiosis argument. (Note, in passing, that the topic is not about how ‘IC’ the complete system might be, but to what extent it is ‘semiotic’). The genetic code method for generating protein involves a relationship that UBP and many others see as symbolic, and in that context, any method for protein synthesis that does not involve that apparent symbolism – such as the generation of peptides before a working ribosome was made, which includes the possibility of an ‘ID ribosome’ – is not strictly part of the argument, since we do not know how specification was achieved.
But while this is tangential to the symbolic argument, it is less tangential to the broader ID/science ‘debate’. Joe brought up this work in order to argue against the RNA world – but it is based upon methodologies in which (many) ID proponents do not believe. It relies upon Common Descent; it looks at evolutionary history as it is inferred from the traces that remain; it points to a (non-ID) origin of the modern protein synthesis system from a non-ribosomal precursor.
And at this point, we get the usual monotonous responses: “ID is not anti-evolution; all YOU have to do is show the system evolving, etc etc”. And once I’ve heard that a few (dozen) times, I might as well say “f*** off”. Yawn, yawn, yawn. Insofar as it is (mistakenly, IMO) seen to advance the ID cause, papers such as this are trumpeted from the rooftops. Yet about everything else that is published, we never hear a peep, nor do we ever see bunfights about different interpretations within the ID framework, contrast the hot debate that characterises much ‘other’ scientific work.
Strange that I provided a reference taht suports what I said and all you can do is choke on it.
LoL! The only people who say I threatened anyone are evo-cowards that have a reason to feel guilty.
Hey if you cannot make your case then why bother?
Allan,
I get it. You have no idea what ID is nor what it claims. Also you have no idea on how to test the claims of your position- Universal Common Descent being one of them.
Joe:
Allan,
I get it. You have no idea what ID is nor what it claims.
It appears to claim that somewhere, sometime, just out of reach of any analytical tools that we may be able to apply, one or more Designers were probably involved.
Also you have no idea on how to test the claims of your position- Universal Common Descent being one of them.
Well, you might want to reconsider using that RNP paper to support your simultaneous RNA-protein-OoL position, then. It is entirely based upon phylogenetic analysis. That thing you say is untestable is a central assumption of such work – which, like all such work, provides further indirect confirmation of the likelihood of UCD. That is, if something other than UCD were governing the patterns, they would be statistically highly unlikely to be capable of arrangement in phylogenetic trees, which paper after paper after paper does, for element after element, structurally, sequentially, you-name-it-ally.
Allan,
YOUR poistion appears to claim that somewhere, sometime, just out of reach of any analytical tools that we may be able to apply, random shit produced teh diversity of life.
And Allan, you have no idea what pattern UCD would produce.
You’re right — not only was that a baseless insult, it was also really lame. I’m sorry.
As for your challenge involving information, the recording and transferring thereof, representations, and protocols, I would have to know how broadly you define those terms. Without operational definitions, a prolonged semantic runaround seems inevitable.
.
RB suggests that I do not understand what an “entailment” is, even after I used the word properly in a statement, then stated that I was using the word in its standard sense, then immediately quoted the Merriam-Webster definition of the word, then restated my original statement using the Merriam-Webster definition in place of the word itself, and it just so happened to fit coherently in the same position within the sentence and evoked the same meaning.
What is incorrect about the Merriam-Webster definition, he does not say.
Then he suggests that the physical entailments of recorded information cannot confirm the existence of a semiotic state. This is the crux of his objection. He says that an “Entailment may be 100% reliable, yet by itself does not “confirm.”
What this entailment is 100% reliable at, he does not say. Are there things it isn’t reliable at, while other things it is? The answer, he does not say. How it is 100% reliable, he does not say. What it cannot confirm, he does not say. Why it cannot confirm whatever it is claimed to confirm, he does not say.
So in one instance we cannot use a standard dictionary as a reliable guide in the definition of terms, and in another instance, we are left to simply assume the validity of his claims since he will not support them. He’s even indicated that he doesn’t have to support his claim, given that he also claims it stands on its own. And throughout all of this, he repeats the allegation that his argument has not been understood, by me.
These are tactical peculiarities which are neither found nor required by my argument.
Semiosis is a descriptive word used to indicate the use of representations and symbols within a process. If a process is said to operate in a semiotic state, then the phrase “semiotic state” is an indicator that representations and symbols are used within that process. If a person who is familiar with the term is told that a process is “semiotic” or that it operates in a “semiotic state”, that person will immediately understand that the process includes the use of representations and symbols. This is neither ambiguous nor controversial.
The semiotic argument makes the claim that the transfer of recorded information is semiotic by necessity. Supporting the argument is the premise that transferring recorded information must have material consequences which can be observed. Observations of these material consequences are provided from various sources within the natural world (humans, animals, insects, and information processing systems). A list of four material consequences are then generalized and presented as a list of physical entailments by which the transfer of recorded information can be confirmed to exist. As before, I am using the word entailment in its standard sense; to impose as a necessary result (Merriam-Webster). These physical entailments are a necessary result of recorded information transfer. They include the use of matter as a medium to carry the information in a representational form, and also the use of matter as a means to actualize those representations into their material effect.
RB states that it is a flaw to claim that the entailments of information (either right or wrong he says) are a reliable indicator of a semiotic state. He claims that other processes could mimic these physical entailments, which are not themselves semiotic, and therefore make the claim false. What these other processes are, of course, he does not say.
In contrast, I have no problem providing observations and rationale which support my claim, even in abbreviated form.
Recorded information exists. The etymology of the word “information” revolves around the Latin verb informare; to give form, to in-form. A more contemporary interpretation is ‘a pattern which can cause an effect within a system’. Information conveys form about something which can cause a particular effect as a result of that conveyance. The means of the conveyance is necessarily material, and therefore must have material consequences.
To transfer form about something requires a material capacity to do so. Observation demonstrates that the capacity to transfer form about something through a material medium is facilitated by the transfer of a representation of that form instantiated in an arrangement of matter. This is complimented by a mechanism allowing a particular material representation to produce a particular effect within a system. The introduction of a representation into a physical system necessitates the physical establishment of arbitrary relationships between objects within that system. Representations are arbitrary to the form they represent because the medium they are transferred by is not the form they represent to the system. Observation also demonstrates that the arbitrary relationship (between the representation and its effect) is established by a second arrangement of matter within the system. This second arrangement of matter (referred to as a protocol in the argument) provides a mechanism by which the material (but arbitrary) representation can induce an effect based upon its material arrangement.
A physical dynamic therefore exist between these material objects as a result of the arbitrary representation. That observed dynamic is that neither the representation nor the protocol ever becomes the effect, while together they determine what the effect will be. This dynamic is the necessary result of having a material effect determined by an arbitrary element within the system; it allows the establishment of an arbitrary relationship within a system otherwise operating by purely material forces. The material effect is induced by the representation while maintaining its arbitrary nature.
Finally, there is a fourth observation (beyond that of representations, protocols, and their dynamic relationships) which is provided as a means to confirm the transfer of recorded information. That fourth element is the unambiguous observation of a functional effect being produced. Without that effect, we could not know with any confidence that any particular arrangement of matter was a representation of anything; we could not know that any particular arrangement of matter established an arbitrary relationship between two separate things. Only by the observation of a functional effect can the relationships of these other objects become discernible.
As stated earlier, RB’s counter-argument is that another process could mimic these material consequences, but he does not say what that process is. He refuses to do so.
If such a process exists, it must include a material effect being produced by two material objects, where neither of the material objects becomes the effect. One of the material objects must induce the effect based upon its material arrangement, not merely its material presence within the system. The other object must then establish what effect will be produced from that particular arrangement, while remaining materially isolated from the effect being produced.
RB’s objection claims that a material process could satisfy each of these material entailments, but not be semiotic itself. In other words, he proposes that the incredibly unique material consequences as observed in all semiotic systems – the very objects and relationships which make a semiotic system even possible – are also demonstrated by non-semiotic processes. If that is true, then we can say that the material consequences which we observe as a result of every instance of information transfer (among all humans, and all insects, and all animals, and in all information processing machinery) are also observably evident in the processing of genetic information – but, the processing of genetic information is somehow different than all the others, even though the material consequences are precisely the same. In short, one process is semiotic and the other is not, regardless of the material observations.
In prior exchanges on this objection, I have asked a simple question: “If in one instance we have a thing that actually is a symbolic representation, and in another we have something that just appears to be a symbolic representation – then someone can surely look at the physical evidence and point out the distinction between the two”. That question is one that no one has attempted to answer. But now RB has gone one step better. He has decided he doesn’t have to point out a material distinction, because he claims that such a distinction needn’t even exist. Apparently, all that is required is to assert that one could exist, and then the content of the argument can be safely avoided.
This is the level at which this material evidence must be resisted. But it does beg the question. We find the same exact material consequences in regard to genetic information that we find in every single instance of recorded information transfer ever observed. What it is within the material evidence that compels us to believe that the same material consequences which we find demonstrated in all semiotic systems, does not demonstrate a semiotic system when we find those same exact material consequences in regard to genetic information?
Of course, there is nothing whatsoever in these observations that compels us to believe this. The value of the assertion is manifest in its result, as thoroughly demonstrated here by Reciprocating Bill himself – the avoidance of evidence.
I have moved a couple of posts to Guano. The rules are here. Implementation isn’t entirely consistent, and I’m at least partly motivated by whether a borderline violation is likely to seriously affect the course of the discussion.
I’m being a bit stricter than usual here, because I think there is a deep gulf in mutual understanding between Upright BiPed and those of us who disagree with him, and I think that if that gulf is to be bridged, an extraordinary degree of patience will be required on both sides, as well as close attention to what the other side is saying.
Scoffing and sarcasm can only hinder.
Cheers
Lizzie
Upright Biped
Semiosis is a descriptive word used to indicate the use of representations and symbols within a process. If a process is said to operate in a semiotic state, then the phrase “semiotic state” is an indicator that representations and symbols are used within that process. If a person who is familiar with the term is told that a process is “semiotic” or that it operates in a “semiotic state”, that person will immediately understand that the process includes the use of representations and symbols.
The chemical pathway of DNA to protein doesn’t use representations or symbols.
A physical dynamic therefore exist between these material objects as a result of the arbitrary representation.
The chemical pathway of DNA to protein doesn’t use any arbitrary representation.
In prior exchanges on this objection, I have asked a simple question: “If in one instance we have a thing that actually is a symbolic representation, and in another we have something that just appears to be a symbolic representation – then someone can surely look at the physical evidence and point out the distinction between the two”.
The chemical pathway of DNA to protein doesn’t appear to be a symbolic representation to those who have studied and understand genetics. The map still isn’t the territory, no matter how desperately you wish it to be.
What it is within the material evidence that compels us to believe that the same material consequences which we find demonstrated in all semiotic systems, does not demonstrate a semiotic system when we find those same exact material consequences in regard to genetic information?
“all fish have fins
whales have fins
therefore whales are fish”
Your claim still entails a basic logical fallacy. As such it is still invalid.
Upright BiPed, it seems to me that your impression that we are “avoiding evidence” is founded on a misunderstanding of the points being made to you.
Nobody is “avoiding evidence”. What we are trying to engage is your concept of “semiosis” in the context of a system in which there is no obvious sender and receiver of information.
I attempted to lay out a possible way forward here.
I’d be grateful for a response to that post.
There is a rather nice Douglas Hofstadter article in Scientific American from 1982 (collected in “Metamagical Themas”) in which he explores much of the ground of interest here – to what extent the “code” is a Code, how arbitrary it is, and what, in any sense, ‘knows’ the code. He’s a mathematician, AI and consciousness enthusiast and lover of the self-referential, so he’s inclined towards the ‘informatic’ picture of the actual biochemical workings. He’s an engaging companion (“One might regard DNA as a big, fat, lazy, cigar-smoking slob of a molecule”), but reaches a somewhat debateable conclusion in the article.
What does him loads of favours is his delight in a post-script on post-publication correspondence when someone (Maurice Guerin) uses one of his own favourite arguments against him, to convince him that his naive view of the informatics was … ummm … naive.
“It just goes to show you that if you dare knock existing establishments […] thus setting yourself up as a proponent of a rebellious disestablishmentarianism, you can be sure that someone […] will come back and blow your points out of [the] water, one by one, with arguments inspired by a conservative but highly flexible [antidisestablishmentarianism].
Guerin’s point was that there are multiple candidates for the term ‘code’, and even the same sequence can produce an entirely different representation depending on circumstances, many of which are much more clearly non-symbolic.
The fundamental code as far as nucleic acid interaction is concerned is strict base pairing. A-T and C-G. That’s it. The physical shape and charge of A constrains pairing to T, and vice versa, likewise C and G.
‘Above’ that, proteins bind to particular sequences with chemical affinity – the shape and charge of the sequence, particularly that which is presented to the major groove, determine what binds where.
What does this ‘code’ for: ->TATAATGATGCCG->? Simplistically, one would get out one’s lookup table and say ‘Tyr-Asn-Asp-Ala -and-a-bit-left-over’. But frame shifted one bit and it’s ‘(the-end-of-something-)-Ile-Met-Cys-Pro’. Shift two bits and its ‘(two-bits-)-STOP-(rubbish that is not preceded by a START so won’t be translated). ‘. Completely different (or no) peptides.
That sequence also ‘codes’ for <-ATATTACTACGGC<-, at least in DNA. Note that the arrows have been reversed – you can only transcribe and translate in one direction, so the uninverted complement of TATAATGATGCCG, will not give you a peptide sequence starting Ile (ATA), even if it aligns on a triplet boundary. The antisense sequence (which is perfectly capable of giving you a protein) is actually ->CGGCATCATTATA-> – three more different possible peptides from the same sequence, making six different ways in all. And, indeed, the SAME sequence can give peptides to both sense and antisense transcripts, and/or overlapping, frame-shifted transcripts in the same direction.
Going back to our original sequence, TATAAT is actually the ‘Pribnow box’ – one of several signals that indicate (not by semaphore, but by binding:D) where transcription should start. There are also such signals for translation.
So, we have up to 6 possible peptides, a set of ‘typographical’ signals that may affect either transcription or transcription, plus the chromatin state of the sequence, plus the status of any upstream/downstream activators and repressors – again, these operate by direct binding upon the physical substrate that we represent as symbols.
That’s all that’s going on here. We can represent this physical interaction symbolically. I have lapsed into ‘semiotic’ language at several points in this, but that is simply metaphorical usage. We can also email a DNA sequence and a lab can create an oligonucleotide and send it to another lab that can translate it one of 6 different ways by insertion into a translated region (with potentially massive effects on the result) in a test tube or in vivo. But none of this makes the system itself symbolic.
DNA is transcribed (metaphorically) by base pairing. The mRNA-ribosome complex physically holds two tRNA molecules together, again by base pairing, enhancing the condensation reaction between them. That is the fundamental spec of ribosomal synthesis, which could be achieved, as I said, by ratcheting along a poly-U/poly-A/poly-C/poly-G mRNA, with just one flavour of tRNA. The fact that it now ratchets along a multi-base mRNA and achieves an equally repeatable and much more flexible result, does not change the chemical territory.
The chemical pathway of DNA to protein doesn’t appear to be a symbolic representation to those who have studied and understand genetics.
Perhaps but they cannot account transcription/ translation by appealing to materialistic processes.
When my grandson builds something out of Lego blocks, is that a semiotic process?
It seems to me that the use of proteins by growing organisms is more like the building of something out of Lego blocks that it is like the transmission of a TV program over the wires.
UB:
“RB suggests that I do not understand what an ‘entailment’ is…”
Correct. I assert (not suggest) that you do not understand entailment, and due to your failure to grasp entailment you have constructed an argument beset with a fatal logical flaw.
“Then he suggests that the physical entailments of recorded information cannot confirm the existence of a semiotic state. This is the crux of his objection. He says that an “Entailment may be 100% reliable, yet by itself does not ‘confirm.'”
Correct. Entailment may be 100% reliable, yet by itself the presence of that which is entailed does not confirm. That is the crux of the biscuit. If you understood entailment, you would understand that statement. The fact that you understand neither is evidenced by your follow-on questions.
“What this entailment is 100% reliable at, he does not say.”
Sure I have. Some entailment maybe 100% reliable. Being a bachelor entails being male with 100% certainty. A entails B with 100% reliability, by definition in this case. In the present instance I am counting your “listed entailments” among those that are 100% reliable for the sake of argument. Specifically, I grant for the sake of argument that “a semiotic state” entails your “listed impairments” with 100% certainty. A entails B with 100% reliability.
“What it cannot confirm, he does not say.”
Sure I have, as have several others. It does not follow from “A entails B” that “B entails A.” Therefore B cannot confirm A. One cannot confirm bachelorhood solely by determining that a person is male.
Yet your entire argument turns on the analogous claim that because your “listed entailments” are observed in every instance of the necessarily semiotic transfer of recorded information, it follows that the presence of your entailments “successfully confirms” the presence of a semiotic state. That, obviously, exhibits the logical error “A entails B, therefore B entails A.” The presence of your entailments “successfully confirms” the presence of a semiotic state only if you assume your conclusion that only semiotic processes can generate physical systems displaying your listed entailments. As a logical demonstration of the necessity of semiosis in the transcription of DNA your argument fails.
As for evidence for my position: recall that my position is that your argument is fatally logically flawed. Evidence for my argument is the defective reasoning found in your most recent post, as well as many of your previous posts.
By the way, what does a “semiotic state” entail that “the transfer of recorded information” does not? If nothing, then why invoke it? If something, then what?
Your recapitulation of your thoughts on semiosis doesn’t speak to this simple question.
The system need not “know” the code any more than hydrogen and oxygen “know” that if they combine in a 2:1 ratio that water will result.
It is UB’s intrinsic claim that ‘the code’ was “written”. But other than strained analogies and misinterpretations of scientific concepts (such as the role of aminoacyl synthetases), I see nothing but unnecessarily verbose face-saving.
Your observations seem irrelevant to the claims you want to claim are absolutely true. I find your claims re: aminoacyl synthetases to be particularly comical, for I had read your misrepresentation of their role get exposed on another forum (a forum which you have not, most interestingly, returned to since).
Right – so because one “new” aspect of your overall claim does not have Abel written all over it, your claims have nothing to do with Abel’s nonsense. OK.
Yes, but what I do not agree with is the notion that this information had to have a “writer.”
A “materially isolated protocol”? Interesting use of metaphorical language, no doubt intended to be taken literally. This is my primary argument against your unyielding series of assertions.
EXACTLY! ALL ID arguments, at some level, boil down to strained arguments via analogy.
How many people have pointed out your beginner’s logic flaw to you? 10? 20? And you still don’t get it.
Very nice summary.
<i>I see we’ve reached the point where the IDiot argument is in a smoking shambles, so the IDiot declares victory while scuttling for the door.</i>
A very common antic of the IDC movement elite.